

RULES FOLDER

STRUGGLE OF NATIONS

AVALON HILL'S TRADEMARK NAME FOR ITS NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGN GAME
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**an Historical Simulation of
The War of German
Liberation—
Napoleon's Spring and
Autumn Campaigns
in Saxony—
1813**



The Struggle of Nations

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Out of this universal feast of death,
out of this extremity of fever
kindling the rain-washed evening sky to
a fiery glow,
may it be that Love one day shall mount?
—Thomas Mann, *The Magic Mountain*

She tried the little golden key in the
lock, and to her great delight it fitted!
Alice opened the door and found that it
led into a small passage, not much
larger than a rat-hole; she knelt down
and looked along the passage into
the loveliest garden you ever saw.
How she longed to get out of
that dark hall, and wander
about among those beds of
bright flowers and those
cool fountains, but she
could not even get her
head through the
doorway; “and even
if my head would go
through, thought poor
Alice, “it would be of
very little use without my
shoulders.” There seemed to
be no use in waiting by the little
door, so she went back to the table,
half hoping she might find another
key on it, or at any rate a book of
rules for shutting people up like
telescopes: this time she found a little
bottle on it (“which certainly was not here
before,” said Alice), and tied round the neck
of the bottle was a paper label with the words
“DRINK ME”
beautifully printed on it in large letters.
—Lewis Carroll

ONE. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

"Do not forget that Europe needs peace—France above all wants nothing but peace." —Berthier to Metternich at the French Court, 26th June 1813.

By 1813, every French soldier, from the lowliest private to the highest-ranking official in the Administration, began to recognize Napoleon himself as the greatest obstacle to an agreement with the Allies, who for their part found the idea of a continued Napoleonic reign intolerable. Thus, just when the expansion of the theatre of operations made Napoleon's presence at the vital point not always possible, the motivation of the troops beyond his vicinity was lower than ever.


As in 1812, vast distances were the greatest enemy

of Napoleon, and careful maneuvering at the fringes of the theatre prohibited him from concentrating his army until it was too late.

A lack of cavalry in the Spring, and the collapse of the French Administrative System (causing hunger and disease among the French troops and the civilian population) in the late Autumn, were combined with those problems of morale and scale to render a French victory even less likely.

All the same the Allied troops (particularly the Prussian Landwehr and the Austrians) were hardly less inclined to report sick or run away whenever possible, and as one would expect, their leadership consisted of a tired and anachronistic nobility, who really had few other prerogatives for exercising their rank besides military command.

SEMANTIC NETWORK (General Course of Play)



The above diagram shows the **Administrative** Rules as the top of an incompletely-articulated hierarchy. In function, they regulate the pace of activities in the game, through their effect on March Attrition and Communications, while only Communications, can have a reciprocal effect on the amount of Administrative Points: as the **Line of Communications** increases in length, the **APs Received** drop off, (also reduced by **Morale**) and if the Line of Communications is broken, no new APs can be added.

To continue through the Semantic Network: the **Center of Operations** is a playing piece moved on the map; there is only one per army. The **LOC** is traced from the Supply Source to this piece (or to a depot). It is the center of Administration on the map, and its function is to convert the stock of APs, when needed, to **Movement Commands**. However, the more the AP stock is depleted, the greater will be the March Attrition suffered by the army. **March Attrition** is simply a non-combat loss of Combat Strength by the units on the Organization Display; it will serve to limit the length of marches.

Movement Commands are used to induce Movement. Each force a Player wishes to move must either receive a Movement Command—to do this the Leader

of that force must be within **Dispatch Distance** of the Center of Opns—or attempt to move under his own **Initiative**, which is resolved by a die roll (modified by cavalry and morale). A Player may expend an additional Movement Command for a Force, enabling it to make an **Extended March** of up to 4 Movement Points; while **Forced March** occurs in a separate Forced March Phase during the Enemy Player Turn, only under Initiative.

The **Leadership** rules govern everything having to do with the constitution of a Force on the map. Each such Force is Commanded by one Leader, who may have subordinate Leaders in his force, depending upon his **Command Span** and how much of that number is taken up by the other Leaders' Subordination Ratings. By this means, the **Size of the Force** is limited (an upper **Stacking Limit** is also imposed) and the size, so determined, has an effect on how much Attrition the force will suffer.

The **Movement** rules explain how a force expends Movement Points from its **Movement Allowance**; these expenditures vary with the **Terrain Type**, each of which has its own MP cost. The ultimate **Distance of March** (the number of MPs expended in one Phase) will help determine how much March Attrition that

force suffers.

The **Zone of Control** is simply the area of eight hexes surrounding a force (within certain limits of terrain). When a force enters the ZOC of an Enemy Force, **Combat** will ensue unless that Enemy Force is able to **Force March** out of the area, a question determined by an **Initiative** die roll (which is modified by the ratio of cavalry strength, and by comparison of opposing Leaders' Initiative Ratings).

Before Combat Resolution, **Artillery** may fire—a die roll modified by cavalry differential. The Combat procedure involves a die roll on the **Combat Results Table** (the column to use on this table is determined by **Terrain** Conditions). This die roll will specify a number of **Casualties** for one side and a Retreat for the other side (unless it is a **Pitched Battle**, in which case the Combat

die roll procedure is repeated by each side in alternation). The Player owning the defeated force Retreats that force along a path determined by a set of Retreat Priorities. The victorious player may then make **Pursuit** along the **Path of Retreat**. The extent of Pursuit is determined by a comparison of Leader Initiative (again modified by cavalry) and a die roll, and determines the Casualties of the retreating side.

If certain Leaders are forced to Retreat, there is an adjustment in **Morale** of one space, either positive for the Pursuing Player or negative for the Retreating Player, at the Pursuing Player's option. Morale determines chances for an **Armistice**. Morale and Weather alike have an effect on Initiative of Leaders whenever consulted.

That, in outline, is pretty much the whole game.

TWO. GAME EQUIPMENT


THE GAME MAP

The Game map shows the area of central Germany, primarily Saxony and parts of the surrounding states, in which the Campaign took place. (Fighting was also going on in Northern Italy and in Spain.) A field of hexagons has been superimposed upon the map to regularize the positioning of the units. The hexes are unnumbered; set-ups for the Scenarios are listed by town name, and the location of those towns involved in each scenario are shown on a reduced map printed on

the same pages.

The Game Map comes in three sections; the maps should be placed with the print reading the same way on each, and with the Western section to the left, the Eastern section to the right, and the Northern section above and aligned with the left edge of the Western section, as shown in the diagram.

Terrain types are shown on the terrain key (Charts & Tables Folder). Some types of terrain are divided into sub-categories of primary (abbreviated 1°) and secondary (2°).



GAME CHARTS, TABLES AND DISPLAYS

Various visual aids are provided for the Players in order to simplify and illustrate certain game functions. There are three displays on heavy paper stock: French and Allied Organization Displays, and Turn Record/Reinforcement Track. All Charts, Tables and Matrices are printed on two identical folded sheets (provided separately). The Chart Sheet includes: Weather Table, Bridge Destruction & Repair Table, Morale Change Table, Administrative Point Pool, Communications Table, French Depots, Initiative Comparison Matrix, Attrition Quotient Matrix, March Attrition Table, Terrain Key & Effects, Artillery Fire Table, Combat Results Table, Pursuit


Table and Armistice Table. The use of these tables is explained in the text of the rules, and in some cases with the Tables themselves.

THE PLAYING PIECES

There are three categories of Playing Pieces: Combat Units, are placed on the Organization Display in track spaces which indicate the force they are in and their strength (while concealing their strengths from the Enemy Player). Leaders, which represent the larger formations and show their location on the map (also sometimes placed on the Organization Display), and Utility Counters, including Center of Operations, Fortress Markers, and Bridging Condition Markers.

Every combat unit has one counter, which has no Combat Strength printed on it, as this Strength is variable. The Strength of each Combat Unit is recorded by its location in one space on the Organization Display; thus, if it is currently in a space with the large numeral "3", its Strength is three Strength Points (3,000 men). Units above the strength of 10 are inverted and placed in the space corresponding to their strength in excess of ten. For example, an inverted unit in the "3" space would have a strength of 13. To change a unit's strength, move it up or down the scale. No unit may exceed its Scenario Starting strength—in the Campaign Game, use the highest scenario strength as the maximum. If reduced to zero Strength Points (SPs) the unit is "eliminated" and removed from the display. Abbreviated names of Generals of Brigade or Division are printed on the counter for historical reference—further OB information is provided in the Scenario Folder.

Sample Organization Display




Sample Leader Marker




Combat Bonus (if any)

Sample Combat Unit




Summary of Unit Types



Summary of Track Markers



Summary of Leader Types



Summary of Utility Counters



GAME EQUIPMENT INVENTORY

A complete game of Struggle of Nations includes the following parts:

- Game Map in three sections
- Organization Displays in two large sheets
- Charts & Tables in two sheets
- Turn Record/Reinforcement Track
- One Rules Folder
- One Scenario Folder
- Die Cut Counters in two sheets (180 and 260 pieces respectively)

If any of these parts are missing or damaged, write:
 Replacement Parts

The Avalon Hill Game Company

4517 Harford Road
 Baltimore, MD 21214

Color Codes, French

Medium Blue
 Purple
 Brown
 Red
 Light Blue

Color Codes, Allied

White
 Green
 Dark Blue
 Magenta
 Yellow
 Orange

Nationality

French Line
 French Guard
 German
 Polish
 French March Regt

Nationality

Austrian
 Russian
 Prussian
 Swedish
 Allied March Regt
 Allied Leaders, unspecified

Unit Size Symbols

XX = Division, X = Brigade, III = Regiment

RULES QUESTIONS

Rules Questions will be answered if 1) Phrased to be answered in a one-word reply, and 2) accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope. Send Questions to the above address, marked "Rules Questions: Struggle of Nations."

You will find that the process of finding the right way of expressing your game questions is an exercise which will most often lead you to discover the correct answer for yourself. If you find a convincing answer in

this way, submitting a written question may not be necessary.

GAME SCALE

The scale of the map is 1:400,000. Each 8mm hex represents an area 3.2 kilometers (2 miles) across. The manpower strength of a unit is shown in thousands (each Strength Point equals 1000 men), and each Game-Turn represents an average of two days real time.

THREE. GLOSSARY (Definition of Terms)

Administrative Points (APs) are allotted to the armies on a turn-by-turn basis. Admin. Points are used to create Movement Commands, and the level of accumulated APs helps to determine the severity of march attrition suffered by forces of that army.

Bonus Point is given to some Leaders. This is indicated on the Leader's Track by a star (★). Leaders with a Bonus Point may affect the die roll for Combat and Attrition.

Only forces in citadels may be **Besieged**; this occurs if any enemy force is adjacent, and the force in the citadel has chosen to avoid combat.

Combat Strength is the basic, current attacking or defending power of a unit, quantified in Combat Strength Points. The units which may have a Combat Strength are known as Combat Units.

Commander or Commanding Leader is a Leader who has at least one Leader currently subordinate to him in his force, in addition to the Combat Units, which together are placed on his Track on the Organization Display. The total number of leaders which may be commanded is dependent upon the Commander's Command Span, and the Subordination Ratings of the Combat Units and of the Leaders on his Track. (Subordination Ratings of Combat Units on subordinate Leaders' Tracks count only against those Leaders' own Command Spans.) A Commander may command Leaders in one package adjacent to his own location. Only those Leaders in the same or adjacent hexes at the beginning of any Phase or Segment may be commanded by a particular Commander.

Command Span is the second number on a Leader's Display and refers to his ability to effectively control and coordinate the activities of subordinate leaders and individual combat units—it is a numerical limit against which the subordination ratings of his force constituents are compared.

Dispatch Distance is the maximum length (in Movement Points) that a force may be from its Center of Operations and still receive a Movement Command. This Dispatch Distance also has an effect on determination of "Supply" (see below).

Extended March is when a force receives an extra Movement Command to enable it to move up to four additional Movement Points.

Force refers to all the subordinate Leaders and all the combat units under a single Commander. A force must consist of at least one Leader plus at least one combat or support unit. A force of more than one Leader has one Leader designated as its Commander. If none of the Leaders present has an adequate Command Span, the Leaders must be treated as separate forces, even if they are stacked in the same location. A force may include Leaders in hexes adjacent to the Commander.

Forced March is a March executed during the Forced March Segment, which occurs during the Enemy Combat Phase.

Formation is the historical name of the Corps which the Leader's HQ was known as. Provided for historical reference.

Fortress (sometimes shortened to "fort") refers to both Citadels and Fortified Towns together.

Friendly Territory is defined in section XIII, affects Length of Dispatch Distance, and causes the identity of French therein to be revealed (turn leader counters face-up). This is to be distinguished from "Occupied Territory" which applies to map area actually occupied at the beginning of the armistice, and is used in the Campaign Game only.

Initiative Rating is given to each Leader—the first number shown next to his name on the Organization Display. This is used to determine the ability of the Leader to move when the Player does not give it a Movement Command for its movement. It is also used to determine the ability of a Leader to pursue the Enemy after a successful Combat.

Installation: Supply Source, Depot, and Cent/Opns.

Leaders are represented by the named individual, rectangular counters and the Tracks on the Organization Display. The units on this track represent the combat strength of the force personally led by that Leader. The number of combat units each Leader may have on

his Track depends on his Command Span and the number of subordinate Leaders he has. The Leader counter always represents the combat units on the map.

Light Cavalry are all Kossacks and cavalry units designated as Light ("Lt.").

Line of Communications (LOC) is a line of Primary Road hexes traced from an Army's Center of Operations to its Supply Source.

March is a normal manner in which units move, carried out during a Friendly Movement Phase.

March Attrition is Combat Strength lost while marching and other non-combat losses such as detachments along the line of communications, losses from disease, lack of forage, physical exhaustion, equipment abandoned, deserters and stragglers. March Attrition occurs each time a force moves, but at least once during the March Phase each turn whether it moves or not, as determined by the Attrition Quotient Matrix and the Attrition Table.

Movement Allowance is the basic, normal daily march distance of a unit quantified in Movement Points. Infantry units have a Movement Allowance of 5, French Guard, 6, Cavalry, 7, Light Cavalry and Leaders, 9.

Movement Commands can be given to individual forces to remove the chance element from their Movement; during the Movement Phase (March Phase) only; these are purchased on a one-for-one basis with Administrative Points. [The movement Command represents not only the actual order (written by the army's Chief of Staff and delivered by a courier to the force Leader), but also the Administrative support for the movement, including the procurement of transport, traffic control, liaison, etc.]

Multi-Leader Forces give rise to the need for Commanders. The Commander is used to coordinate the individual Leaders into a single force. (Without a Leader with sufficient Command Span to equal the Subordination Rating of his own Organic units and another leader, each force may have only a single Leader in it.) A multi-leader force uses the Initiative Rating and Combat Bonus of the Commander. The Initiative Rating and Combat Bonus of any of the subordinate Leaders are ignored as long as they remain part of that force.

Organic Units of a given Leader are those units which are on that Leader's Track.

Organization Display is the sheet containing the Tracks where units are placed, at once assigning them

to individual Leaders, establishing their strength, and concealing their assignment from the Enemy Player. However, the stacking rules apply to the combat units organic to two or more Leaders in the same location, and their organic units are always considered to be in the same place. Players should be careful when stacking Leaders to avoid overstacking combat units.

Package is a term which refers to the two adjacent hexes occupied by a given Leader counter on the game map (his "location"). Thus a Leader will be said to occupy a "package." Two packages are said to be adjacent if they have at least one hexside in common.

Pitched Battle is a combat situation in which a Force loses Strength Points rather than retreating. One "round" of Pitched Battle consists of one attack and one counter-attack.

Provisional Movement Commands can be issued via Depots; they act as Initiative Modifiers rather than guaranteeing movement; the cost is one AP.

Pursuit Battle is a combat situation in which a force retreats and has its losses determined by the pursuit of Enemy forces.

Subordinate Leader is a Leader whose own force makes up part of a larger force under a Commanding Leader. A subordinate Leader may not in turn have subordinate leaders of his own; only organic units.

Subordination Rating is the third number listed next to a Leader's name. (This number may either be 1, 2, 3 or 4). This number represents a Leader's ability to subordinate himself to the authority of a Commanding Leader. The Subordination Rating is deducted from the Command Span of the Commanding Leader of the force; thus the higher a Subordinate Leader's Subordination rating, the harder he is to control and the fewer points of the Commander's Command Span which will remain to be used to control other Leaders and combat units at the same time.

Subordination Rating: Combat Units

Infantry and artillery units and march regiments have a subordination rating of "one;" cavalry units and march regiments have a subordination rating of "one-half," Bridging trains cost zero.

Support Units are those units with special functions and no attack and defense capability: ie., Engineers and Bridging Trains. These units may be assigned to a Leader at no cost to his Command Span. Note that only deployed Bridging Trains are actually placed on the game map; there are no Engineer counters.

Zone of Control is the area comprising the hexes a Leader occupies and the eight hexes adjacent thereto.

FOUR: SEQUENCE OF PLAY

HOW TO PLAY

One Player assumes the command of the French Armies, including their German and Polish allies, and the other Player assumes the command of the Allied Armies of Austria, Prussia, Russia and Sweden. These armies are represented by the various combat units and Leaders. After choosing sides the Players must decide whether they will play the Campaign Game or one of the Scenarios.

The cardboard Playing Pieces should be punched out of the Unit Counter Sheet. The differently colored units represent forces of the various contingents. The French Player always controls all French Army units; his opponent always controls units of the Allied nationalities.

THE GAME TURN OUTLINE

Struggle of Nations is played in sequential turns called Game-Turns. Each Game-Turn consists of two alternating Player-Turns, which consists of three Phases. The Player whose turn is in progress is termed the Phasing Player. All action must take place in sequence as outlined below. Any action taken out of sequence is a violation of the rules. All Game-Turns are identical and follow one another until the game is ended. The Scenario being Played determines which Player must move first (the "First Player").

A. First Player-Turn

I. COMMAND PHASE

a. Administrative Segment

The First Player, only, must determine weather as his first action. Either Player performs all other functions, but during his own turn. Once weather is determined for the Game-Turn, the Phasing Player's first concern is to determine the addition, if any, to the accumulated Administrative Point Track of each army. During the Campaign Game, only, the Phasing Player then adds any replacements indicated by the Game-Turn record track, to his accumulated Replacement Track.

b. Organization Segment

The Phasing Player may transfer combat units between Leaders in the same hex. He may also eliminate combat units and transfer the strength points from these eliminated units to any unit of the same type and nationality (if Allied) stacked in the same hex. Or, he may create a March Regiment with part of the strength of an existing unit, or from Replacement Points if eligible to receive them. Replacement Points are only accumulated during the first Game-Turn of each Game-Week, but may be incorporated into units during any Game-Turn. Reinforcements should be placed on the map.

II. MOVEMENT PHASE

a. Movement Command Segment

The Phasing Player may move any of his Forces by expending one Movement Command (deducting one Administrative Point) per force to be so moved. The Player may also have a Force make an Extended March by expending an additional Movement Command and Administrative Point per Force.

b. Individual Initiative Segment

The Phasing Player may attempt to move any Force which has not been moved in the Movement Command Segment, by use of the Force Leader/Commander's Initiative Rating. The die roll must be less than or equal to the Leader's Initiative Rating for the Force to be able to move, after all die roll modifiers have been incorporated.

Movement Routine

For each Force moved during the Movement Phase or the Forced March Segment, the procedure is similar. Note that all forces which are to receive Movement Commands must be moved before any forces move under Initiative. Then, each force to be moved under Initiative is rolled-for and moved (if possible) individually, before determining the Initiative die roll of the next force.

Step 1. Determine Movement Command Availability

Because he has a limited number of APs the Player must limit the number of Movement Commands; thus some Forces will do without. In addition, Forces in Enemy ZOCs may not be given Movement Commands; nor may units beyond Dispatch Distance of the Center of Operations receive them. All forces which do receive a Movement Command are now eligible to be moved and have their Attrition determined.

The March Phase is divided into two Segments: the first for all Movement under Movement Command, the second for all movement under Initiative. No Movement Commands may be issued after any force's Initiative die roll has been made.

Step 2. Determine Individual Initiative.

This step is for Forces which failed Step 1 only (ie., those without Movement Commands). If the Force is not in an Enemy ZOC the Player rolls a die: if the result (after being modified for Morale) is less than or equal to the Force Leader's Initiative Rating the Force may move. If the force is in an Enemy ZOC, its Leader Initiative Rating is compared with the Initiative of the Leader of the Force adjacent (or, if more than one, the highest). The Initiative Comparison Matrix yields a die roll modifier (which is added to weather, cavalry and morale modifiers); the modified die roll must be less

than Leader Initiative for the force to be able to move. Whether it does or not, it still suffers attrition, and after all forces have been moved, all un-moved forces must also suffer attrition.

Step 3. Movement

The Force in question now moves, expending a number of Movement Points to cross each hexside into the adjacent hex. A Force may move to the limit of the Movement Allowance of its slowest component (5 MPs unless no infantry or artillery is present). Forces making Extended March move up to 9 MPs (infantry/artillery); cavalry likewise extend their March by 4 MPs. During the Forced March Phase no extended march is allowed.

Step 4. March Attrition

For all forces, find the column on the Attrition Quotient Matrix corresponding to the type of march executed and its distance. Cross-reference this with the line for the size of the force and its army's Accumulated AP total (unless out of Supply). With the resulting Attrition Quotient, resolve the Attrition Die Roll on the March Attrition Table, and assess the number of Strength Points shown against the strength of the Force. Steps one through four are repeated for each moving force (execute step four alone for non-moving forces during the Movement Phase).

c. Bridge Segment.

Repair and destroy bridges. Deploy Bridging trains.

III. COMBAT PHASE

a. Forced March Segment, non-Phasing Player only.

No Movement Commands are issued during this Segment; any or all Forces may move, but may do so only under their Leader's Initiative. They may enter Enemy ZOCs only if the Enemy Force concerned is already adjacent to Friendly Force and must still be adjacent to the friendly force already adjacent. For each Forced Marching Force, the non-phasing Player rolls the die, moves the Force if successful, and adjusts its strength for attrition.

b. Battle Resolution Segment.

Combat occurs between all adjacent opposing forces. The forces of the Phasing Player are used to attack and the units of the non-Phasing Player defend, regardless of the overall strategic situation. Combat odds are determined by counting the opposing strengths for each combat situation and locating the simplified odds on the appropriate terrain line of the Combat Results Table. The die is rolled (modifying for Bonus Point, if any), the results are applied, and the losses are determined and deducted.

Combat Routine

For each force adjacent to the enemy during the Battle Resolution Segment, the following procedure is followed. Combat is mandatory for adjacent opposing units (except for attacking units adjacent to the same

enemy stack unable to attack that enemy stack as a single force). Before starting, both sides must choose either pitched or pursuit battle.

Step 1. Determine Cavalry Differential

Count the strength of all cavalry which participates in the combat. Divide the lesser amount into the stronger side's total, to determine a simplified ratio: 2 to 1, 3 to 1 etc.

Step 2. Artillery Fire

Determine the amount of Artillery strength in the attacking (or counterattacking) force; the cavalry differential tells which column to find the result in; roll the die on the column corresponding to the cavalry differential. The result specifies the amount of strength lost by the defending side.

Step 3. Find the Odds Column on the CRT.

The attacker's strength (including cavalry and excluding artillery) is compared with the strength of the defending force, and this comparison is simplified to the nearest odds shown on the CRT (Rounding off in favor of the defender) which is then located on the line corresponding to the prevalent terrain.

Step 4. Resolve the Attack

Do this by rolling the die. The result, under the column found in Step 3, will specify which force retreats. The die result may be modified by the Attacking Leader's Bonus Points.

Step 5. If the losing force chose Pitched Battle at the beginning of the Combat Routine, then the result obtained in Step 4 shows the strength points lost by both sides, and these are now removed. If the losing force chose Pursuit Battle, then the results specify only the length of its retreat, while the winning side loses the number of points shown in the result obtained in Step 4.

Step 6. Counterattack or Re-attack (Pitched Battle only)

The non-Phasing Player becomes the attacking player, and repeats Steps 1 through 5. The alternate Player in each successive attack continues to attack in turn until the losing player opts to apply the combat results achieved against him as a Retreat instead of as Combat Strength Points lost; or until the number of his losing rounds of Pitched Battle equals his Initiative Rating.

Step 7. Retreat

Now execute the retreat result obtained in Step 4.

Step 8. Pursuit (Advance After Combat)

If the non-retreating force wishes to advance along the path of retreat vacated by the retreating force, compare its Leader's Initiative with the retreating Leader's initiative to determine the modifier to the Pursuit die roll (which is combined with modifiers for Cavalry differential and Active Morale). The Active Player rolls the die on the Pursuit Table. The modified

result tells the number of hexes the force may advance along the path of retreat.

Step 9. Remove Losses.

If there is an advance after combat, reduce the strength of the retreating force by an amount equal to the length of the advance, in hexes, of the pursuing force (only one force may pursue). If there is no pursuit, the retreating force loses the same amount of strength as the pursuing force.

Steps 1 through 9 are repeated for every attack

c. Disorg. and Rally Segment (explained in Section XXI.)

B. SECOND PLAYER-TURN

The Second Player now becomes the Phasing Player

FIVE: ADMINISTRATIVE POINTS

The Administrative Points, which are allotted to each of the three armies on a turn-by-turn basis, show the effects of an army's administrative and staff functions. Timetabling troop movements, insuring the time and space for bivouacking and foraging, spacing moving columns so as to avoid traffic jams, providing the necessary wheeled transport, are all examples of the administration of an army, without which it cannot function.

Much more is also represented by the APs, however. Included in these are the physical and mental conditions of the Commander-in-Chief of an army and his staff. Bluecher suffered from delusions and a complete breakdown. Schwarzenberg suffered from gout, and Le Tondou himself was a manic depressive. Politics are another factor represented by the AP system: three emperors with three very different interests were present at Schwarzenberg's headquarters.

Further functions depicted are those of supply—the procuring and transporting of arms and food to the place they are needed—communications—if the transmission of orders is faulty or too slow, they might just as well never have been drafted—intelligence—if a commander has no news of enemy movements, he is forced to forestall his own orders until news reaches him—and strategic consumption—detachments along the LOC (reflected in the Admin effect on Attrition).

All of the above factors can hamper the movement of individual forces or an entire army, or halt it altogether; and the Player will be made to function under Administrative systems which are faulty. The player who fails to make the most conservative use of the resources available will be unlikely to win the game.

Administrative Points are used to create Movement Commands, which the Player must expend for each Force if he wants to be certain it can be moved. The Level of Accumulated APs determines the severity of March Attrition for Forces moving under Movement Commands. New Administrative Points are

and accomplishes Command, Movement and Combat functions in the manner and sequence described above, exchanging roles with the First Player.

C. GAME-TURN RECORD

The Game-Turn Marker should begin the game on the Turn Record Track at the space corresponding to the initial turn of the scenario; for the full Campaign Game this is the first space on the track (a shortened Campaign may be begun on 15-16 August). At the end of each Game-Turn the Game-Turn Marker should be advanced one notch to mark the passage of one Game-Turn and signal the start of another. Weather conditions for the upcoming Game-Turn are determined by a die roll referenced to the Weather Chart. The concept of the "Game-Week" is also used during the Campaign Game for determining occurrence of Armistice.

accumulated during the Administrative Segment of the Player-Turn.

HOW ADMIN POINTS ARE RECEIVED

Admin Points are received during the Admin Segment of the Player Turn. The Player refers to the Administrative Point Pool and rolls the die to determine the point quantity he receives. The die is cross-referenced with the Length of the Line of Communications for the appropriate army, and is modified for Army Morale. If the Line of Communications is currently broken, or exceeds 80 hexes in length (60 hexes for North Army), the army may receive no new Admin Points.

HOW TO USE THE ADMIN POINT POOL

Cross-reference the distance between the army's Center of Operations and its Supply Source (on the line for that army) with the die roll (adding the current Army Morale). During the Spring, the Allied Player rolls once each turn, using the line for the Silesian Army during "Armistice/Spring." He begins to roll a second time, for the Bohemian Army, on 19th July. With the arrival of the North Army on 25 August he will roll three times each turn. The number resulting from the roll of the die tells the Player the quantity of Admin Points which are added to his accumulated total. Admin Points may be exchanged for Movement Commands on a one-for-one basis during the Admin Segment.

How to Use the Admin Point Tracks

For each army, use the two markers provided: one indicates "Ones," the other "Tens" of Accumulated APs. These markers are moved back and forth along the track to record the level as it ebbs and flows. **Examples:** To show "Eleven" APs, place the Tens marker in the Nr. 1 space, and set the Ones marker on

top of the Tens Marker. To show "Twenty," place the Tens marker in the Nr. 2 space, and the Ones marker in the Zero space. Use all three sets to show the levels for the armies of Bohemia, Silesia and North, on the same (Allied) AP Track.

Negative APs

The Player may continue to expend APs even beyond the "Zero" level, up to a limit shown on the Attrition Quotient Matrix for each army. Once negative APs are expended, forces out of Dispatch Distance for that army must use the current negative AP column.

Admin Point Pool Index

The index gives the average APs received per turn (minus one per turn), known as the "Index." During the Armistice, or during an army's withdrawal into cantonment, the army is assumed to gain the amount shown on the Index for each turn. The Index for the appropriate length of LOC is multiplied by the number of turns involved and the result, rounding fractions down, is the number added to the AP track at the end of the period. No die is rolled.

EFFECTS ON AQT COLUMN OF AP ACCUMULATION

"What creates great difficulty in the profession of the land-commander, is the necessity of feeding so many men and animals. If he allows himself to be guided by the commissaries he will never stir, and all his expeditions will fail."—Napoleon

"Napoleon allowed 200,000 men to starve to death in Saxony."—Rogniat

SIX: COMMUNICATIONS

Admin Points are considered to flow along a Line of Communications from an Army's Supply Source to its Center of Operations, and accumulated Admin Points are considered to reside with the Center of Opns. From there, Admin Points may be converted into Movement Commands, which again are considered to flow along a limited Dispatch Distance from the Center of Opns to the forces for which they are intended. In actuality, the Center of Operations was the place, in the immediate rear of an army, where the hospitals, munitions convoys, and main field parks could congregate in support of operations.

CENTER OF OPERATIONS

In order to issue any Movement Commands (or replacements), or to receive new Admin Points, an Army's Center of Operations must be active. In order to be active, it must not have moved during the last two full Player-Turns (one friendly and one enemy), and it must have a Line of Communications. This LOC may be traced only to the appropriate army's Supply Sources (listed on the Communications Table).

At the beginning of each Player-Turn, a Player must announce the level of support that he wishes to give his army by forgoing some or all of the APs that he would otherwise acquire in that turn. The level of "Support" on a given turn determines how many columns he must move away from the column corresponding to his current AP Level when he uses the Attrition Quotient Matrix to determine the result of Attrition die rolls. A Player must choose the amount of Support he wishes to give his army before he rolls for APs. He may choose a level of support that would require the expenditure of more APs than he could possibly receive. After the AP die roll he subtracts the number of APs allocated to Support from the number of APs received that turn. He need not subtract more than the number actually received as a result of that die roll. That is, if he doesn't receive as many APs as he has allocated for support, he gives up only the APs that he did acquire, but receives the shift that he chose anyway. (Exception: A Player can never shift one column to the left of the current, unmodified column unless he has received at least three APs and has subtracted those three APs from his AP total.) A Player never need shift to the right beyond the worst column on the AQT. Once a Player has established the direction and extent of his AQ shift, that shift applies in both the Movement Phase of that Player-Turn and in the immediately following Forced March Segment of his opponent's turn.

AQ Shift on a given turn APs subtracted from APs received on that turn

one column to the left	- 3
no shift	- 2
one column to the right	- 1
two columns to the right	0

An army with an inactive Center of Opns receives no new Admin Points in the Admin Segment, and may issue no Movement Commands at all in the following Movement Command Segment.

Movement of Center of Operations

The Center of Operations (represented by a unit counter) has 5 MPs, moves just like cavalry, without the option of movement under Initiative, during the Movement Command Segment of the Movement Phase (only). No Movement Commands need be expended to allow movement of the Center of Opns. Unlike all other units, it may always move automatically, every turn.

Dispatch Distance on the turn of Center of Opns movement is determined toward the initial location of the Center of Opns that turn—the Center of Opns may not be moved until all Movement Commands have been allocated. The Center of Opns may not use Extended March. It is not subject to March Attrition. It may not enter an Enemy controlled hex. It is never considered to be part of a Force, does not require a Leader, and does not count against stacking limits. Its

presence in a depot hex does not affect the functioning of either. Centers of Operation may be positioned anywhere on a Primary Road Hex. They have no Combat Strength or ZOC, and cannot block the enemy LOC or Dispatch Distance. Center of Opns cannot destroy bridges.

Effect of Movement of Center of Opns of AP receipt

If the Center of Opns was moved in the previous turn, no new APs are received and no APs may be issued. However, units in Dispatch Distance of the Center of Opns still get the benefit of the Accumulated APs when determining Attrition Quotient, and use the column on the AQM corresponding to the accumulated AP total even if the Center of Opns had moved on the previous Game-Turn (ie they are not automatically considered out of Dispatch Distance simply because the Center of Opns has moved).

Example:

Second Player moves his Center of Operations in Turn 1, and flips it over; in this turn he added APs normally and his forces received Movement Commands. In his Admin Segment of Turn 2, he adds no APs, but turns his Center of Opns back over to its "Active" side. Thus, during his Forced March Phase of turn 2 and thereafter, his Center of Opns is considered to be functioning normally.

Disbanding of Center of Operations

The Player may voluntarily disband his Center of Operations. He simply removes it from the map and places it on the Turn Record Track where it will appear as a reinforcement seven Game-Turns later at the Army's Supply Source. He may disband it only during his Administrative Segment and before rolling for any Administrative Points. While it is disbanded no new Admin Points may be rolled for and no replacements may be added to combat units. All forces use the zero column on the A.Q.M. while it is disbanded. One Admin Point is required to disband the Center of Opns.

Dispatch Distance

Dispatch Distance is the maximum distance, in Movement Points, that a Force may be away from an active Center of Operations in order to receive Movement Commands or receive replacements (see the Communications Table). The path of the Dispatch may be traced through any passable terrain at the Cavalry Movement Cost. The distance is traced from the Center of Opns to the Force Commander.

When determining attrition, worse attrition is suffered if the force is not within Dispatch Distance of the Center of Opns or an active Depot (all friendly Supply Sources are active Depots).

To determine whether a force is within dispatch distance, refer to the Communications Table. This will tell the Dispatch Distance, in Movement Points, for the appropriate army. If the Player can trace a line of Movement from the Center of Operations to the force in question (not the other way around), no longer than

the distance shown (as modified for friendly and hostile territory)—and if the Center of Operations is Active—then the Force is within Dispatch Distance and may receive a Movement Command (regardless of whether it moves out of Dispatch Distance thereafter).

Effects of Being Beyond Dispatch Distance (ie out of Supply)

A Force which is beyond Dispatch Distance must use the zero column (or the Army's current AP total, if worse) on the Attrition Quotient Matrix, and receives no Movement Commands. A force within Dispatch Distance may use the column on the AQM appropriate to the army's accumulated AP total, and may be given a Movement Command.

Communications Status of Forces

In Communications: (1) Capable of receiving Movement Command, because (2) Dispatch Distance can be traced from Center of Opns.

In Supply: (1) Incapable of receiving Movement Command but still allowed to use column on AQM corresponding to current Army AP level, because (2) Dispatch Distance cannot be traced from Center of Opns, but can be traced to friendly Depot or Supply Source.

DISPLACEMENT OF CENTER OF OPERATIONS

The enemy Player may never capture the Center of Operations (it was too small, and too mobile, to allow that). However, the Center of Operations must be moved whenever it is placed in an enemy ZOC or when Enemy Forces move into or through the hex occupied by the Center of Opns. If forced to move, the Center of Opns is picked up and moved five MPs down a primary road toward its Supply Source. This mandatory displacement is not impeded by the presence of enemy forces—for game purposes the Center of Operations is considered to "fly." If the Center of Opns is forced to "fly" it is out of order (inactive) for the next friendly and enemy Player-Turns.

DEPOTS

Depots (printed on the map) may act just like a Center of Opns, with respect to determining Dispatch Distance, etc. Only the French Player has Depots specially so-called. However, the active and non-active Supply Sources of both sides are also Depots. Any number of Forces may trace Dispatch Distance to a single Depot in one turn, if it is active in the scenario (see the French Depot Table). Any number of Provisional Movement Commands may be transmitted through a Depot if it is in Dispatch Distance of the Center of Opns, and if the force receiving the Movement Command is in Dispatch Distance of the Depot.

Depot Symbolology

The number inside the Depot Symbol tells the class of the Depot, as explained on the "French Depots" Table. Dresden has two numbers: one which refers to

its Supply Source Class (4), and the other which refers to its Depot Class (3).

Enemy Depots may not be used. Once captured and occupied at the end of a phase, Depots (not Supply Sources) are considered inactive for the remainder of the game.

LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS

A Line of Communications is a line of connected, primary road hexes free of enemy units or their Zones of Control (regardless of friendly occupation), stretching from the Center of Operations to the Supply Source. It may be up to 80 hexes in length, but the longer it is, the fewer APs will be received. If the Line of Communications is broken, or exceeds 80 hexes in length, all forces use the zero column on the AQM, the army may receive no new Admin Points or reinforcements, nor may it create any Movement Commands. A Line of Communications may be traced only along primary road hexes.

SUPPLY SOURCES

Allied Supply Sources are not printed on the map. Supply Sources of the various armies are listed on the Communications Table. The Supply Source currently in use is designated by the placement of the Supply Source Marker. It may be placed on any 1° road hex on the appropriate map edge. An army may have only one active Supply Source at one time.

The Supply Source is the anchor of the Line of Communications. Any friendly Supply Source which is "active" (see *French Depot Table*) may be used as a Depot, whether or not it is currently in use as a Supply Source. Every Supply Source on the map (French and Allied) is considered a Depot which may be used only by the friendly player, and only by the appropriate army.

Supply Source Set-Up

The Active Supply Source Marker (and the Center of Opns), of which one each is provided per army, may begin the game at any possible Supply Source, and anywhere within Communications of that Active Supply Source, respectively. (Refer to the following: *Communications Table*, p.2 of *Study Folder*, and "*Spring Scenario Allied Communications*," below.)

CHANGING THE SUPPLY SOURCE

Allied armies may only use Supply Sources listed for them, but they may switch freely from one primary road hex in the appropriate territory to another without delay or penalty. Allied armies may also trace through another army's Center of Opns (see below). To make this latter kind of change, and for the French Player to change his Supply Source, is a process which takes one or more complete Game-Turns to accomplish. To initiate, flip the Supply Source Marker over, to signify that the process is begun, at the begin-

ning of the Admin Segment. During each succeeding Admin Segment, roll a die: a one or a two indicates that the procedure is complete. While the Active Supply Source Marker is flipped over all forces use the zero column on the AQM, the army receives no new APs, and may issue no Movement Commands or replacements. You may attempt to change the Supply Source at any time.

Change of Dresden Supply Source

Dresden ceases to be a Supply Source on 20 September, unless it has been changed before. At this time Erfurt automatically begins to function as the Supply Source without need for die roll.

Tracing Through Friendly Army's Center of Operations

If an Allied army changes its Communications to go through the other Allied Center of Opns, the distance on the Admin Point Pool would be equal to the distance between the two Allied Centers of Opns and then onward to the other army's Supply Source. **NOTE:** Even though its Admin Points would be coming through the other army's Supply Source, those points are in no way associated with the Admin System of the other army: They are neither deducted from nor determined on the column of the other army.

Supply Source Garrisons

Each Active Supply Source Marker has an intrinsic garrison of one Strength Point. These garrisons have a Zone of Control, but cannot move (except by the Supply Source Change procedure, in which case the Supply Source Marker is displaced directly from one 1° road hex on the map edge to another), nor may they attack. If attacked with no other Friendly combat units in the hex, the garrison is eliminated if forced to retreat. (The Marker may be reintroduced at an unblocked Supply Source hex during the next friendly Player-Turn.) If the attacking force retreats the garrison remains intact. In either case the attacking force's loss may never be more than one Strength Point. If other Friendly units defend in the hex their Strength is added to that of the garrison. Friendly retreat still results in the destruction in this case; if the enemy retreats the garrison remains intact (and all losses occur normally). Garrisons receive all the normal benefits of terrain. They may not be repulsed.

Capture of Supply Sources

Dresden—The Supply Source hex of Dresden must be occupied at the end of the phase to be permanently eliminated.

Others—Cannot be permanently eliminated. The Supply Source Marker can be replaced as soon as the enemy forces are removed. If occupied, the Marker may be placed on the nearest unblocked 1° road hex in friendly territory (this would be considered a "change" in Supply Source).

SPRING SCENARIO ALLIED COMMUNICATIONS

Allied Line of Communications in Spring may be traced to any 1° mapedge road hex in Silesia or Brandenburg. Only one Center of Operations is used by the Allies,

and for all purposes the Allied army is regarded as "Silesian Army." If you change it from Silesia to Brandenburg, you must roll a die as outlined under "Changing the Supply Source."

SEVEN: MOVEMENT COMMANDS

The movement Command represents not only the actual order (written by the army's Chief of Staff and delivered by courier to the force Leader), but also the Administrative support for the movement, including procurement of transport, traffic control, liaison, etc. Movement Commands are created and issued to the individual forces of an army during the Movement Command Segment.

CREATION OF MOVEMENT COMMANDS

Movement Commands are created during the Movement Command Segment. The Player deducts one Admin Point from his accumulated total for each Command created. No Movement Commands may be created if the Army currently has no Line of Communications; not even from previously accumulated APs (these remain for use after reestablishment of an LOC).

FUNCTION OF MOVEMENT COMMANDS

Forces which are allocated Movement Commands are guaranteed to be able to move during the Movement Command Segment. (Exception: Provisional Movement Commands, issued through depots). The only time a force may receive a Movement Command is during the Player's Movement Command Segment. At any other time the force may only move under its Leader's Initiative (cf).

Provisional Movement Commands

These may be issued to any force within Dispatch Distance of a Depot which is itself within Dispatch Distance of the Center of Opns. This issuance is signified in the usual way, by the deduction of one AP from the pool. The effect of the Provisional Movement Command so issued does not guarantee the movement of the force to which issued. Instead, its effect is to decrease the Initiative die roll, for that turn only, of the Leader to whom issued, by "2." Provisional Movement Commands may not be used for Extended March.

HOW TO ISSUE MOVEMENT COMMANDS

In order to receive a Movement Command, a Force must start the Segment within Dispatch Distance of the Center of Operations of its Army. (In the case of a multi-hex force, only one of the hexes occupied by the commander need be within range.) To receive a Provisional Movement Command, the Dispatch Distance is traced to a Depot. Simply announce that the force is receiving a Movement Command (or Provisional

Movement Command) and immediately execute its March. One Movement Command is expended for the force, regardless of its total strength or the distance of its March. **Exception:** A force making an Extended March requires two Movement Commands.

EXPENDING MOVEMENT COMMANDS FOR EXTENDED MARCH

(see "Extended March" under "Movement".)

The force to make the Extended March must be within Dispatch Distance of its army's Center of Operations at the beginning of the Movement Command Segment and must be within Dispatch Distance at the end of its normal Movement. The Player must expend a Movement Command at both times—one for the normal move and one for the additional Movement Points. Thus, it would cost a total of two APs to perform Extended March. Note that the force is required to be within Dispatch Distance only at the two times APs are expended. Note also that "end of its normal movement" is when a Force wishes to enter a hex but would not be able to do so because of the terrain costs, unless it had the additional Movement Points.

DIVISION OF COMMAND IN THE ALLIED ARMIES

An Army may only issue Movement Commands to a force in its own army. The breakdown is shown on the Organization Chart; but it will help to remember that the Army of Bohemia consists of Austrian and Russian Leaders and Corps, the Army of the North consists of Swedish and Prussian, and the Army of Silesia of Prussian and Russian contingents.

However, a Commander from one Army may lead a force of another army. If this Commander has no subordinates or Combat units from his nominal army in his force, the Movement Command must come from the army to which the subordinate Leaders and units belong. Similarly, the Admin Level for attrition determination is that of the army providing the Movement Command, not the army of the Commander. On the other hand, if there are Leaders of two different armies under one Commander, one Movement Command must be issued by both armies involved, if they are to move under Movement Command. There is no penalty, though, if the force can move under the Initiative of the commander. In short, the administration of the two armies must be kept completely separate.

Individual combat units may be switched around between the armies freely, though leaders may not permanently change armies. A Leader may have organic units and subordinates of any friendly nationality unless he is listed as the leader of a

specific corps; in the latter case he must stick to his own nationality. Thus, you can't have a Prussian Inf

Bde organic to a Russian Infantry Corps Leader. [Note that Nationality of French Player units has no effect.]

EIGHT: MARCH ATTRITION

March Attrition reflects the many non-combat losses suffered by an army which, in a long campaign like the present one, exceeded losses in combat. Included in these would be detachments to guard communications in hostile territory, losses from disease, lack of forage or physical exhaustion, equipment abandoned in forced marches, particularly in muddy conditions, deserters and stragglers taken in or ambushed, respectively, by the populace. Taken together, these causes are known as Strategic Consumption.

WHICH FORCES SUFFER ATTRITION

Each force is subject to attrition during the March Phase, whether it moves or not, and during the Forced March Phase if it attempts a Forced March, only. Attrition is determined separately for each force.

Attrition Free Movement

(see "Unit Type")

HOW TO DETERMINE ATTRITION RATE

This is a two-step procedure, both steps of which must be carried out to determine how many Strength Points a given force will lose in a given Movement Phase.

Attrition Quotient Procedure

After the force is moved, the Player must cross-reference the total strength of the force in SPs (excluding any Old Guard (OGde) units and cavalry; cavalry attrition is figured separately) with the number of APs remaining at the moment. (If the force began its move out of Dispatch Distance, it uses the "Zero APs" column or the current AP level, if negative.) He then cross-references this with the variety and distance of the March. This gives him the Attrition Quotient for that force. The Player needs this Attrition Quotient in the following procedure, but for now it tells him the average Attrition loss he can expect

to suffer (he may decide at this point to modify the force's move). Note that marches with an attrition quotient greater than twelve are not allowed.

Attrition Determination Procedure

For each force, the Attrition procedure must be resolved once during the Friendly March Phase (whether it moves or not) and again if it Force Marches at least one hex. The Player rolls the die on the die roll line corresponding to the current weather, and reduces it by one for the Bonus Point of the force Commander (if any). He then cross references the resulting die roll number with the Attrition Quotient. The result is the Attrition loss to the moving force: the number of Strength Points shown must be removed from the units of the force.

Example: An Allied force of 20 SPs in the Bohemian Army, with five accumulated APs, marching three Movement Points in each of two different March Phases, would average a 5% loss in each Phase; whereas if it marched 5 MPs in one Phase only, it would lose 15%.

Distribution of Attrition Losses

Attrition losses must be distributed as evenly as possible between the different Corps of a force, and as evenly as possible among the units of a Corps during a given phase, but within that restriction each player may single-out units of his choice for attrition losses.

Figuring Cavalry Attrition

Cavalry and infantry may be part of the same force for movement and stacking purposes. However, their strength is not combined when determining attrition. Cavalry in a force must resolve its attrition separately, and only the total cavalry strength is counted (see "Cavalry").

NINE: LEADERSHIP

One of the great failings of the French Army was that it had only one great leader. This was not a clear handicap during the blitzkrieg campaigns of the early war years but later, with the increase in size of the theatre of war and the shifting of France onto the Strategic Defensive, entire Allied campaigns were waged on the simple precept that Napoleon was never to be fought in person, insofar as this could be avoided, and that each Allied army would maneuver relentlessly, in the

absence of the Emperor, against his subordinates.

Any Leader may command a force which consists, firstly, of those units organic to him on the Organization Display (they are considered to be in the same two hexes as their Leader). The number of such units is limited by the Subordination Rating of the Units, which counts against the Command Span of the Leader, printed on the Organization Display next to his name. Secondly, a Leader may command a number

of subordinate Leaders, whose Subordination Ratings must also be deducted from the same Command Span. Subordinate Leaders must be in the same Package or any one package adjacent to the force Commander. However, none of these subordinates may presently have Leaders subordinate to themselves: each subordinate Leader's force must consist only of those units on his track on the organization Display.

INITIATIVE RATING

The first number listed next to a Leader's name is his Initiative Rating (see "Ten: Initiative").

LIMIT ON FORCE SIZE: COMMAND SPAN

The Command Span is the second number on a Leader's Display. The number of combat units which may be on a Leader's track, and the number of subordinate Leaders a Commander may have, is dependent on that Leader's Command Span. Each Command Span is a numerical rating which is the basic number of Organic Units the Leader may have. A subordinate Leader may count up to "four" against the Command Span. Thus, if his Command Span is "five" the Commander could have five organic units and no subordinate Leaders, or subordinates with a combined Subordination Rating of "four" plus one organic unit on his own track, etc.

CREATING MAJOR GENERALS MARKERS

Major General markers can be used to create an on-map force whose Leader is the individual named on a given combat unit.

If you want a Major General Marker, since he is in reality already with the force he is to command, his counter can be instantaneously generated. If his division is eliminated or subsumed into a larger force, his counter must be done away with (it doesn't go to the Center of Operations). Creation of Major Generals is not dependent upon the limit of available markers or tracks.

Maj General Markers are created or removed only during the Organization Segment of a Friendly Command Phase. To create a Maj General, the Phasing Player places an unused Maj Gen on the map in the hex occupied by the force and then transfers combat units from the display of some leader in the hex to the Maj Gen's Display. Note that the Force Commander's Command Span may as a result be exceeded, because of the Higher Subordination Rating of Maj Gen. Thus, Players should be aware of the implications or creating an additional division of command within a Force, as it may alter the structure and capabilities of the force as a whole. To remove a Maj Gen simply reverse the above procedure, replacing the units on the Organic Units Track of some Leader in the hex and removing the Maj Gen Marker from the map.

TYPES OF MAJOR GENERALS

1. Infantry Maj Gens: Where there is no other Leader on the spot, the general of division or brigade named on the combat unit Strength Marker may be pressed into service as a Leader, receiving Movement Com-

mands and representing the location of his unit on the map. Anonymous, letter-coded Maj Gen Markers are provided for this purpose, each of which has a corresponding track on the Organization Display.

The names of the Major Generals are not given on the Maj Gen counter, since they would be identical to the name on his unit counter. Maj Gens have an Initiative Rating of zero; a major General's force may not voluntarily enter or exit an enemy ZOC, unless they have a die roll modifier.

2. Cavalry Maj Gens: Same as above, used for any Force consisting entirely of cavalry which hasn't already a Leader. Cav Maj Gens do have Initiative Ratings. Cav Maj Gens may enter and exit Enemy ZOCs.

SUBORDINATION RATING

The third number listed on a Leader's Display is his Subordination Rating. This number represents a Leader's ability to subordinate himself to the authority of a Commander. The Subordination Rating is deducted from the Command Span of the Commander of the force; thus the higher a subordinate Leader's Subordination Rating, the harder he is to control and the fewer Points of the Commander's Span which will remain to be used to control other Leaders and organic units at the same time.

Unit Subordination Ratings

Artillery and Infantry units and march regiments have a subordination Rating of "one;" Cavalry units and march regiments have a Subordination Rating of "one-half."

Optional Rule:

REPLACEMENT LEADERS: NEY AND MACDONALD

To increase their flexibility, Ney and Macdonald assigned their corps provisionally to the command of one of their subordinate divisional commanders. The Player may at any time "create" the Leaders "Souham" and "Gerard," placing their counter in the same stack with Ney and Macdonald respectively—provided that the combat units Numbered "8th" and "35th" respectively are present—and moving the organic units of the commander to their own tracks. Note: this procedure may not be undertaken when the Commander in question is subordinate to another commander.

The Replacement Leaders may be removed by reversing the above procedure. Similarly, the Allied Player may use either the tracks of Miloradowitsch or of Rajewski and Yermalow to display the Garde and Reserve infantry and represent their location on the map.

Optional Rule:

NEY'S CHIEF OF STAFF-JOMINI

Jomini deserted during the Armistice. Make Ney a 4-6-3 in the Spring and a 3-5-3 in the Autumn period.

MOVEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL LEADERS

If a Leader wishes to move without any subordinates or organic units, he may do so without reference to the Attrition procedure and without expenditure of Movement Commands or necessity of rolling for Initiative. The Player simply moves the Leader. In this case he moves like light cavalry. That is, he has 9 MPs during the March and Forced March Phases. His movement is not impeded by enemy Zones of Control. However, if a Leader attempts to move a force under his own Initiative, whether he succeeds or fails, he may not then move independently.

Unemployed Leaders

Unemployed Leaders are Leaders who begin the Friendly Movement Phase alone in the hex. Unemployed Maj General Markers are removed from play. Other Unemployed Leaders must move towards the Center of Operations or they must move directly toward a designated friendly force. Unemployed Leaders which reach the Center of Opns are removed from the map, and remain out of play until troops appear at the Center of Operations out of which to create a force.

Elimination of Leaders

Leaders are only eliminated when all of the units with which they are stacked are eliminated in combat or pursuit.

When any Leader with a Command Span of 6 or greater is eliminated, the opposing Player may affect his own or the owning Player's Morale by one Space (see "Changes in Army Morale").

LEADERSHIP BONUS POINTS

The Leadership Bonus Point is shown by a star between the Initiative and Command Span on the leader Display.

In Combat

The Attacking Player may add or subtract one to the die roll, if the leader commanding his attacking force has a Bonus Point. In the case of a multi-leader attack, the bonus of only the Commander may be used.

In Attrition

A Leader's Bonus Point may be subtracted from the Attrition die roll of the force he is commanding.

THE FORCE

A Force (represented on map by one or more Leader markers) may consist of one or more combat units, or

of a number of units and Leaders, under the command of a single Commander. A force could consist, at the top, of a Leader with a Command Span of one or greater (such Leaders, when in command of the force, are termed Commanders). He would command a number of combat units organic to himself in combination with a number of Leaders Subordinate to him in the same or adjacent hexes, depending upon his Command Span. These subordinate Leaders would each control only the organic units on their track. Note: In order to be considered part of a force, a unit or Leader must begin the Phase as part of that Force.

Organic Units

Organic Units (Combat and Support units) are always considered to be in the same hexes as their Leader, and are kept on his Organic Units Track on the Organization Display. If they are not to remain with the Leader, they are placed under a new Leader and are moved to that new Leader's Organic Unit Track; this transfer may only happen when both leaders are in the same package.

Reorganizing Units on the Display

Unit assignment on the Organization Display may only be adjusted during the Organization Segment, eg the composition of a Leader's Organic Units Track may only be altered during the Organization Segment.

Creation of a Force

For the purpose of movement, the owning Player creates a Force just before he moves it. Each Leader is considered to be an individual Force until the Player states otherwise. Thus, if the Player wished to create a multi-Leader Force he would have to state his intention before moving any of the Leaders involved. This would be done by the Player stating that "Commander X is now moving, and subordinate Leaders include Leaders A, B and C." You can always detach a Leader or Leaders subordinate to a Commander at any point.

A Commander may "drop off" a Leader or Leaders of his force in the middle of his movement, and continue on without that Leader to complete his movement (the detached leader would have to remain in the hex in which he was detached). No new Leaders may be "picked up" by a force in the middle of movement.

For the purposes of combat, the Phasing Player (only) creates a Force of Friendly Leaders (only) at the instant of combat. Thus, he could move several Forces adjacent to the Enemy and within the Command Span of one Commander and have that Commander lead the attack. Players should note that the concept of the Force only comes into use during the Friendly Movement, Forced March or Combat phase, and that Forces can be re-defined at the beginning of any Phase. Only the active Player selects the units which constitute a Force, and he may do so only for his own units.

TEN: INITIATIVE

The Initiative Rating represents the effects of troop motivation in a particular force and that force Leader's interactive effect upon it. Initiative die roll can be modified by Army Morale.

Initiative is the mental debate within the officer and among his immediate staff, among two courses of action in an unexpected situation when the Commander-in-Chief is not nearby. The first is to stick to the letter of the Commander's instruction; the second is to take advantage of other opportunities arising out of the unforeseen circumstances. Reason demands obedience to the former, intuition pleads an attempt at the latter. Initiative is a rating of intuition, clarity of imagination, as well as simple bravery.

Forces may attempt to move under the Initiative of their Leader. For each such Force, the Player rolls the die and adds or subtracts the current Army Morale. If the result is equal to or less than the Leader's Initiative Rating, the Force may be moved normally. If it is higher, the Force may not move that segment. (This form of Movement is obviously less than dependable, though it does have the advantage of requiring no Movement Command expenditure.)

Exiting Enemy Zones of Control

Another instance in which a Leader will be called upon to move under his own Initiative is when he wishes to exit an Enemy ZOC. Forces in Enemy Zones of Control may attempt to exit during the March and Forced March Phases. If they are to move, Forces which begin the Movement or Forced March Phases in an Enemy ZOC must move under their own Initiative; Movement Commands may not be issued to them. Their Initiative Die roll is modified for Resistance of enemy Leader and Cavalry Differential. Basically, the presence of an Enemy Leader tends to reduce Friendly

chances of escaping (see the "Initiative Comparison Matrix") while a preponderance of enemy cavalry has the same effect (see also "Movement out of Enemy ZOCs").

Procedure: The Leader's Initiative Rating must be compared with the Enemy Leader's to obtain a die roll modifier known as the "Resistance Modifier." To this, the cavalry differential modifier is added or subtracted, and this combined modifier is added to or subtracted from the die roll. If the modified die roll is less than the moving ("Active") Leader's Initiative, the force may move.

Pursuit (Advance After Combat)

In a combat situation in which an enemy Force has been forced to retreat, the friendly Leader's Initiative Rating is cross-referenced with the length of that retreat, on the Pursuit Table. The die is rolled on that column, and modified for Resistance Modifier and Cavalry Differential, and the result is the number of hexes the Friendly force may advance (see "Combat-Pursuit.") Note that a force may never advance farther than the enemy force retreated, and that even if the pursuit places the opposing forces adjacent, another attack is not possible.

Initiative Comparison Procedure

The Active Leader is the Leader of the Force which is attempting to exit an Enemy ZOC or pursue. The Passive Leader must be the Enemy Leader in the hex. To determine the Active Leader's Initiative Modifier, simply cross-reference his printed Initiative with that of the opposing (Passive) Leader. The result is the Resistance Modifier. This may be modified by Cavalry Differential.

ELEVEN: ORGANIZATION DISPLAY

All the pertinent information concerning any Leader or Commander is printed on an individual space on the Organization Display: The name of his command, his Initiative Rating and Command Span. Below this information is a track on which the combat units (and support units) organic to that Leader's formation are placed. Only the Leader is actually ever deployed on the map (although there may be instances when an individual bridging train is deployed directly on the map).

The Organization Displays for each Player are printed on separate sheets. The actual strength of a Leader's units as recorded on their Organic Units Track is concealed from the Enemy Player until revealed during combat. Note that not all Leaders begin the game on the map (see "Replacements—Rein-

forcements"). All units in place on a Leader's Track are considered to occupy the same hexes as the Leader's Marker.

In addition to the stacking limit, each Leader has a personal maximum number of units which can be placed on his Track, which varies depending on his Command Span and the number of Leaders subordinate to him (see "Leadership").

How to Use the Organization Display

Set the Organization Chart up on the opposite side of the map from the opposing player (names and strengths cannot be read from a couple of yards distance). At the beginning of the game place all combat units in the boxes indicated for them on each

Leader's Track. The number in the box indicates the current strength (in Strength Points) of the unit. For example, in Scenarios "D" and "L", General Bluecher begins the game with an artillery unit at a strength of "5" (representing 5 × 16 or 80 guns).

Reorganizing Units on the Display

During a Friendly Organization Segment a unit may be transferred to the Organic Units Track of another Leader currently stacked in the same hex (see "Division of Command in the Allied Armies"). There are no nationality restrictions concerning placement of the French Player's units.

Eliminated Units

Once a unit is eliminated, it may never be re-formed. You can never bring eliminated units back with replacements. (**Exceptions:** Cavalry Constituents (below) and in the Campaign Game, during the Armistice.)

Austrian Brigades with Both Infantry and Cavalry Constituents

In many cases a unit has both Infantry and Cavalry strength, and thus many units have both Infantry and Cavalry markers. Cavalry Strength is shown by a "c" next to the name; infantry by "i." If the unit has no cavalry strength to start, put the Cavalry Marker aside. Cavalry Replacements could be used to bring the unit's Cavalry Marker onto the track.

Creating and Disbanding Combat Units

Strength may be transferred between units on the

Display. The Combat Strength of two or more units of the same type may be amalgamated into a single combat unit, eliminating the others, so long as no unit exceeds its strength at the beginning of the scenario, (except in the Campaign Game—see "When replacements may be added") or "three" Strength Points, whichever is greater; (except March Regiments). The Combat Strength of a single unit may be divided, part going into another Combat Unit. For this purpose the Player may create a March Regiment placed on the same Track. The Strength of any unit may be increased via the introduction of Replacement Points.

Removing Losses from the Organization Display

Losses called for either in March Attrition or Combat must be distributed throughout the component units in a force as evenly as possible, beginning with the Leader in Command of the force, and proceeding to each Subordinate Leader in turn, each losing one Strength Point, until the specified number has been removed. If Strength has been removed from every leader in the force and the quota has not been fulfilled, begin the procedure again with the commander, taking a strength point from another unit on his track (if any), and from the Subordinates.

LEADERS' ORGANIC UNITS' MAXIMUM COMBAT STRENGTHS

Leaders with abbreviated tracks (with spaces numbered "1-5" only) may not have organic units stronger than "5" Strength Points. Other Leaders (with spaces from one to ten), may have organic units up to a strength of "13;" strength over "10" is indicated by flipping counter over and starting again in the "1" space to indicate "11," etc.

TWELVE: MORALE

Morale is the key to victory. This is shown in the Victory Conditions. If the Morale of an Army breaks, with the Morale Marker moving off the "+" end of the track, the cohesion of the Army's units is considered broken; the soldiers have agreed that their cause is lost (or unjust), and have gone home. The Allies have a Morale advantage to reflect their commitment to driving the French out of their homes. The French have only their faith in Napoleon, which after Russia was certainly not unshakable, and after Dresden, widely considered misplaced.

The Morale of the Armies is recorded on the Morale Track. The Morale may either be positive, neutral (which has no effect), or negative. Morale is affected by the outcome of all Pitched Battles in which certain commanders are involved (see "Effect of Pitched Battles on Morale").

Army Morale is tracked for each Player. (Though they have more than one "army," the Allies have only one "Army Morale" for their entire army-group.) Army Morale modifies Initiative and the number of APs received. At start, place the Morale Marker where indicated on the Track.

EFFECTS OF ARMY MORALE

Tracked Army Morale Rating is a die roll modifier which applies to the active forces when moving under Initiative or Pursuing. It is also added to the Admin Point die roll, and vital to Victory Conditions.

Effect on AP Die Roll

Each Player adds or subtracts his current Morale Rating to the AP Die Roll before cross-referencing to determine how many APs he receives. The Modified die roll may not be greater than 6 or less than 1.

Changes in Army Morale

Allies—Fall of Berlin: move marker one space to left, if French capture Berlin and occupy at the end of a Phase. (If recaptured, move one space back to right.)

Fall of Dresden: during the Spring (only), same as above.

French—Fall of Dresden: during the Autumn (only),

move marker one space to the left, if Allies capture Dresden and occupy at the end of any Phase. (Recapture, same as above).

Either Side—Pitched Battle involving any Leader with Command Span of "6" or greater actually in command of a force (on either or both sides): The winner of such battle decides whether his morale goes up or loser's goes down one space. However, if either side is at the end of its track, the other side's marker must move. To qualify, the "winner" must pursue at least one hex and there must be at least one round of pitched battle before the Pursuit (See "Pitched Battle").

Either Side—Leader with Command Span of 6 or greater is killed (same effect as the preceeding).

Campaign Game Only:

Objectives Controlled During Armistice

If the French Player starts in Berlin, or the Allies in Dresden, at the beginning of the Autumn Period,

THIRTEEN: FRIENDLY TERRITORY

Friendly Territory includes everything west of the Elbe (except Bohemia) for the French; Brandenburg, Silesia and Bohemia for the Allies (regardless of which Allied nationality). Saxon, Westphalian and Anhalt-Dessau territory east of the Elbe is friendly to neither side. Territory friendly to the Allies is hostile to the French; but the reverse is not true—no territory is hostile to the Allies.

FOURTEEN: MOVEMENT

Movement takes place during the Friendly March Phase and the Friendly Forced March Phase. The rules of Movement Command and Initiative govern which forces may be moved—all combat units move as part of a force, whose location is denoted by the presence on the map of a Leader. Combat units are never placed on the map. A force may be moved in any direction or combination of directions.

Forces are moved one at a time, tracing a path of contiguous hexes through the hex grid. As a force enters each hex, it must pay one or more Movement Points. Upon completing its move, each force is subject to the Attrition Procedure (cf).

The number of Movement Points which may be expended by a force during a single Phase may not exceed the different Movement Allowances of the different units in the force (except when given an extra Movement Command for an Extended March—cf). Unused Movement Points may not be accumulated from segment to segment or transferred from unit to unit.

HOW TO MOVE FORCES

During the Movement Segments, only the Forces belonging to the Player whose Segment it is may be

reduce the morale of the opposing side by one before play begins in that period.

Maximum Morale

Morale Marker may not be better than, "– 2" for the Allies and "– 1" for the French. The Morale Marker may not exit the "good" end of the Morale Track.

Morale Victory

The Morale marker may have to move off the "bad" end of the Morale Track (ie worse than + 2). If this happens, the enemy Player wins the game automatically. However, note this may happen only if the other side's Morale Marker is already at the "maximum" (see above). Also, the "winner" must not have lost any "round" of Pitched or Pursuit Battle in that combat situation. If both sides had lost at least one time in a given combat situation, there would be no effect on either side's morale.

Effect on Unit Identity

French Player forces moving in hostile territory have their identity revealed to the Allied Player (strength remains concealed). Allied Player can simply examine the identity of French Player Leader counters (not combat units or strength) in hostile territory.

Effects on Dispatch Distance (see Communications Table)

moved; all, some or none of his Forces may be moved (depending upon the Movement Command and Initiative procedures). No Enemy movement and no combat may occur during a Movement Segment (but see "Repulse").

Movement is calculated in terms of Movement Points. The basic cost in MPs to enter a hex is one Movement Point; the cost varies with the type of terrain in the hex and the type(s) of units in the force. The terrain costs are fully described on the Terrain Effects Chart.

MOVEMENT ALLOWANCE

A Force may continue to move until any unit in the Force has expended its full Movement Allowance. The full Movement Allowance may be expended during both the March Phase and the Forced March Phase. A Force may add an Extended March of 4 MPs. A Force may never enter a hex unless every unit in the Force has sufficient MPs remaining to pay the full entry cost of the terrain in the hex (plus any additional cost for leaving an Enemy Controlled Hex).

The Movement Allowances of the various unit types are as follows: Regular and Heavy Cavalry = 7 MPs, Light Cavalry and Leaders = 9 MPs, All other 5 MPs.

Old Guard Movement Bonus

A force composed entirely of Old Guard infantry (plus engineers, YGde and cavalry, if any) receives a Movement Bonus of 1 MP; it may thus move up to 6 MPs in one Phase, without resorting to the Extended March procedure (which would allow the Old Gde force to expend another 4 MPs; ie up to Ten).

EXPENDING MOVEMENT POINTS

A Force expends Movement Points in order to move from hex to hex on the game map. A force would normally expend one Movement Point to enter a hex. This might be altered depending on the terrain of the hex or the hexside crossed to enter that hex.

A Force is moved by displacing the Leader from hex to hex, paying the terrain cost for each hex from the Movement Allowance of each unit type in the Force. When a Force includes both infantry and cavalry and it enters a hex which requires a different expenditure of Movement Points for each, the Player must make the appropriate expenditure from each type and make a mental note as to the number of Movement Points remaining to each type.

Movement of a Multi-Leader Force

Movement of such a Force is in the same manner as explained above. Simply move the stack of Leaders through the path of hexes to be taken, expending Movement Points for each hex.

Movement of a Multi-Package Force

It is not necessary that each stack enter the same hex as the Commander's stack; neither need each stack remain within one hex of the path taken by the Commander. The only requirement on units which begin the March Phase as part of a single force is that they all be adjacent at the end of their march. Thus each stack is moved, and its Movement Point expenditure is calculated, separately. Consider the number of MPs expended by the Force as a whole to be equal to the larger amount expended by any one stack in the force (again keeping separate track of cavalry and infantry expenditure), unless you wish to "drop off" one stack along the way.

Movement Inhibitions and Prohibitions

A Force may never enter a hex occupied by an Enemy combat unit unless it first repulses the enemy. A Force which enters a hex containing no enemy combat units may displace the occupying Leaders to any adjacent hex of the non-moving Player's choice. If a bridging train is in such a hex (deployed or not), it is not displaced; but is automatically captured by the entering Force and may be placed on a present Leader's Organic Units Track.

A Force may freely enter (see "Force Integrity") and/or move through hexes containing other Friendly Forces. A Force does not expend any additional movement Points to enter or leave Friendly-occupied hexes. A Force may never be moved off the mapedge, except through voluntary Withdrawal into Cantonment (cf),

or unless required to retreat off the map. In the latter case, the Force re-enters the map in its following Movement Phase at the nearest possible mapedge hex. Pursuit of such retreating Forces must end at the mapedge hex.

WHEN MOVEMENT TAKES PLACE

A Player's Forces may be moved only during his own Movement or Forced March Phases. The one exception to this is when, during the Combat Phase, a Force involved in combat may be called upon to advance or retreat after combat. Once a Force has been moved, and the Attrition it suffers has been determined, it may move no farther that Phase, nor may it take back or change its move.

EXTENDED MARCH

Extended March occurs when the owning Player wishes to increase the Movement Allowance of his Force by as many as four additional Movement Points for each unit. In order to do this, the Force in question must be within Dispatch Distance at the end of the normal march (see "Expending Movement Commands for Extended March"). If it can receive the mandatory additional Movement Command, the Force may continue another four Movement Points along the way—note that the Movement Allowances of both Infantry and Cavalry are increased by 4 MPs during Extended March. Attrition for the force is determined only once, at the end of Extended March. Forces moving under Initiative may not make an Extended March.

FORCED MARCH

Forced March is simply movement of a Player's Force during his Forced March Segment, which occurs within the Enemy Player's Combat Phase. A Force may only move by its Leader's Initiative during Forced March. It may not use Extended March. It may not enter an Enemy Controlled hex unless the Enemy Force controlling that hex is already in a Friendly ZOC. In this case it must be adjacent to the Friendly Force already there.

STACKING

There is no stacking limit. However, maximum force size is 68,000 men (68 SPs), for Movement Purposes, and up to 68 SPs could occupy a single package. More than 68 SPs may combine in a single attack, if possible. The number of SPs which may pass through a hex is unlimited.

Suggestion: Leaders stacked together may be removed to the Organization Display of their Force Commander off map; they should be placed in the space on his track corresponding to their Subordination Rating. Thus, the Player can tell at a glance, by counting the Subordinates and Combat units on the track together, how much of the Commander's Span remains unused.

Overlapping Units

This is not allowed. Stacked units must both occupy

the same two hexes. Such a stack is termed a "Package" (cf).

Force Integrity

Two Leaders may not be stacked in a single package unless one of them is a Commander capable of commanding the other, or a third Commander/Leader is in the package or adjacent, and actually in command of both Leaders stacked together. Exception: Two Forces without a capable Commander may end the Movement Phase in the same package if organic unit reorganization in the following Reorganization Segment removes all organic units from one of the Leaders. (Players must be careful to insure that a Commander's Command Span is not exceeded.) Further, a Leader stacked with the Commander of one Force may not be subordinate to another Commander in another package. Thus, two Forces may not end the Phase in the same hexes (see exception above). Therefore, all the Leaders in a hex will always belong to the same Force, unless the two forces can be consolidated in the next phase. Two separate and distinct forces which begin the phase in the same hex may not remain stacked together—this applies during Combat Phases as well as movement. In this case the excess Leaders unable to be combined under a single Commander's Span are displaced to an adjacent hex.

Overstacking Penalty

The Owning Player must choose, in the case of more than 68,000 men occupying a single package, units from the over-stacked package to be displaced in the direction they entered the hex from, and must displace units until the stack is in conformity with the stacking limit. This must be done at the beginning of any combat phase; during Movement, the over-stacked forces must simply separate.

Stacking Effects on Combat and Retreat

Units stacked in a single hex always defend as a combined strength. Units stacked in the same hex may never attack different hexes. Units in a Force must all attack the same hexes.

FIFTEEN: FACING AND UNIT MODE

'Column' and 'Line' are terms of convenience; what is represented by the two possible unit modes is the difference between the extended array used by a force when marching—in reality being spread-out across a width of ten miles and a depth of perhaps thirty—and the concentration of this array for battle on a given frontage. Inducing the enemy to commit his troops to a false front was part of the Napoleonic method.

Leader Counters have two sides: in column, their identity is hidden from the Enemy Player; in line, their name shows. When in column, a unit has a "front" of 5 adjacent hexes; in line, the front is three. There is a cost of one-half MP to change facing, and it can be

Units may not retreat into or through Friendly-occupied hexes: if such a hex is the only alternative to a Force retreating after combat, the non-retreating Force must be Displaced (cf), to an adjacent hex, and then the retreating Force may pass into the vacated hex.

REPULSE

During the Movement Phase (only) the Phasing Player may attempt to Repulse the Enemy Forces in the path of any Friendly Force or Forces. The Phasing Player may exercise this option for any Force which he suspects has the necessary overwhelming odds. He must state which enemy Forces are being repulsed. In order to be excluded from the Repulse attempt, all other Enemy Forces adjacent to the Repulsing Force must be attacked or repulsed by other Friendly Forces during that same Player-Turn.

A successful Repulse requires seven-to-one odds or greater. The Repulsed Force simply retreats two hexes and neither Force takes any casualties.

Repulse attempts may be announced during the course of Movement. Simply move adjacent to the object Force (do not yet determine attrition for the moving Force). When the attempt is announced, the opposing strengths are revealed immediately. The two hex retreat is carried out if the odds are sufficient. If odds are six-to-one or less, the confrontation is resolved as a Pursuit Battle (not a Pitched Battle) during the battle segment, with the die rolled on the column two columns to the left of the actual odds.

If the Repulse attempt is successful, the Repulsing Force is entitled to march into the hex vacated by the Repulsed Force, and continue its march in any direction. There is no extra MP cost for Repulse. This march is considered a continuation of the Force's march, and hence it must afterward determine the attrition for the total of all Movement Points expended before and after the Repulse.

The Repulsing Force may march adjacent to other Enemy Forces after the successful Repulse, and may participate in or undertake attacks against any Enemy Force(s) to which it moves adjacent; it may even attack the Repulsed Force, or Repulse it again.


done during any friendly Movement Phase (March or Forced March).

Front of a Unit

In movement, a unit may enter the hex(es) its front faces. In addition, if in column (only), it may turn to one hex on either side (see diagram below). If in line, it may turn by moving forward only one half the counter (left or right side). The direction of facing can be reversed (ie from east to west) at a cost of one-half MP (this does not change the unit position). To change direction or mode—any change or combination of changes not re-

quiring displacement of the unit from the hexes it occupies—costs one-half MP.

Definition of Forward Movement



Unit can enter any hex marked "x" when in type of formation listed. Unit can enter "y" hexes only by reversing facing at a cost of ½ MP, and "•" hexes only by changing mode.

COLUMN AND LINE FORMATIONS


According to which side of a Leader counter is showing, the troops in that Leader's force may be considered either in Column or Line. The cost to change formation is one-half MP. Attack strength is halved for improper facing—and formations have inherent facing.

Movement in Column

When in column, the rear half of the unit is considered to "follow" the front half. All turns are made at no extra cost. When moving a unit in column, completely disregard the following half. The only requirement is that at the end of movement, the following half must be in the hex the leading half of the unit entered its final hex from. Direction of facing may be reversed at a cost of one-half MP, at the end of the march, except if ending in enemy ZOC.


Movement in Line

When in Line, both halves of the counter move forward together, paying Movement Points only for the half which moved through the most costly terrain.



In Line, a unit may only enter hexes it is facing. A turn (wherein only half the unit displaces into a different hex) still costs the full MP cost of the hex entered by that half.

Example:



Changing Mode in Enemy ZOC

To make a change when you begin the Phase in an enemy ZOC requires a successful Initiative Die Roll, in order to expend the necessary ½ MP. The Force making the Mode change could then remain in place or continue to move out of the package. Mode cannot be changed at the end of march when in enemy ZOC (see "Movement out of Enemy ZOCs").

Effect of Mode Change on Facing

Note that the front of the package changes 90° with mode change; ie



The position of the package does not change when it's flipped over.

Mode Change in Retreat/Pursuit

In Pursuit, you always advance the number of hexes, regardless of mode; retreating and Pursuing Forces may change mode during retreat/pursuit freely.

FACING EFFECT ON COMBAT

The classic Napoleonic battle involved inducing the defending side to commit all its reserves at right angles to its front by placing a flanking force toward the defender's rear, whereupon an assault upon the resulting "hinge" in the defender's line habitually met with resounding success. To show this, however, it is not necessary (and, at this level, would be somewhat misleading) to depict the actual facing of the forces as it relates to combat, for the corps formations we are concerned with were capable of protecting their flanks by committing their own reserves thereto. It was only after this induced commitment that the real effect of the flanking gesture was felt—the lack of reserves to meet a new attack on the hinge. All that is required in our present application is a rule showing that a force, any one hex of which is surrounded by enemy forces or their Zones of Control, when forced to retreat, has its normal loss due to pursuit doubled. In complying with this regulation, Players will find it necessary to place a "flanking" force toward the enemy rear, though for purposes of the formulation in the following rule, the terms 'front,' 'flank,' and 'rear' are irrelevant. Facing is thus completely disregarded during combat: A defending stack may be attacked from front or rear with no effect.

The only consideration concerning facing in combat is that it shows which hexes a force may attack without penalty—a force may attack any one or more hexes it faces, so long as every enemy Force adjacent to any side of the force is attacked by some Friendly Force, and that all Leaders participating in a given at-

tack face the same defending stack and are all adjacent to the same Commander. (Note also the effect of unit Mode on Combat.)

FACING AND COMBAT

If the attacking force consists of two packages, they must be adjacent, through at least one hexside, to each other. Facing does not affect the defender. However, if the attacking Force does not 'face' the defender it attacks, if required to do so, at halved Combat Strength.

Two Leaders in the same package cannot attack different packages. Two Leaders in the same package cannot be attacked separately, and there may only be one commander per package.

Note that you can ignore facing if you're in column, as you are halved (see "Combat Effect of Unit Mode").

Terrain and Facing

A stack occupying two hexes divided by a river is halved in Defense Strength. Facing does not affect forces inside fortresses.

Attacking Forward

The Front of a unit determines which hex or hexes the unit may attack at full strength—it may attack a hex not to its front only when forced to do so.

A Friendly Force adjacent to an Enemy Force which is not being attacked by some other Friendly Force, and which is itself unable to change to face that Enemy Force, automatically attacks at halved Combat Strength.

COMBAT EFFECT OF UNIT MODE

A Force in column is halved in Strength. **Exceptions:** If the force is already halved due to having a river bisect its package, or due to attacking a package it does not face, or is reduced in strength for any other reason (eg mountains), there is no further effect for being in column.

Cavalry Strength Exemption

Cavalry Strengths, unlike Infantry and Artillery, are

SIXTEEN: TERRAIN

EFFECTS OF TERRAIN ON MOVEMENT

The basic Movement Point cost is one Movement Point per Clear Terrain hex. The cost to enter certain non-clear terrain hexes and/or cross certain hexsides may be more or less than one MP, as shown on the Terrain Effects Chart. Terrain costs are cumulative.

Roads and Rivers

A Force which moves along a road across a road hexside pays the rate for that type of road (primary or

not affected by the halving of strength Penalty for being in column during combat (only).

Halving Strength

When Halving Strength, for whatever reason, always round defender's strength up, attacker's strength down.

INTELLIGENCE

Leader Identity

Leader counters moving across the map stay inverted, and their identity hidden from the Enemy Player, while in column. Their identity must be revealed for as long as they remain in Line, or for as long as they remain adjacent to Enemy units. If an Enemy Force moves through their ZOC, or vice-versa, their identity is revealed and again immediately concealed.

Effect of Hostile Territory on Intelligence

(see "Hostile Territory.")

Optional Rule:


DUMMY COUNTERS

The Allied Player may place one Dummy Leader on the map for every actual Leader he has on the map. The French Player may place one dummy Leader for each two actual Leaders he has on the map. Dummy Forces are moved and in every way behave like real forces until their identity is revealed; at this point they are removed from the map (but may be replaced in the following turn). If the number of forces a Player has is reduced, he must reduce his number of Dummies. Dummies can be placed anywhere within Dispatch Distance.

Limit to Dummy Counters

The number of Dummy Counters which may be deployed is limited to those provided in the counter mix (32 for the Allies; 16 for the French).

Movement Example



secondary), regardless of other terrain in the hex. A Force may cross a primary River hexside only through a Bridge hexside (for which there is no additional MP Cost). Secondary River hexsides may be crossed at the MP cost noted on the Terrain Effects Chart. For purposes of movement and Combat, crossing of bridges must be done in column.

Variable Movement Point Costs

Some Movement Costs, shown on the TEC, are different for cavalry and infantry. Cavalry costs are applicable only to cavalry units, Centers of Opns, Leaders moving independently, and when calculating Dispatch Distance.

EFFECTS OF TERRAIN ON COMBAT

Except for fortresses and rivers, which are special cases, when the package occupied by a counter is in split terrain, the defender gets the maximum benefit afforded by either hex. Note the separate case for a package split by a river; river benefit is only enjoyed if all hexsides between attacker and defender are river hexsides. A counter must occupy both hexes of a fortress to enjoy the benefit.

When a force is defending in "Affecting" Terrain and/or attacked exclusively across River hexsides, the Combat odds are located on the "Affecting" Terrain Line on the Combat Results Table. Units may attack across Primary River hexsides only if bridged on the hexside and may only make Pursuit Battles across them. To attack across a bridge, the attacking force must be in column. A Force may ignore the bridge and attack across a 2° river in line.

Affecting Terrain

Affecting Terrain includes all Fortified Town, Hill and Mountain hexes when the defender is in the hex, or

secondary River, and Bridge hexsides attacked across. Use the "Affecting" line on the CRT. Non-affecting Terrain includes Clear, Towns, and Swamp (*but see effects below*). There is no cumulative benefit for hex and hexside Affecting Terrain.

Marsh Effect on Combat Strength

The Strength of units attacking out of such terrain is halved (rounding fractions up). Marsh is not Affecting Terrain. Strength of units defending in Marsh hexes is not affected (**exception:** see *Cavalry Effects below*).

Effect of Mountains on Tactical Deployment

A maximum of three Infantry and no Cavalry or Artillery units may attack from a single Mountain or part-Mountain package. This limit does not apply to defenders in Mountain hexes. (Note that this Attack Limit is not a Stacking Limit—units in excess of the Attack Limit are affected by adverse combat results, remaining with the Force and being affected by the combat result (they may pursue if their force wins). Defending units in Mountain hexes receive the benefit for Affecting Terrain. (There is no effect on defending unit's strength.

Fortified Towns Effect on Combat

(see Section Twenty-three)

Effects of Terrain on Cavalry Strength

Cavalry Strength is halved when defending in (or attacking out of) Marsh hexes. Cavalry units may not attack or pursue out of Mountain hexes. When halving Strengths, round fractions down when attacking, up when defending. The Combat Strength of Cavalry units is also halved when attacking into, or defending in Woods hexes.

SEVENTEEN: ZONES OF CONTROL

A package (two hexes) and the eight hexagons immediately surrounding it constitute the Zone of Control (ZOC) of any units therein. Hexes upon which a Force exerts a Zone of Control are called controlled hexes. ZOCs halt Enemy Movement. Enemy Forces are compelled to attack when in a Friendly ZOC at the beginning of their own Battle Resolution Segment. Depending upon his Individual Initiative (as modified), a Leader and his Force may exit an Enemy Controlled hex during either the March or Forced March Phases. A Force may be compelled to retreat or advance out of an Enemy ZOC during the Combat Phase. Zones of Control do not extend across non-bridged Primary River hexsides.

When Forces Exert Zones of Control

All Forces exert a Zone of Control at all times during

the game unless the Force has no combat units in it. (See also "Supply Source Garrisons.")

Effect on Infantry Maj Gens

A Force led by an infantry Maj Gen may not enter an Enemy ZOC (even a Friendly occupied one), unless he has a negative Initiative Die Roll modifier of at least "– 1".

EXTENT OF ZOC INFLUENCE

The presence of Enemy ZOCs is never negated due to the presence of Friendly units or their ZOCs, and it endures throughout the Game-Turn. Adjacent Enemy units are equally and mutually affected by each other's ZOC. There is no additional effect from having more than one Force exerting its ZOC into a single hex.

Repulse

An Enemy Force may be Repulsed (cf) during the Friendly Movement Phase. The effect of Repulse is that the Repulsed Force in no way impedes the Friendly March.

ZOCs and Terrain

The only terrain feature which blocks the Zones of Control of a Force non-Bridged Primary River hex-sides (see the *Terrain Effects Chart*).

ZOCs and Command

A Line of Communications or Dispatch Distance may never be traced into or out of an Enemy Controlled hex, regardless of presence of other friendly forces in ZOC. (This means that forces in enemy ZOCs may only move by Initiative.)

EFFECT OF ZONES OF CONTROL ON COMBAT

A Force in an Enemy Controlled hex at the start of the Battle Segment must attack at least one Enemy Occupied hex. All enemy forces in Friendly ZOCs must be attacked by a Friendly Force.

Retreat into Enemy ZOCs

A Force may retreat into an Enemy Controlled hex (if permitted by the priorities under the Path of Retreat rules). A Force does not have to cease retreating upon entering an Enemy Controlled hex. However, such a Force must double its total losses caused by Enemy Pursuit.

Pursuit Effects

A Force entitled to advance after combat may ignore any and all ZOCs along its path of advance.

MOVEMENT OUT OF ENEMY ZOCs

A unit is required to stop expending Movement Points

upon entering an Enemy Zone of Control during the March and Forced March Phases, and remain in that enemy controlled hex for the remainder of that Movement Segment (without changing mode). It may leave in a subsequent Segment. There is a Movement Penalty for exiting Enemy ZOCs—there is no extra cost to enter. To exit an Enemy ZOC costs two additional Movement Points beyond the cost of entering the adjacent hex (**exception: see below**). A Force may never move directly from one Enemy Controlled hex to another (unless advancing or retreating after combat).

Initiative for Purposes of ZOC Exit

A Force in an Enemy controlled hex may move only under the Initiative of its Leader—it may not be issued a Movement Command. In addition, the Leader's Initiative may be adversely affected by the Initiative of the adjacent Enemy Leader. To determine the Initiative die modifier which the exiting Leader has, use the Initiative Comparison Matrix. If more than one Enemy Force controls any hex occupied by the friendly force, use the enemy Leader with the highest Initiative Rating for reference. Add the Cavalry Differential: In this case, total the cavalry in both enemy packages in determining the Cavalry Differential Modifier (see "*Cavalry Differential Initiative Modifier*").

Exceptions to Enemy ZOC Movement Penalty

1. Tiny Forces: A Force of only one Combat Strength Point does not compel an Enemy Force exiting its ZOC to expend any additional MPs for that purpose. A Force of two Combat Strength Points requires an additional MP cost of one MP (only) to exit its ZOC (**exception: below**).

2. Cavalry: Cavalry units never pay any additional MP cost to exit an Enemy ZOC unless there is enemy cavalry (any amount) in the control-line hex. If there is any amount of cavalry (even one or two Strength Points) in a hex, all units must pay the full two additional MPs to exit its ZOC.

EIGHTEEN: COMBAT

"You see that two armies are two bodies which meet and endeavor to frighten each other; a moment of panic occurs, and that moment must be turned to advantage . . . it only requires a slight opportunity, a pretense, to restore confidence."—Napoleon.

By using the following procedures, adjacent opposing units inflict losses on one another. The Players first decide the type of battle being fought. In a Pursuit battle the Phasing Player makes a single attack on the Defending Force. In a Pitched Battle, after the Phasing Player attacks the Defending Force, the non-Phasing Player Counterattacks, and combat between the two Forces may continue for a number of alternating attacks and counterattacks. At the end of either type

of battle the losing side must retreat and the victorious Force pursues. After all combat for the Phase has been resolved, all retreating forces roll to see if they become disorganized, and all currently disorganized forces roll to see if they rally.

All Enemy forces in Friendly Zones of Control must be attacked by the Phasing Player's units in the Combat Phase. All of the Phasing units adjacent to the Enemy must attack at least one Enemy occupied hex to which they are adjacent. (Non-phasing forces may counterattack, but are not required to attack all enemy forces adjacent.) Before resolving any Combat both Players must secretly and independently choose which type of battle they wish to fight in each combat

situation (see below), and the Player attacking or counterattacking may resolve artillery fire (refer to "Artillery-Use in Combat).

HOW TO DETERMINE COMBAT ODDS

After artillery fire has taken its toll, the attacker totals the Combat Strengths of all units attacking a given hex and compares the total to the total Combat Strengths of the defending units in the hex under attack. The comparison is expressed as a ratio between attacking and defending Strength Point totals (attacking Strength divided by defending Strength) and is simplified by rounding off (in favor of the defender) to one of the odds ratios shown on the Combat Results Table (CRT).

Example: If thirteen Strength Points were attacking four, the combat odds ratio would be 3.25 to 1, rounded off to three to one (rounded down). You may not voluntarily reduce the Combat Odds.

Having determined the actual combat odds, the Player locates the corresponding odds heading on the line for the governing terrain, and rolls the die, modifying the result for the attacking Leader's Bonus Point (if any). The resulting number indicates a line on the Combat Results Table, which is cross-indexed with the column representing the combat odds. The intersection of line and column yields the Combat Result. How this result is applied, and whether the defending Player counterattacks to continue the combat, depends on the type of battle chosen by the Owning Player of each Force. Each separate combat Situation may be resolved in any order that the Phasing Player wishes, so long as each combat is fully resolved before proceeding to the next, and all enemy forces adjacent to Phasing forces are attacked during the Combat Phase.

PURSUIT BATTLE

Every battle is a "Pursuit Battle" unless the loser has chosen "Pitched Battle" for that situation at the beginning of the Combat Routine. In a Pursuit Battle the losing force will retreat and have its losses determined by the Pursuit of the victorious Force. The Combat Result will give two numbers, one of which indicates distance in hexes the losing force must retreat; the other indicates the number of Strength Points lost by the victorious force (the retreating force's result is printed in *italics*). This result should be applied, and the Pursuit procedure carried out, before going on to resolve any other combat.

PITCHED BATTLE

At the beginning of the Combat Routine both Players secretly choose which type of battle each Friendly Force involved in a combat situation will fight. These choices may be written down, or (if the Players can trust one another) simply stated before each battle is resolved. Once made, a Player's choice may not be altered until after the first "round" of Pitched Battle. Pitched Battle allows a Force to convert retreat results into Strength Point losses, thus compelling the

Defending Force to counter-attack. This option may only be used by Forces that chose Pitched Battle at the beginning of the Combat Routine. In any Combat situation, Pitched Battle will continue only so long as the retreating side chooses (and is able) to remain in place. As with Pursuit Battle, the initial attack by the Phasing Player will produce a Combat Result of two numbers. If the retreating Force chose Pursuit Battle at the beginning of the Combat Routine then no Pitched Battle occurs; the losing Force simply retreats. If, however, the retreating force chose Pitched Battle, then no retreat occurs and the combat result indicates the number of Strength Points lost by each Force. After these losses have been applied the non-Phasing Player immediately counterattacks with all (surviving) units which defended against the original attack. This attack must be made against at least one stack of enemy units which made the original attack. The odds for this counterattack are calculated in the usual manner (allowing for artillery fire before determining strength), and are modified by affecting terrain and/or any Combat Bonus of the counterattacking Leader. The results of this and all subsequent attacks and counterattacks between the two Forces may be applied as if it were either a Pitched or Pursuit Battle, at the retreating Player's option. If the Player who loses the counterattack chooses to continue the Pitched Battle then the Phasing Player, must repeat his original attack (on all defending hexes) possibly causing the non-Phasing Player to counterattack again. This alternating sequence of attacks and counterattacks continues until one force retreats (and has its losses for that particular combat determined by Pursuit).

Restrictions on the Type of Battle Chosen

Pitched Battle may not be conducted across 1° river bridges.

Infantry and Cavalry Major Generals may never choose Pitched Battle (ie they must retreat if such a result is indicated for them on the Combat Results Table). Of course, such Leaders could participate in a Pitched Battle if they were under a Friendly Commander's Force. The number of attacks (or counterattacks) a Force may make during a Pitched Battle may not voluntarily exceed the Initiative Rating of the Force Leader (for multi-Leader forces, use the Initiative of the Force Commander). For example, Lt. Gen. Osten-Sacken, with an Initiative of "3", could make no more than three attacks (or counterattacks) in any given Pitched Battle. If such a limit is reached and the Force is still required to attack or counter-attack, it may continue to do so, but must retreat as soon as any Combat Result is obtained calling for the Force to do so (that is, once this limit is reached the Force may no longer convert retreat results to Strength Point losses and thus remain in place).

You always complete all the rounds of one Pitched Battle before going on to begin to resolve the next battle.

If a Force is entirely eliminated in a Pitched Battle, the winning side may advance into (but not beyond) the hexes occupied by the eliminated Force.

Remember: The loser of the round of battle is the

Player who receives the italicized combat result. His choice, alone, always determines whether Pitched Battle will begin (or continue), according to whether he opts to take strength point losses or retreat. However, it is the Defender (the non-Phasing Player) who always make the first counterattack, regardless of who lost.

Which Forces Attack

No Force may participate in more than one combat situation per Combat Phase. Although Forces engaged in a single Pitched Battle may attack and be attacked more than once per Phase, they may do so against only one opposing force. Combat is mandatory between adjacent opposing Forces. A Force in an Enemy ZOC at the beginning of the Battle Resolution Segment must attack at least one Enemy Occupied Hex (but see "Multi-Force Combat," below). All Enemy Forces adjacent to Phasing Forces must be attacked by a Phasing Force. The Phasing Player may choose which attacking units will attack each defending Force, as long as all adjacent opposing Forces are engaged by some Phasing Force, and as long as all opposing Forces are adjacent to each other. Non-phasing counterattackers need attack only one adjacent stack. All units which are attacking a given stack must belong to the same Force at the beginning of that Battle Segment. And every counter in the Force must be adjacent to the Enemy package being attacked—non-adjacent forces may not participate.

MULTIPLE FORCE AND TWO-PACKAGE COMBAT

A Force must combine in a single attack; the strength of all units in the Force is totalled. Even if the Force occupies two packages, it may not separately engage Enemy-occupied packages. If the attacking units in the different packages are subordinate to a single Commander, he is considered in Command of each package. A defending Commander can only apply his Initiative for Pursuit to combat involving his own package.


A single combat may involve attacking or defending leaders in any number of different locations, so long as all of the attacking leaders are part of a single Force. To be resolved as a single combat, all of the attacking Force must be adjacent to at least one hex of each defending package. Two separate Forces may not make one combined attack; these attacks, on separate packages, must be resolved separately. Two or more separate defending stacks may be attacked simultaneously, in one combined attack, by an Enemy Force which occupies a hex adjacent to both Friendly defending Forces.

A force may never be attacked more than once in a given Combat Phase, and different Leaders in the same package may never be attacked separately.

Multi-Force Combat


Often a Player will have more than one Force adjacent to an Enemy-occupied package. The additional Forces may not add their strength in an attack against the defending; although the additional Forces would suffer any adverse results along with the Force

actually attacking. In other words, a Player may have more than one Force adjacent to the defender, but only one force may use its Combat Strength for the calculation of the Combat Odds.



Different Forces or units in a package may not be attacked separately. If the Phasing Player's Force is in the Zone of Control of more than one Enemy stack, it must attack all those adjacent enemy stacks which are not engaged by some other attacking Force. A Player may attack only those hexes to which his Forces are actually adjacent:

NOTE: The word "adjacent" as applied herein means that two opposing packages share at least one common hexside (examples below). The term does not refer to units across an unbridged primary hexside from each other—attacks are not allowed across such hexsides.



COMBAT CASUALTY PROCEDURE

Losses called for in the Combat Results and Pursuit Procedures must be allocated to combat units on the Organization Display. Once a unit is eliminated, it remains out of play.

After rolling the die on the CRT, remove the losses called for for the non-retreating side, (for both sides if the loser chooses to continue a Pitched Battle). If the loser will retreat, execute the retreat, removing no losses for now from the retreating side. Then go through the Pursuit Procedure, and determine whether the advance will extend the same distance as the retreat. If it does, the retreating force loses the full amount shown on the CRT (the number equal to the length of its retreat). If it does not, the retreaters' losses are equal to the actual advance of the Enemy Force, but they must at least equal the loss taken by the Enemy. Put another way, the retreating Force

takes the full loss shown on the CRT only when at least one Enemy Force involved advances the full distance of retreat along the Path of Retreat. If this does not occur, the retreating Force loses either the same number of Points as the Enemy or a number of SPs equal to the actual advance, whichever is greater.

Distribution of Losses

(See "Organization Display—Removing Losses.")

Calculating Lost Strength

Loss Calculation is always based on a unit's basic strength as shown on the Organization Display. No additional strength derived from terrain may be considered "lost" for pursuit or any other causes.

The Combat Strength loss which units take is the net effect of a series of events which would occur immediately after the battle and throughout the next day. First, many battalions, regiments and even entire brigades would have been "broken" in shock—hand to hand—combat and lost any cohesion or effectiveness. The Leaders would spend the next day attempting to rally the individual troops from these broken formations and reorganize them; the retreating army could only undertake this procedure beyond the limit of pursuit by Enemy Forces. But the farther away from the battlefield it takes place, the fewer men will eventually find their way back to their units. Inevitably, even for

the side which retains possession of the battlefield, numbers of troops will be hopelessly and permanently lost, not only due to reorganization problems but, of course, also due to casualties resulting from enemy fire. But of the two types of strength loss (eg disintegration due to shock combat and wounds inflicted on individuals due to fire combat) the former is the more significant.

Effect on Morale of Pitched Battles

For each combat situation in which at least one "round" of Pitched Battle is resolved (that is, the loser at least once converts his retreat loss into combat strength points lost, and the defender counter-attacks), and at least one side's Force Commander has a Span of "six" or greater, **and** at the end of the combat one side pursues at least one hex, and that side did not lose any combat within the rounds of that Pitched Battle situation, there will be a change in morale. If all four conditions are met, the Pursuing side is considered the victorious side, and the victorious Player may make a change in either the French or Allied Morale Marker, one space at his choice. He may not move both markers at once. He may decide either to move his own Morale marker to the right, or to move the Enemy Morale Marker to the left, within the restrictions concerning the movement of the Morale Marker off the Track (see "Morale Victory.")

NINETEEN: RETREAT AFTER COMBAT

When the Combat Result requires that a Player's Forces be retreated, he must move them the full number of hexes shown. Units stacked together must remain together. Retreat is in terms of hexes (not Movement Points), but the easiest hex (in terms of MP cost) must be chosen along the Path of Retreat (see "Priority of Retreat Path").

Retreat Through Enemy ZOC

If any one package of a Force is completely surrounded by Enemy Forces or ZOCs, that Force may retreat through an Enemy controlled hex (never through an enemy-occupied hex). However, Forces which do retreat through Enemy-controlled hexes have their losses due to Pursuit doubled (see "Zones of Control—Retreating into Enemy ZOCs").

Retreat into Friendly Occupied Hexes

A retreat is permitted into or through a friendly-occupied hex. Units in these hexes, however, must be displaced (cf).

RETREAT OF A TWO-PACKAGE FORCE

Leaders in adjacent packages may not retreat in different directions if they participated in a single com-

bat. (Leaders in the same hex must always retreat together.) Such Forces must end the retreat adjacent. In this case the Path of Retreat is considered to be the path taken by the Leader Commanding the Force and for casualty determination purposes the Enemy Pursuit is counter along his path.

PATH OF RETREAT

Whenever an Enemy force is forced to retreat, it will leave a path of vacant hexes behind it called the Path of Retreat. This path must be as straight as possible; no hex in the path may be adjacent to more than one hex already retreated through by the retreating Force, nor may one hex be passed through more than once. (**Notice:** for Path of Retreat purposes, ignore the "trailing" rear half of the Leader counter, and regard only the leading half.) The Path of the retreating Force may not pass through prohibited terrain. If no such path is available, the retreating Force retreats as far as it can; if the Enemy Pursuit would carry the Pursuing Force into the final hex in which the retreating Force came to a halt, the retreating Force is entirely eliminated. If there are two or more equally nice retreat paths to choose from, the retreating Force must include in the general direction of its Supply Source. (cf. "Mode Change in Retreat/Pursuit" under "Facing").

Priority of Retreat Path

The following is a listing of the parameters in order of priority within which Forces may retreat.

- 1) The Forces must retreat the total number of hexes indicated. They must end their retreat that number of hexes (as indicated by the Combat Result) away from the hex in which they suffered the result.
- 2) They may not retreat into or through any hex they have already retreated into during this retreat. They may not retreat into an Enemy occupied hex. If any of these conditions cannot be met the force in question is eliminated in the last hex of the retreat path which did meet these conditions, if the Enemy Force advances into that hex.
- 3) The Path must work out to be the one with the lowest Movement Point cost, as if the units were making a normal move along it—although the retreat execution is in terms of hexes.
- 4) The path should be through hexes vacant of Friendly Forces. If the path must traverse Friendly occupied hexes, they should be those hexes containing the fewest Strength Points.
- 5) The Path may only include Enemy Controlled hexes as a last resort, and then must include the fewest number of them possible.
- 6) All other things being equal, the units must choose the path which places them closest (in terms of Movement Points) to their Supply Source (not the Center of Operations).

Turning During Retreat and Pursuit

An Initial turn at the beginning of Retreat or Pursuit (where only half of a package moves) does not count as a hex of retreat.

DISPLACEMENT

If the only hex available to the retreating Force (outside of Enemy ZOC) is one which is occupied by a Friendly Force, then the Friendly Force is displaced.

The displaced force is moved out of the way one or more hexes as necessary, as if it were retreating as a result of combat, and the Path of Retreat proceeds into or through the hex it vacated.

If the displacement would cause a move into prohibited terrain or Enemy ZOC(s), the retreating force is instead eliminated. Displaced forces can themselves displace other Friendly forces in a sort of chain reaction of displacement, if that is the only alternative.

Displacement of Part of a Package

You may displace only half of a force; in fact, in most cases it will only be necessary for a retreating force to traverse one of the hexes of a friendly occupied package. In these cases, the unit to be displaced is in effect 'turned' with the non-displaced part of the Force remaining in its previous location while the other half of the Force moves to a hex adjacent to its old position (and, of course, to its non-displaced 'other half'). Note that this same kind of turning maneuver may be allowed in retreats of only one hex, when only half of the package is adjacent to the enemy. You do not displace a Force out of its entire two-hex package unless this is the only route available for the retreating unit.

RETREAT OFF THE MAP

If a Force is compelled to retreat off the map it may do so. Any Pursuing Enemy Force must stop at the mapedge, however, the retreating Force takes any losses due to any Pursuit normally (although the length of the Pursuit may be shortened because the Pursuing Force must stop at the mapedge). The retreating Force is automatically disorganized (regardless of its Leader's Initiative) but (once rallied) may re-enter the game as if it were a reinforcement, using the hex it exited the map from as its entry hex. If its exit hex is blocked, it may re-enter on the nearest free hex.

TWENTY: PURSUIT (ADVANCE AFTER COMBAT)

The Friendly Force which participated in the combat is allowed to pursue the Enemy, advancing along the Path of Retreat. Pursuing Forces may not stray from this Path. They may cease advancing in any hex along the Path of Retreat, short of or equal to the length of advance specified on the Pursuit Table. Pursuing units may advance from one Enemy controlled hex to another. A Pursuing Force may never move into the hex occupied by the retreating Force. If the retreating Force did not retreat its full allotment (cf. "Priority of Retreat Path," #1) and the Pursuing Force would be able to Pursue into either hex occupied by the retreating Force, the latter is eliminated and the Pursuit carries on into the last location of the retreating force. A Force may not advance farther than the number of hexes shown on the Pursuit Table, nor beyond the retreating force's position. The Pursuit Procedure must be carried out immediately, before

any other combat resolution. Units are never forced to pursue. After advancing, units may not attack any more that Phase, even if their advance places them adjacent to Enemy forces whose battles are yet to be resolved, or who were not in a battle situation.

How to Determine the Extent of Pursuit

To determine the permissible length of advance after combat, take the advancing Leader's Initiative Rating, cross-reference it with the length of retreat of the enemy force (determined by the Combat Results Table), roll the die and modify it for Resistance and Cavalry Differential. The result is the length of advance permissible: the Player may opt to advance a shorter distance, or not at all.

If a force is entirely eliminated in retreat, the Pursuit may not go beyond the hex in which the force was

eliminated. You may never advance beyond the hex in which the Enemy Force was eliminated.

Pursuit Bonus

Add one hex to the Length of Advance shown on the Pursuit Table for a Force of exclusively Cavalry and/or Old Guard. If a retreating force retreats its full allotment, but the pursuit bonus of a pursuing force composed of cavalry/Old Guard units could carry that pursuing force into the hex occupied by the retreating force, the pursuers halt their pursuit adjacent to the defeated force, which loses one extra SP.

Which Forces May Pursue

The entire Force actually involved in the Combat may pursue. However, a Player may wish to compose a Force consisting of only one or more of the participating Leaders, and their organic units, to make the Pursuit, while the remaining Leaders hold in place. He may not, however, create any new Maj Gens

or juggle the units organic to the Leaders: this can only take place during the Organization Phase. Only one Force may make Pursuit. The Pursuing Force must be equal in Strength Points to the length of advance which it makes. And when determining the length of advance, only the advancing Leader's Initiative Rating is compared against the Enemy Leader's to get the Initiative Modifier for the Pursuing Force.

Only a Force actually engaged in combat with the Retreating Force may advance in its Path of Retreat. Forces adjacent to the Pursuing Force which are engaged with other Enemy forces may pursue only as a result of their own combat action.

Unit Mode in Retreat and Pursuit

A unit may change mode freely during Retreat and Pursuit. One initial turn of the force counter (where only half the counter moves to a different hex) may be made freely at the beginning of the retreat or pursuit (and nothing is deducted from the specified distance of retreat or pursuit for the turn).

TWENTY ONE: DISORGANIZATION & RALLY

A Force that retreats after combat (due to either a Pitched or Pursuit Battle) must determine whether or not it (and its Leader) becomes disorganized. During the Disorganization and Rally Segment immediately following the retreat, the Owning Player must roll one die. If the die roll (modified for Army Morale, only) is greater than the force Leader's Initiative then the force (and its Leader) is immediately disorganized. Any other result has no effect. In the case of a Multi-Leader Force the Owning Player may choose to have the entire Force make one die roll using the Initiative of the force Commander; or have some or all of the Leaders in the Force make separate die rolls, each using their own Initiative. Forces that are Disorganized should have their identities recorded on a piece of paper, or Players may indicate this fact by rotating the affected combat units 180° on the Organization Display.

Effects of Disorganization

Disorganized Leaders may not use Forced March or attempt to move under Initiative. When moved using a Movement Command they must end their march closer (in terms of MPs) to their Supply Source. Disorganized Forces may not enter Enemy controlled hexes unless that hex is already occupied by a Friendly unit. Disorganized Forces may be included in a Commander's Force, but may still move only if that Commander is given a Movement Command, and must still move closer to their Supply Source. Disorganized

units may not attack, but they may defend normally. If a Force composed entirely of disorganized units is compelled to attack, this attack is automatically resolved at the worst possible combat odds (the "1-5" Column). Disorganized combat units may not be reorganized on the Display into the force of some other Leader. Disorganized Leaders may not receive any additional units through reorganization. Disorganized Forces that are forced to retreat again do not roll for any additional disorganization. They merely remain disorganized.

RALLY

Disorganized Leaders may attempt to recover from their disorganized state ("Rally") during all subsequent Disorganization and Rally Phases. For each force which begins the Phase Disorganized, the Owning Player should roll one die (modified for Army Morale), using the same procedure as above. If the die roll as modified is less than or equal to the Leader's Initiative the Force is considered to have rallied and is returned to "normal." There is no limit to the number of times a force may become disorganized, rally, and again become disorganized.

Players Note: Players who wish to increase the realism and uncertainty in the game should keep the results of their Disorganization and Rally die rolls hidden from their opponent.

TWENTY-TWO: REPLACEMENTS AND REINFORCEMENTS

REPLACEMENTS

The Armies receive a limited number of Combat Strength Points which may be accumulated or distributed among any units of the specified type during the Organization Segment of the Player-Turn in which the replacements are listed. Replacements may be accumulated for distribution on later turns. The specific number of Strength Points of new replacements available on a given turn for each army and unit type is shown on the Turn Record Track.

When Replacements May be Added

Replacements may only be added to units of their own nationality and unit type which are within Dispatch Distance of the Center of Operations or Depot, and which are not at their starting strength for the Scenario in play. Units in an Enemy ZOC during the Organization Segment and disorganized units may not receive replacements. Units may not be increased in strength beyond their strength at the start of the scenario. For the Campaign Game, use their highest scenario strength as the maximum. Previously eliminated units may not be brought back into the game with replacements (except Austrian brigades with both infantry and cavalry; also except during the Armistice if playing the Campaign Game.)

How to Record Accumulated Replacement Points

Just use any combat unit marker of the proper nationality and type, which is currently not in play, to mark the level of accumulated replacements of that type and nationality. **Example:** An Austrian infantry unit in the Nr. 4 space would indicate four Points of Austrian Infantry Replacement Points available. Slide the combat unit marker along the track to reflect increases and decreases in accumulated Points. Obviously you may not accumulate more than 12 Points of a given type and nationality, since the track only goes that high. Make a written note of replacements for which you do not have a counter available to record.

REINFORCEMENTS

Each Player receives a limited quantity of Forces during the course of the game as reinforcements. The exact composition of each reinforcement Force and its turn of arrival are set forth on the Game-Turn Record Track; the combat unit set-up shown on tracks of Leaders in the reinforcement force applies to the units at the time of their arrival. Reinforcements enter the

game during the Friendly March Phase. The reinforcement force is considered, for one turn only, to enter the map under its own initiative (ie initiative is already built into its arrival date). They may not perform extended march on their turn of arrival.

How Reinforcements Arrive

Reinforcements arrive on the road hex listed and pay the normal terrain cost for the entry hex (including the road bonus). Reinforcements may arrive stacked so long as the stacking and command rules are not violated. The first stack of reinforcement units brought onto a single hex in a Phase expends one Movement Point to enter the hex, the second stack expends three, the third five, etc., allowing for the two-hex length of each stack. These costs would be halved for units entering on Primary road hexes. Reinforcements must enter in the forces indicated on the Turn Record Track and may not be reorganized on the Organization Display before entering the game.

The owning player may delay the entry of any reinforcements beyond the Game-Turn indicated on the Game-Turn Record Track, only if the entry hex is occupied by an Enemy Force or is controlled by Enemy Force. If either condition exists, the Player may withhold the reinforcements until the removal of the Enemy presence, or he may bring the reinforcements on in any subsequent turn, at the nearest map edge hex unblocked by Enemy presence. Note that the owning Player has the option to enter into an enemy controlled hex but is not required to do so.

Road Entry

Entry of Reinforcements is always indicated by the name of the town nearest the map edge hex of arrival. Arrival hexes thus identified are always road hexes. **Stettin Note:** The road "to Stettin" exits the north map edge and runs through Berlin.

Army of Poland

This, or, any, group of reinforcements without a strength shown for the scenario in which they enter the game, should use their strength for the following scenario.

In addition, the Army of Poland, as well as any other reinforcements which enter the map beyond their assigned army's communications, may be assigned to another Allied army. Such reinforcements are not limited to the army assignment shown on the Organization Display. (This, however, does not apply to forces removed into cantonments.)

TWENTY-THREE: FORTRESSES (CITADELS & FORTIFIED TOWNS)

There are eight Citadels (Magdeburg, Wittenburg, Torgau, Thieriesenstadt, Spandau, Glogau, Breslau, Schweidnitz) and three Fortified towns (Leipzig, Dresden, Koenigstein). Together, these two types are referred to as Fortresses. Each fortress takes up two hexes (as indicated by the yellow tint extending beyond the "wall" symbol): the main, outlined hex, and the "bridgehead" hex on the opposite side of the river. In order to be considered to occupy a fortress, a Leader marker must be placed to occupy both hexes of the fortress package indicated by the yellow tint.

Zones of Control extend into and out of Fortresses normally, but combat between units in Citadels and adjacent Enemy forces is not mandatory. Forces in fortified towns are doubled in strength (up to a limit of ten SPs; thus 10 Strength Points would count as twenty and 15 would count as 25).

Stacking Limits

Because of their limited size, Fortresses have reduced stacking limits. No more than 25 Strength Points may end a Phase in a Fortress.

SIEGES

Once a Force in a Citadel hex has taken advantage of the Citadel (ie used the Citadel to avoid combat with adjacent enemy units), that Force is considered to be under siege. The decision whether or not to use the Citadel benefit is made at the moment combat would normally be required, and a Force in such a hex may choose to ignore the Citadel and resolve combat normally. Once placed under siege, however, a Force remains in that condition until the beginning of any Phase in which the state of siege is removed.

Besieged Forces may not receive Movement Commands but may attempt to move and/or attack out of the Citadel (unless they are completely surrounded) by using the Initiative Modification procedure. If such an attack is made, it is resolved under the normal conditions, and on the Affecting Line of the Combat results table (see "Breaking the Siege").

If forced to retreat, the besieged Force would instead remain in place and lose a number of SPs equal to the number of hexes indicated on the Combat Result; there would be no Pursuit. If the besieging Force(s) is Forced to retreat it may either remain in place and lose Strength Points in the same manner, or retreat normally, at the owning Player's option.

How a Citadel is Placed Under Siege

Only Citadels may be besieged. As long as at least one hex adjacent to the outlined hex of the citadel is occupied by enemy forces at least equal in strength to those inside, the citadel is considered "besieged." This means that the friendly force in the citadel cannot be moved. However, if a Citadel is considered to be in supply (due to a depot within the Citadel) the besieged force suffers no attrition. The unit in the citadel controls only its own package (indicated by positioning of

Leader or Garrison marker). Enemy forces may move past the package freely, though they may not move into or through the citadel package itself. If you move further forces into the hex and they are still besieged, the entering forces would be under the same strictures as the force already there.

State of Siege

A Force is considered in a state of siege (or "besieged") if it (1) has taken advantage of the citadel to avoid combat, and (2) is adjacent to a besieging force at least equal in SPs to itself. The besieging force need not occupy nor control all the hexes adjacent to the citadel in order to impose a state of siege.

Attrition of Forces in Citadels

1. Forces in Citadels are always considered "in Dispatch Distance" of the Center of Operations for purposes of Attrition Determination, if their strength is 6 SPs or less, and use current AP level to determine Quotient.

2. For forces in Citadels stronger than 6 SPs, Attrition is always determined using the "Zero" column on the AQT, (or the current Army Level, if negative).

Surrender

The Citadel will surrender at the end of any Besieged-force Player-Turn in which the number of SPs inside is "four" or less, and the citadel is besieged. When a Force surrenders, all surviving Strength Points (if any) are immediately eliminated; all Leaders are granted the "Honors of War" and return to the Center of Opns. Whenever a Citadel surrenders, units of the victorious Player may advance into the hex, within the stacking limits.

Breaking the Siege

Besieging forces are considered to occupy all eight hexes adjacent to the Citadel. All that is necessary to break the siege is to interpose some non-besieged force in a hex adjacent to the citadel not containing an enemy counter. The besieged force may leave the citadel otherwise only by first attacking the besieging force.

FORTIFIED TOWNS

Effect on Combat

Units defending in a Fortified Town have their Combat Strength doubled, up to a maximum of ten extra SPs. For example, a 3 SP Force in such a hex would defend at 6, while a Force of 12 SPs would defend at 22 (since only ten of its SPs are doubled). A Fortified Town is considered Affecting Terrain.

Zones of Control do extend into Fortified Towns (unlike Citadels). However, units are never required to attack out of Fortified towns, either in their own Com-

bat Phase or in a Pitched Battle counterattack. (By not counter-attacking, the battle is ended.) Enemy Units adjacent to Fortified Towns are required to attack normally.

CONTROL OF FORTRESSES

A fortress (Citadel or Fortified Town) is considered to be in Allied hands unless otherwise indicated by positioning of a leader or garrison marker. This marker's appearance on the map denotes the existence of the assigned "garrison units."

Fortress Markers

These are used to designate the location of fortress

garrisons on the map, and to similarly show the location of the Allied force besieging Glogau.

Fortress Garrison and Besieging Force Leaders

The Leaders of these units are represented on the map by the Leader Markers with the name of their respective fortresses. Their Initiative Rating is "Zero." Since they each represent only one unit (maximum) they don't need a Command Span, and their Subordination Rating is the same as that of the one unit they represent (that is, "One"). Though labelled as "static," this refers to their historical capacity—they may be moved.

TWENTY-FOUR: WEATHER

Mud increases attrition as a result of the men and materiel which would have to be left behind in a rapid march as roads and trails dissolved into quagmires. Rain facilitates retreat after combat by hampering pursuit; but it also allows a force to more easily "sneak-up" on unsuspecting Enemy forces, by reducing the possibility of their being able to force march away from the battle.

There are five different types of weather, one of which must be in effect during each Game-Turn. The weather may be either Fair, Heat, Mud, Rain, or Mud & Rain. At the beginning of each scenario and at the beginning of each subsequent Game-Turn the First Player must roll the die and consult the Weather Table to determine the weather for the coming turn.

Effects of Nasty Weather

MUD: Mud affects the severity of attrition. Players must use the indicated die roll column on the Attrition Table during Mud. During Mud, one SP of a Force's loss must come from an artillery unit, if the Force loses five or more SPs as a result of that march alone (see "Artillery").

HEAT: Same as Mud, except that the special loss of one SP must come from Cavalry.

MUD & RAIN: Same as Mud, plus the addition of a die roll modifier for Initiative during Pursuit and when exiting an enemy ZOC. The Die roll modifier is "+ 1".

RAIN: The Initiative Die Roll Modifier only (no attrition effect; note on Table is incorrect).

FAIR: No effects.

TWENTY-FIVE: EFFECT OF SPECIAL UNIT TYPES

BRIDGES AND ENGINEERS

Repair of Blown Bridges

There are no Engineer counters per se in the game. However, each Leader on the Organization Display except Cavalry Major Generals (only) is considered to have one organic Engineer unit. The appropriate Leader is moved into the hex adjacent to either end of the Blown Bridge. There must be no enemy units adjacent to the leader counter (regardless of ZOCs). In the following Friendly Movement Phase, the Player rolls the die, finding the right line for type of engineer unit and bridge. There are two types of bridges, primary and secondary, which bridge primary and secondary rivers respectively. The bridge is repaired if the die roll is less than or equal to the number shown. Remove the blown bridge marker when the bridge repair die roll succeeds. Engineer units may not attack, and have a Strength of Zero.

To repair a bridge a Major General need not be put in charge of the engineers if the commander to whom the engineers are organic does not leave the bridge-occupied package that turn.

Destruction of Bridges

A bridge may only be blown if a Player has a unit (of any kind) in a hex into which the bridge enters. If there is an Enemy unit at the other end of the bridge when a Friendly unit is attempting to destroy it, he must increase the die by one. The procedure for determining whether the bridge is destroyed is the same for repair. If the bridge is blown a Blown Bridge Marker is placed adjacent to the bridge.

Effect of Destroyed Bridges

A destroyed bridge is ignored for all purposes; the hexside it bridged is treated as a normal river of whichever type.

Bridging Trains (Pontoons)

Bridging Trains may be used to bridge any river hexside. Each Allied Army Command (ie Bluecher, Schwarzenberg, Wittgenstein—Spring only—and Bernadotte) is given one bridging train. Napoleon receives only one bridging train. The only way the French Player may get other bridging trains is to capture them (he can also lose them this way). This can only be done by moving a friendly unit into the hex containing the enemy bridging train, either during the March Phase or as a result of advance after combat. Bridging trains which are deployed do not retreat after combat when combat units in their hex suffer that result. They remain behind and may be captured by advancing enemy units. They may not be destroyed. Only bridging trains which are currently deployed (ie on the map as opposed to the Organization Display) can be captured. Bridging Trains can only be deployed or un-deployed during the Bridging Segment of the Friendly Player-Turn. To use a bridging train, simply place it across the river hexside to be bridged. In the following turn it is usable if it has remained in that hex, and units may move over it as if it were a normal bridge. It may be moved out of the package in the same turn it is crossed by units. When using a bridging train to cross a river it does not matter if there are enemy units in the hex across the river, and one can attack across it as a normal bridge. A bridging train can be used without an engineer unit present. A bridging train can be captured and moved by a cavalry unit, and can make an extended or forced march.

Function of Support Units

Engineers and Bridging Trains can be assigned to Major Generals, and they move like normal units, but only if these Support Units are to be employed in tasks suitable to their special properties, ie., creating or removing bridges. They are powerless to capture anything, harm anyone, or block any path (and this goes for capture of Center of Operations, too). Support units may be allocated to a Leader's Organization Display in the same manner as normal combat units. They have no Combat Strength, for either attack or defense. They move as if they were infantry units, but do not suffer attrition of any kind.

FRENCH IMPERIAL GUARD

A Force of exclusively Old Guard (OGde) Infantry suffers no attrition (see "Attrition Free Movement"). In 1813, any Young Guard (YGde) troops in the force with the OGde may be counted as OGde so long as all Old Guard troops in the game are present in that Force. OGde (and YGde counted as OGde) do not count toward attrition in any force to which they belong. When moving in a Force which also includes other unit types, the Player may choose to remove attrition losses from the OGde units in a Force but he is not required to do so, as long as there are sufficient SPs of other types to absorb the losses.

A force of exclusively OGde (and YGde counted as OGde) and/or Cavalry has a Pursuit Bonus of one hex.

ARTILLERY

Use in Combat

Artillery Fire occurs in Step 2 of the Battle Resolution Segment of the Game-Turn. This Step is repeated for each round of Pitched Battle. The effect of artillery fire is to eliminate enemy combat strength before the calculation of combat odds for battle resolution.

Procedure

The procedure relies on the Cavalry Strength Differential obtained in Step 1. The die is rolled and the result located in the column beneath the Cavalry Differential Ratio in effect. (The cavalry differential must be read as a ratio of: artillery-firing side-to-target side.) The die roll is cross-referenced in the column beneath the artillery strength.

Artillery Unit Losses

- 1) Artillery never suffer loss from enemy artillery fire, unless they are the only types in the force under attack.
- 2) Artillery suffer no losses in Pitched Battle rounds.
- 3) Artillery Lose one Strength Point if their force was pursued more than five hexes (this SP loss does count toward the total Pursuit loss required).
- 4) Artillery Lose one SP to march attrition during mud, except if less than five SPs of attrition loss total is suffered by its force. During non-Mud turns, and during turns when March Attrition to its force is four SPs or less, Artillery loses nothing to March Attrition.
- 5) Artillery Strength is never counted when determining force strength for attrition purposes, or for determining combat odds, and never suffers attrition loss of more than one SP per march.

Restrictions on Movement

Artillery may never make Extended Marches, or participate in Pursuits.

CAVALRY

"An army superior in cavalry will always have the advantage of being able to cover its movements, of being well informed as to the enemy's movements and giving battle only when it chooses. Its defeats will have few evil consequences, and its successes will be decisive."
—Napoleon

Cavalry Attrition Procedure

Roll for Attrition normally; do not count cavalry into total force strength for Attrition determination; resolve cavalry attrition as though it were a separate force. Then remove attrition specified from the cavalry unit(s) normally, replacing the strength lost on the same track with an Infantry March Regiment in the appropriate space. If this would result in an exceeded Command Span (and only then) the infantry

strength may instead be incorporated into any infantry unit(s) in the same hex, or, if none, an infantry Major General may be created to represent the March Regiment on the Map. (This rule shows the loss of horses to the cavalry unit, and the March Regiment represents the dismounted cavalry troops.) Note that the dismounted cavalry will henceforth suffer attrition, and behave in all ways, like other infantry.

Cavalry Leader With Non-Cavalry Units

If any non-cavalry units are in the Force moving under the Initiative of a Cavalry Leader, add two to the Initiative Die Roll for that force.

CAVALRY DIFFERENTIAL INITIATIVE MODIFIER

The side with superiority in cavalry may receive an Initiative Modifier in any case where Initiative is consulted and opposing forces are adjacent. Cavalry Superiority is also a factor in determining the effects of Artillery fire. The Maximum Modifier is 3 "+" or "-."

How to Use

First, determine the ratio of cavalry strengths (see below), and then subtract "one" from the Initiative die roll of the Leader with cavalry superiority for each order of magnitude above 1:1.

Procedure

- Determine superiority of cavalry (which side has the most). Cavalry strength may not be withheld.
- If making a Pursuit, subtract one from the Initiative die roll of the side with superiority, for each order of magnitude of superiority: superior in cavalry, but less than a 2-1 ratio = subtr. one; 2-1 ratio or greater = subtr. two; etc.
- If making a Forced March out of enemy ZOC, Cavalry Differential Modifier can only be used to negate a "+" modifier from the Initiative Comparison Matrix. That is, Initiative cannot be better with combined Cavalry Differential and Initiative Modifiers than it would have been if the Force were not adjacent to the enemy. **Example:** Active "4", Passive "2"; there would be no Cavalry Modifier.
- To receive this benefit, cavalry must suffer one Strength Point of the loss in that combat die roll resulting in that pursuit situation.

TWENTY-SIX: POLITICS AND OFF MAP MOVEMENT

SAXON NEUTRALITY

The cultured and gentle Saxons (see Scenario folder) were more than usually unwilling to become involved in this war. Throughout the opening of the 1813 Campaign, their king had attempted to maintain the status of armed neutrality, along with Austria, and had even taken refuge in Prague until blackmailed into returning by Napoleon, dictating from his capital of Dresden.

Determining Superiority

Count the amount of cavalry present during Step 1 of the Combat Routine. (Leave out of account any losses sustained due to previous Pitched Battle.) Determine the difference in cavalry strength between the two sides and which side is superior.

When counting cavalry strength for purposes of determining cavalry differential, count only the cavalry actually in a package adjacent to the active force, and engaged in combat with that force. If one side has no cavalry, the other side has a "3-1" differential automatically.

Effect of non-Clear Terrain on Cavalry

When determining the cavalry ratio of opposing forces, do not count cavalry in non-clear Terrain. Always use "1-1" cavalry differential when firing Artillery into or out of non-clear Terrain.

MARCH REGIMENTS

Each Player has a number of March Regiments which are used to represent detachments of smaller than division size. They may be created in one of three ways: **1)** With Replacement Points at Depots or Center of Opns., each Replacement Point deducted from the pool being added to the March Regiment's Strength. **2)** By division, deducting strength from a combat unit and adding this strength to the March Regiment. **3)** by Cavalry Attrition, wherein cavalry strength is converted to Infantry March Regiment Strength.

There are March Regiments for both infantry and cavalry. The maximum strength of an Infantry March Regiment is three Strength Points; Cavalry March Regiments may only be 1 or 2 SPs. Cavalry March Regiments count as ½ unit against a Leader's Command Span; ie their Subordination Rating is "½." Infantry March Regiments have a Subord. Rating of "1."

The strength of a March Regiment may be incorporated into the strength of any unit of the same type with which it is stacked, during the Administrative Segment, at no penalty. March Regiments can represent units of any nationality.

NATIONALITY

The Turn Record Track mentions "nationality" of French Player's troops. There is no effect of these different nationalities on play.

attacked by either side, nor may Torgau be moved through by either side.

Note: "Occupied" means troops physically in place in the package.

FALL OF BERLIN

Since most of the administrative services had been located outside of Berlin (and off the map), the effects of the fall of the Prussian capital are largely moral.

Effects on Prussian Replacements

One half of the specified Prussian replacements are permanently lost during the period of French occupation of Berlin (rounding fractions down). Thus if the track specifies "4i" and the French currently occupy Berlin, only "2i" are received; the other 2i are not accumulated.

Effect on Army Morale

The Allied Army's Morale Marker moves one space to the left if Berlin falls to the French. If re-occupied by the Allies, morale moves back one space. French Player may not improve his own Morale in this contingency, unless Allied Morale is already "+ 1" and French Morale is less than "- 1."

Berlin Militia

Tauenzien and 20,000 men (use the same units from his Dresden Scenario set-up at reduced strengths) constitute the Berlin garrison, which may not move or attack. They must fight a Pursuit Battle if attacked. They defend otherwise normally, and may retreat out of Berlin. They are placed on the map only if Berlin is approached by French forces, and must be placed only in Berlin and any one adjacent hex. If forced to retreat out of Berlin they may still not attack until the end of the Armistice. If Berlin is occupied by the French, or in French occupied territory, Tauenzien's force begins the Autumn at its strength at the beginning of the Armistice (plus any replacement points the player wishes to add). Otherwise, it sets up at its full Dresden set-up Strength automatically.

DRESDEN EFFECT ON MORALE

The effect on French Morale of the loss of Dresden to the Allies during the Autumn (only) is the same as the effect on the Allies Morale from the loss of Berlin. In this case, only the French Morale is affected; (unless French Morale is already "+ 2," and Allied Morale is less than "- 2," in which case the Allied Morale is affected); the marker is moved one space to the left.

AUSTRIAN INTERVENTION AND NEUTRALITY

Austria is a neutral power out of play during the Spring. No units may enter Bohemia (Austrian territory) during the Spring. Any units forced to retreat across the border are considered "interred" and are out of play until the armistice (if any), at which time they are returned to the owning player (unless the game is over).

Austria is considered to intervene automatically at the conclusion of the Armistice. Her troops and leaders always enter the game under the control of the Allied Player, after 14 August. Note that APs are accumulated only from 19th July onward (the date of Austrian mobilization).

BAVARIAN RE-ALIGNMENT

Bavarian reluctance, reduced the originally-planned Bavarian contingent to Napoleon from an entire Corps (the IXth) to a single division (the 29th) plus cavalry. The remaining units of the corps were, however, raised and went over to the Allies upon the signing of a compact between Bavaria and Austria on 8th October. (These troops were defeated at the battle of Hanau on 30th October, off-map, during Napoleon's retreat toward Mainz.) On 8th October, unless the French Army Morale is "- 1", the Bavarian units (29 and 29c) are removed from play along with any strength they contain.

WITHDRAWAL INTO CANTONMENT (OFF-MAP MOVEMENT)

Troops of any Allied army may withdraw "into cantonment", off map, exiting at any possible Supply Source route for their army. While off the map, they suffer no attrition. If at any time you have no Combat Strength on the map, you are considered to have resigned and the game ends immediately.

Limit to Withdrawal

Troops of a given army may only withdraw off the map once in every 20 turns.

Return to the Map

The return of withdrawn forces is handled exactly like reinforcement entry. The minimum time off the map in cantonment is one game-week (4 turns). They may then return on any possible map edge Supply Source hex, or as near to the road as possible.

Center of Opns off Map

1. No APs may be expended while off map; APs may be accumulated using "index."

2. Use current AP Level to determine attrition of forces off map, tracing to the exit hex for units still on map.

Campaign Game Only:

ARMISTICE

Armistice occurrence depends upon the Armistice Table, and always lasts through the August 15-16 Game-Turn exclusive. During the Armistice, Players accumulate all APs, Replacements and Reinforcements receivable during the period of the armistice (see the Scenario Folder and the Turn Record/Reinforcement Track)—individual Game-Turns are not played during the armistice. At the conclusion of the armistice procedure (see below), the

Game-Turn Marker is advanced to the August 15-16 space and normal play resumes.

Effects on Forces on Map

Upon occurrence of the Armistice, no further Movement or Combat may take place: all forces are stopped in place. No attrition is considered to occur during the period of the Armistice.

Effect on Army Morale

Army Morale markers are reset at their "start" positions.

Procedure for determining Occurrence of Armistice

The Game-Week Interphase occurs before the First Player-Turn of the Game-Turns indicated by the tinted spaces on the TRC. At these times, compare the Allied and French Morale, and roll the die. If the result is less than or equal to the number shown for that morale combination, Armistice occurs immediately. Players may not "voluntarily" agree to commence Armistice; it must be brought about by die roll on the Armistice Table. Armistice occurs automatically at the end of the 9-10 June Turn, if not before.

ARMISTICE PROCEDURE

The Armistice procedure below is played through once, after commencement of the Armistice, and comprises a complete Armistice duration.

A. French Armistice-Turn.

I. COMMAND PHASE

a. Administrative Segment

Duration of Armistice (June 10-11 through August 13-14 inclusive) is 34 Game-Turns minimum. To this number are added turns of Armistice before June 10-11, if any, and subtracted are turns of Center of Opns movement. The French Player multiplies the number of turns thus obtained by the "index" shown on the AP Point Pool, using the position of the Center of Opns desired at the conclusion of the Armistice to determine the column on the Pool to consult (ie movement of the Center of Opns is considered to occur immediately after cessation of hostilities). Example: If distance between Center of Opns and Supply Source was 20 or less at the end, French Player would multiply duration of Armistice (minus turns of Center of Opns movement) by $1\frac{1}{2}$; assuming no additions or subtractions, $34 \times 1\frac{1}{2} = 51$ APs received.

Dresden as a French Supply Source

Dresden is a Supply Source throughout the Armistice; if occupied by the French at the end of the Spring period. It may never be used as a Supply Source by the Allies.

Occupied Depots and Supply Sources

If occupied by enemy forces, or in "enemy-occupied

territory" during the Armistice, friendly installations may never be used thenceforth (see "Capture of Supply Sources" and "Depots".)

b. Organization Segment

Replacements shown on the Table on page 3 of the Scenario Folder are received. Do not change the strength of units which are already in the game during the Spring unless you give them replacements. (They do not automatically move to their Dresden Scenario Strength.) Units need not be in forces in the same hex to be transferred between them. All other Organization Segment activities are carried out normally.

II. MOVEMENT PHASE

Any force may be moved anywhere on the map (within "Occupied Territory"—see the Turn Record Track) at will; simply remove the force and replace it where desired. Exception: Center of Opns movement must be counted-out to determine number of turns inactive; this is done during Administrative Segment (in Armistice Procedure only). No APs are expended for such movement (its already allowed for), and no Attrition is suffered by any Force at all during the Armistice. Bridges may be created and destroyed at will in "occupied territory." Once he is through moving, the Allied Armistice-Turn commences, and the French Player cannot make any further adjustments to his forces until his Player-Turn of 15-16 August. There is no combat Phase during the Armistice. In determining occupied territory, do not consider Cavalry Corps Leaders or Cavalry Major Generals. Ignore their presence for this purpose (see the Turn Record Track).

B. Allied Armistice-Turn

I. COMMAND PHASE

a. Administrative Segment

The Silesian Army receives APs, calculated in the same manner as the French. The Austrian Army historically began its mobilization on 19th July, which allows only 14 Game-Turns in which to collect APs. Use index of $1\frac{1}{2}$ for Bohemian Army, over 14 Game-Turns (unless Center of Opns enters the map during the Armistice) for a total award of 21 APs at start. North army is not considered during Armistice.

b. Organization Segment
(same as I.b., above)

II. MOVEMENT PHASE

(same as II. above). All of Bohemia is always considered "Occupied territory" of the Allies during the Armistice.

C. Commence Play with August 15-16

The Armistice Procedure is complete, and normal Game-Turns resume.

TWENTY SEVEN: OPTIONAL RULES

THE SOUND OF GUNS

It was customary in written orders, to cover all contingencies in developing situations, to specify that a force should maneuver toward the sound of the guns, if there were any. We also know that Napoleon would travel out from headquarters until within earshot of cannonfire, and would be able to determine from listening what was happening (no doubt this was a common practice). The maximum distance the sound could carry, except in really large bombardments, seems to have been about ten miles.

This rule supplies an Initiative benefit which can be used only during the Forced March Phase by Forces not in Enemy ZOCs. The benefit can be used by any Force within five hexes of an Enemy Force about to attack a Friendly Force (the latter may not Force March out of the combat if the Initiative benefit is taken). The force to use the benefit must be close enough to make a Forced March of five hexes or less and end the forced march adjacent to the attacking Enemy Force. The Initiative Benefit for the Sound of Guns is to subtract one from Initiative Die Roll, but can be used only if the Force actually marches into the battle.

FORCED MARCH INTO PITCHED BATTLE

Units which force march into a battle may not be considered present during the first few rounds of Pitched Battle. To determine in which round they are considered to arrive, consult the table below and roll the die, modifying for normal Initiative modifiers and cross-referencing with the number of MPs expended by the force in question. If there are fewer rounds of Pitched Battle than the number resulting on the table, the forced marching Force does not make any counterattack, and the attacking player may not attack it that Phase. He would conduct a normal Pursuit of the retreating Force, ending that Combat situation.

HURRY-UP TABLE

Forced March				considered present.
Die	Distance (MPs)			Modifiers: same as for Initiative; exclude Sound of Guns Modifier.
Roll:	1	2-3	4-5	
1/2	0	0	1	Modified Result of Zero
3/4	0	1	2	= The Forced Marching Force arrives before the first attack (in this case the situation is as in the ordinary rules).
5/6	2	2	3	
KEY: # = Round of Battle during and after which troops arriving by forced march are				

UNIT TYPE EFFECT ON ATTRITION

Units in special categories defined below must determine their attrition separately from the force they are moving with. Their strength is not combined with the other units in the force when determining attrition.

Class C: French Cohorts, Austrians.

Class D: French Conscripts, Prussian Landwehr, Swedes. + 1 to Attrition Quotient

Class F: German and Italian Allies of France, Russian Kossacks. + 2 to AQ.

For each unit in any such special class, the player resolves attrition separately. He determines the Attrition Quotient for the remainder of the force as usual, and adds to this the number of lines specified for the type of unit involved. Example: Attrition for the normal units in a force is determined normally, not counting units in classes C, D and F. Let's say their Attrition Quotient is determined to be "3/8." After resolving the normal attrition, this would be increased to the next line if there was class D unit, to 1; if a class F unit, it would be increased to "1 1/2". The die would be rolled on this modified column for each individual unit in classes C, D or F in a force. Each such unit would suffer the full amount of attrition called for in that individual die roll.

If the Force is 100% Class C, D and/or F, determine what its combined Attrition Quotient would have been if the force were composed of normal unit types, and then add to that Quotient for each individual unit in the force.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

2: Game Equipment

Q: Could not the following information be included on the TRC? . . .

May 28; June 6; October 30: Actions of Hoyerswerda; Luckau; Hanau.

May 27-8; 29-30: Note optional 'No Armistice' Replacements and Reinforcements, arriving at any Supply Source/Depot possible.

Oct. 8-9: Barvarian units withdraw (unless French Army Morale is "- 1.")

A: Yes, the above can be noted.

Q: I have a number of questions about the "Summary of Modifiers, Facts and Figures" on the Charts & Tables Sheet.

1) Should not the Maximum Force size really be specified as a maximum package size, and then only for movement purposes? **A:** Yes.

2) Can't replacements simply "arrive" with any unit in Dispatch Distance of the Center of Opns? **A:** Yes, they can.

3) Army Morale Number is also added to Disorg. & Rally die roll. **A:** Correct.

4) Another change in Army Morale is that for fall of Dresden in the Spring Scenario (affecting the Allies). **A:** Correct.

5) Rain, only, reduces Initiative (not heat); when exiting enemy ZOC and during Pursuit. **A:** Correct.

5: Administrative Points

Q: What level of "support" do the non-phasing players have during the force-march segment of the first Player-Turn of each scenario?

A: They have the same level as will apply in their next Player-Turn.

Q: How do you determine the level of "support" given an army on the turn after its Center of Operations has moved (or when it is inactive)?

A: In such instances the Level of Support is considered to be zero.

Q: On the turn after a Center of Operations has moved (or when it is inactive) the level of support it receives is considered to be zero. Does that mean that there is an AQ shift of two columns to the right because no APs were spent on "support"?

A: Yes. In these cases you must shift two columns to the right.

6: Communications

Q: In the Spring Scenario, does the Allied Player choose at the beginning of the game whether he will have his Center of Operations trace its LOC back to a primary (1°) road hex in Silesia or back to a first degree road hex in Brandenburg, or does he automatically begin the game tracing his LOC back to the Silesian map-edge? If he does not switch the base of his LOC from Silesia to Brandenburg, can he still use first degree road map-edge hexes in Brandenburg as Depots and Supply Sources for the purpose of A) figuring attrition quotients; B) transmitting Provisional Movement Commands (assuming that the Allied Center of Operations is close enough)?

A: It is the players freedom of choice in all these questions.

Q: How do you figure Dispatch Distance regarding territory modification, from where the Center of Opns is or where the unit is?

A: It doesn't matter. Either way, the territory modifier applies.

Q: Does a Center of Operations occupy one hex or two? (Should it occupy one hex or two?) Does a Supply Source occupy one hex or two?

A: You may trace to either hex of the counter.

Q: Can a Center of Operations move two Player-Turns in succession?

A: Yes.

Q: Should there be a Russian active supply and center of operations marker?

A: One such set is supplied for each army (note there is only one Allied army in the spring). Players may use any of the colors provided to represent the various armies.

Q: Could you please spell-out the functions of Depots?

A: 1) If a force is within Dispatch Distance of a Depot, it is saved from having to roll for Attrition on the "Zero" Column, and

2) If a force is within Dispatch Distance of a Depot, and the Depot in turn is within Dispatch Distance of the Center of Opns., it can receive a Provisional Movement Command through the Depot.

Q: The rule states that to be 'active,' a Depot must be within Dispatch Distance of the Center of Operations. Yet elsewhere it states that it need be within Dispatch Distance of the Center of Operations only to provide Provisional Movement Commands, while the Depot can always keep forces off the 'zero' Column for Attrition.

A: The reference to 'active' should be exchanged for the phrase: 'able to provide Provisional Movement Commands.' The Depot remains 'active' whether in Dispatch Distance of the Center of Operations or not.

Q: Is the Road "to Kalisch" (i.e., the one just north of Sagan) near the Brandenburg border considered to be in Silesia, and therefore a valid Allied supply source in the Spring Scenario?

A: Yes, it is valid. (The fact that Kalisch is actually in Polish territory makes no difference.)

Q: Does this "Fall of Berlin," rule only pertain to the Spring Scenario and the Campaign Game, or does this additional force of 20,000 Prussians appear in the Dresden Scenario even if Tauenzien is already deployed? Moreover, what constitutes Berlin being "approached by French forces."?

A: The 20,000 Prussians are the nucleus of Tauenzien's force in the process of organizing. In the Spring they were not field-ready, or even adequately armed. These 20,000 are subsumed into the larger force under Tauenzien which appears in the Dresden Scenario; they are not a different or separate force, simply an earlier state of the same force. Berlin is "approached" whenever French forces come within 7 MPs of that place; Tauenzien can be placed on the map

at the same instant that Berlin is "approached." Of course, if he is already on the map, this rule does not apply.

8: March Attrition

Q: What are the attrition figures for cavalry units that force-march 6-9 MPs? Does the 6-9 MP March column apply to cavalry at all?

A: The printed figures apply to cavalry if they move 6-9 MPs.

Q: In figuring cavalry attrition, does cavalry roll on the 6-9 column when using its whole Movement Allowance?

A: Yes.

Q: Is a Forced March of 6-9 MPs impossible even for cavalry?

A: Yes.

9: Leadership

Q: Does the attacking player decide whether he will add or subtract one (for a commander's bonus point) from the combat die roll before the die roll actually takes place or after it?

A: He decides after the die roll.

Q: In the Dresden Scenario, Buelow has no Center of Opns until August 25-26, and no way to accumulate APs. Historically, Buelow was quite active (eg. Battle of Grossbeeren). He also was the only Prussian Corps Leader to operate independently—and successfully too. So why not make his Initiative Rating a "3."

A: In principle, I have no objections to the Players making such adjustments as they see fit on historical grounds; this suggestion is a good example of an absolutely viable alternative to the obviously subjective evaluation made by the designer.

Q: Obviously, opinions will differ on various Ratings and Spans of Leaders, but I note the following trends:

1) Of sixteen Infantry Corps Leaders in the French Army, eleven have Command Span's of "6." Throw out Augereau and Poniatowski, Leaders of very small corps, and it's 11 of 14. Doesn't this seem too high? I would assume the rationale includes previous independent commands, extra-large number of divisions, or historical role as wing or independent commander. But where does that leave Bertrand and Drouot (former Napoleonic aides), Souham (Gen. of Div.) Mortier and Victor (minor or unsuccessful in independent command)? Or Eugene, an independent army commander several times, never badly defeated—who rates a mere "5." Why is Augereau, a Marshal, only a '3', while Reynier Bertrand, Souham and Drouot, rated higher, are generals only?

2) French Initiative Ratings of four are given to St. Cyr, Soult, Reynier and Macdonald (and Poniatowski—obviously a special case—commanding the equivalent of a flying column). A case can be made for each, but only these four, equal to Napoleon himself, even in a bad year? And in relation to the others? Reynier over Marmont?

3) Once again, a case can be made for the distribution of Bonus Points, but considered as a group—Vandamme, Mortier, Reynier, Bertrand and Macdonald? Bertrand over Marmont? or Soult? It's not the individual choice or matchups that matter but the

overall picture.

4) Consider that, according to the ratings, Reynier and Macdonald are Napoleon's top generals (4*6) with Reynier (!?) marginally better because of his lower Subordination Rating (2 opposed to 3). Does that sound right? After the Katzbach, how could Macdonald be the second-ranked general?

Why not promote Eugene who, with the generally inflated ratings deserves a 3-6-3? Shorten to '5' the Command Spans of Mortier, Victor, Bertrand and Souham (and maybe Reynier)? Drop Initiative Ratings of Drouot (to 2), Reynier, and Macdonald (maybe not, since he disobeyed Napoleon to go to the Katzbach)? Drop Bonus Point for Macdonald (and maybe for Reynier and Bertrand)?

For the Allies, why is Markow the only other "4" Initiative besides Bluecher? Why do Hesse-Homburg and Dochturow have Subordination Ratings of '3'? (They're the only ones.) Why is Bennigsen only a '4' in Command Span—perverse delight in just denying him control of 'Army of Poland'?

A: As I said above, I have no objections to players making personal adjustments to the ratings (or anything else—it's their game). I am including this rather lengthy disquisition not because I agree with the conclusions, but to show the incredible latitude given to anyone in making up these numbers (which are the substance of the game). To attempt a brief answer to the above, there are a few rationale considerations I relied heavily on which are not mentioned by the correspondent (Michael Jeck). Primarily they have to do with historical usage. That is, I first determined how many troops and subordinates were assigned to the Leaders at different times during the campaign. Then I made a judgement: did that commander handle all the subordinate Leaders and troops effectively? For all their bumbling, the French leaders rarely left large bodies of men lying near at hand, unused during engagements, while the Allies did so constantly. I therefore made a generalization: Allied commanders were less often capable of controlling all their assigned troops than were the French. That is, Napoleon was better able to gauge the number of subordinates and troops to assign to his Leaders; therefore the actual forces historically constituted are a better gauge to the abilities of the French Leaders than they are to the Allied Leaders. As a bias, if the documents show a French force constituted so-and-so, it can be done in the game in similar terms; whereas, an Allied force probably cannot be put together the way it looked on paper at Allied Headquarters. Of course, there are exceptions: Napoleon's placing Oudinot in charge of the 'Berlin Army' is the best example of his failures. So, in this way, the Command Spans were based upon actual usage, with some exceptions, mostly on the Allied side. Initiative Ratings were also based upon performance. My main question was not 'how does one leader stack up in comparison to another' but 'what kind of number would a given leader need to match his historical performance in this campaign?' (Note that these ratings are tailored to 1813, not to an individual's lifetime.) In testing the game, the printed Leader Ratings seemed, overall, to work. That doesn't mean that these numbers are the final word. As for Macdonald,

perhaps he should be down-graded. However, 1) with the higher rating, the Player may be induced to try more than he ought to with Macdonald as a separate wing commander, and 2) Perhaps it was this, and not the qualities of the Marshal per se, that resulted in his misfortune. For the ratings go a long way in determining what can be accomplished strategically, but they are not the only considerations—Macdonald was in an impossible position on the Katzbach, isolated and insupportable, like a branch waiting to be cut off, and no one could beat Bluecher anyway. Some Allied Leaders are given higher Subordination Ratings because of their large Command Spans. Some French Commanders with small Command Spans are given higher Initiative Ratings. To some degree therefore, the three ratings are inter-dependent.

Q: Is it permissible for a leader of lesser rank to command a force consisting of a leader of higher rank (and his attached units), assuming the command span is not violated? E.g., could General Reynier, assuming he has no attached organic units, be in command of a Force consisting of solely Marshal St. Cyr (with a command span and subordination rating of two, respectively)?

A: Yes, it is permissible. Actual military rank is not a consideration in constituting a force.

11: Organization Display

Q: Can any unit be built up to 3 SPs or its maximum scenario strength, whichever is greater?

A: Yes.

Q: On the Allied Army Manifest, the 4th Drag., Emanuel, is listed as 'X' in all three scenarios, while it is listed as part of Borosdin's 1st Drag. of St. Priest's VII Corps in the Designer's game "Napoleon at Leipzig."

A: The Emanuel counter was provided by accident; his unit strength is accounted for in the Borosdin unit.

Q: In the same place, the Austrian 2d Lt (Bubna) is listed as 'X' under the Dresden Scenario, but under Maj Gen A on the Display.

A: This unit should be in play from the beginning of the Dresden Scenario, as shown on the Display.

Q: All sources (W.P. Atlas, Chandler, etc.) have Barclay present at Bautzen—after bringing in 12,000 to 15,000 reinforcements with him. You have him present at June 4-5 Set-up (p. 3 of Scenario Folder); but nowhere have him entering. When does Barclay enter and with what and where?

A: Barclay was investing the fortress of Thorn, in Poland, which capitulated on 18th April. From Thorn to Bautzen is over 250 miles, assuming primary roads and regular marches, a distance requiring over 13 turns, which would bring Barclay in about 14th May. In fact he arrived only shortly after that, albeit only with the III Cav Corps (later under Wasiltschikow). His infantry, presumably identical with Sacken's autumn force, fell behind and did not join the army until June.

To simplify things, I had Barclay and Wasiltsch. arriving along with Sacken during the armistice. In other instances also, where a single small-unit force is involved, I have simplified wherever possible.

However, Sacken's presence alone may be of importance to the Allies during the Spring, in that he's a better commander than Wittgenstein. Therefore, players interested in a closer reading of the historical texts may bring Barclay, with Wasiltschikow (4c) in his force, into the game from Kalisch on 11 May.

Q: This leads to another question. Where is Tschaplitz? Scenario lists him with Osten-Sacken, but the unit manifest has him with Ostermann-Tolstoi.

A: The confusion here arises from the fact that Tschaplitz commanded the III Cav Corps (later given to Wasiltschikow) before he took over the militia cavalry of Ostermann-Tolstoi. Therefore when the sources stated that Tschaplitz was with Sacken, this referred to the III Cav Corps represented in the game by Wasiltschikow. Thus the placement of the "Tschaplitz" unit counter on Sacken's track is an error; Tschaplitz should always remain with Ostermann-Tolstoi. (The confusion is worsened by the fact that Wasiltschikow commanded Sacken's infantry corps before switching to the cavalry.)

Q: Shouldn't the following Static divisions of the French have a note on the organization display indicating "(D and L only)": Durosnel, Margaron, Lauer?

A: Yes.

Q: Does Bluecher have the 9th Brigade at strength "6" in the Spring? This unit is listed on the Display, not on the manifest.

A: Yes, he does; the manifest is in error.

Q: For the Dresden Scenario, Harpe is not listed on the Organization Display under Woronzow, but the Unit Manifest has him at strength "4" for this scenario. Which is correct?

A: In this case, the Unit Manifest is correct.

Q: In the Spring, the Organization Display lists a "Kos X," but the Manifest says Mensdorf commanded the Kossacks under Kleist.

A: Our sources did not know, or perhaps there was no formal organization of the Kossacks under Kleist. We just guessed Mensdorf when preparing the Manifest.

Q: The notation in Lt. Gen. Arrighi's box "2" on the Organization Display, specifying a Spring Scenario Strength, is misleading since Arrighi arrives during the Armistice.

A: Correct: Arrighi was indeed on his way to the front, but was unable to join by the time of the Armistice. Therefore, his Spring set-up should have been removed from his track.

12: Morale

Q: Are army morale modifiers—even those affected at the same instant—always cumulative? E.g., in the Spring scenario, if the French win a pitched battle victory against an Allied force occupying Dresden, and are able to pursue the retreating Allied Force at least one hex into the city, would the French be able to adjust the Allied morale marker one to the left, and the French marker one to the right? (Or, if the Allied marker were already at "+ 1", would the French be able to claim a morale victory)?

A: Yes to all examples.

14: Movement

Q: Does a repulsed force lose its ZOC in relation to the repulsing force for the duration of the Movement Phase?

A: No.

15: Facing

Q: Are the terms "Formation" and "Mode" interchangeable?

A: Yes. Both words refer to the same concept.

Q: When judging facing during a Battle Segment, how many hexes does a package in column "face"?

A: It faces only the front three hexes. IMPORTANT: This is nowhere stated in the text of the rules.

Q: Does the force that is attacked at the beginning of a Pitched Battle halve its combat strength when it counter-attacks if it is not facing the force being counter-attacked?

A: Yes.

Q: Can one leader stack with another if the two end a Movement Phase facing in different directions? I assume that they can't under the existing rules, but I suppose that it is possible that a subordinate leader's facing is automatically changed to bring it into conformity with that of the Commander of his package, if doing that doesn't entail changing mode or direction in an Enemy ZOC at the end of a move. If there are, indeed, significant restrictions on stacking units with different facings, they ought to be spelled out. Once they are spelled out, you might ask yourself again whether such restrictions on a player's freedom of action improve SN as a game or as a simulation. Given the time-scale you are working with, I have my doubts.

A: Forces in the same hex must have the same facing and mode.

Q: What, if any, are the restrictions on changing mode during retreat and during pursuit? When changing mode, can a retreating or a pursuing force change its direction in mid-course? That is, can a retreating force, say, switch from column to line, making a ninety-degree shift in facing at the same time? Can a force pursuing a defeated force that is retreating in column (for it's no longer in the ZOC of the retreating unit), shift into line, pivot on one hex of the retreat path (without actually moving forward along the retreat path and thus inflicting casualties on the retreating force) and then continue the pursuit in line? (Maneuvers such as these seem to violate the spirit if not the letter of the rules, but I'm not certain of that.)

A: There are no restrictions; mode changes do not count as hexes pursued.

18: Combat

Q: Does one "round" of Pitched Battle consist of a single combat resolution, or of an attack and counterattack together?

A: One "round" is any single combat, whether attack or counterattack.

Q: Who is the commander, and who can counter-attack, if two or more forces in adjacent packages without a leader of sufficient Command Span to combine both into one force, are attacked by a unified enemy force?

A: In this case only one of the packages may counterattack.

Q: What if two separate forces were in the same hex, planning reorganization, when attacked?

A: Again, only one force may counterattack.

Q: Rules, P. 29 "Restrictions on the type of Battle Chosen"; "The number of attacks (or counterattacks) a Force may make during a pitched battle may not voluntarily exceed the Initiative Rating of the Force Leader . . ." For the purposes of determining the number of rounds of voluntary pitched battle undertaken by the players, can the *modified* initiative ever be used?


A: No. Strictly speaking there is no Modified Initiative, only modified Initiative die rolls. Use the printed Initiative Rating.

19: Retreat After Combat

Q: Does a turn of half of a package in line formation that is made after the initial turn of a retreat count as a full hex of retreat?

A: Yes, but two consecutive ones in opposite directions do not. Turning is allowed, and counts, but two turns would count as one hex.

Q: If a package forced to retreat begins the retreat in column, with both hexes of the package in Enemy ZOCs, can it move laterally across the enemy front without incurring the penalty for retreating through an Enemy ZOC? (See Figure A) In this case, it is only the trailing half of the package that passes through the Enemy ZOC and according to the third sentence of "Path of Retreat", "for Path of Retreat purposes, ignore the trailing rear half of the Leader counter and regard only the leading half." Can a package that begins a retreat in such a position switch into line before moving (since, again, according to "Mode Change in Retreat/Pursuit" (p. 26), "retreating and pursuing forces may change mode during retreat/pursuit freely") and then move out of the Enemy ZOCs without penalty? (See Figure B.) Can such a package switch to line formation, make an initial turn (moving half the package), then switch back to column and begin the retreat? (See Figure C.)



20: Pursuit (Advance After Combat)

Q: In the pursuit table there is a note that says it's "impossible for pursuing force with initiative of 4 or 5" to get a modified die roll of 0 or -1. Why?

A: You can't do it because you might be advancing farther than the retreat, which is not allowed.

Q: Being able to shift one hex for free makes it much easier to destroy the enemy force; merely pivot into his hex, get into column and off you go!

A: This is impossible, as you can't change mode in an Enemy ZOC at the end of movement. (You may at the beginning of a move, if you get initiative.)

21: Disorganization & Rally

Q: Essentially a unit gets two rolls for Disorganization and Rally, one when it becomes disorganized and another to rally right back.

A: No, if a unit is disorganized, it may not roll for rally in the same turn that it becomes disorganized.

Q: Does Army Morale also apply to Disorganization and Rally die rolls?

A: Yes.

22: Replacements & Reinforcements

Q: When the rule states that if an LOC... exceeds 80 hexes... an army may receive no... reinforcements, shouldn't this say 'replacements' instead?

A: Yes.

Q: Does the French player have his choice as to which of the two "Road to Hamburg" entry hexes he may bring the May 5-6 and May 13-14 reinforcements in on? Which route did they historically take?

A: In any case such as this where the rule does not further restrict the Player, he may assume that the final choice is his. Either road may be used, since historically this choice was open. Apparently the actual road was the most westerly.

Q: Can only Guard Cavalry replacements be added to Guard cavalry units?

A: Yes.

Q: On replacements for Sept. 8-9, there are two listings for infantry; also, I presume that it reads "one Old Guard," not 10.

A: The second listing for infantry replacements ("3i") should be identified as Young Guard.

Q: Can Units move in the same Player-Turn in which they receive replacements? Can a Player add replacements to the units of an army a) on the Game-Turn after its Center of Operations moves? b) While its Center of Operations is inactive?

A: The answer to all three questions is "no."

23: Fortresses

Q: Can an Enemy force move into or through the "bridgehead" hex on the far side of the river before or after the citadel is placed under siege? **A:** No. Does a unit in a citadel or a fortified town exercise a ZOC in hexes that are adjacent to the bridgehead hex but aren't adjacent to the outlined citadel hex?

A: No, both hexes are alike.

Q: Where, exactly, does the Allied Player place Major-General K (assigned to "Wittenberg", which is garrisoned by the French) and Wronzoff ("nr Madgeberg")? How near Madgeberg?

A: "nr." means "adjacent to the citadel hex of".

Q: The Spring Scenario seems to require the Magdeburg garrison to attack Woronzof on French Player-Turn One, unless it is reinforced to the point where it can withstand a siege by Woronzof's force.

A: Units in citadels never need to attack or be attacked, even on turn one. The minimum strength for siege applies only to the besieging force—there is no minimum necessary strength needed to be considered "besieged" and to take advantage of a citadel.

Q: The rule under "Fortresses" says that ZOC's extend into and out of Fortresses normally. However, other rules suggest that this is true of Fortified towns, but that it is not true of Citadels.

A: ZOCs do extend into and out of Citadels and Fortified Towns alike. However, combat is not mandatory for units in Citadels.

Q: Is it true that a force in a Citadel can refuse combat anytime, but that it is "besieged" and unable to move only when the besieging force is at least equal in strength to it?

A: Yes.

Q: Can a siege be broken in any of these ways?

1) When a friendly force moves adjacent (as noted in the rules);

2) When the besieging force drops via attrition or combat below the strength of the besieged force;

3) When strength is added to the besieged force making it greater than the besiegers in number.

A: Yes, to all three.

Q: If a force in a fortified town is attacked, chooses Pitched Battle and loses the first die roll of the Pitched Battle, can it then decline to counter-attack?

A: Yes.

Q: ... Take its SP loss and immediately end the battle?

A: Yes.

Q: ... Without the morale of either side being affected?

A: No! Its morale would be affected.

25: Effect of Special Unit Types

Q: When determining the cavalry ratio of opposing forces in pursuit situations, do you count cavalry attacking into "non-clear terrain"?

A: You do count its strength but its strength is halved.

Q: When calculating the cavalry ratio of opposing forces in order to determine the die roll modifier of a force in non-clear terrain attempting to leave an Enemy ZOC, do you count the strength of cavalry units that are exercising a ZOC in non-clear terrain? That is, can cavalry prevent the exit of an enemy force from a wood or town hex?

A: Yes, but again you halve the cavalry strength. NOTE: Towns may either be considered clear or non-clear terrain, at player's option, for this purpose.

Q: If there is an Enemy force at one end of a Blown Bridge that once spanned a River 1° when a Leader moves into the hex at the other end of that bridge with the intention of repairing it, is that Enemy force then considered to be "adjacent" to the Leader attempting the repair and thus able to prevent the bridge repair die roll from taking place?

A: Yes.

Q: Can a Leader move into a hex at one end of a Blown Bridge during the Force-March Segment of the Enemy Player-Turn and then try to repair it during the next Friendly Movement Phase?

A: No, it cannot be done. A unit which spans a bridge (occupying hexes on both banks) may not blow the bridge under it. A unit which begins the Movement Phase in a fort may withdraw to one side of the river spanned by the fortress and attempt to blow the bridge

during the immediately ensuing Bridge Destruction & Repair Phase.

Q: Does a unit attempting to destroy a bridge have to spend any specific length of time at one end of the bridge before trying to destroy it?

A: His entire Friendly Movement Phase.

Q: In several locations on the map you have two bridges crossing the river through the same hexside. This presents a problem when determining blown bridges.

A: One blown bridge marker takes care of all bridges on the same hexside.

26: Politics and Off-Map Movement

Q: Does a Player have to take both Dresden hexes from his opponent in order to affect Army Morale?

A: No, only the citadel hex on the west bank of the Elbe.

Q: Does the fall of Dresden to the French in fact affect morale?

A: Yes, it does.

Q: When you state that the Berlin Militia "are placed on the map only if Berlin is approached by French forces . . .", what exactly do you mean? Define "approached"

A: "Within 7 MPs, counted at the inf. rate."

Q: What does the phrase "... through the August 15-16 Game Turn Exclusive" mean? Did you intend to say "Inclusive" instead of "exclusive"?

A: No, the armistice excludes the 15-16 turn.

Q: If the Armistice occurs during the interphase between Turns June 2-3 and June 4-5, does the Allied Player win or is the game a draw? (I presume that it is a draw, but you might rewrite the rule to make that clear, adjusting it to the change in the procedure for determining the occurrence of the armistice introduced in the first set of additions.)

A: It is not a draw; regard the said interphase as part of 4-5 June.

Q: On the Armistice Table, apparently an armistice occurrence is less likely if the French have a great morale advantage. And since the victory conditions allow a French victory for certain armistice occurrences, this appears to make it harder for the French to win in this manner. Is this intended?

A: Yes. Even though it might not be to their advantage, a side with overwhelming strategic position is often less disposed to diplomacy. Thus, if the French Player finds his morale superiority extreme, he will have to seek the extreme, strictly military, solution, because historically, though the player knows better, that is most likely what the tendency would have been.

Q: On the armistice Table, shouldn't the Table specify the addition of the modifier as "on June 4-5" (only)?

A: Yes.

DESIGN CREDITS

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CONCLUSION

And what was the result of [Napoleon's] vast talent and power, of these immense armies, burned cities, squandered treasures, immolated millions of men, of this demoralized Europe? It came to no result. All passed away like the smoke of his artillery, and left no trace. He left France smaller, poorer, feebler, than he found it; and the whole contest for freedom was to be begun again. The attempt was in principle suicidal. France served him with life and limb and estate, as long as it could identify its interest with him; but when men saw that after victory was another war; after the destruction of armies, new conscriptions; and they who had toiled so desperately were never nearer to the reward,—they could not spend what they had earned, nor repose on their down-beds, nor strut in their chateaux,—they deserted him. Men found that his absorbing egotism was deadly to all other men. It resembled the torpedo, which inflicts a succession of shocks on any one who takes hold of it, producing spasms which contract the muscles of the hand, so that the man can not open his fingers; and the animal inflicts new and more violent shocks, until he paralyzes and kills his victim. So this exorbitant egotist narrowed, impoverished and absorbed the power and existence of those who served him; and the universal cry of France and of Europe in 1814 was, "Enough of him;" "*Assez de Bonaparte.*"

It was not Bonaparte's fault. He did all that in him lay to live and thrive without moral principle. It was the nature of things, the eternal law of man and of the world which balked and ruined him; and the result, in a million experiments, will be the same. Every experiment, by multitudes or by individuals, that has a sensual and selfish aim, will fail. The pacific Fourier will be as inefficient as the pernicious Napoleon. As long as our civilization is essentially one of property, of fences, of exclusiveness, it will be mocked by delusions. Our riches will leave us sick; there will be bitterness in our laughter, and our wine will burn our mouth. Only that good profits which we can taste with all doors open, and which serves all men.

—Ralph Waldo Emerson, from
"*Napoleon, or, the Man of the World*"

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
THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS

SCENARIO FOLDER

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 AVALON HILL'S TRADEMARK NAME FOR ITS NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGN GAME.

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HOW TO SET-UP THE GAME

Choose Scenario and Sides to be Played.

You can choose any of the three scenarios, or you may begin the Campaign Game at the beginning of the Spring or Dresden Scenarios. The Spring Scenario alone is best for introductory purposes.

One Player will control the French Army (including its German, Italian and Polish units), and the other Player will control the Allied Armies of Silesia, Bohemia, and the North (with Prussian, Russian, Austrian and Swedish units and leaders).

Organization Displays.

Each Player has one Organization Display. If Playing the Spring Scenario, the bottom portion of each display may be folded under and out of the way. Each Display has a track for each Leader, giving the initial unit strengths for the combat units in his Track (his Organic Units are those which bear his Corps designation in white). Place the combat units in the space on the Track in which their number is shown for the scenario in play (see "How to Use" on the Allied Organization Display).

Scenario Information.

The number of APs each Army begins the scenario with, the First Player, and the number of Game-Turns in each, is listed below.

	Scen S Spring	Scen D Dresden	Scen L Leipzig	nr. of APs at Start
Army				
French	21	45	39	
Silesian	11	45	52	
Bohemian	•	21	39	
North	•	16†	16	
1st Player	French	Allies	Allies	
Length (turns)	23*	21	18	

*may be less due to Armistice. † amount on entry, 25-6 Aug. (cent/opns arrives at this time).

Victory Conditions.

The winner of the game is determined by the following four criteria:

1. If, at the end of the scenario, one side X's morale is worse than its "at start" level, and side Y's morale is better than side X's, side Y is the winner.
2. **Morale Victory** (see the rules). This type of victory can occur at any time during play, and automatically ends the game.
3. **Armistice** (Spring only). When playing the scenario (not the Campaign Game), if the Armistice occurs by the end of May 27-28, the French Player wins. If it occurs later than June 2-3, the Allied Player wins.
4. Any outcome other than those specified above is a draw.

HOW TO USE THE SET-UP TABLES

Leaders listed on pages 5, 7 and 9 begin the game on the game map. Other units are brought on to the game map on the turn next to which they are listed on the turn Record/Reinforcement Track and are termed "Reinforcements."

Leaders in parenthesis following a Commander's name are considered subordinate to that Commander and must be set up at start as part of that Commander's force, in the same stack if possible. Each stack must be set up in the town hex specified, or as near as possible, on road if available (the other hex occupied by their stack may be any adjacent hex). In some instances the name shown in the set-up will be the successor or predecessor to the Leader shown on the counter, indicated by a prefix to the name (eg. "ex-"), corresponding to the name printed on the Organization Display, in parenthesis after the leader's name.

The specification of two towns indicates the force is marching from the first-named to the second, and the Leader markers must be set-up in column mode, facing in the specified direction, anywhere along the shortest path (in terms of MPs) between the two towns. Reinforcements specified to be entering "from" a certain town must begin their entry in the road hex labelled "to" the specified town.

Besieging units show the name of the fort being besieged—these units set-up adjacent to the fort listed. As long as at least one hex adjacent to the fort is occupied by enemy forces, the fort is 'besieged.'

Supply Source, Center of Opns:

At the beginning of a scenario, you can choose any Supply Source (only one per army, maximum at all times) but this choice must be specified before play commences. The Center of Opns may be set-up anywhere.

Mode:

Units may be in any mode when set-up, except those shown to be marching between two points (see above).

Multi-hex forces:

If there is more than one stack of counters in a single force, at least one hex of every force must be within one hex of (i.e. adjacent to) the listed hex.

Command Spans: If a Command Span is exceeded in a set-up, as printed, the owning Player must create Maj. Gen. and/or separate forces to accommodate the excess immediately. Note that an extra Maj. Gen. would be necessary for the Allied Reinf. of 2-3 Sept., and some shifting of units from Stedingk's Track would be necessary in the Dresden setup (for example).

(Units): Individual divisions and brigades are drawn attention to if they have been switched away from the corps designated on their counter, and are listed on the same line as the leader to whom they are attached. If individual units have been removed from their designated corps, the corps leader has the symbol "(-)" after his name.

CAMPAIGN GAME ONLY

ARMISTICE REINFORCEMENTS AND REPLACEMENTS

Received in one lump only after commencement of Armistice, and appear in Friendly-occupied territory.

Nationality	Units	Leaders (with units)
Russian	Bohemian Cent/Opns 24 Wuitsch Pahlen II Denissiew Karpow II 21 Laptew	Barclay de Tolly Kapzewitsch Osten-Sacken Wasiltschikow Langeron (Olsufiew, Scherbatow) St. Priest Pahlen
Prussian		Tauentzien

ARMISTICE REPLACEMENTS

*There is no functional difference between Prussian and Landwehr. [Historical interest.]

Prussian: 9i, 2c
*Ldw: 69i, 7c

Nationality	Units	Leaders (with units)
French	27 Rozniezky Res. Art. 29 Lecoq 20G Curial 29c Beaumont 6 Vial 22c Hammerstein 25c Norman 3YG Delaborde 4YG Roguet 3GC Walther 23 Teste 21c Corbineau	Girard Mortier Murat LHeritier St. Cyr Poniatowski Kellerman Arrighi "Dresden" "Leipzig" "Torgau"

Russian: 26i, 13c
Gde: 5i
Art: 3a

French: 38i, 24c
Gde: 2i

Austrian: 1a

SITUATION: 27 May 1813

What if there had been no armistice, and the campaign had continued after the battle of Bautzen? The following material is presented in the form of a speculation, not as a formal scenario intended to be played.

No Armistice Option (Campaign Game Only)

If both sides agree, the French Player can refuse to Accept the Armistice, in which case the game is played through to a morale victory, or until June 8-9; the Allied Player wins automatically if no morale victory occurs by the end of that turn (Austria is considered to intervene). In this case, the game does not continue in the Autumn.

Reinforcements and Replacements

Reinforcements and Replacements shown below arrive only when playing this option. (This is their

historical arrival time, but since it was too late for them to actually intervene historically, in games with Armistice they are considered "Armistice replacements and reinforcements.") The reinforcements arrive on May 29-30 at any possible Supply Source; the replacements on May 27-28.

Sacken (8i), Langeron (Scherbatow, 8i). Replacements (9i, 1c, 3G Ru; 5i Pr).

Strengths at Start; Main Army: Russians 35, Prussians 22. Buelow 8 (Tauenzien 20). Woronzow 10. (Russian break-down on 4-5 June: Guards 6, Res Cav 5, Grenadiers 6, Barclay 8, Wittgenstein 12, Miloradovitch 8, Sacken 8). French 125 (the French had suffered 43,000 combat casualties and 90,000 were on the sick lists). Positions can be derived from Petre, pages 144-148. [Source: Wm. Vane, Narrative]


FULL NAMES OF SOME GENERALS

Gdk Graf Maximilian von Merveldt 1761-1815
FZM Hieronymus Graf von Colloredo-Mannsfeld 1775-1822
FZM Graf Ignaz Gyulai 1763-1831.
Gdk Graf Johan von Klenau 1757-1819. Of Janowitz.
Gdk Erbprinz Friedrich J.L. von Hessen Homburg 1769-1829
FML Prinz Moritz von Liechtenstein 1767-1819
FML Graf Ferdinand von Bubna und Litic 1768-1825
FML Graf Johann von Nostitz-Rieneck 1761-1840
Gdk Graf Emanuel von Mensdorff-Pouilly 1777-1852
Graf Mikhail Semyenovitch Vorontsov 1782-1856
Prince Aliksei Ivanovich Gorchakov 1769-1817
Tsarevitch Konstantin Pavlovich 1779-1831
General Leitenant Fyodor Karlovich Korf 1774-1826
Nicholas Jean de Dieu Soult, Duke of Dalmatia 1769-1851
Friedrich Wilhelm, Count Buelow of Dennewitz 1755-1816
Hans David Ludwig, Count Yorck of Wartenberg 1759-1830
Auguste de Marmont, Duke of Ragusa 1774-1852
Nicholas Charles Oudinot, Duke of Reggio 1767-1847
Karl Philipp von Schwarzenberg 1771-1820
M.B. Barclay de Tolly 1761-1818
L.L. Bennigsen 1745-1826

D.S. Dokhturov 1756-1816
A.P. Ermolov 1772-1861
M.A. Miloradovich 1771-1825
F.V. von der Osten-Sacken 1752-1837
N.N. Raevsky 1771-1829
A.P. Ostermann-Tolstoy 1752-1819
D.V. Vasil'chikov 1778-1859
P.C. Wittgenstein 1768-1842
V.N. Latour-Maubourg 1768-1830

Spelling of Russian names is presented in the German transliteration from the original cyrillic characters. As a guide to pronunciation, the more common appearances of some of the Russian names are listed below: Dokhturov (Dochturow), Ermolov (Yermalow), Gorchakov (Gortschkow), Miloradovich (Miloradowitch), Raevsky (Rajewski), Vasil'chikov (Wasiltschikow), Vorontsov (Woronzow), Alsufief (Olsufiew), Scherbatov (Scherbatow), Kaptsevitch (Kapzewitsch).

THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS



SCENARIO S: SPRING

From Napoleon's arrival with the main army through commencement of the Armistice, April-June 1813.

ALLIED SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) (Units)

Bluecher
Wittgenstein (St. Priest)
Winzingerode (Eugen, Treubetzko)
Kleist (-)
Maj Gen M (August 12)
Yorck
Miloradovich (Markow, Korff)
ex-Berg
Woronzof (Borstell 5)
Maj Gen K (Harpe)
Buelow

ex-Tormassov (ex-Kennevitzin, ex-Lawrof,
Galitzin V)
Maj Gen Besieging (Rosen)

Location

Altenburg
Lindenau
Wachau
Halle
Wettin
Zorbis
Chemnitz
Landsberg
nr. Madgeburg
Wittenberg
Rosslau-
Koethen

Dresden
Glogau

FRENCH SET-UP


Commander (Leaders) (Units)

Eugene (Macdonald, Lauriston (Chastel 3L)
Latour) (Roguet 10G)
Reynier (-)
Victor (-)
Ney
Maj Gen H (Marchand 39)
Maj Gen E (Sahr 25, Gabl 26c)
Maj Gen Garrisons: (Lapoype)
(Lanusse)


Location

Aschersleben
Egeln
Bernberg
Weimar
Saalfeld-
Orlamuende
Torgau
Wittenberg
Glogau
Magdeburg

*"nr." means adjacent to the citadel hex



THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS



SCENARIO D: DRESDEN

From the lapse of the armistice until the beginning of French Administrative Decline, Aug.-Sept.

ALLIED SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) (Units)

Bluecher (Osten-Sacken,
Wasiltschikow, Tschaplitz)
Yorck
Langeron (Olsuffjew, Scherbatow,
Kapzewitsch, Korff)
St Priest (Borosdin)
Barclay (Eugen,
Gortshakow, Pahlen)
Wittgenstein (Konstantin, Yermalow, Galitzin,
Rajewski) (Alvens. Gde)
Kleist
Buelow
Winzingerode (Woronzof, Tauentzien)
Maj Gen Besiegung (Senden)
Maj Gen Z
Maj Gen A

Location

Breslau
Schweidnitz

Striegau
Breslau

Muenchengratz
Muenchengratz
Muenchengratz
Charlottenburg
Charlottenburg
Glogau
Gabel
Freihrit

FRENCH SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) (Units)

Napoleon (Drouot, Mortier, Nansouty)

Kellerman
Latour
Poniatowski

Victor
Marmont
Macdonald (Lauriston)

Ney (Sebastiani)
Vandamme

St. Cyr
L'Heritier

Reynier (Bertrand)


Arrighi
Oudinot
Girard (Lanusse)
Maj Gen F (Dombrowski 27)

Maj Gen Garrisons: (Laplane)
(Durosnel)
(Lauer)
(Margaron)
(Lapoype)


Location

Bautzen-
Hochkirch
Lobau
Goerlitz
Ostritz-
Zittau
Rothenburg
Bunzlau
Lowenberg-
Goldberg
Liegnitz
Weissig-
Stolpen
Koenigstein
Glasshuetten-
Bergieshubel
Kalau

Dahme
Baruth
Magdeburg
Wittenberg-
Dennewitz
Glogau
Dresden
Torgau
Leipzig
Wittenberg



THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS



SCENARIO L: LEIPZIG

The final French collapse, from the abandonment of the right bank of the Elbe, Sept.-Oct.

ALLIED SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) (Units)
 Bennigsen (Dochturow, Tolstoi)
 (Stroganow AvGde)
 Osten-Sacken (Tschaplitz Div.,
 Wasiltschikow)
 Barclay de Tolly (Pahlen)
 Buelow

Tauenzien
 Bluecher (Yorck, Langeron,
 St Priest, Korff, Olsufjew,
 Borosdin, Kapzewitsch)
 Scherbatow
 Maj Gen C (Philipp 3)
 Maj Gen B (A. Liechtenstein 2)
 Maj Gen A (Bubna 2Lt)
 Colloredo
 Klenau
 Meerveldt
 Bernadotte (Stedingk, Winzingerode,
 Woronzow)
 [Bridges]

Location

Leitmeritz

Grossenhain
 Teplitz
 adj. to
 Wartenburg
 Jessnitz

Elsterwerda-
 Torgau
 adj. to Neustadt
 Hof
 Annaberg
 adj. to Neustadt
 Zinnwalde
 Marienberg
 Teplitz
 Barby and
 Rosslau
 Acken,
 Wartenburg

FRENCH SET-UP

Commander (Leaders) (Units)
 Napoleon (Lauriston, ex-Soult (Albert 10),
 Mortier, ex-Bessieres)
 Oudinot (Raglowich 29)
 Macdonald (Sebastiani) (Marchand 39)
 Souham (-)

ex-Vandamme
 St Cyr (-)
 Maj Gen F (Creutzer 42)
 Maj Gen H (Claparede 43)
 Murat (Victor)
 Poniatowski (Kellerman)
 Ney (Bertrand, Reynier, Arrighi)
 (Guilleminot 14)
 Marmont


Latour

L'Heritier
 Maj Gen Z (Lefebv 2G, Br 1L)
 Girard (Lorge 5L)
 Augereau
 Maj Gen J (Lefol)
 Maj Gen Garrison: (Lemoine)
 [others same as Scen. D]

Location

Dresden
 Weissig
 Dresden-
 Grossenhain
 Berggieshubel
 Dippoldiswalde
 Koenigstein
 Pirna
 Freiberg
 Nossen

Kemberg
 Meissen-
 Seerhausen
 Grossenhain-
 Meissen
 Meissen
 Altenberg
 Dessau
 Saalfeld
 Weimar
 Magdeburg



	Berlin	Breslau	Bunzlau	Chemnitz	Dresden	Dux	Freiburg	Glogau	Goerlitz	Halle	Haynau	Hof	Hoyerswerda	Jauer	Koethen	Landshut	Leipzig	Luckau	Magdeburg	Meissen	Torgau	Weimar	Wittenberg
Altenberg	—	—	30½	12	4½	6½	7½	—	22	30½	—	27	26½	—	—	—	24	25	—	9	20	—	—
Altenburg	—	—	—	9½	19	24½	14	—	—	13	—	16½	31	—	17	—	6½	26	31	27	26	14	19½
Aschersleben	—	—	—	29½	—	—	—	—	—	11	—	—	—	—	11½	—	17½	—	7	32½	25½	27½	22
Berlin	23½	—	—	—	19	26½	—	23½	—	5	—	30	26	—	27½	—	30½	15	25	—	20½	—	17½
Bitterfeld	—	—	—	—	19	26½	—	23½	—	5	—	30	26	—	27½	—	30½	15	25	—	20½	—	17½
Boehmisch Leipa	—	—	22½	28	18	15	23½	—	14½	—	27½	—	23	34½	—	32½	—	—	—	22	—	—	—
Borna	—	—	—	7½	17	20½	12	—	—	11	—	18½	28½	—	15	—	4½	23	29	14½	13	16	17½
Breslau	—	20½	—	—	—	—	—	23½	28½	—	15½	—	—	16	—	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bunzlau	—	—	—	—	25½	—	33½	16	8	—	5	—	20	13	—	15	—	36½	—	29½	—	—	—
Chemnitz	—	—	—	—	11½	13	4½	—	29	18½	—	15	28½	—	27½	—	12	36½	—	11	26½	28½	25
Dresden	—	—	25½	11½	—	9½	7	—	17½	26	30½	26½	11½	—	30	—	19½	19½	—	4½	15½	—	32
Dux	—	—	—	13	9½	—	8½	—	28	31½	—	30	24	—	—	23½	25	—	—	13½	27½	—	—
Elsterwerda	24	—	28	22	10½	22½	17½	—	20	23½	—	—	8	—	27½	—	17	9	—	11	7½	—	24
Freiburg	—	—	33½	4½	7	8½	—	—	24½	23	—	19½	18½	—	32	—	16½	26½	—	6½	22½	33	29½
Freihrit	—	21	19	—	—	—	—	29½	22	—	21½	—	—	15½	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Glogau	—	23½	13	—	—	—	—	—	21	—	8	—	28½	15½	—	25½	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Goerlitz	—	28½	8	—	29	17½	28	24½	21	—	13	—	12	18½	—	18	—	23½	—	11	22½	—	—
Goldberg	—	15½	8	—	—	—	—	16½	15½	—	3½	—	28	5	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Halle	28½	—	—	18½	26	31½	23	—	—	—	—	29½	31½	—	7	—	6½	25½	18	21½	16	17	11
Haynau	—	15½	5	—	30½	—	—	8	13	—	—	—	25	8	—	17½	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Hellendorf	—	—	29	21½	11½	—	16½	—	21	—	—	—	19	—	—	—	25½	31	—	16	27	—	—
Hof	—	—	—	15	26½	30	19½	—	—	29½	—	—	—	—	33½	—	23	—	—	26	32½	17	36
Hoyerswerda	26½	—	20	28½	11½	24	18½	28½	12	31½	25	—	—	32½	—	30	25	11½	—	16½	15½	—	28
Jauer	—	16	13	—	—	—	15½	18½	—	8	—	—	32½	—	—	11½	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Juterbog	11	—	—	—	25	—	32	32½	19	—	—	—	20	—	20	—	19	8½	29½	29	9½	34	8
Kalau	19	—	27½	31	19½	29	26½	32	19½	29½	32½	—	7½	—	30½	—	23½	4	—	24	14	—	20½
Koethen	27½	—	—	27½	30	—	32	—	—	7	—	33½	—	—	—	—	10½	30	14	25½	20	24	12
Komotau	—	—	—	10½	13½	4½	10	—	—	29	—	25½	25½	—	33	—	23	—	—	15	29	—	—
Landsberg	25½	—	—	18	25½	31	22½	—	—	3	—	29	31	—	4½	—	6	24½	18	21	14½	20	8
Landshut	—	17	15	—	—	23½	—	25½	18	—	17½	—	30	11½	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Leipzig	30½	—	—	12	19½	25	16½	—	—	6½	—	23	25	—	10½	—	—	18½	24½	15	9½	14½	13
Lubben	14	—	33	—	22	—	29	—	25	28	—	—	13	—	32½	—	21	2½	—	23	12½	—	19
Luckau	15	—	31½	36½	19½	—	26½	—	23½	25½	—	—	11½	—	30	—	18½	—	—	20½	10	—	16½
Magdeburg	25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	—	—	—	14	—	24½	—	—	—	33	35	21½	—
Meissen	—	—	30	11	4½	13½	6½	—	11	21½	—	26	16½	—	25½	—	15	20½	—	16	30½	31½	—
Muenchengraetz	—	—	20	—	26½	27	—	—	16	—	25	—	28	28½	—	26½	—	—	—	31	—	—	—
Muskau	31	—	16	31½	21	30½	28	19	8	—	21	—	9½	26½	—	26	—	16	—	25½	25	—	—
Naumburg	—	—	—	20	31½	33	24½	—	—	10	—	23½	—	—	17	—	8½	27	28	24½	18	6½	21
Pirna	—	—	25½	19½	8	11½	15	—	17½	—	30½	—	15½	—	—	—	27½	27	—	12½	23½	—	—
Saalfeld	—	—	—	27½	—	—	32	—	—	25	—	14	—	—	32½	—	22	—	—	34½	31	8	—
Sagan	—	32½	17½	—	27	—	—	14	14	—	17	—	15½	25	—	32	—	22	—	31½	31	—	—
Schweidnitz	—	11	18½	—	—	—	—	21	17½	—	13½	—	—	5½	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Spremberg	24½	—	22½	31½	14½	27	21½	25½	14½	—	27½	—	3	33	—	32½	28	9½	—	19½	18½	—	26
Thieriesenstadt	—	—	29	26	20½	13	21½	—	21	—	—	—	29½	—	—	—	—	—	—	25½	—	—	—
Torgau	20½	—	—	26½	15½	27½	22½	—	22½	16	—	32½	15½	—	20	—	9½	10	33	16	—	24½	15½
Weimar	—	—	—	28½	—	—	33	—	—	17	—	17	—	—	24	—	15	—	35	30½	24½	—	27½
Wittenberg	17½	—	—	25	32½	—	29½	—	—	11	—	36	28	—	12	—	13	16½	21½	31½	15½	27½	—
Zittau	—	—	14½	27	15½	21½	22½	27½	6½	—	19½	—	15	25	—	24½	35	26½	—	20	30	—	—
	Berlin	Breslau	Bunzlau	Chemnitz	Dresden	Dux	Freiburg	Glogau	Goerlitz	Halle	Haynau	Hof	Hoyerswerda	Jauer	Koethen	Landshut	Leipzig	Luckau	Magdeburg	Meissen	Torgau	Weimar	Wittenberg

Notes: Distances are shown in Movement Points, almost always via 1° road (if not, via 2°).

Distances above 30-or-so MPs are not shown. Accuracy is ± 5%. When two routes are possible, the shortest in MPs is listed.

PLAYERS NOTES

Now that you've read the rules, punched out the counters and set up a scenario, you are ready to play "STRUGGLE OF NATIONS". Well, sort of! The nature of the beast is such that a player unfamiliar with the system could be overwhelmed by the number of decisions necessary to complete a turn. What follows, hopefully, will provide some basic ideas and techniques to facilitate play.

First, we cannot emphasize too strongly that a basic historical knowledge of the 1813 Campaign will greatly clarify your objectives and choices as a player. It is recommended that the player closely study, not just read, the historical notes in the Scenario Folder. The player who is familiar with the historical campaign will have an advantage over one who is not.

Perhaps the most striking physical component is the small hexagon mapboard. This affects play in two ways. First, it makes "STRUGGLE OF NATIONS" a very close game played close up to the mapboard often causing the player to lose his perspective. Second, for the veteran gamer, the small hexes magnify the scale of the map; distances are much greater than is apparent. A player should always know the march distance between supporting forces and the march distance to the enemy. (You will get used to the scale).

"STRUGGLE OF NATIONS" revolves around supply sources, the center of Operations and Administrative Points.

An army can never have too many Administrative Points, as they must be used both to issue Movement Commands and alleviate attrition. It is recommended that both the Allied and French players commit at least two Administrative Points to support their armies, thus taking attrition in the "actual" accumulated AP column on the AQT. This support, however, will greatly curtail accumulation of APs on the Admin Point Pool Table, depending on the distance between the Center of Operations and the source of supply.

The only problem is that as APs are spent to create necessary movement commands, the army's accumulated APs are spent, raising attrition on the AQT. Administrative Points should, therefore, be husbanded and not frivolously spent on unnecessary movement commands. You will note the devilishly clever Sequence of Play requiring all Movement Commands be issued prior to the movement forces based on the leaders' Initiatives. There is no second chance. If you do not spend the Admin Point to issue the command and if the leader does not roll his Initiative, thou shalt not move!

Thus, APs should be spent on movement commands when you wish to initiate combat, block an enemy advance, or retreat out of danger. APs will also, unfortunately, often have to be spent to issue a movement command to an isolated force with a low leader Initiative rating. If you are the French Player it is often advantageous to issue two APs to allow the Guard to conduct an extended march, thus using them as a mobile "fire brigade", immune from attrition, moving from one trouble spot to another, throwing their weight into an attack or blocking a potentially dangerous enemy advance. In all other cases, APs should not be spent to create Movement Commands to merely reposition a force from point A to point B.

One of the secrets to good play is to move your forces on your leaders' Initiative, in anticipation of your opponent's plans, to meet all contingencies, without running hither and yon plugging holes and wasting APs on Movement Commands.

Of course, before you receive a movement command, before you can support the army and before you can accumulate APs; you must have an active Center of Operations. Given the most favorable situation the Center of Operations should always be within 20 road hexes of the source of supply and it should never be inactivated.

Given the situation, on offense the LOC and Dispatch Distance stretches only so far. The player will, therefore, find it necessary to surge forward in fits and starts stretching the Dispatch Distance to the maximum, then suffering a self imposed stand down while the center of OPs displaces forward. This is particularly applicable to the French in the Spring Scenario and a bit less so to the Allies in the Dresden Scenario. The primary problem is for the army commander to determine the axis of his advance and, when necessary, to advance the Center of Opns. to support the offensive in as few moves as possible.

In retreat you can never go wrong by placing your Center of Operations too far to the rear. A player should always be careful not to place the Center of Operations too close to the front as it could expose his Line of Communications to be cut or directly expose the center of Opns to being deactivated by an enemy force.

The player should always concentrate on maintaining an active Center of Operations. You cannot afford to move your army on the "0" AP column of the AQT. Your source of supply should be regarded with one simple principal; never, never, under any circumstance allow your LOC to be cut. Maintaining your supply line will not guarantee that you will win, but failure to do so will guarantee you will lose. An even more cardinal sin, if possible, is to allow the enemy to occupy the source of supply. This is tantamount to

disaster. To place your army on the "0" column, for attrition on the AQT, with only a 1/3d chance of changing the supply source could destroy your army without a battle.

Because of the nature of the game, maintaining LOC and source of supply is a much greater problem for the French than the Allies. In the Spring Scenario, due to the lack of cavalry and the necessity of the offensive, the French LOC is constantly exposed to marauding allied cavalry. The French player must, therefore, take care to allow sufficient forces to protect his LOC.

The Dresden and Leipzig scenarios present a slightly different problem, since the cavalry differential has been redressed. The French Player must keep a much closer tab on his LOC as it is often extended to the maximum. The LOC is more often in danger of being cut closer to the front line corps than by raiding parties in the rear. The results, while localized could be profound. As the combined Allied armies are more powerful, a forced retreat while out of supply, to avoid attack could cost as many strength points in attrition as a major battle. The French starting at a numerical disadvantage cannot afford the loss.

In the Dresden Scenario, that city is the only source of supply able to support sustained offensive operations east of the Elbe. For that reason, the French player must be particularly sensitive to any advance on Dresden. By the Leipzig Scenario the French supply source is again on the west edge of the map and again the French are faced with marauding cavalry threatening the source of supply. Due to the low counter density it is necessary to be constantly prepared to block small Allied raiding parties from gaining unopposed access to the French Communications.

Supply for the Allies is a much simpler affair. In the Spring Scenario the biggest problem is where to locate your source and still be within a reasonable distance of your Center of Operations. As the Allied Army is outnumbered by approximately 3-1 and will be retreating on its supply source, I suggest the northern edge of the Eastern section, Silesia, be used.

This will enable the Allied Player to place his Center of Operations so as to be within Dispatch Distance of both the Berlin and Dresden fronts; available to issue the necessary Movement Commands to combat French advances on both fronts.

The Dresden and Leipzig scenarios present a far different situation. The Allied Player has three separate armies with three separate sources of supply. This makes the Allied armies much less sensitive to a French maneuver to the rear, as the French army rushes one or two of the Allied armies the best play is to retreat with those armies which are pressed and advance on the French rear with the army or armies which are not being moved on.

To sum up, Struggle of Nations revolves around Administrative Points which are a function of the relationship of the Center of Operations to the source of supply. In concert with the logistics, the player must move his corps in sympathetic harmony with each others' strengths and weaknesses. Unlike most wargames, battles in Struggle of Nations are not periods at sentence end; but merely notes, albeit sharp and sustained, in a continuing melody.

After logistics both Players, but especially the Allied Player, must pay close attention to their TO&E, the Organization Display. Due to the poor Initiative Ratings of his leaders and small numbers of SPs in many Corps, the Allied Player should subordinate them to leaders with a higher Initiative such as Barclay, Langeron and Osten-Sacken. This serves two purposes; first it allows for a concentration of a combined arms force and second it gives the army a greater mobility. The drawback is, of course, that a large force is liable to a consequently larger march attrition rate. This however the Allies can afford.

The French Army due to the better Initiative of its officers will be able to maintain a greater dispersal, and leave itself much less liable to march attrition.

The French Old and Young Guard should always be kept concentrated as when combined the total is immune from attrition and can with the issuance of the necessary movement commands extend its march with impunity. Napoleon should, as much as possible, not be encumbered with individual units on his command track, such as the reserve artillery with which he starts. Thus freed he will be able to quickly transfer to the threatened fronts at the speed of Light Cavalry and once there be able to command the maximum number of individual forces necessary.

As the French initiative is greater and the overall AP situation is much less favorable, it is recommended that the French Player keep his forces dispersed until threatened with an Allied advance.

Both players should continue to have their leaders with Bonus Points command large forces as the bonus favorably affects attrition as well as battle. Both should also be cognizant of their leader's Subordination Rating vis a vis their Command Span. Timely reorganization can often eliminate inefficient leaders by reassigning their units to other corps commanders (i.e. Augereau), freeing those leaders for the protection of the LOC and the concentration of

scattered garrisons.

Finally the creation of cavalry and infantry major generals should always be actively considered during each reorganization phase, the first for raiders and the second to protect the LOC and other fixed strategic points.

At this point a special word should be said for cavalry, the Player's most versatile SPs. For the French the Old and Young Guard cavalry as stated previously should be kept together to preclude attrition. These are strictly battle cavalry. When defending always screen your main army with a cavalry force, when attacking you should combine the cavalry with your main force to obtain a cavalry majority to favorably influence the enemy leader's Initiative, add to your artillery's effectiveness and increase your force's pursuit ability following a victory or decrease the enemy's pursuit ability following a defeat.

In addition, due to its mobility a cavalry force can prevent a second enemy force from reinforcing the main battle by either defensively screening the force or, more aggressively attacking it, creating a double battle. As it is highly ineffective cavalry should not be heavily committed to battles in woods or mountains. Cavalry can also be used in small corps or division forces as raiders to disrupt the enemy's rear and to blow bridges in retreat. Both Players should endeavor to keep at least 2000 cavalry with each major force as 1000 cavalry are often not enough to modify the enemy cavalry effects on Initiative and pursuit.

As for battle tactics a Player should never allow a force to be attacked in column or march mode. If you screen your main force with cavalry you will have the option of attempting to retreat the cavalry or reinforcing the screen with the main force.

The Player should never attack with a two package force unless each package is equal to or greater than the defending package. That, however, being the case, the attacker should attempt to form a hinge placing all possible retreat hexes in his Zone of Control to double the effect of pursuit. The attacker should always attempt to screen the main battle from possible reinforcement by enemy forces in the vicinity.

You cannot have too much cavalry in an attack, only too little. When a large battle is imminent the Player should attempt to concentrate all cavalry not otherwise engaged in screening or attacking other enemy forces.

If you must retreat it is best to do so line mode, especially if you are the attacker and your opponent gets the next move. You also must keep in mind, there is a good chance that your losing force will be disorganized, precluding any move under Initiative and thus the possibility of changing mode in an enemy ZOC.

If forced to attack in the mountains you should always attempt to form a two package attack force as only three infantry units per package may attack. An attacker should always endeavor to have a leader with a bonus point command the attacking force.

In defense, it may be advantageous to declare a pitched battle if your force outnumbered one package of a two package attack force by at least 2-1. The defense should always attempt to place his force to take maximum advantage of affecting terrain, keeping in mind that if you are cavalry poor it is better to defend in swamps or woods.

Finally remember that small forces with little or no cavalry can be overwhelmed and eliminated causing the leader of the force also to be eliminated.

When defending a fort, (Dresden or Leipzig) a force of 20,000 can hold out for many turns as the attacker may only attack one round per turn. The only efficient way to attack a fort is to cut its LOC and reduce it by attrition as well as battle casualties. Citadels especially those on the Elbe, present a special problem. They can be invested but not attacked, yet the forces inside may attack out to break the siege.

To draw the threads together, in the Spring Scenario the burden of the offense is on the French Player. While he indeed outnumbers the Allies approximately 3 to 1 he is cavalry poor making it difficult to bring the Allied army to battle. The most obvious and perhaps best route of advance is via Leipzig to Meissen and Dresden, clearing the west bank of the Elbe, recapturing Dresden to raise French

Morale and open the Citadel of Torgau for passage over the central Elbe. A secondary advance can also be made on Berlin through Wittenberg. Although an obvious target due to its effect on morale, the Berlin front should not be strengthened to the detriment of the Dresden advance. This division of forces often only serves to delay the fall of Dresden without causing the fall of Berlin.

In this scenario the French Player can afford to trade Strength Points for time sacrificing them to march attrition. What cavalry is available should be concentrated in two or three corps to deal with the enemy and support the major forces in pitched battles.

For the Allies, a retreat to the east bank of the Elbe is the only apparent answer. You should blow the bridge at Meissen and staunchly defend Dresden. The forces initially located on the west bank can be evacuated to the east bank of the Elbe via the Pontoon bridge carried by Wittgenstein. It is then merely an act of fighting a delaying action as the French are stretched to the limits of their supply.

In the Dresden scenario perhaps the most obvious line of advance for the French Player is towards Berlin, with the placement of the Center of Operations in Luckau. Be warned, however, previous play has revealed that due to the poor road net the Berlin front is a morass. Perhaps a better line may be Napoleon's original plan to trap the Bohemian Army north of the mountains by outflanking their advance on Dresden to the east. Dresden is the major French supply source and its loss would be disastrous. This flanking move would take a cast iron will and singleness of purpose for if Dresden were lost so would the game be.

For the Allies, best play appears to be to avoid pitched battles at all costs, retreat when pressed and advance when not pressed; preferably upon the French LOC. Any advance upon Dresden is guaranteed to cause a French reaction. The primary goal of the Allied Player is to avoid a decisive defeat and run the French army into exhaustion by constantly pressuring it to defend against thrusts from three sides. Cavalry raiding parties can cause the French a great deal of discomfort and help to diffuse his already inferior army.

The Leipzig Scenario is quite different as the initiative had definitely passed to the Allies. While the situation dictates an Allied victory a certain satisfaction can be gained hustling the French Player from the Leipzig position by indirectly advancing on his LOC. To this end the Silesian Army is the chief protagonist in unhinging the French from the west bank of the Elbe and cutting off the River Citadels. When the French Player reacts, which he inevitably must, the Bohemian Army then debouches from Austria into lower Saxony, threatening the French LOC, cutting off Dresden and, theoretically forcing a retreat.

For the French Player a victory would be maintaining the Elbe River line and holding Dresden preventing it from being isolated. To remain strictly on the defensive on the West bank of the Elbe appears less than satisfactory as you cannot prevent Bluecher from forcing a crossing. Perhaps a better strategy, giving the French some play, would be to screen the Bohemian Army with strong forces while keeping Napoleon and the main field army on the West bank of the Elbe, threatening the Silesian Army's LOC. Remember, the Elbe Citadels give the French Player unlimited access to both banks of the river, all other bridges should be blown and guarded.

As for the Campaign Game it is merely the connecting of the Spring and Dresden Scenarios with a variable armistice. Perhaps the most important aspect of the armistice is the accumulation of Admin Points. For these there is no substitute. It is therefore recommended that the Center of Opns. be moved to within 20 hexes of the source of supply. Any initial disadvantage suffered immediately following the Armistice due to the Center of Opns. being out of position will be more than compensated for by the surplus APs.

Last and perhaps least a word on the victory conditions. They are difficult and for the French Player, perhaps impossible to meet. More often than not something less than victory is achieved by one Player and something less than defeat by the other. The lack of a morale victory or defeat, however, will not conceal from the players who has won and lost the game. Only the most intransigent of players will fail to recognize a defeat.

Bob Coggins

SITUATION, 8th OCTOBER 1813
[For historical interest; not a "scenario".]

FRENCH POSITIONS

Commander (Leaders)

Souham¹
Napoleon (Drouot, Mortier, Oudinot¹,
Nansouty)
Macdonald¹ (Sebastiani)
Ney (Bertrand, Reynier², Arrighi)
Latour³
Marmont¹
Murat (Poniatowski³, Kellerman,
Lauriston, Victor, LHeritier³)
Maj Gen Z (Lefebvre 2Gc, Br 1L)
Girard
Augereau¹
Maj Gen J (Lefol)¹
Maj Gen Garrisons (Margaron)²

Location

Torgau

Meissen
Meissen
Wurzen
Pretsch
Taucha
Waldheim-
Colditz-Borna

Magdeburg
Jena

Leipzig
Torgau
Wittenburg

ALLIED POSITIONS

Commander (Leaders)

Bernadotte (Stedingk, Winzingerode,
Buelow, Woronzow)
Bluecher (Langeron, St Priest, Korff,
Olsufiew, Borosdin, Kapzewitsch)
Yorck
Osten-Sacken (Tschaplitz, Wasiltschikow)
Tauenzien
Scherbatow
(Bridges)

Location

Dessau, Zorbig,
Jessnitz

Dueben
Muehlbach
Eilenberg
Rosslau

Rosslau, Acken,
Wartenbg.

DISTANT ALLIED FORCES (Do not move until date shown)

Game- Commander (Leaders)

Turn

8 Oct Wittgenstein (Barclay de Tolly) Zwickau
Maj Gen (Thielemann, Mensdorf,
Platov) Gera
Maj Gen B (A Liechtenstein)
Yermakow¹ Gera
10 Oct Schwarzenberg (Meerveldt¹,
Klenau¹, Gyulai, Hesse-
Homburg¹, Konstantin) Chemnitz
14 Oct Bennigsen (Dochturow, Bubna
2 Lt, Stroganow AvGde) Freiburg

Unless specified, use strength shown for Scenario "L".

Notes: ¹ = reduce strength of each unit on leader's
track by 1000 men from Scenario L Strength.

² = the same, but reduce by 2000.

³ = increase strength of all leader's units by 1000.

Unless noted, use strength shown for Scenario "L."

Note: ¹ = reduce strength of each unit on indicated leader's
track by 1000 men from scenario L strength.

ALLIED ARMIES UNIT MANIFEST

Formation

Commander

AUSTRIAN ARMY

Divisional Generals

Composition of Unit

	Bubna (2Lt) M. Liechtenstein (1st Lt)	Jaegers, Grenzer, Ldw and cav. Jaegers, Grenzer and cavalry
1st CORPS General Colloredo	Andrasy-Greth (3rd) Schneler-Hardegg (1st c) Wimpfen (2nd)	Regular Grenzer and cavalry Regular
2nd CORPS General Gyulai (later Meerveldt)	Lederer (1st c) A. Liechtenstein (2nd) Weissenwolf (3rd)	Reg., Grenzer and cavalry Regular Regular
3rd CORPS General Gyulai	Crenneville (1st) (ex-3d Res.) Murray (2nd) Prince Philipp (3rd)	Grenzer and cavalry Regular } ex-div. Weissenwolf (3/II) Regular
4th CORPS General Klenau	Meszko-Mohr (3rd Lt) Hohenlohe Bartenstein (2nd) Mayer (3rd) Ehrensgerde (1st c)	Wallachian Grenzer and cav. Regular Regular Cuirassiers
RESERVE CORPS Prince Hesse-Homburg	Chasteler-Weissenwolf (1st Res) Bianchi (2nd Res) Civalart (3rd Res) (ex-1st/III) Nostitz Reisner	Grenadiers Regular Regular Cuirassiers Artillery

*Grenzer = "border" troops

PRUSSIAN ARMY

1st CORPS (later 2nd)
General Bluecher (later Kleist)

Roeder-Pirch I (10th)
Kluex (9th)
Prince August (12th)
Zieten (11th)
Dolffs-Roeder
Alvensleben (Gde)
Reserve

Regular and Ldw.
Reg., Ldw and Ldw cav.
Reg., Ldw and Ldw cav.
Reg., Ldw and Ldw cav.
Cavalry

2nd CORPS (later 1st)
Lt. General Yorck von Wartenburg

Steinmetz/Losthin (1st)
Karl/Warburg (2nd)
Horn/Weltzien (7th)
Huenerbein/Girsa (8th)

Artillery
Grenadier
Reg. Ldw and cav.
Reg., Ldw and cav.
Reg., Ldw and Cav.

3rd CORPS
Lt. General Buelow

H. Homburg (3rd)
Borstell (5th)
Krafft (6th)
Oppenheimer
Thuemen (4th)

Reg., Ldw and cav.
Reg., Ldw and cav.
Infantry and Ldw
Cavalry
Reg., Reserve and cav.

4th CORPS
Lt. General Tauentzien

Puttlitz
Hirschfeld
Dobschuetz
Wobeser

Ldw
Ldw
Ldw
Ldw

SWEDISH ARMY CORPS

Marshal Stedingk

Braendstroem (3rd)
Posse (4th)
Boije (6th)
Schuttsenheim (1st)
Reuterskjold (2nd)
Cavalry
Artillery

RUSSIAN ARMY

1st INFANTRY CORPS
Lt. General Berg (later Gortschakow)

Helffreich (14th)
Lukof-Mesenzow (5th)
Kasakofski
Alexeief-Ilowaiski

Regular and Jaeger
Regular and Jaeger
Mixed
Kossacks

2nd INFANTRY CORPS
Lt. General Eugen

St. Priest-Pueschnizki (4th)
Schachowskoi (3rd)

Regular and Jaeger
Regular and Jaeger

1st CAVALRY CORPS (later 4th)
Lt. General Korff (later Pahlen)

Milesinow-Moller Sak. (1st Hus)
Lisanewitsch
Karpof

Ulans
Kossacks

3rd GRENADIER CORPS
Lt. General Kenevitzin (later Rajewski)

Zwilenief-Tschoglokow (1st Gren)
Sulima (2nd Gren)

5th GUARD CORPS
Lt. General Lawrof (later Yermolow)

Rosen (1st Gde)
Udom I (2nd Gde)

2nd CUIRASSIER CORPS
Prince Galitzin V

Depreradowitsch (1st Cuir)
Kretow (2nd Cuir)
Duka (3rd Cuir)
Tchalikof-Schewitsch (Lt)
Huene (Res)

Artillery

9th INFANTRY CORPS
Lt. General Olsufiew

Kornilow (15th)
Udom II (9th)

Regular and Jaeger
Regular and Jaeger

7th INFANTRY CORPS
Lt. General St. Priest

Gortschakof II-Pilar (17th)
Gurgalow (11th)
Borosdin II (1st Drag)

Regular and Jaeger
Regular and Jaeger

6th INFANTRY CORPS
Lt. General Scherbatow

Benardos (18th)
Talysin I (7th)

Regular and Jaeger
Regular and Jaeger

(AD HOC)
General Miloradovitch

Engelhardt/Volkonski
Karpenko

Chasseurs

4th INFANTRY CORPS (later 10th)
Lt. General Markow (later Kapzewitsch)

Schapski-Turtschaninow (22nd)
Urussow (8th)

Regular and Jaeger
Regular and Jaeger

1st CAVALRY CORPS
Lt. General Korff

Pahlen II (2nd Chas)
Denissiew
Karpow

Kossacks

Thielman
Mensdorf
Platov

Kossacks
Kossacks
Kossacks

11th INFANTRY CORPS
General Osten-Sacken

Newjerowski (27th)
Lieven III (10th)

Regular and Jaeger
Regular and Jaeger

3rd CAVALRY CORPS
Prince Treubetzko (later Wasiltschikow)

Lanskoi (2nd Hus)
Pandschulidsef (3rd Drag)
Karpow II

Hussars

Kossacks

14th INFANTRY CORPS
Lt. General Woronzow

Laptew (21st)
Wuitsch (24th)
Harpe
ORourke (AdvGde)
Krassofsky

ARMY CORPS
General Dochturow

Chowanski (12th)
Paskiewitsch (26th)
Lindfors (13th)
Puschkin (c)
Markow-Stroganow (AdvGde)
Reserve

Jaegers
Regular and Jaeger
Reserve Inf.
Chas and Ulan
Inf., cav. and Jaeger
Artillery

MILITIA CORPS
General Ostermann Tolstoy

Muronzow
Tirow
Tschaplitz (c)

FRENCH ARMY UNIT MANIFEST

Formation

Commander

1st CORPS

General Vandamme (later Mouton)

2nd CORPS

Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno

3rd CORPS

Marshal Ney, Prince of Moscow

4th CORPS

General Bertrand

5th CORPS

General Lauriston

6th CORPS

Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa

7th CORPS

General Reynier

8th CORPS

General Poniatowski

9th CORPS (aka 15th)

Marshal Augereau

10th CORPS (blockaded in Danzig)

General Rapp

11th CORPS

Marshal Macdonald

12th CORPS

General Oudinot

13th CORPS (Around Hamburg)

Marshal Davout

14th CORPS

General St. Cyr

1st CAVALRY CORPS

General Latour-Maubourg

2nd CAVALRY CORPS

General Sebastiani

3rd CAVALRY CORPS

General Arrighi

Divisional Generals

Phillipon-Cassagne (1st)

Dumonceau (2nd)

Teste-Dufour (23rd)

Corbineau-Cobrecht (21st c)

Dubreton (4th)

Dufour (5th)

Vial (6th)

Bruno-Hammerstein (22nd c)

Souham-Brayer (8th)

Brenier-Delmas (9th)

Girard-Albert (10th)

Ricard (11th)

Laboissiere-Beurmann (23rd c)

Marchand (39th)

Morand (12th)

Peyri-Fontanelli (15th)

Franquemont (38th)

Briche-Wolf (24th c)

Maison (16th)

Puthod (17th)

Lagrange (18th)

Rochambeau (19th)

Dermoncourt (6th c)

Compans (20th)

Bonnet-Lagrange (21st)

Friederichs (22nd)

Normann (25th c)

Lecoq-Zeschau (24th)

Thielmann-Sahr (25th)

Durutte (32nd)

de Gaebles (26th c)

Kamieniecki (26th)

Roznietzky-Dombrowski (27th)

Uminski (27th c)

Turreau (51st)

Semelle (52nd)

Grandjean (7th)

Heudelet (30th)

Destrees (33rd)

Ledru dessarts-Philipon (31st)

Gerard (35th)

Charpentier (36th)

Montbrun (28th c)

Pacthod-Gruyere (13th)

Lorenz-Guilleminot (14th)

Raglowich (29th)

de Seissel (29th c)

Loison (3rd)

Thiebault (40th)

Pietrowski (50th)

Frederic

Wathiez (30th c)

Mouton-Creutzer (42)

Claparede (43rd)

Berthezene (44th)

Razout (45th)

Jacquet (16th c)

Bruyere-Corbineau (1st Light)

Chastel (3rd Light)

Bordessoule (1st Heavy)

Doumerc (3rd Heavy)

Roussel d'Hurbal (2nd Light)

Exelmans (4th Light)

Wattier-St. Germain (2nd Heavy)

Lorge (5th Light)

Fournier (6th Light)

Defrance (4th Heavy)

Nationality of Unit

French Cohorts and 3rd bns

French Cohorts and 3rd bns

French Conscripts

French and Anhalt

French Reg.

French Reg.

French Conscripts

Westphalian

French Regular

French Regular and Cohorts

French Regular and Cohorts

French Regular and Cohorts

French and Baden

Hessian and Baden

French Reg.

Italian

Wuerttemberg

Wuerttemberg and Westphalian

French Cohorts

French Cohorts

French Cohorts and Foreign

French Cohorts

French

French Regular and Marines

Line, Marines and Spanish

French Reg.

Wuerttemberg

Saxon

Saxon

French "Deserters and Cowards"

Saxon

Polish

Polish

Polish

French Conscripts

French Conscripts

French, Polish, German

French and Confederation

Neapolitan

French, Westphalian, Neapolitan

French and Italian

French

Wurzburg and Italian

French

French

Bavarian

Bavarian and Hessian

French

French Conscripts and Polish

French Conscripts

Danish

French and Polish

French Conscripts

French Conscripts

French Conscripts

French Conscripts

French

French and Saxon

French

French and Saxon

French

French

French

French

French

French

4th CAVALRY CORPS	Sokolnitzki (7th Light)	Polish
General Kellerman	Sulkowski (8th Light)	Polish
5th CAVALRY CORPS	Klicky-Subervie (9th Light)	French
General Lheritier (then Pajol)	Collaert-Lheritier (5th Heavy)	French
	Lamotte-Milhaud (6th Heavy)	French
IMPERIAL GUARD:		
OLD	Roguet-Friant (1st Old Guard)	French and Italian
Marshal Drouot (acting, Soult)	Curial (2nd Old Guard)	French, Polish and German
I YOUNG	Dumoustier-Pachod (1st Young)	French
Marshal Oudinot	Delaborde-Decouz (3rd)	French
II YOUNG	Barrois (2nd Young Guard)	French
Marshal Mortier	Roguet (4th Young Guard)	French
GUARD CAVALRY	Lefebvre-Ornano (1st c)	French and Berg
Marshal Bessieres (then Nansouty)	Walther-Lefebvre (2nd c. Young)	French
	Walther (3rd c.)	French

Note on Div Gens: where two names are shown, the second succeeded to command during the campaign.

FRENCH PRONUNCIATION:

These guides can only give a general impression, limited as they are to sounds in the English language.

"g" is soft as if written "j"; "t" and "s" at the end of a name are silent; "-er" ending sounds like "a"; "-au" sounds as "o."

DESIGNER'S NOTES

If we assume, as the historians do, that great men lead humanity toward the attainment of certain goals—the grandeur of Russia or France, the balance of power in Europe, the dissemination of the ideas of the Revolution, general progress, or anything else—then it is impossible to explain the phenomena of history without the concepts of *chance* and *genius*.

If the aim of the European wars at the beginning of the nineteenth century had been the aggrandizement of Russia, that aim might have been accomplished without all the preceding wars, and without the invasion. If the aim was the aggrandizement of France, that might have been attained without either the Revolution or the Empire. If the aim was the dissemination of ideas, the printing press could have accomplished it far better than soldiers. If the aim was the progress of civilization, it is extremely easy to see that there are more expedient ways of propagating civilization than by destroying men and their wealth.

Why did it happen in this way instead of in some other way?

Because that is how it happened. "*Chance* created the situation; *genius* utilized it," says history.

But what is *chance*? What is *genius*?

The words *chance* and *genius* do not denote anything that actually exists, and therefore cannot be defined. These words merely indicate a certain degree of comprehension of phenomena. I do not know why a certain event occurs; I think that I cannot know it; so I do not try to know it and I talk about *chance*. I see a force producing effects beyond the scope of ordinary human agencies; I do not understand why this occurs and I talk of *genius*.

To a flock of sheep, the one the shepherd drives into a separate pen to feed every evening, and that becomes twice as fat as the others, must appear to be a genius. And the circumstance that every evening this particular sheep, instead of coming into the fold gets into a special enclosure where there are oats, and that it is precisely this sheep that is rolling in fat and is killed for mutton, doubtless strikes the rest of

the flock as a remarkable conjunction of genius with a whole series of extraordinary chances.

But the sheep need only give up thinking that everything that is done to them is done solely for the attainment of their sheepish ends; they need only admit that what happens to them may also have purposes beyond their ken, and they will at once perceive a unity and coherence in what happens to the sheep that is fattened. Even if they do not know for what purpose it was fattened, they will at least know that what happened to the sheep did not happen accidentally, and will no longer need to resort to conceptions of *chance* or *genius*.

Only by renouncing the claim to knowledge of an ultimate aim immediately intelligible to us, and admitting the ultimate purpose to be beyond our comprehension, may we discern the logical consistency and expediency of the lives of historical personages; the cause of the effect they produce, which is incommensurate with ordinary human capacity, is then revealed to us, and the words *chance* and *genius* become superfluous.

We have only to admit that the purpose of the upheavals of European nations is unknown to us, that we know only the facts—the murders, first in France, then in Italy, in Africa, in Prussia, in Austria, in Spain, and in Russia—and that the movements from west to east and from east to west comprise the essence and end of these events, and not only shall we have no need to see exceptional qualities and *genius* in Napoleon and Alexander, but we shall find it impossible to regard them as anything but men like other men; and far from having to evoke *chance* to explain the minor events that made those men what they were, it will be clear that all those minor events were inevitable . . .

A man without convictions, customs, traditions, without name, and not even a Frenchman, emerges by the very strangest of chances it seems, from among all the turbulent parties of France and, without attaching himself to any of them, is borne forward to a prominent position . . . During the wars in

Italy he is several times on the brink of disaster and each time is saved in some unexpected way. Owing to various diplomatic considerations, the Russian armies—the very armies that have the power to destroy his prestige—do not appear on the European scene while he is there . . . In Africa a whole series of outrages are perpetrated against the virtually defenseless inhabitants. And the men who commit these crimes, especially their leader, assure themselves that this is admirable, this is glory, that it is like Caesar and Alexander the Great and that it is fine.

This ideal of *glory* and *grandeur*, which consists not merely in considering nothing wrong that one does, but in priding oneself on every crime one commits, ascribing to it an inconceivable, supernatural significance—this ideal, destined to guide this man and his adherents, is given full play in Africa. Whatever he does succeeds . . .

He alone, with the ideal of glory and grandeur he had developed in Italy and Egypt, with his insane self-deification, with his audacity in crime and his outright lies—he alone can justify what has to be done.

He is needed for the place that awaits him, and consequently, almost independently of his will, and despite his indecision, lack of plan, and all the blunders he makes, he is drawn into a conspiracy that aims at seizing power, and the conspiracy is crowned with success.

He is thrust into a meeting of the legislature. Alarmed, he tries to flee, feeling that he has been betrayed; he pretends to fall into a swoon, and utters senseless things that ought to have brought about his ruin. But the once proud and shrewd rulers of France, feeling that their part has been played, are even more befuddled than he, and fail to say what they ought to have said to retain their power and crush him.

Chance, millions of chances, give him power, and all men, as if by agreement, collaborate to confirm that power. *Chance* forms the characters of the rulers of France, who submit to him; *chance* forms the character of Paul I of Russia, who recognizes his power; *chance* puts the Duc d'Enghien in his hands and unexpectedly impels him to assassinate him—thereby convincing the mob by the most cogent of means that he has the right since he has the might. *Chance* contrives that though he bends all his efforts toward an expedition against England (which unquestionably would have ruined him) he never executes his plan, but fortuitously falls upon Mack and the Austrians, who surrender without a battle. *Chance* and *genius* give him the victory at Austerlitz; and by *chance* all men, not only the French but all Europe, except England, which takes no part in the events about to occur—forget their former horror and detestation of his crimes, and now recognize his authority, the title he had bestowed upon himself; and his ideal of glory and grandeur, which seems splendid and reasonable to them all.

As if taking their own measure and preparing themselves for the coming movement, the forces of the west several times push toward the east: in 1805, 1806, 1807, and 1809, growing in size and strength.

In 1811 the group of men that has formed in France unites into one enormous mass with the peoples of Central Europe. The increase in the size of the group further justifies the power of the man who stands at the head of the movement . . . Everything is done to deprive him of what remains of his powers of reason and to prepare him for his formidable role. And when he is ready, the forces are ready too.

The invasion courses eastward and reaches its final goal—Moscow. The capital is taken; the Russian army suffers heavier losses than the opposing army suffered at any time during previous wars from Austerlitz to Wagram. But all at once, instead of *chance* and the *genius* that had so consistently led him by an unbroken series of successes to the predestined goal, a succession of counter *chances* occur—from the cold in his head at Borodino to the frosts, and the spark that set fire to Moscow—and instead of *genius*, stupidity and unprecedented baseness are displayed.

The invaders flee, turn back, flee again, and now the *chances* are not for Napoleon but consistently against him.

A countermovement is effected from east to west, bearing a remarkable resemblance to the earlier movement from west to east. There are the same preliminary attempts to move from east to west as there had been from west to east in 1805, 1807, 1809, before the great westward movement; there is the same coalescence into a group of mammoth proportions; the same adherence of the people of Central Europe to the movement; the same hesitation midway; and the same accelerated speed as the goal is approached.

Paris, the ultimate goal, is reached. The Napoleonic government and army are destroyed. Napoleon himself is no longer of any consequence; all his actions are patently mean and pitiful; but again an inexplicable chance occurs. The allies detest Napoleon, whom they regard as the cause of their misfortunes. Deprived of power and authority, his crimes and his cunning exposed, he should have appeared to them what he appeared ten years earlier and one year later—an outlawed brigand. But by some strange chance no one sees this. His role is not yet ended. The man who ten years before and one year later was considered an outlawed brigand is sent to an island two days' sail from France which is presented to him as his dominion, with guards and millions of monies paid to him for some reason.

The storm of nations begins to subside. The waves of the great sea recede, leaving a calm surface on which are formed eddies of diplomats who imagine that it is they who have produced this lull.

But the calm sea again swells. To the diplomats it seems that their dissensions are the cause of this fresh pressure of forces; they anticipate war between their sovereigns; the situation seems to them insoluble. But the wave they feel to be gathering does not come from the quarter they expect. It is the same wave as before, rising from the same point—Paris. The last backwash of the movement from the west occurs: a backwash that serves to solve the apparently insuperable diplomatic difficulties and put an end to the military movement of that period.

The man who has devastated France returns to France, alone, without any conspiracy, without soldiers. Any guard might arrest him; but, by a strange chance, not only does no one touch him, they all rapturously acclaim the man they had cursed the day before and will curse again within a month.

This man is still needed to justify the final collective act.

The act is performed. The role is played out. The actor is bidden to disrobe and wash off his paint and powder: he will not be wanted any more.

And some years pass during which this man, in the solitude of his island, plays for himself his pitiful comedy, ignominiously intriguing and lying, justifying his actions when justification is no longer needed, and showing to the world at large what it was that men had mistaken for strength so long as an unseen hand directed his actions.

The manager, having brought the drama to a close and stripped the actor, shows him to us. . . .

As the sun and each atom of ether is a sphere complete in itself, yet at the same time only a part of a whole too vast for man to comprehend, so each individual bears within himself his own purpose, yet bears it to serve a general purpose unfathomable to man.

A bee, settling on a flower, stings a child. And so the child is afraid of bees and declares that the purpose of the bee is to sting people. A poet delights in the bee sipping from the nectaries of the flower and says that the purpose of the bee is to imbibe the nectar of flowers. A beekeeper, seeing the bee collect pollen and carry it to the hive, says that the purpose of the bee is to gather honey. Another beekeeper, who has studied the life of the swarm more closely, says that the bee forages for pollen to feed the young bees and rear a queen, and that the purpose of the bee is to propagate the species. A botanist, observing that the bee flying with the pollen of a diclinous flower to a pistil of another flower fertilizes the latter, sees in this the purpose of the bee's existence. Another, observing the pollinating of plants, notices that the bee assists in this work, and may say that this is the purpose of the bee. But the ultimate purpose of the bee is not exhausted by the first, the second, or any of the processes the human mind can discern. The higher the human intellect rises in the revelation of these purposes, the more obvious it becomes that the ultimate purpose is beyond our comprehension.

Only the speculation on the relation of the life of the bee to other manifestations of life is accessible to man. And so it is with the purpose of historical characters, and nations.

—Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, Epilogue, Part One, Chapt. 2-4

On Economies

The Campaign of 1813 bridges the gap between two distinct epochs of European history. With the August declaration of Austria against Napoleon, the political alignment formalized at the Congress of Vienna, a commitment to conservatism, stability and the *status quo* which held through the 1870s, was effectively

forged. Before mid-1813, Napoleon never faced all his potential foes at once; he had fought them singly and in pairs at worst. Thenceforward, under concentric attack by three great armies financed by Britain, his resistance collapsed.

The British Empire was manifestly an economic one, and economic competition was both cause and means for her single continuation of the struggle against Napoleon. While the other powers came and went for a year or so at a time, Britain alone was continuously at war from 1802 to 1814, with no major force in the field until 1808.

British economic support allowed the defeated nations to return again and again to the offensive. Without the £2,000,000 given to Russia and Prussia and the £500,000 given Austria in June and July of 1813 the Armistice would probably have been followed by a peace treaty.

If Clausewitz is correct and war is the pursuit of politics by other means, and if politics is the process of control and distribution of wealth, then war, at least since the advent of capitalism in the Middle Ages, can be seen to spring from economic causes. The economies of Europe were straining under the so-called "Continental System," Napoleon's only weapon in the economic war, which structured trade in France's favor and excluded Britain. Tsar Alexander's evasion of the British embargo was a leading cause of the invasion of Russia, and it was for the sake of their sagging economies that the rest of Europe joined the fight in 1813.

Sadly, many nineteenth-century historians failed to trace things back to their causes, content with appearances and unconcerned that nationalistic fervor, in this case as always, was artificially created by the familiar propagandistic processes at the service of the state. Disastrously, the forces of nationalism once released continued to simmer, fueled by a glorification of the wars by Napoleonic historians on all sides, and ultimately overcame the shadow of the Congress of Vienna one summer a hundred years after its inception.

*"How oft we sigh, when histories surmise,
that histories lie."*

History has long had a reputation for being inexact, erroneous, misleading in its very nature, and subject to the conscious and unconscious whims and fantasies of historians. With this in mind, the study of Order of Battle material presents the naive hobbyist, particularly given the current rage for things quantifiable, with what seems to be a possible realm in which to seek a strange sort of certitude. It seems to deal with established facts of magnitude: such-and-such division, on such-and-such date, had exactly so many men.

Now aside from the failures of the data, often, to stand up to its own established criteria (eg., does it include officers, sick, and is it estimated? Was the tally really taken at the time specified? etc.) After a great deal of study it appears that the most misleading aspect of these lists is the concept of a "unit" as a fixed identity. Though the name or i.d. number of a division may remain constant between two tallies, the percentage of men lost, detached, and


replaced appears to be so great and so incessant that, much like an atom giving off and absorbing virtual particles, the constituent components of the unit at those two times are substantially unlike. In brief, the OB of such-and-such date is like a snapshot of an object in a state of flux, and it is altogether impossible to speak of the same unit existing at two different points of time.

The source material may speak of a given regiment belonging to a brigade; but at a lower level of research, inevitably this is only part of the story, as often half or more than half of the battalions of that regiment are scattered elsewhere over the face of Europe. And within the battalions, individual companies are constantly being detached, attached from other battalions, consolidated without end. And of course the composition of a given company does not remain fixed one day to the next, as it is subject to the same processes down to the level of the individual.

Thus the OBs in the sources reflect their compiler's appreciation of them as being in a solid state; fixed, definable, and immutable. In actuality, these OBs were tallies and nothing more; and the division of the

mass of the army into units was the way of counting: it could never come out the same way twice; even if two tallies were conducted on consecutive days, a shifting between groups would be unavoidable.

"A universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart. The skin of a living organism cuts off an outside from an inside. So does the circumference of a circle in a plane. By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appear almost uncanny, the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science, and can begin to see how the familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the original act of severance. The act is itself already remembered, even if unconsciously, as our first attempt to distinguish different things in a world where, in the first place, the boundaries can be drawn anywhere we please. At this stage the universe cannot be distinguished from how we act upon it, and the world may seem like shifting sand beneath our feet." (G. Spencer-Brown: "Laws of Form.")



The St. Thomas church, Leipzig, where Bach lived as cantor 'til 1750, was used as a military hospital for 1500 patients in October of 1813.

BACKGROUND: THE CIVILIZATION OF THE ELBE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

Under Frederick Augustus I, Elector of Saxony from 1694 to 1733, Dresden became "the Florence on the Elbe," leading all German cities in expenditure on art. The great *Gemaeldegalerie* of Dresden took form under his successor, while an opera house rose in Dresden in 1718.

The University of Halle was the first to accord

freedom of teaching to its professors and to expand instruction in natural science, social studies, and law. Christian Gellert, who taught philosophy and ethics at the University of Leipzig, mourned the dead at Rossbach instead of celebrating Frederick's victory.

Germany in the Eighteenth Century was the least na-

tionalistic of European "states," and German literature is said to have suffered from this lack of national consciousness, though this century gave birth to Kant, Klopstock, Wieland, Lessing, Herder, Schiller, and Goethe.

The most famous composer of religious music in Germany was Georg Philipp Telemann, born in 1681 and died in 1767. In 1701, passing through Halle, he met the sixteen-year-old Handel, and loved him at first sight. He went on to Leipzig to study law, but relapsed into music as organist for the Neuekirche in 1704. A year later he accepted the post of *Kapellmeister* in Sorau; then to Eisenach, where he met Bach. In productivity he was unrivalled, composing sacred music for all the Sundays and feast days of thirty-nine years—Passions, cantatas, oratorios, anthems and motets; he added operas, comic operas, concertos, trios and serenades.

The valley of the Elbe is, with that of the Rhine and Danube, one of the main lines of definition of German culture. Some idea of the centrality of the area depicted on the map to that cultural life can be glimpsed in the following brief itinerary of one of its sons.

Johann Sebastian Bach was born on 21st March 1685, at Eisenach, in the duchy of Saxe-Weimar, and first performed in the orchestra and choir of the Convent of St. Michael at Luenenburg, 28 miles from Hamburg. In 1703 he became the organist at the Neuekirche in Arnstadt (near Erfurt), where he composed his first significant works.

Bach composed the earliest of his preserved cantatas as organist at Muehlhausen (1707 to 1708) at the age of twenty-two. The form of these early works is based on a colorful sequence of sections articulated into smaller subdivisions.

In June 1708, he moved to his new post as organist in the *Schlosskirche* in Weimar. When appointed concert-master of the orchestra at the court of Duke Wilhelm there in 1714, he was also allotted the task of composing and performing a new church cantata for the court service every four weeks. At this time he turned toward the "newer style of church cantata" which added the recitative and (da capo) aria

to the sacred concerto, strophic aria and chorale movements of the older type.

When Bach found himself disappointed in his hopes for succession to the post of Court Director of Music at Weimar, he abandoned the composition of further cantatas in 1716 and moved to Koethen in the following year. Here, at a court attached to the Reformed Church, he was obliged above all to compose secular instrumental music and cantatas.

Bach was engaged for the post of cantor in the *Thomasschule* at Leipzig in 1723, and remained in that job until his death on 28th July 1750. He regarded it as his main duty to provide the music of the main churches, St. Nicholas and St. Thomas, with cantata compositions of his own. This set him the task during his first years there of composing new cantatas week after week (except in Advent and Lent) until there was a sufficient number available. A little over three of the five yearly cycles of cantatas have survived.

The first large-scale work that Bach wrote for his new center of activity in Leipzig was the *St. John Passion*. This was followed by the *St. Matthew Passion* a few years later, perhaps the greatest of his compositions. Toward the end of his life he compiled three monumental works, solely because he wished to create the best examples he could of works cast in certain forms. These were the *Mass in B Minor*, the *Art of Fugue*, and the *Musical Offering*.

[This background material was taken from: "Johann Sebastian Bach's Cantata Compositions," by Alfred Duerr, published in the *Telefunken* recordings of the Cantatas; "Bach's Passions," by Paul Steinitz (Scribners); and "The Age of Voltaire," by Will and Ariel Durant (Simon and Schuster).]

DISCOGRAPHY: Nicky Harnoncourt and the *Concentus Musicus Wien* have recorded the Passions, and have set themselves the arduous task of making the first complete recording of the entire Cantata oeuvre (about 125 hours of music). Numbers one through 114 are currently available; all recordings are performed on museum instruments and are available in America on the *Telefunken* label, in twenty-eight boxed sets.

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Appendix

It was on December 4, 1812, that Napoleon left the wreck of the Grand Army, which six months ago he had led across the Niemen, to its fate in the snows of Russia. Handing the command of its pitiful remnant over to Murat, he hurried back to Paris as fast as post horses could carry him. On the 14th he was in Dresden. From there he wrote to the King of Prussia, calling on him to raise another 30,000 men, an order with which the King was most willing to comply, as it afforded cover under which to continue preparations for the national emergency which all Germans felt must arise sooner or later. On December 19 Napoleon arrived in Paris and wrote to Murat a letter, in which he made it appear that the King of Prussia had himself offered these reinforcements. No evidence of any such offer has, however, been found, and the motive which led to this distortion of fact remains obscure, unless Napoleon craftily intended to put fresh heart into his beaten and famishing soldiers by leading them to believe that the Prussians still had a good enough opinion of their invincibility to offer to back them up in spite of their retreat from Moscow.

On January 19, 1813, the Emperor wrote to Davout, then in Hamburg, ordering him to seize Swedish Pomerania forthwith, if there were boots enough in store there to make it worth his while. The order was promptly carried out, but the boots had to be dearly paid for, as this violation of Swedish territory was not the least of the causes which subsequently compelled Bernadotte to throw in his lot with the Allies.

Meanwhile, the debris of Napoleon's beaten army was reaching the Prussian frontier, and a report of the Q.M.G. of Königsberg shows that on December 21 there were 255 French generals, 699 colonels, 4,412 captains and subalterns, and 26,590 men, exclusive of 6,000 sick in the hospital, quartered in that district alone.

As the stragglers arrived at the frontier they were ordered to report at the following places:—

I and VIII Corps at Thorn; II and III at Marienburg; IV and IX at Marienwerder; V at Warsaw; VI at Plock; Artillery and Engineers at Danzig; Dismounted Line Cavalry at Königsberg; Guard Cavalry at Elbing. The 30th Division (Heudelet) consisting of Bavarians, together with 8 Squadrons, had only recently reached Danzig, and were the only formed body of troops available for the field.

The X Corps, (Macdonald), to which the Prussian contingent under Yorck was attached, was still in the neighbourhood of Riga, and the VII Corps (Reynier) was with Schwarzenberg close to the Austrian frontier. The Russians had halted about Vilna, and on the Bug, only following up the French retreat with their Cossacks, who on December 21 crossed the Prussian frontier near Gumbinnen and Insterburg. On December 30 the convention of Tauraggen was concluded, by which von Yorck separated himself from Macdonald and surrendered to the Russians. The exact truth of this surrender will probably never be ascertained, for many verbal messages passed between Yorck and the King in Berlin, of which under the circumstances no written record exists. The situation was far too delicate to entrust such secrets to paper.

General von Wrangel, in his *Memoirs*, published in 1830, says that in August, 1812, he carried verbal instructions to von Grawert, authorizing him, in case of a general retreat, to separate from the French and withdraw on Graudenz, but von Grawert had just resigned his command on account of sickness, and the message was delivered to his successor, von Yorck, who, however, did not show himself at all inclined to act upon verbal instructions in a matter of such moment.

But already at an early stage of the proceedings a kind of tacit agreement had been arrived at to limit the fighting at the outposts "as far as was compatible with the honour of the Prussian arms," which was also a portion of the verbal instructions conveyed by von Wrangel, then a Major and confidential Staff Officer. The Russians kept Yorck well informed as to the progress of the retreat, and from time to time made efforts to induce him to desert the French cause. but to all these Yorck returned answer that he had been all his life a soldier, knew nothing of diplomacy,

and must carry out his orders. At length, in December, the collapse of the French Army becoming more evident every day, Yorck transmitted a fresh proposal of the Russians to Berlin for the Royal instructions, and a Major von Seydlitz was sent to him again with verbal instructions, the precise import of which cannot be discovered, for the testimony of the eye-witnesses of the several interviews which now took place differs on several essential points. All that seems certain is that von Seydlitz's verbal message actually did authorize Yorck to act "according to circumstances," and these presently became so pressing, with the prospect of becoming immediately worse, that on the night of December 29 Yorck agreed to a meeting for the next day, at which the final terms of surrender were agreed upon with the Russians.

All doubts as to the military importance of Yorck's action are set at rest by Napoleon's own opinion. On January 19 he wrote to Jerome in the following words (*Corres.* 19,462): "The immediate consequences of this act of treachery are that the King of Naples will have to withdraw behind the Vistula, and that my losses will be increased by all the sick left in the hospitals of Old Prussia." Clausewitz, who was present with Wittgenstein's Headquarters, confirmed this by his independent testimony to the effect that the Russian Army was so completely exhausted by its losses that had Yorck and Macdonald remained together, the pursuit must have come to a standstill on the Niemen, and all the resources of East Prussia would have been paralysed for months to come. As it was, East Prussia proved the nucleus of the Nation's revival, for the Cossacks pressing on the heels of the French gave the necessary screen behind which the first new formations could be organized, without news of them reaching the French Emperor.

The King leaves Berlin. The situation was indeed one that called for all the King of Prussia's perspicacity. At Berlin he was still within the clutches of his adversary, and might at any moment be taken prisoner. To avoid this risk he left Berlin on January 22, and betook himself to Breslau.

On his way he wrote to Napoleon, pointing out in diplomatic language that though he was most anxious to fulfil his treaty obligations, money was an indispensable condition of his compliance, and that if the French Government's payment for the supplies issued to French troops during the previous year was forthcoming (as provided for in their agreement) the process of rearmament would be greatly facilitated.

Meanwhile, the Estates of East Prussia met on their own initiative at Königsberg, being cut off from direct communication with their King, who officially, was still the Ally of Napoleon, by the Russian screen of Cossacks, and with great enthusiasm passed a resolution in favour of placing all the resources of the district at the disposal of Yorck, Bülow and Borsstell, the principal military representatives on the spot, and they proceeded to call out the quotas of men due under the existing law from the several parishes. But though the townspeople were ready to welcome all signs of military activity, the peasants in the country shewed no corresponding zeal for the National Cause. The orders directing the recruits to join their headquarters were torn up, the civil authorities were openly defied, and ultimately dragoons had to be sent round the provinces to enforce obedience to the law.

Arrived at Breslau, Frederick William came more within the direct influence of the Russians, and on February 23 decided openly to throw in his lot with theirs; but his celebrated proclamation denouncing the French Alliance, and calling on the whole Nation to rise against their oppressors, was only published on March 16, and the actual declaration of War did not reach Paris until the 27th of the same month.

Looking at the numbers actually brought into the field by the date of the first great battle of the War of Liberation, Lützen or Gross Gorschen, on May 2, viz. 95,000 Allies against 145,000 French, one is inclined to think that an even longer delay could only have been advantageous, for the great difficulties in raising fresh troops consisted in laying the foundations of a sound organization and system of administration, matters not easily attended to when once active contact with the enemy had been established. Once it is quite clear

who is really responsible for clothing and equipment, who is authorized to sign requisitions and decree new formations, etc., fresh units are comparatively easily called into existence. But all such machinery was idle in the districts still held by the French or occupied by the Russians, who were still technically the enemy; while the poverty of the country, its comparative roadlessness, and more particularly the alternations of frost and thaw, made the circulation of orders and instructions most tedious and unreliable.

To overcome, as far as possible, these difficulties the King decided on a bold step, i.e. decentralization. Accordingly he decreed on March 15 the sub-division of the Kingdom into four Military Governments, viz., (a) the district between the Elbe and Oder, General von L'Estocq; (b) between the Oder and Vistula, Lieut. General von Taunentzien; (c) between the Vistula and Russian frontier, Lieut.-General von Massenbach, and (d) the district of Silesia, Lieut.-General Graf. Götzen—within each of which divisions the civil authorities were made responsible for the supply of recruits, equipment, etc., while the military authorities undertook the organization of the men thus supplied, their training, and all matters of local defence. Each unit as it was formed and completed was at once drafted to the Field Army.

It will be clear that even a couple of weeks' delay would have been invaluable to allow this new machinery to work smoothly; but at the last, events forced the hands of the King. Napoleon's demands for the supply of fresh troops, and his claim to place Prussian commands at the disposal of his Marshals for employment against the "common enemy" became too insistent, while on the other hand the continuous advance of the Cossacks, who drove the French out of Berlin on March 3 and 4, 1813, rendered further delay impossible.

Reading and re-reading the mass of documentary evidence accumulated by von Holleben, from whom the above figures and facts are principally taken, an unbiased critic is absolutely forced to the conclusion that the King showed sounder judgment than all his advisers put together, although their list comprises such names as Scharnhorst, Bülow, Blücher, Hardenberg and Stein; their ideas were premature, his were practical.

On March 15 Scharnhorst submitted to the King a final project for the organization of a *Landwehr* and *Landsturm* throughout the whole kingdom, which was finally approved on the 17th of the same month. The project had indeed been under discussion for months, and the fundamental idea, together with the name, can be traced back to 1658; but the poverty of the country was so great, and the different degrees in which districts were or had been affected by the passage through them of French or Russian troops, prevalence of active hostilities, and so forth, had hitherto rendered any attempt to deal with the matter on a uniform basis, if not impossible, at any rate inopportune. Even as it was, such delays arose in its execution that no formed bodies of *Landwehr* actually took part in field operations until after the Armistice of June 4, though isolated detachments, temporarily called together without uniforms or even muskets, rendered good service in support of the field troops, both in sieges, and in the operations on the Lower Elbe before Napoleon's reappearance on the scene in the beginning of May. Permission was also given by the King of Prussia to form Volunteer Corps, and though these too were not employed until after the Armistice, a recapitulation of their names here will be in place. These volunteers found their own equipment, and were commanded by ex-regular officers.

They were "The Lützow Free Corps," whose formation, sanctioned on February 18, reached on March 21 a strength of 1,036 men, organized in 4 Companies, and 2 Squadrons, to which subsequently a Battery of 3 guns and 1 howitzer were added.

The foreign battalion, "von Reusz," and the volunteer rifles, "von Reiche," both formed of volunteers drawn from the rest of Germany, and nearly all deserters from the Westphalian or other contingents of the "Grand Army."

Major Hellwig's volunteers 2 Squadrons of partisan Cavalry; Major von Schill's Hussar detachment—commanded by a brother of the celebrated von Schill, killed

in a raid near Stralsund, 1809—comprised 2 Squadrons. Also a variety of smaller detachments, mostly composed of picked foresters, even of poachers amnestied.

The total of all these formations up to the date of the Armistice only reached the figure of 8,500 men, of whom 2,000 were mounted.

The most amazing point, however, seems to me to be this, in spite of all the efforts of the Tugendbund and other secret societies, to say nothing of the inspiring *Volkslieder* of Arndt, etc., the two weak battalions of Reusz and Reiche appear to have been quite adequate to absorb all the true patriots of the remaining 20 million Germans.

By the end of March there stood ready for the field:—

(a) 21 Battalions, 40 Squadrons, 12½ Batteries, 2 companies' engineers = 646 officers, 26,510 men, 10½ guns—under Blücher.

(b) 27 Battalions, 24 Squadrons, 11½ Batteries, 4 Companies' engineers = 646 officers, 25,751 men, 106 guns—under Yorck and Bülow.

(c) 4 Battalions, 4 Squadrons, 1½ Batteries = 61 officers, 2,761 men, 12 guns—under Borstell.

Other small detachments brought the numbers up to 57 Battalions, 70 Squadrons, 27½ Batteries, 7 Companies engineers, 8 park columns, and 1 column tradesmen—in all 1,145 officers, 58,865 men, 234 guns available for field service, but their sick list was very high. In addition there remained 30,077 garrison troops, and 33,640 in the depôts, giving a grand total of 122,582 men.

Compared with the states for August 1, 1811, these figures shew a net increase of 48,169 men, which, even allowing for losses in Russia and a high rate of sickness, seem very small for such an emergency, and appears insignificant compared with the re-creation of the French Army during the same period.

Considerable difficulty was also experienced in finding new officers for the Forces. The conditions of the entrance examinations had to be relaxed, and the two cadet schools were suppressed, their pupils being posted direct to Regiments. Non-commissioned officers of good character and approved conduct in the field were also freely promoted. The cause of the difficulty, of course, lay in the Treasury policy of the past forty years, which had compelled the retention of officers on the active list long after they ought to have been pensioned. It was not that the Generals of the pre-Jena Army had been too old, but the captains and senior subalterns decidedly were so (the former averaged about the same as those who served under Moltke in the Franco-German War, and were younger than the average of French Generals ten years ago); they had lost all youth and activity, and collapsed wholesale under the stress of the retreat.

As regards muskets, there appear to have been sufficient for the Field Army, but the depôt and garrison troops had to drill with extemporized pikes, while some of the Landwehr, even after the Armistice, were led against the enemy their front ranks provided only with similar weapons. The supply of guns, too, was sufficient, though heavy and antiquated patterns had to be employed,¹ and both the draught horses and cavalry remounts appear to have been fair material, though time was wanted to train them in the systematic manner of former days, and, as Marwitz and others have since shewn us, this training was the real secret of excellence in the old Frederickian Cavalry.

English subsidies were largely instrumental in rendering the equipment of these troops possible. Unfortunately, we also sent over a number of uniforms of English pattern (colour not stated), and, to quote Von Holleben, "The King had to submit to the daily annoyance of seeing his men clad in these tasteless garments."

Meanwhile the Russian Field Army had been moving forward, leaving detachments behind to observe the fortresses of Thorn, Danzig and Küstrin—in all 36,000 men, 313 guns; and troops to keep order in Poland—21,800 men, 150 guns. Making these deductions, however, at the end of March, 1813, the troops available for the Field Army numbered 63,686 men and 436 guns, of whom 19,000 with 92 guns under Wittgenstein constituted an Advance Guard that was pressing close on the heels of the retiring French, while the remainder under Kutusow were drawing near to Kalisch on the borders

of Silesia.

It is time now to return to the operations of the wreck of the Grand Army, which, as we have seen above, had been compelled to evacuate in haste the banks of the Vistula on receipt of the news of Yorck's defection at Taurögen. Murat's orders we have already given; these were the last he issued, as he was immediately afterwards recalled to Paris, and handed over his command to Prince Eugène, Viceroy of Italy. At this moment, January 19, the whole of the six Corps, nominally at the Prince's disposal gave him barely 12,000 fighting men, and these almost worn out by privation. He would have had practically no men for field operations, but for the arrival at Posen of some 10,000 provisional detachments of different nationalities; for the only other troops which had preserved their formation, viz., the Polish Division, Grand Jean, of Macdonald's Corps, and Heudelet's Division of the XI Corps had been thrown into Danzig, raising the garrison of that place to 30,000 men, of whom, however, barely two-thirds were fit for active service.

On the right wing the VII Corps (Reynier), two Saxon Divisions and the French Division (Durutte) had separated themselves from Schwarzenberg's command when the latter concluded an armistice with the Russians, and were marching through Silesia, suffering continually from the attacks of Cossacks and other local partisans. But Poniatowski's Poles, about 8,000 men, had been cut off in Warsaw, and another 12,000 had been left as garrisons in Modlin, Zamosc and Thorn. In rear of the centre there remained only the 31st Division (Lagrange) of the XI Corps, 10,000 strong, but dispersed to hold Berlin and garrison Magdeburg Spandau and the fortresses on the Oder—Glogau, Küstrin and Stettin, whilst the Division of Grenier, 18,000 men, was only due in Berlin on January 25.

Out of the 12,000 men thus immediately under Prince Eugène's hand he organized four weak Divisions—one Bavarian (General Rechberg), one Polish (General Girard), one French (General Gérard), and finally one of the Guard (General Roguet), grouping them around Posen, and drafting all supernumerary officers and non-commissioned officers in excess of their complements back to the depôt at Erfurt. The name "Division" was retained in order to deceive the enemy as to their actual weakness. Some 2,000 mounted men, partly surplus to the above detachments, partly rallied to him by force of circumstances, were also organized in two "Divisions." With this skeleton force the Prince endeavoured to impose on the Russians and hold the line of the Oder in obedience to the Emperor's orders, until reinforcements from France could reach him. He also summoned Bülow and all other Prussian detachments to his aid, but received evasive answers. Meanwhile the growing unrest in Berlin and its neighbourhood compelled him to keep back the new XI Corps, organized out of Grenier's 18,000 men, for the maintenance of order in his rear.

His situation soon became hopelessly untenable. Frost held all the rivers in its bonds, and Tettenborn's and Tschitschagow's Cossacks swept all round his flanks. At length on February 12 he began his retreat, reaching Frankfurt on the Oder on February 18, where hearing that the Cossacks had already crossed the river further to the north, he continued his movement on Berlin. Meanwhile in the south Reynier's two Saxon Divisions deserted him, and Durutte's Division was surprised on the march and nearly cut to pieces.

But even Berlin, (where he had rallied the Viceroy's return from the new XI Corps, to which Gouvion St. Cyr had been appointed in command,) could not, as we have seen, be held for long, and on March 5 the Viceroy's (Prince Eugène's) force withdrew to the Elbe, whilst the wreck of Reynier's troops gathered in Dresden. Napoleon wrote one of his characteristic letters to Eugène, censuring him severely, but more as an elder brother than as a Generalissimo, for his failure to hold the line of the Oder; but his reasoning, though unanswerable from the arm-chair-critical standpoint, like his letters to Jerome when in Spain, made no sufficient allowance for circumstances of weather and topography.

If the old school of strategists had gone altogether too far in the attention they paid to the configuration of the

ground and other circumstances which exist only to be conquered by skill and determination, he now overshot the limit of the reasonable in ignoring the limits of human endurance and climatic vicissitudes. To him as Graf. Yorck von Wartenburg in his *Napoleon as a General* has well pointed out, a "Corps" remained always a "Corps," even if its numbers had shrunk to 5,000 men or less, while a river or a mountain range was a scratch on a map, unless he happened at the moment to be face to face with it himself. In this instance he had entirely overlooked the terrible frost which still held all the rivers of Eastern Prussia in its grip. Had the Oder been in its normal unfordable condition, undoubtedly the possession of its four fortresses, Stettin, Frankfurt, Küstrin and Glogau, might have enabled Eugène to hold it, even with his reduced forces for some weeks longer than he actually did, as the Russian Army was still a long way off and Yorck and Bülow's forces were quite insignificant. But in the weather then prevailing the Oder could be crossed almost anywhere, as, in fact, it was, and with a population on the verge of insurgence behind him, the Viceroy certainly had not a moment to spare when he came to his decision to retreat.

On the question of the abandonment of Berlin, Napoleon's comments are again masterly from the general point of view, although, as above pointed out, no allowance is made for the actual position of affairs as seen by the average man on the spot.

"Nothing is less in accord with sound military practice than your decision to withdraw your Headquarters behind Berlin (viz., to Schöneberg, a preliminary step to complete withdrawal). It should have been evident to you that this step must attract the enemy. If, on the contrary, you had taken up a position in front of Berlin (i.e. east) communicating by convoys with Spandau, and thence with Magdeburg, and had brought up a Division of the V Corps (from Magdeburg) midway between the two latter points, and had constructed there a few redoubts, the enemy would have believed that you intended to offer battle. Hence he would not have passed the Oder until he had united 60,000 to 80,000 men, which he was far from being in a condition to do." As a fact, on March 4 the Russians were still five days' march from Berlin, Yorck and Bülow even further; but there is no evidence to show that the Viceroy was aware of this, and in view of the hopeless inadequacy of his mounted forces and the nature of the country, it seems hardly possible that he could have scouted efficiently to that end. Napoleon then continues: "The day on which your Headquarters retired behind Berlin you practically advertised your determination not to hold that town, and thus lost that attitude of determined opposition which it is the real Art of War to know how to keep. An experienced General in your place would have established a camp (presumably entrenched) in front of (i.e. east of) Küstrin, and thus have gained time to draw forward the Corps on the Elbe to Berlin. He could not then have been attacked except at the cost of the time it would have taken the enemy to prepare the wide sweeping movements the capture of such a position would have entailed."

Eugène, however, seems to have had but little choice in the matter of his retreat, and appears to have considered even the Magdeburg road, to which the Emperor refers, as not safe enough for his retrograde movement, for, in fact, he retreated in two columns, the principal one on Wittenberg, the other by Lückau on Torgau, a Saxon fortress still held by Saxon troops, who declined to allow the French to pass on the grounds that Saxony was a neutral country. Refused passage here, the column bent off up stream to Meissen, where it arrived most conveniently in time to assist Reynier in overawing the people of Dresden.

These movements brought the French troops into position along the Elbe, a cordon position of the worst kind; and here for the moment the Viceroy left them, till, his report having reached the Emperor, a storm of reproaches burst upon his head.

"I do not see what obliged you to quit Berlin. Your movements are so rapid that you have not been able to take the direction I had prescribed (alluding to a previous letter received too late for compliance with its mandates). You have uncovered Magdeburg with-

out having taken steps to assure yourself whether it is sufficiently provisioned or garrisoned. Yet it contains all our Field Artillery, and many other important things. (This is hardly fair, as Eugène had, in fact, left there the whole V Corps, some 30,000 men.)

"By your march on Wittenberg you have left unprotected the whole of the 32nd 'Division Militaire' and the Kingdom of Westphalia. You thus run the risk of losing all the Cavalry which is distributed in cantonments, and have left the finest provinces of the Empire at the mercy of an advance guard of a few thousand men. I have always told you that you should retire on Magdeburg. In laying your lines of communication via Mayence, not only have you compromised the safety of the 32nd 'Division Militaire,' but also Holland and my squadrons in the Scheldt. It is really time to begin making war seriously. It is in front of Magdeburg (i.e. to the east of it) that you should have united 80,000 men, whence as a centre you would protect the whole of the Elbe. Our operations make us ridiculous in the eyes of our allies and of our enemies, because you constantly retreat a week before their infantry come within sight of you. It is really time that you should set to work and begin to operate like a soldier. I have laid down what you ought to do."

Then follows in detail the plan the Emperor wishes to see carried out:—

"Prince Eugène takes position nine to twelve miles east of Magdeburg with the V Division and XI Corps, Roguet's Division, and the greater part of the Cavalry—65,000-70,000 men of the best available—and covers his camp with redoubts, leaving ample space to manoeuvre between them. Marshal Victor with the 4th Division (12 Battalions) moves on the left bank of the Elbe to near Dessau, where he establishes a bridge, and till this is complete a ferry, covered by fortifications. His action will extend as far as Torgau, and the garrison of Wittenberg, raised to 2,000 men. General Reynier, with the 7th Corps (which the Emperor imagined to be 12,000 strong, but which was in reality only 6,000) will ensure the watch over the line of the Elbe from Torgau to the mountains of Bohemia (about 70 miles); he will fortify the bridge at Meissen. The Saxon General commanding in Torgau will employ two-thirds of his force (4,000 men) to watch the river above and below the town; the rest will remain always in the place. (As we have seen, the Saxon General refused to accept any orders from the French.)

"Marshal Davout, with the 1st Division (16 Battalions) will place himself on the left of Magdeburg (i.e. north). He knows Hamburg and is known there too, and his proximity to that town will be very useful. Hamburg will have a garrison of 8,000 men, sufficient, with the aid of its municipal guards, to hold the town against the Cossacks. The King of Westphalia will organize a mixed Division of his troops, to be concentrated two or three marches west of Magdeburg, which will be ready to support either Victor or Davout as the case may require.

"Of course all the boats on the Elbe and its affluents on the right bank must be systematically destroyed, or brought under the protection of our own guns. The line of communications will be from Magdeburg on Wesel.

"The principal Corps, placed in the camp in front of Magdeburg, will send out every day mixed reconnaissances of 1,500 horsemen and a Division of Infantry. I presume that you do not intend to let yourself be shut in by the Cossacks and a few Battalions.

"In case of an attack directed against the principal Corps, Marshals Victor and Davout will cross the river and manoeuvre against the enemy's flanks.

"Your position in the camp in front of Magdeburg will re-establish the 'moral' of your troops. If the enemy marches in force on Havelberg, he must leave at least 80,000 to mask you (and this is impossible, as the Allies have not a sufficient number of men available). If they make a serious effort towards Dresden, more than Reynier can deal with; then the latter will fall back behind the Mulde; or, further, always keeping on your right. Then an advance of the principal corps from Magdeburg or Brandenburg will frighten them and bring them back to the right bank of the

Elbe again. In taking up this offensive position and showing the great number of troops you have in Magdeburg, the enemy will be held in check and will be unable to undertake anything without bringing at least 100,000 men against you; and seeing himself on the eve of a battle, he will take good care not to make any detachments which would weaken him."

Although throughout this letter Napoleon had systematically overestimated Eugène's forces and underestimated those of the Allies, the form of defence is perfect; but before this letter reached its destination the Viceroy had made further dispositions which aggravated the evils of the first. He had brought Davout from Hamburg and sent him to command all the troops about Dresden, and had written to justify his previous measures. This brought down on him renewed reproaches, for, as Napoleon very rightly points out, "for General Reynier to withdraw from Dresden means nothing, but for a Corps (however weak) under the Prince of Eckmühl to be compelled to retreat is quite another matter; it would show that we intended to defend that place, but did not dare to act up to our intention."

Ultimately on March 18, under renewed pressure from Napoleon and the news of the occupation of Hamburg by Tattenborn's Cossacks, orders were issued to concentrate in the form indicated in the Emperor's orders, but with the important exception that the bulk of his troops were retained on the left bank of the river.

Meanwhile, the news from Hamburg which reached the Viceroy became alarming. A rumour was in circulation that 10,000 to 15,000 British troops were expected there, to form the nucleus of a Corps of 10,000 Danes, 5,000 Russians, and some thousand Swedes, their object being an attack on the 32nd "Division Militaire" and a descent thence on the Viceroy's communications with the Rhine. Napoleon was evidently much annoyed at the facility with which such rumours gained credence, and he administered to his unfortunate son-in-law the following reproof: "You go altogether too quickly, and alarm yourself too readily. You attach too much importance to every rumour. More calm is required in the direction of military matters, and before attaching credence to reports they should be carefully discussed. Everything that spies and agents tell you (unless they have seen with their own eyes) is nothing, and even when they have seen, it is worth very little. Why do you believe that the British are going to disembark at Hamburg? Where are their means? All their efforts are directed towards Portugal. Is it because a number of ships are in view? But you can see thousands every day from the coast of France. What I tell you is all useless, because it is only experience which teaches one to reduce these astonishing reports to their true dimensions."

Actually this censure was in excess of the Viceroy's deserts, for the Cossacks had spread far into the territory of the 32nd "Division Militaire," and as the inhabitants had risen in many places, it was almost impossible for any accurate idea of the enemy's movements to be ascertained.

On March 31, however, definite news was received to the effect that Wittgenstein had quitted Berlin on the 27th, and was marching on Rosslau to cross the Elbe at that place. The Prince now decided to bring his troops over the river to the position indicated in Napoleon's instructions in front of Magdeburg, and from this movement resulted a straggling encounter known as the "Combat of Möckern" on April 3, 4 and 5, only noticeable from the extreme fury with which the raw Prussian troops fought. Their numbers, however, were far less than Eugène had been led to expect, hence when by the evening of the 5th it had become apparent that there were not 20,000 men engaged in front of him, he concluded that the real main body of the enemy must still be on the march towards Rosslau with the intention of turning his right flank by the left bank of the river, and a report coming in stating that the bridge at Rosslau actually had been captured (a false rumour, as it afterwards turned out to be), he ordered his troops back to the left bank of the Elbe, and the Prussians were far too spent by their exertions to interfere with them.

The whole incident was unfortunate for the French, for the Allies made the most of their success, and the

reports of it went far and wide all over Germany, raising confidence everywhere in the hearts of the patriotic party, which as yet was far from being synonymous with the whole Nation. Contrasting Eugène's action with Napoleon's orders, one can only ask oneself wonderingly, what possible cause there could have been strong enough to compel the Emperor to leave this most important command in such incapable hands, when all the time there was on the spot perhaps the ablest and most determined of all his Marshals; Davout—a man of his own age—active and resolute far beyond the common standard, and devoted to Napoleon heart and soul. Every commentator in turn has asked this question, but hitherto no adequate reply has been suggested.

The Prince now, recognizing the impossibility of continuing to hold the line of the Elbe, determined to defend the Lower Saale, and during the following days the Army of the Elbe moved into the position shown on Map 1. Wittgenstein having now no enemy in front of him crossed the Elbe at Rosslau on the 10th, and moved southward to gain touch with Winzingerode and Blicher, whose cavalry scouts already watched the whole line of the Saale, and whose troops were disseminated between Leipzig and Dresden, whilst the Russian Main Army still lay at Kalisch, retained there by Kutusow in spite of the protestations of the Prussians. It was only on April 7 that the Russian Guards commenced their march on Dresden, distant 200 miles; hence they could not be expected to reach Leipzig; 90 miles further on, before the 27th or 28th of the month.

Till that date therefore the Allies had not more than 70,000 men available. Hence of necessity they called a halt and busied themselves in the improvement of communications, notably of bridges across the Elbe at Meissen and Dresden, whilst Wittgenstein attempted to surprise Wittenberg, but was repulsed.

On April 19 a rumour, premature as it turned out to be, that Napoleon was in full march at the head of the Army of the Maine to effect a junction with that of Prince Eugène, startled them into activity. Wittgenstein moved to Düben, Kleist to Halle, and Bülow, left before Magdeburg, was relieved by a small Russian corps of observation, and also rejoined the main body

NAPOLÉON TAKES THE FIELD—CONCENTRATION OF THE GRAND ARMY AND OPERATIONS TO THE BATTLE OF LÜTZEN

It is time now to return to the Emperor, of Grand and to review his activity during these months of heavy strain.

By a decree issued from the Trianon, March 12,¹ the composition of the Army was laid down as follows:—

- I Corps, Marshal Davout (Prince d'Eckmühl). 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions.
- II Corps, Marshal Victor (Duc de Belluno) 4th, 5th and 6th Divisions.
- III Corps, Marshal Ney (Prince de la Moskova), the existing I Corps of Observation on the Rhine, together with the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th Divisions.
- IV Corps, General Bertrand, the existing Corps of Observation in Italy, with the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th Divisions.
- V Corps, General Lauriston, the existing Corps of Observation on the Elbe, with the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th Divisions.
- VI Corps, Marshal Marmont (Duc de Ragusa), the existing II Corps of Observation on the Rhine, with the 20th, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd Divisions.
- VII Corps, General Reynier, intended to comprise the two, Saxon Divisions, the 24th and 25th, and the 32nd Divisions (Dumortier).
- VIII Corps, General Prince Poniatowski. Two Polish Divisions Nos. 26 and 27 (only partly raised).
- IX Corps. No General named. The 28th and 29th Bavarian Divisions (new complements).
- X Corps, General Rapp, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd and 34th Divisions (old numbers), the remains of the old 34th Division were absorbed by the 30th.
- XI Corps, Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, which had hitherto formed the Advance Guard on the Elbe, consisted of the 31st, 35th and 36th Divisions.

Besides these troops, the Westphalians were to supply the 37th Division, the Würtemburgers the 38th Division, the Hessians, Badenians, and Frankfurters the 40th Division, and ten Battalions organized in Erfurt were made into the 41st Division.

Subsequently on April 24, the formation of a XII Corps was decreed, and at a later date a XIII, Headquarters at Bamberg, was called into existence.

As a whole the plan was never realized, for, as already pointed out, circumstances proved even stronger than Napoleon's will, but as far as practicable each fresh

unit organized was fitted into its appointed place, so that the framework of an Army existed from the very first, and the commands remained, whatever changes in detail might supervene.

I Corps The débris of the I Corps had rallied in Stettin, 68 officers, 1,536 non-commissioned officers and men, on February 17. An order of January 27 had originally laid down the strength of these Corps at four Divisions of 64 Battalions in all, of which the 1st Division was to be formed by 16 Battalions in Stettin itself, the 2nd Division (of another 16) in Erfurt, but on the evacuation of the Oder line this became impossible, and on February 10, the 1st Division began its formation in Leipzig. As the battalions (practically all new formations) only became ready in succession, and complete Divisions were required at the earliest possible date, all the 1st Battalions of Regiments went to the 1st Division, the 2nd Battalions to the 2nd Division, the 3rd and 4th Battalions in like manner to the 3rd and 4th Divisions, a method which was generally followed throughout the Army. The 1st and 2nd Divisions, commanded respectively by Phillipon and Dumonceau, were available for field service by the end of April.

II Corps The II Corps.—Originally the Emperor had hoped to constitute this Corps out of the wreck of the old II and III Corps, but this proved quite impossible. No attempt, therefore, was made to build up the Battalions at the front. "But the Companies in the Oder fortresses will take the numbers of the Companies belonging to the 5th Battalions, and those of the 5th Battalions at the dépôts take the number of the Companies of the 1st Battalions, thus I shall have in France all the 1st Battalions at full strength" as Napoleon wrote to his War Minister, General Clarke, on March 31, adding, "Each Regiment in the Grand Army will thus have four Battalions, with one or two Companies of the 5th Battalion in the Oder fortresses, and the balance of the 5th Battalion Companies will be at the dépôt." Ultimately the 4th and 5th Divisions were formed at Magdeburg and Osnabrück respectively, and by the end of April had attained the strength of—4th Division (Duberton), 12 Battalions, 8 guns, 7,000 men; 5th Division (Dufour), 11 Battalions, 8 guns, (5,979 men); and they were then moved up to the Elbe and Saale. The 6th Division did not reach the front till the end of June.

III Corps The III Corps, the original Corps of Observation on the Rhine, was built up of eight Regiments formed of the "Cohorts" (see above, p. 31) of the old 22nd Regiment of the Line (4 Battalions), 10 provisional Regiments, and the 9th and 29th Light Infantry, both of two Battalions in all 60 Battalions. The Corps Headquarters were fixed at Mainz, and the Divisions were ordered to concentrate at Hanau, Frankfurt am Main, and Mainz. The 39th Division (Badeners, Hessians and Frankfurters) was also assigned to it as a 5th Division. Four Squadrons of the French 10th Hussars, and five Squadrons of the Baden Dragoons were further allotted to it, and by the end of April 44,764 men and 84 guns were available on the Saale. The Divisional Commanders were: 8th Division, Souham; 9th, Brenier; 10th, Girard; 11th Ricard; 39th, Marchand.

IV Corps The IV Corps.—Already on January 10, Napoleon notified the Italian chancellor (Melzi), of his intention to concentrate a Corps of Observation at Verona, and on February 27 informed him that the Corps must be ready on March 10 to set out for Augsburg. General Bertrand was to start with the first Division available, the others to follow as they were completed. Eight Battalions of "Cohorts," two Line Regiments with nine Battalions, 16 Battalions, conscripts of 1813, 13 Italian, one Algerian and three Neapolitan Battalions in all, were to supply the Infantry, and two Squadrons of Neapolitans, eight Squadrons of Württembergers, the Cavalry. The Württemberg Division was also assigned to this Corps. Many delays arose in carrying out these orders, and only the 12th (Morand), and 15th (Peyri) Divisions, numbering 18,400 men with 37 guns, were available on the Saale by the end of April. The Württembergers, 7,204 men, 12 guns, joined on the march, (May 4), at Freyburg (Saxony).

V Corps The V Corps.—Eleven Regiments of "Cohorts" (44 Battalions), the 34th Regi-

ment of the Line (four Battalions) and four foreign Battalions were assigned to this Corps, and the four Divisions, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th were at first ordered to be formed at Magdeburg, Münster, Osnabrück and Frankfurt am Main, but at the beginning of March they were all ordered up to Magdeburg, where Lauriston assumed the command. Towards the end of April they had attained a strength of 28,000 men (with 67 guns) unequally divided in the following manner—16th Division (Maison) eight Battalions, 17th (Puthod) 12 Battalions, 18th (Lagrange) 15 Battalions, 19th (Rochambeau) 12 Battalions, the 3rd Light Cavalry Brigade being assigned to them. The 17th (Puthod) was detached towards Hamburg and only rejoined on the battlefield of Bautzen, this left available at the end of April only 32 Battalions, 51 guns, in all 20,832 men.

VI Corps The VI Corps.—The II Corps of Observation on the Rhine became the VI Corps of the Grand Army, by the decree of March 12, and was to be collected about Mainz. The material available was 20 Battalions of Marines, eight provisional Line Battalions, four Battalions of the 37th Light Infantry, 10 other Light Infantry Battalions, and 16 Line Regiments.

The formation of this Corps met with all kinds of difficulties. Only fourteen Battalions of Marines had arrived on April 15. The 23rd Division (Teste) had only received two of its Battalions on the same date, and had to be left behind in Giessen and finally was only completed in Magdeburg in June, after the Armistice.

Thus only three Divisions, the 30th (Compans), 12 Battalions, 21st (Bouet) 13 Battalions, and 22nd (Friedrichs) 14 Battalions, with 62 guns, making 24,250 men, were ready on the Saale at the end of April; only two Squadrons of Hessians had joined on May 1.

VII Corps The VII Corps had only the 32nd Division (Durutte) available, and on May 1 its strength amounted to only 102 officers, 903 men, with four guns.

XI Corps The XI Corps was principally constituted out of the only intact reinforcements for the Grand Army of 1812, on their way to the front in December of that year, viz. the 31st Division (Lagrange) of the old XI Corps, the very strong Division (Grenier), formed in November, 1812, in Verona, was divided into two Divisions on arrival at the front, which received the number 35 and 36. Seven Battalions of the 31st Division had been left behind in Stettin, and the remaining five were grouped with five others belonging to a temporary Division under Gerard, who received the command of the whole. Lagrange being recalled to France and given another command instead. Three Polish Battalions were also added, so that by the middle of March the Division, then at Meissen, numbered 13 Battalions, 12 guns. The 35th Division consisted of 12 Battalions and 22 guns, the 36th of 11 Battalions and 14 guns, but as the 31st Division was ordered to find 2,000 men for the garrison of Wittenberg, and to make other detachments, it was only six Battalions (about 3,000 strong) on the resumption of hostilities. The total strength of the Corps on April 15 was only 661 officers, 21,700 men. On April 22 General Gerard was again transferred to the 35th Division. General Ledhu received the 31st Division, and General Charpentier the 36th.

XII Corps The XII Corps was formed by a decree of April 24, by taking two Divisions, the 13th (Paethod) and 14th (Lorenz), from the IV Corps and adding to it a Bavarian Division (Raglowich). The command of it was given to Oudinot (Duc de Reggio). On April 30 it was in the vicinity of Saalfeld 24,000 men and 50 guns strong.

We have already seen how the Viceroy had gathered a small body of the Old Guard under Roguet around him. On March 13 this little Division numbered 133 officers, 2,896 Infantry; 62 officers, 944 men. Cavalry, 4 officers and 188 men artillery and engineers.

About 1,000 other officers and non-commissioned officers for whom no men were available had been sent back by post to France, where on a nucleus supplied by 3,000 veterans of the Guard, who had volunteered to rejoin, they proceeded to reconstruct sixty Battalions of the Young Guard. Of these only one Division

(Dumoustier), 16 Battalions and 52 guns, reached the front in time for the battle of Lützen, and a second (Delaborde) joined on May 25, at Dresden.

General Bessières received the command of the Cavalry of the Guard, which numbered 2,800 men, with two Horse Artillery batteries. It consisted of two Regiments of the Lancers, one of Chasseurs, one Dragoons, one Grenadiers, the celebrated Mameluke squadron, four Squadrons of "Elite Gendarmerie" and four Regiments of the "Gardes d'honneur" formed of young men of good family who had hitherto escaped the conscription by paying for substitutes, but at length had been caught by the same trick which was applied to the "Cohorts."

The Cavalry The Cavalry of the whole Army was, as before mentioned, by far the weakest element of the whole force. It was organized in three Corps, of which the 1st had attained a strength of 172 officers, 3,343 men, 3,705 horses, on the Elbe and Saale, at the end of April. The 2nd, on April 15 numbered 149 officers, 3,144 men, and 3,581 horses; and the 3rd, which on May 1 was at Hanau, reported 3,895 men fit for duty.

Further formations were in progress throughout the whole of Europe at the time under the Napoleonic dominion, the details of which would require more space than it is possible to afford. However, the net outcome of the whole was that on May 1, 1813, the Emperor again stood at the head of 226,177 men, with 457 guns, which were subdivided into two Armies, the Army of the Main under his own command, and the Army of the Elbe under the Viceroy of Italy (Prince Eugène). To the former belonged the III, VI and IV Corps, the Guards on arrival, and the 3rd Cavalry Corps. The latter comprised the V and XI Corps and such portions of the I, II, and VII Corps as were available, together with the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps.

Early in March, he entertained and drafted an outline plan, which though it was never put into execution, deserves notice for the amount of criticism to which it has been subjected, and also because its guiding idea recurs repeatedly at a later stage of this campaign (1813).

Leaving a retaining force on the Saale, he proposed to cross the Elbe with his main body, march direct on Berlin and thence relieve the garrisons of the Oder fortresses and Danzig. The chief criticism directed against this has always been, that neither Berlin nor the relief of the fortresses afforded a sufficient objective for a Field Army, which should always aim primarily at the destruction of the Field Army of its adversary, essentially the guiding principle of the whole Napoleonic strategy. Further, it is condemned because it contains no single allusion to the *decisive battle* which all sound strategy should aim at. These criticisms come chiefly from Germany, and I confess that for years they had my full adherence, until I came under the influence of the modern French school, when Napoleon's reasons at once became plain. The chief difficulty of his situation lay in holding, or inducing his enemies to stand, or indeed in controlling their action in any way. The march to Berlin, thence onward, ultimately towards Königsberg, not only meant the ruin of the Prussian Monarchy for a second time, but also threatened the Russian communications with Petersburg. It was, therefore, a reasonable calculation that the threat on Berlin, as once before at Jena, would bring the Allies down in force to oppose it, and marching in his favourite *battalion carrée* it was, as already explained, immaterial to him when, where or how they chose to attack him.

His reason for abandoning the idea has never to my knowledge been made clear. The necessity often alleged for covering the Southern States of Germany to ensure their loyalty has never appealed to me as adequate, because nothing would seem better adapted to secure their wavering attachment than the sight of the beaten Russians and Prussians straggling back upon their frontiers. More probably the scheme was originally based on insufficient information, and was given up when it became clear that the total force the Allies could have concentrated to oppose him was altogether too small to offer them a reasonable prospect of success in the battlefield; therefore they would voluntarily, (abandoning Berlin and East Prussia), fall back into Russia, when he would again find himself face to face with the terrible problem of the previous year, and with

far less satisfactory material to enable him to deal with it. At the time of its inception also he had still no adequate idea of the completeness of the disintegration which his old Army had undergone, and he attached far more value to its fragments than they actually deserved. With them the process of "war seasoning" been overdone, and "war weary" would better describe them. "I have 600 men of the Guard with me here," wrote Rapp from Danzig "but not two hundred will ever be fit for the field again"—and if this was the case with the Guard, the condition of the rest of the Army may be imagined!

Meanwhile, the action of the Allies was forcing Napoleon's hand, and the question of the neutrality of the German Southern States became a matter of time, whilst the attitude of Austria was more than threatening. From Dresden, their advance if continued towards the upper waters of the Saale and Main, covered Bavaria and Saxony, and might even jeopardize the arrival of the IV Corps from Italy via Augsburg. On the other hand, the further they continued in this direction, the more they exposed their own communications to a blow from the north-west, and the chance of catching them in a position in which they would be compelled to fight increased. He, therefore, now busied himself with a plan which was almost the exact inverse of his Jena Campaign, and issued orders to unite his whole force in the angle of the upper Saale and Elbe.

On April 11, The Army of the Elbe lay with its Headquarters at Aschersleben—about 30 miles south of Magdeburg. The III Corps along the road from Aschaffenburg to Schweinfurt; VI Corps around Hanau; Guards at Mainz; the IV and XII coming from Italy with their head at Anspach and the rear-most Division ten days' march behind, near Augsburg. The Emperor knew from a certain source that the Russian Guards had only commenced their march from Kalische on April 1, and could not, therefore, reach the troops already in the field before May 1; but it was always possible that the latter might continue their advance without waiting for the Guards, in which case they might reach the Saale by April 20. Therefore, he had to be prepared for this contingency, though it was an improbable one.

Accordingly he proscribed the next stage of his advance in such a manner that his concentration would be assured whatever case arose. To this end the Army of the Elbe was directed to advance to the line of the Wipper—a small affluent of the Saale, with its left resting on the latter river and its right on the slopes of the Harz Mountains, thus threatening the enemy's right if they should attempt to march upon Erfurt. The VI Corps and Guards were to move along the great road from Mainz through Fulda, Gotha, to Erfurt, the III Corps from Schweinfurt to Meiningen, and the IV and XII Corps by Bamberg, Coburg, and Graf-

The Emperor had caused most careful reconnaissances to be made of all the roads through the Thuringian forest—a mountainous densely wooded district with ridges rising some 3,000 feet above the plain. He knew that from Meiningen and Coburg alternative roads existed which would enable him either to direct the further movement of these Corps on Erfurt or on the Saale, as the case might require. If now the Allies determined to march either direct upon Erfurt against the Army of the Elbe, in either case the latter could hold them till the centre and right swung in—or if by the time they reached the above-mentioned places it was clear that the enemy was moving southward against the right column, or waiting for the Russian Guards to arrive—the whole of his forces could combine their forward movement, and complete their concentration in the neighbourhood of Leipzig; and this was what actually happened.

On April 24 the French Army of the Elbe still lay on the Wipper, the III Corps at Weimar, followed by the Guards, which had passed the VI Corps at Erfurt, and the VI strung out along the road from Gotha to Vacha for some 30 miles. The IV and XII Corps lay with their advance guard at Grafenthal, their main body extending from Coburg to Anspach. The Bavarians were on the extreme right at Bayreuth, the total front being about 140 miles,

depth 60 miles. But the Emperor himself had delayed too long at Mainz, trusting to his Generals on the spot, and as usual they had fallen far short of his reasonable expectations. Ney, having reached Meiningen, and not having appreciated Napoleon's reason for ordering him to make a temporary halt at that place, had concluded, that as the road from Meiningen to Weimar across the hills was rather an indifferent one, he would take the easy one down the valley to Eisenach, and cut in on the main road through Erfurt to that place. He thus fouled the line of march of the Guards and VI Corps, blocking them back all along the road.

At the same time the Cavalry of the Allies made a succession of brilliant attacks in the district between the Wipper and Unstrutt with the result that a series of regrettable incidents, from the French point of view, took place. On April 12, Major Blücher (son of the Field-Marshal) at the head of some 200 Prussian Hussars appeared before Weimar, with this result, that the Saxon Battalion on duty immediately laid down its arms. On the 17th, Major Helwig with a Squadron of 150 men fell suddenly upon the rearguard of the Bavarian Division (Rechberg) near Langen-Salza, capturing some hundred men and a couple of guns. On the 18th the same party dispersed a Westphalian Cavalry regiment, near Wanried on the road to Cassel, thus creating wild alarm in King Jerome's mind. Finally, reports of all these events reaching Ney at Erfurt on the 19th, caused him serious apprehension of more to follow. The result was a series of orders and counter-orders which narrowly escaped throwing the whole command into disorder. As Marshal Bessières wrote to Berthier, "I must tell you frankly that if the enemy had been advancing on Naumburg and Jena as the Prince de la Moskova wrote to me that night, we should have been in no position to meet them, or the Prince either."

Meanwhile the Emperor's orders were Napoleon's already on their way for the whole Army to concentrate on the Saale on April 25.

"The Army of the Main marches on Jena and Naumburg; the Army of the Elbe will move up the Saale and occupy Halle and Merseburg. The Corps from Italy, circumstances permit, will march by Saalfeld on Jena, the left bank of the Saale."

In elucidation of this the Major General (Berthier, wrote to Prince Eugène from Mainz (April 22):—

"The Emperor is to-day still in Mainz. As the Corps of the Prince de la Moskova cannot be completely closed up until the 24th, it is necessary for you to occupy Querfurt so as to maintain direct communication with the Prince, who is going to occupy the heights above Naumburg. Destroy the bridge which the enemy has over the Saale near Wettin. Occupy Halle and Merseburg as bridge heads, and place these towns in a condition of defence against Cossacks by palisading the gates. Occupy Halle first, Merseburg afterwards. *The Emperor's intention is to guard the whole of the Saale, so that the enemy cannot penetrate to the left bank at any spot. You must be on the alert to march at once against the enemy should he advance from Jena or Naumburg.*"

Following closely upon these orders, the Emperor himself reached Erfurt on the morning of the 25th April, and the first duty to claim his attention was the arrangements of the Supply Service. The Corps had taken the field with from 12 to 14 days' bread, biscuit or meal—four days' rations carried by the men, the remainder in carts, and they had lived as far as possible on the country they had traversed. But now they were too concentrated to do this, and were to be fed from the magazines Napoleon had ordered to be prepared in Erfurt. Evidently this service had been neglected, for on the evening of the 25th we find a letter to Marshal Duroc.

"Collect to-night the Intendant and two or three of the principal members of the administration of the country, as well as the Commissary of War, and settle what steps are to be taken to collect supplies at Erfurt. We must have in four days 200,000 rations of bread to issue at the rate of 50,000 a day. They must also procure as soon as possible, two million rations of flour—as much beef on the hoof and brandy; also two million rations of oats. To get these quicker you are to pay cash."

The main line of communication for the

cations. Main Army was to be by Mainz, Fulda, Gotha, while the IV and XII Corps after passing Saalfeld were to give up completely their previous line, viz., Coburg and Nuremberg; and any communications necessary with Augsburg were to go by Fulda-Wurzburg, an indication of the growing insecurity of the country. A comparison of the halting places actually attained with the orders issued, shows that in the Army of the Main all the prescribed marches were duly and punctually performed, but the Army of the Elbe was 24 hours late in starting and then only averaged seven miles a day. No explanation of this extraordinary passing that, with Napoleon in person on the spot, twenty-five, even thirty miles a day was by no means an unusual effort for bodies of such strength to accomplish. Singularly, also, there is no trace of any reprimand being administered to Eugène for this dilatoriness.

On the 30th, the several Corps attained the under-mentioned positions.

ARMY OF THE MAIN.
Headquarters of the Emperor: Weissenfels.
The Imperial Guard: Weissenfels.
III Corps: Headquarters and four Divisions: East of Weissenfels. Marchand's Division: Stossen.
VI Corps: Headquarters and two Divisions: Naumburg. Friedrich's Division: Kösen.
IV Corps: Along the Saale from Dornburg to Jena and Rudolstadt.
XII Corps: Still in rear, between Saalfeld and Coburg.

THE ARMY OF THE ELBE.
Headquarters and Division Roguet (Guards): Merseburg.
1st Cavalry Corps and XI Corps: Three miles east of Merseburg.
V Corps: Three Divisions west of Merseburg; a detachment of four Battalions at Halle.
32nd Division: at Schafstedt.
4th Division (Victor): Bernburg.

The ten Battalions of this Division formed a cordon all along the Saale, which river was henceforth so closely watched that none of the enemy's Cavalry succeeded in crossing it. *This cordon defence of a river line was Napoleon's expedient to compensate for his deficiency in Cavalry, for it gave him "security" and ensured secrecy of his own movements*, but of course it could not help him to ascertain what his enemy was about. For this, however, he cared little; he had now 145,000 men in hand ready to fight in any direction at a moment's notice, and it mattered nothing to him when or where he met his opponents, if only they would fight to a finish when they did encounter him. Secrecy and promptitude were, however, the essential factors of the situation, for if once the Allies realized the overwhelming numbers against them, they would certainly concentrate to the rear, as for the moment they had no interest in the actual occupation of the ground on which they stood. Experience had shown them the efficacy of a rapid retreat as a means of evading Napoleon's sledge hammer blows.

His orders, therefore, for May 1, ran as follows, "The Army of the Elbe is to advance in front of Merseburg to Schladebach—placing Merseburg in a condition of defence.

"The III Corps with the Cavalry of the Guard from Weissenfels towards Lützen.

"The VI Corps to support the III with two Divisions, the third remaining at Naumburg. The Imperial Guard (two Division) to Weissenfels.

"The IV and XII to continue towards Naumburg as rapidly as possible."

As this movement took the Army out into open country very favourable for the enemy's Cavalry, to avoid any possibility of surprise, the troops now marched in masses straight across country.

The formation of the III Corps may be taken as the type generally followed. Behind an Advance Guard consisting of all the Corps Cavalry (a Brigade of 10 Squadrons), two Battalions and a half Battery of Light Artillery, the Main Body followed at a distance of about 3,000 yards in as many lines as it contained Brigades. Each Brigade was in line of columns of Regiments (four Battalions) with double company front at half distance, so as to be able to form regimental squares rapidly. The Artillery of each Division between the leading Brigades.

As Napoleon had expected, the Cavalry of the Allies attempted several charges during the day, but were easily repulsed with a trifling loss. There was no longer a Seydlitz to lead them, nor were they trained to that great Leader's standard of perfection; and the day had ended most satisfactorily but for the unfor-

late death of Marshal Bessières, killed dead by a cannon shot at the passage of the Rippach. The bearing of the young soldiers had won the approval even of Ney, who with many others seems at first to have had serious doubts as to their steadiness. At the close of the day the Emperor was at Lützen.

ARMY OF THE ELBE.

XI Corps from Quentz to Markranstädt.
V Corps in rear of Ganthendorf.
1st Cavalry Corps, between Schladebach and Oetzach.
32nd Division, at Merseburg.

ARMY OF THE MAIN.

Cavalry of the Guard at Lützen.
Imperial Guard (two Divisions) Weissenfels.

III Corps. Headquarters: Kaja.

(Souham's Division: Kaja, Rahna, Klein and Gross Gorschen.
Girard's Division: Starsiedel.
Brenier's Division: near Lützen.
Ricard's Division: near Lützen.
Marchand's Division: near Lützen.

VI Corps. Headquarters: near Rippach.

(Bouet's Division: near Rippach.
Compans Division: near Lössau, west of Rippach.
Friedrich's Division: at Naumburg.

IV Corps. Headquarters: Stößen.

(Morand's Division: Stößen; Advance Guard: Pretzsch.
Peyri's Division: Gross-Gestwitz.
Württemberg Division: Jena.

XII Corps. Head of Column at Kahla, rear near Saalfeld.

Looking at the Map we see that the *battalion carrée* or lozenge formation, has been modified to suit the circumstances. On the left the flank being protected by the Elbe and Elster, needs no particular precaution, so the whole left and centre are closed up to form the "mass of manoeuvre"—the right flank being covered by the III Corps and Guards, from Weissenfels to Lützen, whilst the IV Corps from Stößen to Jena is in a position to outflank any attack upon the III coming from the southward.

From the reports of the enemy's movements received, it appeared that the latter was concentrating about Zwenkau, whilst a portion of his troops still held Leipzig. Judging from his knowledge of Wittgenstein's character, the Emperor considered an attack on his right flank during the next day as highly probable. But this threat did not deter him an instant in his determination to gain ground to the front and appear in mass in the plains to the east of the Elster on May 3.

As a measure of precaution, however, the III Corps around Lützen was ordered to stand fast till noon, whilst the Army of the Elbe advanced on Leipzig, and all other elements of the Army closed in on the III Corps.

In case of an attack from Zwenkau the III Corps is thus facing in the required direction to act as Advance Guard—to fix the enemy and allow the remainder of the Army to manoeuvre against him.

In their execution of these orders the **Battle of Lützen** troops had reached the position shown in the sketch, when about 11 a.m. a tremendous cannonade burst out in the direction of Kaja, and Napoleon leaving the Army of the Elbe to continue its movement, galloped across country to see what had happened.

Reaching the brow of a low undulation which hid the field of action from his sight, he suddenly discovered Souham's Division (part of it already in serious disorder), beset by overwhelming forces of the enemy. Souham's troops had allowed themselves to be surprised in broad daylight by almost the whole of their adversary's Army.

The Emperor was not disconcerted even for a moment. Taking the whole situation in at a glance, he issued the following terse and fitting orders.

"The III Corps will hold its position at any cost. Its business is to fix the enemy, and thus form a pivot on which the rest of the Army can manoeuvre."

"The VI Corps prolongs the right of the III Corps."

"The IV Corps moves against the enemy's left."

"The XI and 1st Cavalry Corps against his right."

"The V Corps occupies Leipzig with one of its Divisions, the others to be echeloned near Markranstädt ready to move on Kaja."

"The Guard marches to the sound of the guns."

Here we will leave him and return to the doings of the Allies which had led to this surprise.

Movements of the Allies We saw them last on April 19, just at the moment when a premature rumour of the arrival of the Emperor at the front compelled them to decide on a course of action.

At this date the Corps of Miloradowitch was moving from Dresden to join Blücher at Altenburg, where he

had been since the 14th of the month, and the Russian Guards were still five marches to the west of Dresden. The news of the death of Kutusow had just been received, and Wittgenstein appointed to the Command-in-chief of the whole Army. At this date, inclusive of the troops already on the Saale, it consisted of 65,000 Infantry, 22,000 Cavalry, 8,000 Artillery with 450 guns.

A rearward movement of concentration would undoubtedly have been the best plan to adopt from a strictly military point of view, but to withdraw without even the show of a fight would have been politically disastrous, in view of the attitude of Austria and the state of public feeling all over Germany. Moreover, the Prussian troops were still too raw to stand the strain of a prolonged retreat. A defeat in battle even if accompanied by heavy losses, might, in the exalted condition of patriotism in which they found themselves, be far better for their subsequent cohesion than the depressing influences of a continuous withdrawal. Finally, in view of the reports that had reached them, as to the poor condition of the French Cavalry and conscripts, both Blücher, Yorck and Wittgenstein felt that with 22,000 horsemen behind them, in a theatre of rolling plains especially favourable to their action, the chances in favour of a victory were good enough to justify the risk. The only point unsettled was the best point of concentration to select. Wittgenstein had rightly gauged the intention of Napoleon to advance through Leipzig, and had called up Blücher from the south to Borna, whilst he himself had determined to concentrate between Leipzig and Würzen. But the Emperor Alexander, who arrived at this moment, considered that this disposition rendered it probable that, in case of disaster, the whole Army would be thrown back on the Elbe about Torgau—and he decided on a more southerly position between Leipzig and Borna.

They were in this position when, in the course of May 1, the reports of Cavalry—most accurate as to what could actually be seen—led them to conclude that the whole French Army was moving in one long column on Leipzig, hardly guarding their right flank at all. And the opportunity to take advantage of this negligence was too tempting to be allowed to escape them. This conclusion, though in fact erroneous, was an almost inevitable consequence of the failure of the Allied Generals to penetrate the real secret of the Napoleonic methods.

Accordingly, leaving Kleist in Leipzig to hold the town (a semi-medieval fortress) to the last, orders were issued at 11.30 p.m. on May 1, to the following effect:—

"The Corps of Miloradowitch (12,000 men) on Zeitz to watch in the direction of Naumburg and Jena."

"The Corps Winzingerode (12,000 men), to Werben, to cover the passage of the main Army over the Elster and Flossgraben."

"The Corps of Blücher (27,000 men) in two columns to cross the Elster at Storkwitz and Pegau."

"The Corps of Yorck (7,500 men) passes the Elster at Pegau, after Blücher's left column, the troops of Berg at Storkwitz behind the right."

"The Guards (18,500 men) follows the troops of Yorck and Berg."

"The Army will form up beyond the Flossgraben, the right on the canal near Werben, and the left at Grünbach near Sohesten, the movement to be completed by 7 a.m."

The troops were on the march between 1 and 2 a.m. (they were, therefore, probably awaiting the arrival of the above orders), but from want of clearness in their instructions, the columns crossed one another, and the resulting delays postponed the final deployment till 11 a.m. The Army then stood in three lines, hidden by a roll of the ground, some 2,000 yards south of Gross Gorschen. Owing to the long night march, the men were much exhausted, and it was decided to allow them another hour's rest. Meanwhile Wittgenstein, with the Headquarters Staff, rode forward to a mound about 1,200 yards south of Gross Gorschen, whence they saw great clouds of dust hanging heavily over the main road to Leipzig, and in the immediate foreground were a large mass of French troops cooking their dinners and completely off their guard.

Attack by the Allies The whole Army of the Allies being already deployed, it would have sufficed to launch a Cavalry Division on Souham to overwhelm

all opposition, and then to advance over the wreck of the French Advance Guard with the whole of the Artillery and Infantry on a broad front, crushing each fresh echelon of the enemy as it came on the ground. Instead of this, the Allies grew circumspect, and advancing some 36 guns, opened the attack with a single Brigade, and the first shots fired gave the alarm to the whole of the French Army.

The first rush of the Prussians easily carried Gross Gorschen, but when they endeavoured to throw a mass of 23 Squadrons on the retreating French—a line of Batteries came rapidly into action between Rahna and Klein Gorschen, and brought the former to a stop with case shot. Then Girard's Division arrived on the spot, and immediately afterwards the whole of the VI Corps (Marmont) came up on his right about Starsiedel, so that by 10 p.m. about 40,000 French were in action against some 65,000 of the Allies. Then followed a series of disconnected and successive attacks by Brigades, where whole Army Corps would have been more to the purpose, and after desperate fighting the villages of Rahna and Klein Gorschen also fell into the hands of the Allies, who then prepared to push forward on Kaja, where Ney in person had in the meantime arrived. Placing himself at the head of Brenier's Division, on whom the remains of Girard's and Souham's commands at once rallied, Ney led them forward, and with the bayonet drove the Allies back to Rahna and Klein Gorschen. Again the Prussians threw in another Brigade, and in turn the French gave way.

Napoleon on the Battlefield At 2.30 Napoleon rode up to Kaja with the Guards. His arrival produced an extraordinary effect on his troops, who saluted him "with cries of 'Vive l'Empereur,' in which even the wounded and dying joined" (*vide* testimony of von Odeleben, a Saxon officer on Napoleon's staff). Instantly taking in the situation, he sent his A.D.C., General Mouton, to Ricard's Division (the last closed reserve of the III Corps), with orders to execute a counter attack, and again bearing down all opposition, the French became masters of the two villages.

Meanwhile, the Cavalry and Cossacks of the Allies had been thundering down in a succession of disunited charges on Marmont's Infantry, and the Marshal, impressed by the visible masses of the enemy in front of him, sent to Napoleon for reinforcements.

The reply he received was characteristic. "Tell your Marshal he is mistaken, the decision lies at Kaja, not at Starsiedel."

A lull in the battle now set in, only the Artillery on both sides continued their fire, and meanwhile Wittgenstein, learning of the approach of the IV and XI Corps, prepared for a final effort. The moment was critical for Napoleon—it was about 4.30 p.m.—the III Corps was practically burnt out and useless, the VI could not be moved, as its presence at Starsiedel was imperative to protect the flank of the III Corps, and only the Guards were available on the spot. But he hesitated to engage them, because he saw that the "battle was not yet ripe," i.e. that the enemy had not yet expended all his reserves and reached that crisis of nervous exhaustion on which the success of the aggressor's final blow depends.

At this moment, about 4.30, some Battalions of the III Corps broke. The Emperor galloped into the middle of them, rallied them by the sheer magnetic power of his personality (none who lived through this moment could ever forget it), and sending in a Brigade of the Young Guard to give them a lead, led back the whole III Corps into the fight. On no occasion in his whole career did Napoleon expose himself more recklessly, and never had his extraordinary power of command asserted itself to a greater extent. It was not, and could not be the mere example of personal courage. In an Army numbering such men as Ney, Mouton, and Rapp in its ranks, personal courage in itself would hardly have attracted unusual attention. It was the indefinable something in the man himself that reawakened the confidence and enthusiasm of all ranks, which, to put it gently, had slumbered somewhat during the months succeeding his hurried departure from Smorgoni on December 14, 1812.

This must be borne in mind throughout the whole of this campaign, if the extraordinary heroism of the French troops immediately under his eyes is to be understood and explained.

At last towards 5 p.m. the XI Corps preceded by all

its Artillery (60 guns), began to arrive from the direction of Eisdorf and Kitzau, reaching well round the enemy's right wing, and at the same time Morand's Division of the IV Corps appeared upon their left.

The time had now come for the final "knock out" blow, and Drouot with sixty guns of the Guard Artillery galloped out to the front, and unlimbering at ease shot range, began to tear the very heart out of the Allied Army, whilst the whole Infantry of the Guard followed in rear, sweeping along with it all that still had life in the sorely shattered III Corps. The Allies gave way at all points, but the blow had been timed a little too late, and in the absence of an efficient Cavalry, darkness intervened to prevent the victorious Infantry reaping their full reward.

To cover their retreat, the Cavalry of the Allies made several gallant charges, and finally just before midnight, a party of eleven squadrons, under a Colonel Dolfs, in the midst of complete darkness, over difficult ground, and guided only by the bivouac fires, threw themselves into the very heart of the French lines. What followed has never been quite clearly established. The French deny all panics, the Prussians affirm them: all that is certain is that the French were kept under arms all night, and morning found them too completely worn out to pursue.

No more striking contrast, illustrating the difference of the fighting value between troops raised under the old long service conditions, fighting for "the honour of their arms" and those raised under the new, inspired primarily by a feeling of nationality, can well be desired than is presented by the different conduct of the Prussians on this occasion and at Jena. In a surprisingly short time the stragglers had sorted themselves out, and were well on their way from the field, and when next morning dawned not a single gun or trophy of any kind remained as prizes for the victorious French.

This was a most fatal blow to the Imperial prestige, for it entirely obscured the remarkable strategy that had united about 140,000 men on the battlefield, but called attention to the fact that these 140,000 odd had not achieved sufficient success against the 75,000 of the allies to bring in a single gun or other trophy. All other conditions which might be brought forward to palliate this want of success, i.e. want of Cavalry, the darkness of the night, etc., were overlooked in the general rejoicing in every Foreign Ministry in Europe over this striking contrast between Napoleon's previous victories and that of Lützen.

Nor had the Emperor better reason to be pleased with the fighting quality which his men had shown. He had actually engaged three Corps, about 60,000 men, had expended one completely, and but for his arrival in person on the scene with the Guard, there could be no doubt that both the VI and III Corps, together with any other Corps in the Army except the Guard, would have been completely defeated under any of his Marshals. Yet the Allies had not engaged the whole of their forces, for (apart from Bülow, who away to the north near Halle had been left out of the combination entirely) Miloradowitch, delayed on the march by causes no longer possible of elucidation, had failed to reach the battlefield before the resolution to retreat had been taken.

It will be noticed also that throughout the day the Allies were on relative interior lines. Had Wittgenstein's original proposal to concentrate about Würzen been adhered to, they would then have been outside the horns of the attack, with the whole Corps of Bülow, (inclusive of Kleist) available, and might then have entertained the reasonable expectation of crushing the heads of the French columns as they defiled across extemporized crossings over the Elster, and out of the narrow gates of Leipzig. This is assuming that Kleist had abandoned that place of his own free will, without any adequate garrison, a course he had no reason to adopt, since poor though its fortifications undoubtedly were, 5,000 men could have held it for days against an Army unprovided with a siege train.

The losses of the day, quite sensible. While the Allies owned to 10,000 the French had to admit 18,000 killed, wounded, or prisoners, 12,000 of which were in the III Corps alone, and it thus lost 25 per cent. of its Infantry. But whereas the young French conscripts, fighting without a cause which appealed to them, reported themselves as sick or wounded on the smallest excuse, the young

Prussians, fully saturated with the importance of the stakes for which they fought, stuck to the ranks as long as their legs could carry them. The Russians also have never been good malingerers, their Company was and as their home, and their ambulances held no attraction for them.

FROM LÜTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE

UNDER cover of Miloradowitch's intact command (12,000 men) and the Cavalry, the Allies rallied their troops which had been engaged, on Froburg and Borna, and then decided to continue their retreat, the Prussians by Colditz and Meissen, the Russians by Rochlitz, on Dresden. Parks and convoys by Freiburg and Chemnitz ultimately on Dresden also. Bülow, near Halle, charged with the special mission of covering Berlin, was informed of their intentions and invited to withdraw behind the Elbe at Rossau.

As soon as order could be restored in the French ranks the Emperor pressed on in pursuit, but here his want of Cavalry told severely, and, over and above his deficiency in this respect, lay the hopeless corruption and inefficiency of his Supply Department. Since the men could draw no rations, they broke up to forage for themselves, and presently this evil attained the most serious dimensions. Thus in a report of the Provost Marshal dated May 15, 1813, quoted by Col. Lanrezac (p. 170) we find that flying columns sent in to collect stragglers had found no less than 5,200 between the Elsters and the Elbe, three-quarters of which, it is only fair to the French to record, were Italians of the IV and XII Corps, neither of which had been actually under fire.

The following order speaks for itself:—

ORDRE DU JOUR,

May 6, 1813.

"Many soldiers have wandered into the country to right and left of the road, others follow the columns as stragglers. It is the fault of the officers who allow the men to leave the ranks. It is the fault of the Generals who march without rear guards to pick up the stragglers. The soldiers unload their arms by firing them off, instead of using the cleaning stick to draw the charge. Others roam about the fields firing at the cattle. This is a crime; because in War a gun shot is frequently the signal of alarm. It is also a crime, because the bullet might kill or wound persons by accident; finally it is a crime because it is an act of maraud. His Majesty orders that any soldier who fires off his musket either as a marauder or to save himself the trouble of unloading properly, shall be punished by imprisonment and degradation. If the shot wounds or kills any one, he shall be punished by death.

"ALEXANDRE,"

"PRINCE DE NEUCHÂTEL, MAJOR-GENERAL.

The Army of the Elbe not having been engaged in the battle, and being also nearest to Dresden and the Elbe, was sent on in pursuit of the enemy, but again the Viceroy's incurable slowness called down upon him the Emperor's reprimands. It seems that the custom had crept in of allowing an indefinite number of private wagons and carriages to accompany the troops, and for second line transport to be inserted in the columns between the combatant Divisions. To put a stop to this abuse, orders were issued that any private vehicles found in the columns would be burnt, and their horses handed over to the Artillery. Only the Artillery wagons were to march with their Divisions, and the rest of the baggage was relegated to the tail of the columns. Fortunately for the French, the Allies were in no hurry to evacuate the ground they held, and soon the pursuers were in touch with rear guards of all arms on the roads towards Dresden and the Elbe, but it was not at first clear by which road the bulk of their forces had moved. Napoleon, therefore, pressed for prisoners, but the admirable order in which the retreat was conducted made it difficult for his subordinates to comply with the demand. At Colditz, on May 4, the XI Corps came upon a Prussian rear guard, and after a sharp tussle, the latter retired, leaving only some twenty or thirty prisoners behind it. The Emperor's reply to the Viceroy's report of this action is characteristic:—

"MY SON,—Yesterday's would have been a very pretty affair had you sent me 3,000 prisoners. How is it that in a hilly and wooded country where the enemy's Cavalry are useless, you cannot catch any for me? The Duke of Ragusa marches for Waldheim at 4 a.m. to-morrow. Take good care to move off not later than 5 a.m., and close up your columns so as not to occupy more than three leagues (nine miles) of road. Place all your baggage at the end of your 3rd Division, so as to march in a soldier-like manner, and be able to bring the whole of your three Divisions into action simultaneously. Put a little order into your Corps; it wants it badly. The Italians in particular commit atrocities, robbing and pillaging wherever they go. Shoot a few of them.

"Your affectionate father."

The reports received on the night of May 4 made it clear that the Russians and Prussians were retreating on Dresden and Meissen, but the strength and whereabouts of Bülow's troops to the northward were still in doubt. In any case it was not and could not be clear whether the Allies would endeavour to hold the line of the Elbe, whether they would cross the Elbe, then separate, the Prussians retiring on Berlin, the Russians to Silesia, or whether the two combined would continue their retreat in the latter direction. Moreover, Napoleon appears to have been obsessed with the idea that the King of Prussia attached particular importance to the possession of Berlin, and he also seems to have been unable to rid his mind of the thought of relieving the Oder fortresses; a proceeding which would only have set free the investing forces by which their garrisons were held in check. According to rule these could not well be less than three times the strength of the troops they neutralized.

With a double object before him, he A new Army under therefore decided to form a new Army, Ney under Marshal Ney, out of Ney's own Corps the III, the II provisional Corps under Victor, the VII under Reynier, and another provisional command under Sebastiani which consisted of Puthod's Division of the V Corps, and the 2nd Cavalry Corps, both of which were still on the Lower Elbe. With this command Ney was to cross the Elbe at Torgau, and hold himself ready to move either up the right bank of the Elbe to Dresden or direct on Berlin as circumstances might dictate.

The Emperor seems to have counted on Saxon co-operation from the first, for Reynier's Corps on paper comprised the two Saxon Divisions, at that time forming under General Thielman the garrison of Torgau, and he was disagreeably surprised when on May 7 news reached him that Torgau refused to open its gates, alleging specific orders from the King of Saxony, and simultaneously that the King himself had abandoned Dresden and withdrawn to Prague, taking with him all his heavy bodyguard Cavalry. Prague being in Austrian territory made the matter doubly awkward.

A messenger of the Diplomatic Staff was at once sent post haste after the fugitive, with an ultimatum giving the King six hours to decide whether he would adhere to the alliance still existing between himself and the Emperor, order Torgau to surrender, at once and return to his capital, or see Dresden and his country treated as conquered territory forthwith.

Meanwhile the Allies were resolutely contesting every mile of the French advance, and the operations of Miloradowitch's column are a model for rear guard Commanders to study. Only a resolute push from the southward by the IV Corps could have hastened matters, but this was one of the Italian Corps, and its men were poor marchers, from want of sufficient discipline. On August 8 the advance guard of the French Army with the Emperor's Headquarters entered Dresden; only to see the last of the Russian troops filing over the bridge to the Neustadt, the suburb on the right bank of the Elbe, and immediately afterwards two spans of the bridge were blown into the air, leaving gaps of 140 feet to repair. Unfortunately for the Allies, the demolition charges were put in too high up, thus the lower tiers of the bridge piles were left untouched, and the work of reconstruction was markedly facilitated.

The French had taken six days to cover 80 miles, an average which fell far short of Napoleon's usual

idea of a day's march in pursuit, viz. seven to eight leagues, i.e. 21 to 24 miles.

All the boats on the river had been systematically destroyed or removed, and though the pontonniers were at hand, the pontoons were still fifteen marches in the rear. Hence recourse had to be taken to rafts of timber and other improvised material, which led to many delays. Even anchors had to be improvised out of rough timber cases filled with stones. The Emperor, finding it impossible to reconstruct the main bridge in face of the Russian guns and musketry from the Neustadt, decided to force a passage lower down the river at a convenient re-entering bend near Briesnitz; and this gave rise to one of the classic examples of the passage of a river under fire. The Russians held the opposite bank with Infantry and some sixty guns, but the French brought up eighty, and taking the whole salient bend of the stream, and the plain beyond it, under a convergent fire, soon obtained a fire superiority, under cover of which a few parties of Infantry were first put across. Then the pontonniers, sheltered by the actual bank of the river from direct vision, managed to float their rafts into position and complete the roadway.

At the same time another attempt to secure a footing on the right bank at Neustadt was made. Twenty guns unlimbered on the well-known terrace of Brühl, and protected by their fire, 300 Voltigeurs of the Guard managed to cross on the few boats which had escaped the general destruction, and seized a strongly built stone building covering the exit from the permanent bridge. Upon this the Russians began to evacuate the suburb, seeking without sufficient justification. The repair of the bridge was at once put in hand, and on the afternoon of the 10th, a few men of Charpentier's Division passed the principal breach in the bridge by means of long fire-escape ladders.

As soon as it became clear that the passage at Briesnitz had been won, orders were issued to the XI, IV and VI Corps to prepare to cross on the morrow (May 10). But in the night a flood came down the river, carrying with it great quantities of drift wood, the bridge was swept away, and a further delay of some thirty-six hours was thus occasioned.

For the moment, therefore, the outlook for the French was gloomy, for not a single standing bridge over the river was in their hands. Besides which the same flood that had swept away the bridge at Briesnitz had increased their difficulties everywhere else. Fortunately, the messenger despatched to the King of Saxony at Prague returned very opportunely with orders to Thielman to hand over the fortress of Torgau.

Accordingly, during the course of May 11, troops entered the town and Reynier was at last in a position to take over his two Saxon Divisions.

This move, however, did not pass off without friction. Thielman, who was most bitterly opposed to the French had left for Dresden before they arrived, and throughout the period of his command he had done his best to promote a German spirit amongst his men and officers, therefore a good deal of re-organization was necessary before the Saxons could be induced to march under their new masters. Reynier's report to Ney (given in *Foucart*, p. 137) is amusing in its querulousness, and his troubles did not end there, because an epidemic, "nervous fever" (probably "influenza") had broken out, so that it was inadvisable to quarter troops in the town. Neither Victor's nor Sebastiani's Corps had arrived, they were indeed still some seven days' march away, their advance being constantly harassed by partisan raids based on Bülow's Corps, and it was fortunate that the Allies had already set out on their further retreat, as Ney had only Durutte's Division of the VII Corps and his own III Corps, of reliable troops, at his disposal.

Much ill feeling had developed between the Prussians and Russians during the retreat to Dresden, of which Napoleon was kept duly informed by rumours collected by his advance patrols. It seems that this ill feeling had penetrated even to the Supreme Command, for the Prussians actually began their march on May 9, from Meissen on Groszenhayn, i.e. towards Berlin, whilst the Russians from Neustadt took the road to Radeberg and Breslau. But on the 10th wiser counsels prevailed,

and leaving the protection of Berlin to Bülow and his partisans, King Frederick William directed his troops, by the road through Kamenz towards Bautzen, where the Russians had preceded him. Here the two Sovereigns decided to make a further stand, and proceeded to fortify their position.

Napoleon's Headquarters remained in Dresden from May 8 to 17, the time being utilized to re-organize his troops and incorporate into the several Corps the reinforcements completed since the opening of hostilities, and now on their way to join him.

On May 12, Prince Eugène received the following order, which those who have followed his progress so far must admit to have been fully deserved:

"My Son,—Start to-night for Munich, and from thence proceed to Italy, where you will take over the command of all my troops in that country, and the Illyrian Provinces. It is my intention to form an Army of observation of between eighty and ninety Battalions, half French, half Italian."

The Army of the Elbe was now broken up, its Corps being absorbed by the Grand Army under the personal command of the Emperor. The following table gives its composition on May 15.

	Divisions.	Batts.	Sqdrns.	Batteries.	Men.
IV Corps	Morand (French)	34	4	7=25,000	
Bertrand	Peyri (Italian)				
	Franquemont (Würtemberg)				
VI Corps	Bouet (French)	39	4	20=22,000	
Marmont	Compans "				
	Friedrich "				
	Divisions.	Batts.	Sqdrns.	Batteries.	Men.
XI Corps	Gérard	31	2	8=17,000	
	Fressinet				
	Charpentier				
XII Corps	Lorenz (French)	33	0	7=24,000	
	Pachot				
	Raglovich (Bavarian)				
Guards	Old Guard	6	—	—=4,000	
	2 Divisions Young Guards	25-30	—	14=15,000	
Guard Cavalry	Dumoustier and Barrois	—	20	3=4,000	
1st Cav.	Bruyère—				
Corps	8 French Regiments—				
Latour	12,000 men				
Maubourg	1 Regiment Italian Chasseurs	2,400			
	2 Regts. Saxons				
	Division Châtel—				
	1,800 French detached to V Corps	—	45-50	4=9,800	
	Division Heavy Cavalry				
	Division Bourdesoules—				
	6 French Regts., 1,200				
	2 Saxon Regts., 1,200				
	Division Doumer—				
	6 French Regts., 1,200				
	1 Neapolitan Regt. 1,000				
Total					115,000

	Divisions.	Batts.	Sqdrns.	Batteries.	Men.
III Corps	Souham	66	8	12=30,000	
Ney	Delmas				
	Albert				
	Ricard				
	Maisons				
V Corps	Lagarange	30	—	10=19,000	
Lauriston	Rochambeau				
	Puthod (mixed)	14	—	2=8,000	
VII Corps	Durutte (French)	16	1	2=9,500	
Reynier	Sohr (Saxon)				
II Corps	1st and 4th French Divisions	22	—	2=13,000	
Victor	Châtel's Division of Light Cavalry detached from 1st Cavalry Corps to march with V Corps, 1,800 men	—	9	—=1,800	
	II Cavalry Corps. Sebastiani	—	15	—=3,000	
Total					84,000

The two Armies together totalled 200,000 men, but were evidently a very heterogeneous collection, particularly weak in Cavalry, and guns for all the Batteries were not complete, so that the proportion was barely 2 instead of the normal 3 per thousand bayonets, but the Allies had received far fewer reinforcements, and on the morning of the battle of Bautzen could not dispose of more than 110,000 over the whole theatre of operations, of which only 90,000 could by any possibility take part in the fighting.

Simultaneously, whilst re-organizing the Army, the Emperor's attention was directed to the preparation of Dresden as a base of operations.

Three bridges were completed with their approaches and defences, and hospitals, magazines, etc., were all prepared; that is to say, orders were given to that effect, but subsequent events make it doubtful whether they were all obeyed.

The following routes of *l'Armée* were decreed.

1st. Main road from Mainz to Dresden, by Frankfurt,

Fulda, Erfurt, Weimar; with two branches, one by Jena to Altenburg; the other by Naumburg and Leipzig.

2nd. A branch from Leipzig to Wittenberg.

3rd. A branch from Augsburg to Altenburg by Nuremberg, Bamberg Schleiz and Gera.

The Augsburg-Würzburg road was suppressed. Halting-places were arranged every six leagues (18 miles) and troops moving along the roads were given one day's rest for six to seven days' marching.

As Col. Lanrezac, whose account I am here following almost textually, points out, the suppression of the links from Erfurt to Dresden via Altenburg and of the Würzburg road was not altogether wise, for partisans continually interfered with the Leipzig line, and orders had to be issued that detachments should march in bodies not less than 500 strong, with all due military precautions.

The main road from Dresden to Bautzen runs across the many forest-clad spurs which descend from the crest of the Riesengebirge. The country was sparsely cultivated and always inhospitable, whilst every day's delay gained by the resistance of their rear guards was employed by the Allies to drive off cattle and forage. The fact that the two Armies, after passing the Elbe, had utilized every available road, and covered their retreat with Cossacks, made it very difficult for Napoleon to decide on the true direction they had adopted. The troops that had gone north to Groszenhayn might very well have been sent to join Bülow before Berlin; hence the Emperor hesitated before making a final decision, and on May 13, he wrote a letter to Ney, which shows clearly what was in his mind.

"I cannot yet see clearly what the Prussians are doing; it is certain that the Russians are retreating on Breslau; but the Prussians—are they also retiring to that town, or have they thrown themselves on Berlin, as seems natural, to defend their capital? The reports I expect to-night will clear the matter up. You will understand that with the considerable forces at your disposal there can be no question of sitting down with folded hands. To relieve Glogau, to occupy Berlin, so that the Prince d' Eckmühl (Davoût) can re-occupy Hamburg, and advance with his five Divisions (he had only three) through Pomerania to seize Berlin, these are the three objects I propose to attain during the month. By the position I have assigned to you, we shall always be able to concentrate and move either to the right or left according to circumstances."

According to the orders already sent to him, Ney would occupy on May 16, with the III Corps and his own Headquarters, Luckau, with the V Corps Dobrilughe, VII Corps Dahme and the II Corps with 2nd Cavalry Corps, Schönwald. The centre of this group is about seventy miles from Dresden. Bautzen is thirty-five miles from Dresden, and about sixty from Luckau; and in view of the fact that the Allies in their own country were always well informed of the French movements, the temptation to move behind the screen of forest land to deliver a stroke on Ney with the whole united Army, must have been great for the Prussians, for they at least could change their base from Silesia to Berlin. But Napoleon gauged the consequences of the Alliance correctly, and though he certainly expected that the latter would try to cover their capital (in which case Ney could easily hold them till he arrived in person) he was convinced that the conflicting interests of the two parties could never be reconciled sufficiently to admit of concerted action.

Meanwhile, as we have already seen, the IV, VI, and XI Corps had crossed the Elbe on the 11th, and on the same day Macdonald's Corps (XI) overtook the Russian rear guard under Miloradowitch at Weissig, on the road to Stolpen, and a sharp action resulted. The Russians withdrew as night came on, and took post at Bischofswerda, where they were again attacked by Macdonald. The fighting on this day was very serious; the village itself was burnt to the ground, and though the Russians again retreated, morning found them only a few miles east of the position they had abandoned, and quite ready to renew the action. For the next two days the French remained watching them whilst the IV Corps (Bertrand) moved by the main road towards Bautzen as far as Königsbrück, encountering only Cossacks, the VI Corps (Marmont), following in second line to Reichenburg.

French Supplies, however, immediately began to
Difficulties create difficulties, and the complaints of
of Supply the Marshals against the barbarous methods
of the enemy in clearing the country read quaintly
from the very men who had first set the example
of making "war support war" under other conditions.

The Cossacks, backed by Prussian Light Cavalry, also
began to make themselves troublesome, and on the 12th,
detachments reached the Elbe near Meissen from Gros-
zenhayn necessitating the dispatch of Latour Maubourg's
Cavalry and a supporting force of Infantry to keep
communication open with Ney.

The degree of insecurity produced by these raids
is indicated by the fact that all important dispatches
were now sent off in triplicate, and were frequently
entrusted to friendly Saxons in disguise, whilst all
provisions had to be sent up to the front in convoy
under escort. In six days nearly one-third of the
Cavalry horses were broken down from want of forage.

By midnight on the 13th, all doubts as to the direction
of the Prussian retreat were set at rest by the comparison
of the reconnaissance reports sent in during the previous
forty-eight hours, but whether the two armies now
reunited at Bautzen would stand their ground or
retreat further to Breslau required to be cleared up.

With this object, the following orders
14th May were issued at 4 a.m. on the 14th.

The XI Corps remains in position at Bischofswerda.
The IV Corps by Kamenz, advance guard to Kloster
Marienstern on the way to Bautzen.

The VI Corps closes up to Frankenthal (three miles
west of Bischofswerda).

The XII Corps by Weissig to Fischbach.
Imperial Guard to remain in and around Dresden.

On the 15th, Macdonald (XI) resuming his advance
beyond Bischofswerda encountered the Russian rear
guard at Göda, and after hard fighting drove it back
till he came within sight of Bautzen, and the camps
of the Allies about that place.

To the north the IV Corps also came within touch
of the enemy about Bautzen and established commun-
ication with Macdonald on its right. The VI and XII
also closed up in support.

It now seemed clear that the enemy intended to
receive battle, for numerous entrenchments were
observed on the heights above Bautzen, and the inhabi-
tants reported the arrival of reinforcements to join
the Allied Forces.

In order to complete the defeat of the
Instructions to Ney Allies at Bautzen, it was Napoleon's in-
tention to send Ney with his III Corps
to join the troops already assembled there. Berthier
was directed to inform Ney in due course, but by some
misunderstanding he failed to make it clear to Ney
that the order issued by the Emperor's command
was merely a "Corps," and not an "Army" order.
Berthier had forgotten that Ney was in command of
the whole force, as well as his own special Corps (III).
Very naturally, when Ney received his order to advance,
knowing the importance of the coming engagement,
he took with him on the 17th 85,000 men, including
Victor with the II and VII Corps. The Emperor had
intended on the 14th to send definite orders to Victor
to advance from Lückau towards Berlin, but the matter
was somehow overlooked, and only on the 18th was
the omission rectified; an illuminating instance of
Staff management in the Grand Army as it was. Such
an oversight would be inconceivable in a continental
Staff nowadays.

Meanwhile, twenty-four hours later, the Emperor
changed his mind again, and Ney received an order
to take Victor and the VII Corps with him (II Corps
understood, as that was Victor's special command).
Now Victor had already marched with Ney, but Ney
having started in a single column his 85,000 men were
strung out over thirty miles of highway. Had Napoleon
been marching to fight, in order to get his men up as
quickly as possible, and as nearly as might be close
together, he would have marched them in masses of
Divisions, with only the guns on the roads. Under these
conditions he would have had his troops up to the point
whence they could deploy into the fighting lines in far
less time, and with less confusion, than men marching
in column could have been handled. Victor with his
35,000 being in rear of Ney's troops could not get past

to obey the Emperor's order as sent to him, and failed
in consequence to reach the battlefield until after the
Allies had made good their retreat from the field of
Bautzen.

On the morning of the 18th, Ney's troops occupied
the following positions:—

V Corps (3 Divisions) at Leutenberg

III Corps and Headquarters at Kahlau.

VII Corps and Headquarters at Lückau.

II Corps and the 2nd Cavalry Corps at Dahme.

On the same day the Emperor left Dres-
den with the Guards for Harthau, half
18th May way to Bautzen, and before starting wrote
the accompanying letter for Berthier (the "Major-
General," as he was always called).

"DRESDEN, 4 a.m., 18th May.

"Send orders to the Duc de Treviso (Mortier) and
to General Latour Maubourg, to move to-morrow to
Bischofswerda.

"As soon as the head of his column arrives, the Duc
de Reggio (Oudinot) will deploy into line of battle.
Reiterate the order to him to occupy Neukirch, and
the positions on the right, so as to make sure that no
enemy remains in those forests.

"Send orders also to General Latour Maubourg to
search out all the country to the right and actively
pursue any Cossacks he may find on the roads from
Neustadt to Neukirch.

"Order the Old Guard with the reserves of Artillery
to start from 4 to 8 a.m., and make a day's march on the
Bautzen road.

"Give orders to Barrois' Division (Young Guard)
to hold itself ready to move off at 11 a.m. I think it
will be necessary to distribute a pound of rice to each
soldier of the Old Guard and of Barrois' Division;
that will make a reserve for four days in case of a block
amongst the transport.

"Reiterate the order to General Bertrand (IV Corps)
to place himself in communication with General Lauris-
ton (V Corps) and the Prince de la Moskova, who are
due to-day at Königswerta.

"I suppose the Field Headquarters have started; send
on everything necessary for a day of battle."

I have cited this order as typical; for the
Comment total absence of any form, its want of
precision, and the way in which points to be attended
to are jotted down almost at random, gives one
the insight necessary to appreciate the peculiar
functions of the "Major-General" in the machinery
of the whole Army. It was his duty to comb out
and disentangle these ideas, and transmit them with
the necessary additions, to their several addresses, and
the slightest want of form or courtesy in the final
order seems often to have been bitterly resented by the
recipients. When in addition to these sources of friction,
the uncertainty and irregularity in the arrival of the
orders themselves at their destination is taken into con-
sideration, one can only marvel at the high average of
success which this almost casual staff service attained.
The chief explanation, of course, is that the whole Army,
Emperor and Marshals, were so accustomed to War and
its chances that the latter "played the game" on a
mere indication from their chief—but as events will
presently show, that indication was the essential factor
in the whole matter.

We have seen above that mistakes and delay in the
receipt of orders had thrown Ney's command twenty-
four hours behindhand in the whole combination. On
the morning of the 19th his troops resumed their march
in accordance with the orders written on the 17th, but
received on the evening of May 18, but these were so
laconic, and conveyed so little information as to the
position of the enemy, that Ney misunderstood their
purport altogether, and his columns were actually
heading for a position in the left rear of the Grand Army,
instead, as intended, to the right rear of the enemy.

Fortunately the unexpected action of
Counter the Allies interfered to prevent this
Attack by the Allies *contretemps*. They had determined to
strike a blow at the converging columns outside
the zone of their position, and to this end a force
of 18,000 men of all arms under Barclay de Tolly and
Yorck set out very early in the morning, and news of
their approach being given to General Lauriston (V

Corps) he closed up his troops for action and brought
up their right shoulders to meet them.

This movement left the flank of the IV Corps exposed,
and its outermost Division (Peyri's Italians), marching
in to Königswartha without proper precaution, was
suddenly overwhelmed and severely handled.

The further advance of the V Corps, however, dis-
engaged them, and Yorck and Barclay fell back in the
night on their main position. But the unexpected
attack completely upset Ney, who now drew up his
troops for the night facing east, instead of south, as
he had originally intended doing; and in notifying the
fight to Napoleon he stated his intention to fall back
on Buchwald if the attack were renewed in the morn-
ing. In that event, he begged that support should be
sent him from the IV Corps on his right. Nothing could
serve better to show how completely Ney misunder-
stood his own rôle, and the whole conception underlying
the Napoleonic system; but fortunately further orders
to continue his march via Klix reached him in sufficient
time to avert misfortune.

The Emperor in the meanwhile had
Napoleon Reconnoitres reached the Grand Army in front of Bautzen
Bautzen. and had reconnoitred the enemy's position as
far as it was visible. During the afternoon of the 19th
the positions of the several Corps of the Grand Army
were corrected for the battle expected on the following
day.

The enemy held the line of the Spree with strong out-
posts, and as before said many entrenchments were visible
on the heights to the westward. Bautzen itself, with
its mediæval ramparts, was strongly held, and north of
the village or townlet a succession of inundations and
ponds rendered access to the position beyond some-
what difficult. South of the town the stream rapidly
decreased in depth as it neared its sources in the main-
chain of the Bohemian frontier; on the other hand its
banks became steep and in some places precipitous,
whilst numerous patches of forest rendered concealment
easy on either side.

Recognizing that such ground suited to perfection
the tactics which all Europe had come to consider the
especial characteristic of the French Infantry, the Allies
from the first regarded this wing, i.e. their left, as the
most exposed to attack, and feeling its weakness, had
prepared a second position about three miles in rear of
the Spree, indicated by the line of the Blossauer Wasser,
a small affluent of the Spree, where more open ground
on their own side gave greater facility of manœuvre,
particularly for their Cavalry, which formed their
main strength. The right wing of the Allies rested on
a group of small kopjes about two miles north-east of
Bautzen, and throughout the position villages had been
fortified, and redoubts and batteries erected.

Wittgenstein, who still officiated as Commander-in-
Chief, had determined to fight a defensive-offensive
battle within his prepared position—and his voluminous
orders provided for every possible contingency, *except*
the one that arose. The extreme front of the position
was about 15,000 yards, altogether too great for the
85,000 men, which seems an outside estimate of the
numbers actually available for its defence.

Owing to the various *contretemps* which had arisen in
Ney's command, the Emperor had a difficult problem to
adjust. Barclay's reconnaissance in force of the previous
day must have completely enlightened the Allies as to
their danger if they continued to hold their ground. On
the other hand, a direct assault on their carefully prepared
position could only be attended with very heavy sacrifice,
and the Emperor was in no position to throw away men
for anything but the prospect of an adequate return.

Remembering his previous experience of Russian
methods, he could not overlook the very great possi-
bility of their retreat during the night if he neglected
to hold them during the day. His only chance, there-
fore, of holding them lay in involving them in such a
severe fight that it would be difficult for them to break
it off and retire under cover of darkness. With this
object the morning of the 20th was spent in ostenta-
tious movements of the centre of the Army—which
in itself was not numerically imposing enough to
frighten the enemy off his ground, whilst they on the
extreme left and Oudinot on the right moved into
their positions under cover.

About 4 p.m. he put his troops in motion, and whilst sending Oudinot (XII Corps) against his enemy's left, he advanced the remainder of his Army down to the river, and under cover of a tremendous cannonade threw trestle bridges across the stream and drove in all the enemy's outposts.

So far this was exactly what the Allies wanted. Their hope had been throughout to induce the French to cross over to their side of the Spree, and then to attack out of their prepared and concealed position on the Blossauer Wasser. They had also succeeded in rather more than holding their own against Oudinot's attack on their left, and no sign of danger from Ney's troops on the north had as yet become apparent. They, therefore, reinforced their left and determined to continue the battle next day.

This was what Napoleon had anticipated and as the arrival of Ney on their right was now certain, he fully expected a victory on the grandest scale. Making every allowance for possible delays *en route*, he ordered Ney to continue his movement via Klix on Preitz, a position well in rear of the enemy's right, and to be there at 11 a.m. Then between 11 a.m. and noon, the general attack would be delivered along the whole line. Meanwhile, Oudinot, reinforced by part of the XI Corps, was to advance against the enemy's left at daybreak, and push the attack home. The centre of the Army was to stand fast until the Emperor gave the word.

Thus the battle began with renewed fury on the Allied left, and the Royal Headquarters rode out to a little knoll near Baschütz, from whence they overlooked the whole of Napoleon's centre, and could watch the progress of the struggle on their left. Their view to the right (north-west) appears to have been interrupted by the ground, in any case their attention was completely absorbed by the scene in front of them. For very soon the French attack began to be held, and presently it was clear that the Russians were making headway. In the excitement of the moment, reports from Barclay on their right appear to have been neglected, at any rate no sufficient attention was paid to them. Here Ney was driving everything before him with overwhelming numbers, and away beyond his left, heavy masses of troops, the V Corps, were showing.

By 10 a.m. Ney had reached Preitz, but his orders told him to be there at 11 a.m. Unfortunately a roll of the ground hid him from Napoleon, who had ridden forward to a low kopje near, and being left without guidance Ney concluded to wait until the appointed time for his appearance. This delay saved the Allies, for now their danger became apparent to them and orders were issued to retreat, but the troops actually in contact with the enemy were to resist as long as was practicable.

The consequent slackening of resistance along the centre did not escape Napoleon, who in the interval had brought up the Guards for the decisive blow, and about 3 p.m. he gave the signal for the final advance. Meanwhile Ney had become absorbed in the fight raging to his right front, and entirely forgetting his instructions to continue his march from Preitz on Weissenburg, a point well on the line of retreat of the Allies, he made his troops bring up their left shoulders and advanced almost south-west across the field. The French converged on the plateau — just as the Prussians who had hitherto held it had received orders to retreat. As the several French columns rose above the slopes they found themselves face to face with one another. The jaws of the trap had closed, but they held nothing between them, for the Prussians had vanished unseen. These incidents are not infrequent on manœuvre grounds, and take some time even then to straighten out. In the confusion incident to the close range fighting of a century ago, the scene which ensued can be imagined, not described.

This was the opportunity of the Allies, and they seized it. Covered by their excellent Cavalry they withdrew in order, and with all possible rapidity, and by nightfall were far on their way towards Görlitz, leaving for the second time not a single trophy to grace the conqueror's victory.

Napoleon's Second Failure Situated politically as Napoleon was, this second failure to reap the rewards of a crushing success was almost as disas-

trous as an actual defeat. With 200,000 men at his disposal—170,000 of whom had actually appeared upon the field, he had failed to capture a single gun or stand of colours. The Allies with less than half his force had resisted all his efforts to beat them for two whole days, and though the reason of this resistance was clear enough to him, he could hardly explain the fact away without seriously damaging the prestige of his Army and its Commanders. His one chance of retrieving the situation lay in a rapid and relentless pursuit, which he immediately initiated. But the heart was out of his Army. His men had not seen their enemy beaten. The failure of the last great blow which should have shattered the "moral" of the Allies beyond retrieval, and turned them from a fighting Army into a frightened flock of sheep, exalting the courage of the victors in proportion as the panic reaction spread through the flying masses, had robbed the French troops of the chief stimulus for further exertion, and they stumbled on blindly, too weary to guard themselves efficiently against possible attack. Each day of the

The French Pursuit brought fresh and bitter experience. On May 22, finding the enemy in position just beyond Reichenberg, instead of *dashing* at them with the old confidence and *elan*, they halted to manœuvre them out of position, and Napoleon galloping up at the moment, impatient at the way his men were checking, sent forward Latour Maubourg's Cavalry who were suddenly ambushed by a couple of Russian Horse Artillery batteries, and before they could recover from the surprise, they were charged and very roughly handled by the Allied cavalry. The sudden engagement had to take its course, and after a stubborn fight the Russian rear guard, having gained all possible time, began its retirement. Reynier, whose Corps (VII) had been making forced marches four days running, now begged for authority to halt and rest his men. But Napoleon only ordered him forward, though he had yielded to a similar appeal less well founded, after the battle of Eckmühl in 1809. A few moments later a spent cannon ball struck down Marshal Duroc, his most faithful and devoted friend. The shock upset even the Emperor's iron nerve; he was profoundly affected, and ordered the firing to cease. That night the Allies bivouacked about Görlitz.

On the 23rd, the pursuit was continued, and on the following days also. Each time the Emperor demanded another 20 miles, which the troops were too worn out to accomplish.

Dissensions Amongst the Allies On the side of the Allies the outlook was also far from promising. They had lost on the battlefield about 20,000 men, and what was worse, all confidence in each other and in their leader had departed. Wittgenstein's position had become impossible. He offered his resignation, which was accepted, and Barclay de Tolly was appointed to the chief command in his place. But this scarcely mended matters. Barclay, of Scots extraction, as his name sufficiently indicates, took a very cool and level-headed view of the situation, and refused altogether to satisfy the patriotic but impracticable longings of the Prussians for another battle. The troops were far too spent for there to be any prospect of success were they allowed to fight, and a thorough reorganization was essential, but when the opportunity for that might arrive remained very doubtful.

The Surprise of Haynau On May 26, the Prussian Cavalry, under Blücher, prepared an ambush for the V Corps, which formed the advance guard of the French Left Column. It had been observed marching without adequate precaution, and Maison's Division, which led the march, was ridden into and dispersed. Then the French grew more cautious, but Napoleon had already reopened negotiations begun after Lützen for an armistice on the basis of *uti possidetis*. He, therefore, felt it necessary to press on and occupy Breslau. After leaving the line of the Katzbach at Leignitz and Goldberg, the Allies had bent away to the south-east, by Jauer on Schweidnitz, leaving the road to Breslau open, and in the course of June 1, the French entered that town, whilst the Allies concentrated on Schweidnitz. The indomitable energy of the Emperor had again triumphed over all obstacles, and if the Allies stood their ground, as in fact they had resolved to do, it would seem, from the map,

that their doom was certain. The French stood on a front of 30 miles from Jauer to Breslau, and in thirty-six hours must have penned them against the Austrian frontier.

The Armistice It was probably this fact which induced the Emperor finally to agree to the Armistice, a step in his career which has received more unfavourable criticism than any other.

Want of Cavalry was the principal military reason which Napoleon put forward in explanation of his consent to an Armistice, and his German critics, notably Graf Yorek von Wartenburg, have always maintained that this reason was insufficient to justify his conduct. This, however, I submit, is because they have systematically viewed this Cavalry question from the standpoint of its reconnoitring value, and not from that of its "victory completing" power.

Comments Situated as he now was, it must have been quite clear to the Emperor, after the experiences of Lützen and Bautzen, that he could no longer hope to win a really decisive battle, such as would of itself bring the War to a close. His Artillery might tear out gaps in the enemy's line with case fire, but in face of the enemy's superior Cavalry, his Infantry could only avail themselves of the lanes of death thus formed by marching in dense columns, ready to form square at a moment's notice. This, he knew, meant delay, which the enemy utilized to break off the fighting. If he could afford to wait for six weeks he could make good this deficiency in the proportion of the Cavalry arm. It would also enable him, not only to fill up the gaps in the existing Corps, due to battle and sickness (principally to the latter—there were 90,000 sick on the morning states of the first week in June), but he could place new Corps now in process of formation in his fighting line, and thus bring up his available field forces to a figure that the Allies, even with Austria included, could hardly hope to exceed. If then, Napoleon could once involve the whole Army of the Allies in a single decisive battle, he had every reason for expecting to end the War by a single blow, for his superiority as a Leader rose relatively to the command on the side of his enemies, almost in proportion to the numbers to be controlled. In other words, he, with his Marshals under his own eye, on one battlefield with 200,000 might safely be trusted to make fewer mistakes than would his opponents at the head of an equal number, and the greater the numbers to be handled, the better his chances of necessity became.

Actually the conduct of operations by his adversaries, as we shall presently see, never gave him his hoped-for opportunity, but at the time it was impossible for him to forecast this.

To make the picture of the Emperor's situation complete, it must be remembered that he had left Dresden with only ammunition enough for "an *jour de bataille*," and his march had been so rapid that his trains could not overtake the troops; and further that Oudinot (the Duke of Reggio), who had been detached after Bautzen to cover the French rear from the direction of Berlin, was facing Bülow near Luckau, and was in fact, badly beaten by him on June 9, before the news of the Armistice could reach either side. Further Tschernitschew's Cossacks had dispersed a regiment of provisional Cavalry on May 25, near Halle, and had captured on the 30th a convoy of Artillery and its escort of 1,600 men near Halberstadt. In addition to this Woronzow, who had been left behind to observe Magdeburg, had made a descent on Leipzig, and was actually driving the French garrison out of its gates when news of the Armistice, arriving very opportunely, put a stop to the fighting. The two most important of these incidents happened after the Armistice, it is true, but they suffice to show how very real were the dangers to which the French lines of communication were exposed.

THE ARMISTICE—FRENCH PREPARATIONS FOR THE AUTUMN CAMPAIGN

The French Army in August The foundations of the new Grand Army were laid, as we have already seen, by Napoleon's Decree of the 12th March. All the Corps therein provided for could not be made ready for the field in time to take part in the operations begun Dresden in May, but an enormous

number of conscripts were already on the march before the Armistice, principally belonging to the levy of 1813, but embodying also many recalcitrants (*réfractaires*)¹ of previous years, and these sufficed to fill the ranks of all the existing Corps, at the front, as well as to complete the I, II, XIII, and XIV Corps, whose formation had scarcely been begun when their Headquarters were hurried up to the front. The Cavalry Corps were also brought up to full strength or nearly so; hence at the close of the Armistice the French Army stood in the following order¹ :—

	Bat- talions.	Squad- rons.	Guns.	Men.
The Guards	62	59	218	58,191
I Corps. Vandamme	42	4	76	33,298
II " Victor	43	6	76	25,158
III " Ney	62	11	122	40,006
IV " Bertrand	36	8	72	23,663
V " Lauriston	37	7	74	27,907
VI " Marmont	42	8	84	27,754
VII " Reynier	33	13	68	21,283
VIII " Poniatowski ² (Poles)	10	6	44	7,573
XI " Macdonald	38	7	90	24,418
XII " Oudinot	30	14	58	19,324
XIII " Davout	47	15	76	37,514
XIV " St. Cyr (Gouvion)	51	12	92	26,411

CAVALRY CORPS				
1st Cavalry Corps.	Latour Maubourg	78	36	16,537
2nd "	Sebastiani	52	18	10,304
3rd "	Arighi	27	24	6,000
4th "	Kellermann	24	12	3,923
5th "	L'Heritier	20	6	4,060
40,764				

	Bat- talions.	Squad- rons.	Guns.	Men.
Girard's Corps	10	16	28	15,000
Artillery and Engineers, Reserve Park	—	—	—	8,010
Corps of Observation at Leipzig. General Margaron	10	8	10	7,800
Grand total of Field Troops—559	battalions, 395	squadrons,		
1,234 guns = 412,510 men.				

In the above list the numbers IX and X are omitted; the former was reserved for the Bavarian Corps (Wrede) and was subsequently transferred to the Corps of Augereau, still in process of formation, and the latter under Rapp formed the garrison of Danzig.

GARRISON OF FORTRESSES ON THE ELBE, EXCLUSIVE OF FIELD TROOPS IN THE COMMAND.

Hamburg	12,000
Bremen	1,500
Magdeburg	3,250
Wittenberg	2,318
Torgau	2,000
Dresden	5,000

Total on the Elbe 26,068

SECOND LINE TROOPS.

Lemoine's Division at Minden	5,460
Augereau's Corps, about	10,000
Cavalry Corps Milhaud, in formation	2,500
Bavarian Corps, Wrede	25,000

42,960

GARRISONS OF FORTRESSES IN POLAND AND GERMANY.

Danzig	25,000
Zamoscz	4,000
Modlin	3,000
Stettin	8,500
Küstrin	4,000
Glogau	5,500
Erfurt	1,774
Würzburg	2,500

55,374

Add to all these reinforcements on their way to the frontier, sick and wounded in hospital, troops of the Bavarian and Westphalian contingents, not included in the above, and the grand total of all cannot well fall short of 700,000, available more or less within the German theatre of operations.

On the whole the average quality of the troops must be considered as somewhat better than those that fought at Lützen, even though the age of the conscripts who had filled up the gaps in the field Army was fractionally lower. The troops had fully recovered their confidence in the Emperor; the weakest elements in *moral* and *physique* alike had been eliminated and the remaining cadres of old war-seasoned non-commissioned officers and men readily absorbed their contingent of recruits, and imbued them with their own rigorously trained spirit. It must be remembered that no man reached the ranks with less than ninety days' training, sixty of which at least had been spent on the line of march, and the physically weak had been removed by the process of the survival of the fittest.

The Cavalry, however, were still the weakest point in Napoleon's organization. They were, as a whole, miserably mounted on horses not broken but broken down, though they possessed some leaders of the highest quality, who knew their men and their work (de Brac; for instance) and their exploits at Dresden and Leipzig

prove that under competent commanders they were still capable of efficient service.

The Artillery was always excellent, and in spite of deficient horse supply showed a uniform superiority over that of the Allies.

The greatest advantage that the French possessed over the Allies lay not alone in the incontestable superiority of the Emperor himself, whether as strategist or tactician, but in the uniform war experience of the Marshals, their Divisional Commanders, Staff and subaltern officers.

The condition of the Allied troops when the Armies of the time hostilities ceased was little if at all better than that of their opponents.

Battalions had shrunk, in some cases to 200 men and even less, and the survivors were spent with the constant strain of marching and fighting. But the Prussians at least were in the heart of their own country, and knew that they were fighting for very existence. The Russians on the whole were older men, of longer service, and far more accustomed to hardship and privation. The men had forgotten, if indeed they had ever known, any other tie but that of the Regiment, and as long as that held together they were at home in the only "home" they were capable of realizing. Moreover, they recovered from the depression due to their heavy, almost daily, losses with the fatalism peculiar to their race.

The losses of the Prussian field troops were made good by recruits with an average of about three months under arms; and since all were filled with the same spirit of goodwill for the service and a fierce desire to close with the enemy, these new drafts were soon assimilated by the war-seasoned ranks of the older men.

By the end of July, the Landwehr also were sufficiently ready for the field. Under normal circumstances they would certainly not have passed the easiest of reviewing officers, for in many cases the front rank was armed only with pikes, their clothing was anything but regulation, and their foot gear beneath contempt. But events proved, as they so often have done before and since, that a regulation equipment is not absolutely essential for men who really wish to conquer their enemies, therefore once these rough troops had become accustomed to their new surroundings, they did excellent service. In all they made up 37 Regiments in 149 Battalions (*Friedrich*, ii, 43), averaging about 680 men; so that we may count them in round numbers as 100,000.

The Cavalry of the Landwehr seems to have been on the whole markedly better than its Infantry, but according to the Cavalry officers of the old Army, they were quite deplorable. They were always willing to charge, but the difficulty was to rally them, and Marwitz, in his diary has many anecdotes about them.¹ But the spirit was in them, and they were about as good as the bulk of their opponents. Altogether they supplied 116 squadrons of a total strength of about 10,000 men. Adding Artillery and Engineers, the grand total of armed men available amounted to about 275,000, to which some 25,000 reinforcements joined during the campaign, must be added.²

These numbers were organized in the following manner (*Friedrich*, ii, 47) :—

FIELD ARMY.

	Bat- talions.	Squad- rons.	Guns.	Men.
(a) In Silesia—				
The Guards	6½	8	16	7,091
I Corps. Yorck	45	44	104	38,484
II " Kleist	41	44	112	37,816
(b) In Brandenburg—				
III Corps. Bülow	40½	42	80	41,135
IV " Tauentzien	48½	29	42	33,170
The Partisans of Lützen, Reiche and Schill	4	7	8	4,068
	185½	174	362	161,764

SEIGE TROOPS.

	Bat- talions.	Squad- rons.	Guns.	Men.
For Blockade of Küstrin	9	5	8	7,122
" " Stettin	15	7	8	10,548
" " Danzig	10	6	8	8,000
" " Glogau	9	4	16	5,000
	43	22	40	30,670
Grand total of troops actually organized : 228½ battalions, 196 squadrons, 402 guns = 192,434 men.				

The total number of Russian troops on German territory at the conclusion of the Armistice amounted to 296,000 men, grouped as follows :—

(a) In Silesia—

	Bat- talions.	Squad- rons.	Cossack regts.	Guns.	Men.
Langeron's Corps	47	15	10	139	34,551
Sacken's "	18	30	12	60	18,553
Wittgenstein's Corps	45	38	5	92	34,926
St. Priest's Corps	20	22	3	36	13,586
Guards and Reserves, under the Grand Duke Constantine	47	71	10	182	44,347
	177	176	40	509	145,713

(b) In Brandenburg—

	Bat- talions.	Squad- rons.	Cossack regts.	Guns.	Men.
Winzengrode	29	44	20	92	29,357
Woronzow	—	—	—	—	—
Tschernitschew	—	—	—	—	—
Attached to Bülow's Corps	—	—	3	22	1,160
Attached to Tauentzien's Corps	—	—	1	—	318
	29	44	24	114	30,835

(c) In Mecklenburg, attached to

	Bat- talions.	Squad- rons.	Cossack regts.	Guns.	Men.
Walmoden's Corps—					
Detachment Tettenborn	—	—	4	—	1,495
Russo-German Legion	6	—	—	—	4,475
With Dornberg's Cavalry Division	—	8	—	—	1,192
Russo-German Artillery Brigade	—	—	—	16	363

Giving a total for the Field Army of 212 battalions, 228 squadrons, 61 Cossack regiments, 639 guns = 184,123 men.

IN SECOND LINE.

	Bat- talions.	Squad- rons.	Cossack regts.	Guns.	Men.
About Warsaw—					
Polish Army of Observation	70	67	10	198	59,090
under Bennigsen	21	5	3	36	15,000
Blockading Zamoscz	7	—	—	—	9,000
Blockading Modlin	—	—	—	—	—
Siege of Danzig	58	12	11	59	29,100
					112,100

The Austrian The successive campaigns of Austerlitz and Wagram had reduced Austrian finance to a condition of almost hopeless destitution. As a measure of economy, the effectives of the troops had been reduced to the lowest possible point, and, worst of all, the greater part of the workpeople in all the arsenals and Government factories had been discharged. Hence the efforts to raise new forces in 1813 were most severely hampered.

Men existed in abundance, but it was difficult to arm and equip them, and the motive of self-preservation not being so overwhelming as in the case of Prussia, the Generals were by no means so ready to take the field without adequate equipment.

In the middle of the month of August the field states gave the following totals :—

In Bohemia : 107 battalions, 117 squadrons, 280 guns, under F.M. Prince Schwarzenberg	127,345
Between the Elbe and Traun, under F.M. Prince Reuss	30,070
In the interior of Austria, under F.Z.M. Hiller	35,557

Garrison troops	192,992
	27,544

Grand total 221,525

Two-thirds of this force consisted of recruits of three months' service, with little enthusiasm for their work, as until a few days before the expiration of the Armistice they did not know against whom they were to fight. As soon as they found out that the French were to play the rôle of their enemy, the whole Army gained courage and enthusiasm. The Cavalry seems to have been considered the most efficient of all the Allied troops, and the Artillery was fairly good. The Infantry, on the other hand, were below the standard of the other Armies; they had neither the dogged pertinacity of the Russians nor the intense patriotism of the Prussians.¹

There remain to be considered—

(a) The Swedish Contingent, amounting in all to 27,263 men. These were excellent material, well found, but the policy of their Commander-in-Chief never gave them a chance of distinguishing themselves;

(b) The Anglo-German Contingent—

	Bat- talions.	Squad- rons.	Guns.	Men.
British German Legion	7	—	—	6 = 4,506
Dornberg's Cavalry Division	—	9	—	— = 1,322
Reserve Artillery of Walmoden's Corps	—	—	—	12 = 412
The Hanseatic Legions	2	8	8	8 = 3,043
	9	17	26	9,283

Note the composition of an "English" battalion—111 Dutchmen, 92 Prussians, 80 Italians, 66 Flemish, 63 Hanoverians and Brunswickers, 46 Frenchmen, 35 Saxons, 27 Austrians, 18 Hamburgers, 14 Bavarians, 14 Hessians, 12 Spaniards, 12 Mecklenburgers, 11 Poles, 10 Holsteimers, 10 Swiss, 9 Hungarians, 7 Danes, 5 Oldenburgers, 3 Russians, 2 Swabians, and 1 Englishman, 1 Portuguese, 1 Swede.

Of these one Hussar regiment of five squadrons, two horse and one rocket battery were nominally British, and six Battalions in British pay formed the garrison

of Stralsund.

(c) The Mecklenburg Contingent—

4 battalions, 4 squadrons, 2 guns = 6,140 men.

The sum total of all available Field troops, therefore, amounted to 556½ battalions, 572 squadron 1,380 guns and 68 Cossack regiments=512,113 men; with, in round figures, 350,000 reserve troops behind them. (Friedrich, vol. i, p. 56 et seq.)

The great difficulty that confronted the Command of the Allies at this juncture was to ensure the harmonious co-operation of these very heterogeneous forces, and after much friction the commands were arranged in the following manner.

As the three Sovereigns were to accompany the Army of Bohemia, and as it was assumed that Napoleon would turn first with his full force against Austria, this Army was made very materially the strongest, and the command entrusted to Field-Marshal Prince Carl von Schwarzenberg. This appointment was severely criticized at the time, for popular feeling was strongly in favour of the Archduke Charles, the victor of Amberg. Würzburg, Stockach, Zürich and Aspern; but political complications with his brother, the Emperor, had rendered him impossible; also he would have been most unpopular with the Russians.

Schwarzenberg, on the other hand, Field-Marshal Prince though of no great talent, was peculiarly Schwarzenberg well fitted to act as conciliator of the many and various interests involved. He was still in the very prime of life, only forty-two; his reputation for personal courage stood very high, and his unselfishness and modesty made it possible to him to adjust the petty jealousies of the war-seasoned veterans around him, as perhaps no other man in Europe at the time could have done. It was no small feather in his cap that in the previous year Napoleon had personally requested his appointment to the command of his Austrian contingent. But he was too humane for War as it had developed during the last few years, and the very strong hint he received before leaving for the front, to the effect that this was the one and only Army that Austria could furnish, was perhaps hardly needed to deter him from adventurous resolves.

His Chief of the Staff, Radetzky, had seen, if anything, more of War than had even the French Marshals, and seems by universal consent to have been the most able and courageous soldier in the Austrian Army. Unfortunately, however, for the Allies, he was too wanting in personal ambition to assert himself sufficiently; thus it happened that the Quartermaster-General, von Langenau, formerly of the Saxon Army, a brilliant but somewhat unscrupulous man, immeasurably behind Radetzky in the solid judgment and knowledge of War which characterized the latter, usurped more than his share of the Sovereigns' confidence, with disastrous consequences to the conduct of operations. He was only thirty-two years of age, and owed his reputation chiefly to the fact that he had served for several campaigns under Napoleon, but as events were to prove, he was like Prince Eugène's mule, which, "though it had served in seventeen campaigns under that great General—remained still a mule."

It would probably have been far better for the Allies if they could have agreed to elect any one of the three Sovereigns as Commander-in-Chief; for all of them possessed considerable military talent, and all had acquired the habit of command. But political interests rendered this out of the question, and hence, having no real responsibility, but feeling the necessity of action, they frequently interfered, sometimes indeed most opportunely, but generally with the reverse result, and they always required to be consulted when any question arose as to the employment of their own Guards.

Two renegades attached to the Royal Headquarters deserve a word of mention, viz. Moreau and Jomini. The former had been banished from France in 1804, and had always been considered by his friends as a rival of Napoleon's. However this might be, a cannon shot at Dresden terminated his career before he had an opportunity of establishing this claim. Jomini, a Swiss by birth, had attracted Napoleon's attention in 1805-6 and 1808-9 in Spain. His military writings had given him a European reputation, and as Staff

officer to Ney he had certainly rendered valuable service. But he had quarreled with Berthier, and when, after Bautzen, the latter held him responsible for Ney's many shortcomings, and not without reason one would think, he deserted to the Allies, and was received by the Emperor Alexander. His conduct, however, was so universally deprecated by the officers of all three Armies that (though the Emperor's friend) he was practically boycotted. Disgusted with his reception, he withdrew, after Leipzig, to his native country, and his subsequent writings were markedly tinged with the strong personal bias one would expect from such a character.

For the Silesian Army the choice of the Sovereigns fell on General von Blücher, then in his seventy-first year, and though events have long since justified this selection, at the time it was received by the higher Prussian and Russian officers with almost unqualified disapproval. It was felt that he was far too old, that he was a born gambler, that he drank freely, and was destitute of all knowledge of any other arm but his own—the Cavalry. Of the higher art of War he was considered to know nothing at all; he could not write a decent report, or even spell correctly; he never looked at a map, and the Staff appointed to keep him straight, Gneisenau, Müffling, Rühle von Lilienstern, and Scharnhorst, were all held to be interlopers, or reformers, by the classic old survivors of the Frederickian period, of whom York was the most typical. But Blücher possessed the one great quality of supremest importance in a great emergency of this nature, when men have to be induced to die for their country somehow, *the power of exciting enthusiasm in the Nation, and not merely in the rank and file of the Army.* York, who undoubtedly had higher claims in the Army itself, and who was intellectually and morally immensely Blücher's superior, was his exact antithesis in this latter respect. His conduct at Taurögen ought to have made him the idol of the Nation, but somehow it failed to do so, and though the men immediately under his command loved him for his care of them and devotion to their interests, it was precisely this attitude of fatherly solicitude for their welfare which would have rendered him useless in supreme Command; he lacked the stern resolution requisite for great emergencies.

Langeron, one of the Russian Corps commanders placed under his orders, resented his supersession even more bitterly than did York himself. He was a French *émigré* who had joined the Russian Army at the beginning of the Revolution, and since then had made a very brilliant career, having held an independent command against the Turks. He would have hated serving under any foreign officer, but might have submitted with better grace to a man of acknowledged military education, and more courtier-like manners than those of rough old Blücher. This feeling of dissatisfaction, which Langeron took no pains to repress, soon spread to the remaining thirty-five generals with which his Corps was overloaded,¹ and throughout the campaign a veiled hostility to Headquarters prevailed, against which the latter were all the more helpless as they did not understand each other's language. Only Sacken seems to have been an exception to this general feeling. He was many years younger than Langeron, of German extraction, and possessed many of the same characteristics as Blücher; in consequence the two understood one another, and Sacken was never called upon in vain.

The Army of the North was given by acclamation to Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden, whose reputation as a Marshal of France stood higher than, before military histories had been written, than it has done since; for as an independent Army Commander he proved an unspeakable failure, as we shall presently see.

The commands having been regulated, it remained to lay down the principles which were to guide the co-operation of these three Armies operating on widely separated lines, and between which inter-communication was, under existing conditions, impossible.

To this end a series of conferences were held, at which endless strategic memoirs were read and discussed. The principal ones are to be found in Friedrich's invaluable work, and deserve attentive study to enable us to get at the spirit of the time. All one can say

of them here, is that like the Bourbons, the Staff officers of the period had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing.

Since agreement on any one plan was out of the question, a common bond of union was at length found in the universal consensus of opinion that Napoleon himself was the dangerous foe. From this the rest easily followed, and was embodied in a long memorandum known, from the place of its signature, as the agreement of Trachtenberg.

The cardinal principle of this document was that, under no circumstances should any one of the three Armies incur the risk of a decisive action against Napoleon in person. Whichever Army he advanced against was to fall back, whilst the others made the best use of their time and opportunities; and probably no other method could have led to a successful termination of the war.

But it made tremendous demands on the young and untrained troops, burning in the case of the Prussians at any rate, with patriotic fire, and not yet broken in to stand that the soldier's *highest duty is to die where he told, not when and where he would like to do so.* Blücher alone proved equal to the situations thus erected, not that he rivalled Napoleon in this greatest gift of a Commander, the psychological power of leading and influencing men, but at least he did more than any other who could have been chosen to fill his position.

Meanwhile, we must return to Napoleon, Napoleon's who was now busily studying his opening Plans moves for the coming campaign.

His first plan was to arrange for the defence of the whole line of the Elbe, from Königstein in the Bohemian mountains, a little mediæval fortress perched on a koppe overlooking the river, to Hamburg, a line some 400 miles in extent. Across this river he held all the passages, by works, either permanent or provisional, which in the end proved sufficient for his purposes. Throughout the whole district he organized supply depôts, and also did something towards the improvement of his lateral communications, though that was singularly little in comparison with what might have been done in the time and with the means at his disposal, considering the importance of such work for the execution of his strategic methods. Road making was as exact a science in those days as it is now, and better roads might have saved him the disaster of Leipzig.

His first idea was a resuscitation of his plan of March 18, viz. to mass the bulk of his troops between Magdeburg and Hamburg, and advance on Berlin, seizing the town and thus relieving the garrisons on the Oder. As before calculated, if the Allies came to meet him, he was certain of a decisive battle under most favourable conditions, whilst if they broke forward to the south of Dresden over the Bohemian mountains, he could fall on them in flank and cut them off from all communications. Against this plan was the possibility that they might elect not to stand at all, in which case he would have to follow them into Bohemia, and again exhaust himself by his ever lengthening line of communication. There was always before him this *absolute necessity for the delivery of a decisive battle, as near to the head of his communications as it could be fought.* Ultimately he decided that his best chance of securing such an opportunity would be by taking up a central position with the bulk of his forces between the two principal Armies, those of Silesia and Bohemia, and taking advantage of the first opening which either should offer him. Meanwhile, separate columns, aggregating nearly 120,000 men, should converge on Berlin from Hamburg, Magdeburg, Wittenberg and Bautzen. This latter feature of his plan was so entirely at variance with all his own previous practice, that we can only suppose he adopted it out of complete contempt for the Prussian Landwehr in front of him; and more particularly for the military ability of Bernadotte, whose probable conduct of operations he predicted in one of his letters in the following words: "Il ne fait que piaffer."

It must be clearly understood that it is the *form* of this movement on Berlin, and not the idea itself, that is here criticized. The threat against his communications contained in the presence of upwards of 100,000 men within about four days' march of the single organized line which connected him with his ultimate base in

France, could by no means be overlooked, and no purely passive defence of the 400 miles from Dresden to Hamburg could conceivably be undertaken by those of his forces available for such a purpose. But to place Ney and Davout under Oudinot, of all men, and to expect the three to execute a combined march of concentration from points several marches apart, seems to have been a voluntary invitation to disaster. As Marmont wrote in reply to a letter written on August 13, 1813, in which Napoleon, after announcing his final decision, asked for his Marshal's free and unfettered opinion of the project—"It is to be feared that on the same day your Majesty wins a great victory, you will learn that your subordinates have lost two"—a prediction which proved true to the letter.

The decision, however, having been taken, the troops moved rapidly to their appointed position and on August 17 the date on which the Armistice expired, they stood as shown on sketch.

A strong advance guard of four Corps under Ney in the square Liegnitz, Goldberg, Lowenberg, Bunzlau. The Main Army under Napoleon, at Görlitz, Zittau, Stolpen and Bautzen. A flanking detachment at Lückau of 60,000 men under Oudinot; whilst the XIV Corp (Gouvion St. Cyr) held the Elbe from Königstein to Dresden, which town Napoleon believed to be sufficiently strong to hold out for at least eight days with the strong garrison assigned to it. *This must be remembered, as it was the keystone of all his arrangements*, which were based on the supposition that the whole Silesian Army was still near Breslau, and the Bohemian Army about Theresienstadt. Viewed from the ordinary standpoint of strategical criticism, the situation appears to the last degree strained and unreal, for the Bohemian Army on the South and Bernadotte on the North already overlap the flanks of the forces immediately opposed to them, both are in a friendly country and therefore presumably well informed as to their enemies' whereabouts, and both are far superior in Cavalry to their immediate opponent. A raid against, or across, Napoleon's communications would therefore seem the obvious plan to adopt, and if strategy really were the "science of communications" as it has sometimes been defined, the extinction of the French Army would seem to be merely a matter of days.

Napoleon was, in fact, quite prepared for the Bohemian Army to make the attempt; indeed the intention to do so had been announced beforehand. When St. Cyr notified the Emperor of the current rumour to this effect, he replied, "If the enemy should march into South Germany, as he proposes, then I shall wish him 'bon voyage' and let him go, quite certain that he will return quicker than he went. It is only of importance that he should not cut us off from Dresden and the Elbe; I care very little if he severs our communications with France," and he concludes with these remarkable words: "What is certain is that you cannot turn 400,000 men, based on a line of strong places and a river like the Elbe, from which they can break out as they please, either at Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg or Magdeburg. All the enemy's far-reaching detachments (against French communications understood) will be missing on the day of battle."

The reply to this is of course obvious; if you cannot turn 400,000 men, etc., you can starve them; and this is what ultimately happened. But it took two months to do this and had the Emperor's orders been carried out to the letter it would have taken even longer, so ample were the stores and provisions accumulated, on paper. But in two months many battles might be fought, and a single decisive victory would have completely transformed the situation.

The truth is that the value of communications is relative and not absolute, and the Art really consists in knowing when and where it is safe to break the letter of the rules and to provide alternative lines and bases in time to permit change of plans.

The above distribution was arrived at on the basis of the best information available at the time; but almost on the day the orders were issued, the Allies had made a decision of such magnitude that the Emperor had never taken even its possibility into account. On the night of August 11, over 100,000 Russians and Prussian troops broke up from their encampments and set out over the

Bohemian mountains to join the Austrians, and some days elapsed before the secret of this sudden movement leaked out.

We have given above the total forces of the several contingents, and such notes as to the personal factors of their commands as are indispensable to the student of military history. It remains now to indicate the final grouping of the forces before the Armistice ran out.

When the above mentioned transfer of Russian and Prussian troops from Silesia to Bohemia was finally effected the order of the Bohemian Army was as follows:—

Commander-in-Chief: F.M. Prince Schwarzenberg.

Chief of Staff: F.M. Lt. Graf Radetsky.

Quarter Master-General: Major-General Baron Langenau.

1. AUSTRIAN FIELD ARMY.

1st Light Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Prince Moritz Liechtenstein. 4 battalions, 12 squadrons, 14 guns = 4,399 men.
2nd Light Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf Bubna. 3 battalions, 18 squadrons, 12 guns = 4,400 men.

Right Wing.

Prince von Hessen Homburg.

1st Infantry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf Civalart. 11 battalions, 18 guns = 9,478 men.
2nd Infantry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf Coloredo. 14 battalions, 18 guns = 14,252 men.

1. Infantry Reserve Division (Grenadiers). Field-Marshal-Lieut. Marquis Chasteler. 2 Brigades = 8 battalions, 12 guns, 5,807 men.

2. Infantry Reserve Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Bianchi. 3 Brigades = 12 battalions, 13 guns = 10,643 men.

3. Infantry Reserve Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf Crenneville. 2 Brigades = 5 battalions, 12 squadrons, 6 guns = 7,004 men.

Cavalry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Graf Nostitz. (Cuirassiers). 16 squadrons in 2 Brigades, no guns = 2,472 men.

Cavalry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. von Schmeller. (Light). 21 squadrons in 2 Brigades = 2,336 men.

Pioneers: 8 companies.

Pontonniers: 1 company.

Total: 50 battalions.
49 squadrons.
72 guns.
8 Pioneer companies.
1 Pontoonier company.

52,730 men.

Left Wing.

Feldzeugmeister: Graf Gyulai.

Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Prince Alois Liechtenstein. 3 Brigades = 12 battalions, 18 guns = 12,514 men.

Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Wiszenwolf. 3 Brigades = 13 battalions, 18 guns = 12,300 men.

Cavalry Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Freiherr-Lederer. 2 Brigades = 18 squadrons = 2,608 men.

Pioneer companies.

Total: 25 battalions.
18 squadrons.
36 guns.
8 Pioneer companies.

27,983 men.

Avance Abtheilung.

3rd Light Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. von Meszho. 2 Brigades = 5 battalions, 12 squadrons, 12 guns (strength not given).

Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Freiherr von Mayer. 3 Brigades = 12 battalions, 18 guns (no strength given).

Division. Field-Marshal-Lieut. Prince Hohenlohe-Bartenstein. 2 Brigades = 8 battalions, 12 guns (no strength given).

Cavalry Brigade. Major-General Kuttalek von Ehrengreif. 2 Cuirassier regiments, 1 H. A. battery (6 guns).

1 Pioneer company.

Total: 20 battalions.
8 squadrons.
36 guns.

Artillery Reserve Park = 18 battalions = 108 guns.

Grand total Austrians = 127,000 men.

RUSSO-PRUSSIAN TROOPS.

Commander-in-Chief: General Graf Barclay de Tolly.

Chief of Staff: Lt.-General Sabanjen.

Quarter-Master-General: Lt.-General von Diebitsch II.

Right Wing.

General Graf Wittgenstein.

I Infantry Corps. Lt.-General Prince Gortschakow.

14th Infantry Division. Major-General von Helfreich.

2 Brigades, 8 battalions = 5,211 men.

5th Infantry Division. Major-General Messenzow.

2 Brigades, 13 battalions = 8,792 men.

Artillery: 3 batteries, 36 guns = 638 men.

II Infantry Corps. Lt.-General Duke Eugène von Wurtemberg.

4th Infantry Division. Major-General Püschnitzki.

3 Brigades, 10 battalions = 5,370 men.

3rd Infantry Division. Major-General Prince Schachowsky.

3 Brigades, 12 battalions = 6,598 men.

3 Batteries, 36 guns = 636 men.

Cavalry Corps. Lt.-General Graf Peter Pahlen III.

Irregular Cavalry—Don Cossacks.

4 regiments = 1,600 men.

1st Hussar Division. Major-General Milosnow.

2 Brigades, 19 squadrons = 2,630 men.

Lancer Brigade. Major-General Lisanevitch.

3 regiments, 16 squadrons = 1,940 men.

Artillery: 2 batteries, 20 guns (4th Battery: 8 guns; 7th Battery, 12 guns).

Pioneers: 1 company.

Headquarter Guard.

1 Dragon regiment, 2nd Brigade Cossacks, 1 Landwehr battalion (Olonez and Wologda) = 1,000 men.

Total: 45 battalions, 38 squadrons, 5 Cossack regiments, 92 guns, 1 Pioneer company = 34,926 men.

Left Wing.

II Prussian Army Corps. Lt.-General von Kleist.

Chief of Staff: Col. von Tippelskirch.

Quarter-Master-General: Lt.-Col. von Grolmann.

10th Brigade. Von Pirch I.

16 battalions, 4 squadrons, 8 guns = 8,026 men.

9th Brigade. Von Klux.

104 battalions, 4 squadrons, 8 guns = 8,021 men.

12th Brigade. Prince August von Preussen.

10 battalions, 2 squadrons, 8 guns = 7,172 men.

11th Brigade. Von Zieten.

104 battalions, 6 squadrons, 8 guns = 8,743 men.

Reserve Cavalry. Von Röder.

Brigade. Von Müllers. Landwehr, 2 regiments.

Brigade. Laroche von Starkenfeld. Light, 3 regiments.

Brigade. Von Wrangel. Cuirassiers, 3 regiments.

Artillery. 2 H.A. batteries, 16 guns.

Reserve Artillery, 64 guns.

2 companies Pioneers.

Total: 41 battalions, 44 squadrons, 112 guns = 37,800 men (about).

Russo-Prussian Guards and Reserves.

Grand Duke Constantine.

Infantry. General Graf Miloradovich.

III Infantry (Grenadier) Corps. Lt.-General Rajewski.

2nd Grenadier Division. Major-General Sulima.

3 Brigades, 12 battalions = 6,756 men.

1st Grenadier Division. Major-General Tschagelokow.

3 Brigades, 12 battalions = 7,206 men.

Artillery. 2 batteries, 24 guns = 382 men.

V I Corps (Guard) Corps. Lt.-General Yermolow.

2nd Division. Major-General Udom I.

2 Brigades, 10 battalions = 5,941 men.

1st Guards Division. Major-General Baron Rosen.

2 Brigades, 13 battalions = 7,725 men.

Artillery. 3 batteries, 36 guns = 632 men.

1st Cuirassiers Division. Major-General Depreradovich.

2 Brigades, 19 squadrons = 2,428 men.

Light Cavalry Division. Major-General Schewitch.

22 squadrons = 2,345 men.

3rd Cuirassiers Division. Major-General Duka.

2 Brigades, 16 squadrons = 2,165 men.

Artillery. 2 batteries = 16 guns.

Irregular Cavalry. 3 regiments Don Cossacks.

Royal Prussian Guard Cavalry Brigade. Col. von Werder.

8 squadrons, 1 battery (8 guns) = 1,606 men.

Reserve Artillery. Major-General Baron Huene. 94 guns.

Russo-Prussian Guards = 51,438 men.

Grand Total:

Royal Prussian Guard Infantry Brigade. Lt.-Colonel von Alvensleben.

6 battalions, 2 rifle companies, 8 guns = 5,485 men.

Cavalry Corps. Lt.-General Prince Galitzin.

4th Cuirassier Division. Kriwow.

2 Brigades, 14 squadrons = 1,860 men.

KATZBACH—DRESDEN—KULM

By the terms of the Armistice a neutral zone some twenty miles in width had been established between the contending forces in Silesia. As the period for the resumption of hostilities (August 17) drew near, it became important to Blücher to be in close touch with the enemy to his front so as to have timely warning of his possible manoeuvres. To obtain this the neutral zone must be traversed, consequently a pretext for infringing the letter of the Armistice had to be found.

It was fortunate for the Prussians that the French at this was not far to seek. The French at the front had been suffering much from want of food and forage, and had from time to time entered the neutral zone in small parties in search of supplies. On August 13, a number of these foraging parties being reported, Blücher, affecting to regard them as a prelude to the more formal fighting to be expected after the 17th, ordered the whole Silesian Army forward, in a line of four Corps, one marching on each available road. The advance Cavalry soon came in contact with the French, who were completely off their guard. When on the following day they learnt that strong Infantry columns were moving against them on a front of thirty miles (being in entire ignorance of the great detachment Blücher had made to the Bohemian Army) they naturally concluded that the troops in front of them were the advance of the whole Silesian army in force, and concentrated backwards, not without some confusion. Thanks to this, the Prussians gained several minor advantages in the fighting which ensued, facts which served materially to raise the moral of the new German levies.

But from the first the want of experience in the Prussian Staff began to create friction. Thus on the very next day, Blücher and Gneisenau separated from each other the better to superintend their observations over the enemy's front, with the result that they did not meet again until late in the afternoon, hence the issue of

orders was delayed to such a degree that the troops did not begin to move until the following noon, and then had to march late into the night to reach their destinations.

Each day, fresh causes of delay arose, and the resistance of the French became more obstinate. Thus every march ended as a night march, and the weather being abominable, the whole Army suffered so severely that when on the morning of August 20, Blücher found himself in presence of the whole massed forces of his adversary across the Bober river, it only needed the sound of the cheers which announced Napoleon's arrival to assume command of the French Army, to decide him to retreat forthwith.

Then followed a series of most obstinately contested rearguard actions in which every day many lives were lost, and by the 25th the whole Silesian Army was in a condition bordering on dissolution. The Landwehr men had deserted in masses to their homes, Langeron, St. Priest, and even Sacken, were complaining bitterly of the way their troops were being wasted, and Yorck found the position so intolerable that he actually wrote to the King, begging the latter to relieve him of his command, as he could not look on and see his troops ruined by the incompetence of the Staff.

Blücher's own position was almost impossible; he hated retiring even more than did his subordinates, with whom and with the men he thoroughly sympathized. But he was compelled to submit, by the terms of his appointment, to the dictation of Gneisenau. For a moment, it is said that he contemplated the extreme step of displacing Gneisenau and appointing von Kaetzler in his place, but learning that Napoleon was no longer in personal control of the French pursuit, on the night of the 24th he decided to turn upon his enemy. Accordingly he issued orders for an advance towards the Katzbach, which resulted on the 26th in the general action which has since borne that name.

Now it was that good luck favoured him in a most unusual degree. The Katzbach springing from high ground in the mountains to the southward, rose during the battle in a sudden flood. Carrying away many of the bridges, and destroying all the fords, it cut the French Army in half as it was moving to the attack of the Prussian position. At the critical moment Blücher ordered an advance of his right wing, and the muskets being too wet for effective use, the battle was practically decided by cold steel, the French, overwhelmed by the fanatical impetuosity of the Prussian assault, being driven into the river, where many hundreds were carried away and drowned. This brilliant victory was the making of Blücher and the Prussian Army. Indeed it was the salvation of the whole Allied cause, for news of it was brought to the Royal Headquarters at a moment when the general situation seemed hopeless, and more than a possibility existed that Austria might enter into a separate treaty with Napoleon and abandon the coalition altogether.

We must now return to Napoleon, and the measures he was taking to utilize to their full the advantages of the "interior lines" on which he stood as regards his adversaries.

The position pronounced a model for all time; for notwithstanding its great extent he could concentrate on its centre or on either wing a greater force than his enemies could possibly bring against him, and provided Dresden could be relied on to hold out for six or seven days, he felt completely master of the situation. It had however the disadvantage inherent in all defensive arrangements, viz. that the initiative lay in the hands of his adversary. Napoleon's first view had been that the Allies might attempt a direct attack on the line of the Riesengebirge, and to that end, he had occupied, and caused to be fortified, all the passes leading over them into the plains. Being for the time quite independent of his communications with France, and relying solely on Dresden, he desired nothing better than an advance of the Bohemian Army against Leipzig, and he seems hardly to have hoped for so much good fortune as actually befell him.

His first act on learning of Blücher's advance was to

reconnoitre personally the line of the passes he had taken up, in order to assure himself that he would have ample time to deal with the Silesian Army before the Austrians could arrive. Being satisfied on that point by a reconnaissance made on the 18th, by which he learnt that troops had actually marched from Blücher's command to Bohemia, he issued orders to Macdonald (now in chief command of the "Army of the Bober," as the troops facing Blücher were called) to have the troops ready for his personal command on the morning of the 20th. He then spent the 19th in reviewing troops and dealing with the endless details of administration, with which, in the absence of a properly trained Staff, he was compelled to burden himself.

His arrival on the morning of the 20th caused, as we have seen, Blücher's immediate retreat; and as information came in which made clear the weakness of the Silesian Army, and hence the exceeding improbability that he could compel it to stand for a decisive battle, he handed over command again to Macdonald on the 22nd, and returned to Görlitz, taking his Guards with him, there to await further developments.

Meanwhile the Allied Headquarters in Bohemia had fallen completely into the trap he had laid for them. Believing Napoleon to be vitally concerned in the retention of his communications with France, they had, after many conferences, decided on a concentric advance over the mountains across Saxony to Leipzig, their right watching Dresden, about the defences, or perhaps the spirit which animated its defenders, they appear to have been better informed than was the Emperor. The detachments of the Prussian and Russian forces made by the Silesian Army having arrived within supporting distance, the march was started by every available road from the Elbe to Leipzig, only two of which, however, were made and metalled roads. The others were little more than mountain tracks, scarped roughly out of the side of the hills with gradients up to 1 in 4 (15°) and no attempt to improve them appears to have been made throughout the campaign.

The natural consequence was that the heads of the several Corps could not keep their alignment, and those unfortunate enough to be on the bad roads (and these were the majority) were worn out in their efforts to keep up with their luckier comrades. During the 20th the news of Napoleon's personal appearance at the pass of Zittau (on the 18th) created something approaching consternation, for many supposed it precluded an advance on Prague, which to the strategists of that day must have loomed up as the prelude to an appalling calamity. Every one in any way entitled to give advice (Moreau and Jomini amongst them) at once assembled, and a discussion ensued in which the only man who appears to have maintained an attitude of decorous modesty was Prince Schwarzenberg, the Commander-in-Chief. Ultimately (though it is impossible to trace with whom the idea originated), the meeting decided that the whole Army should bring up its left shoulders, and swing in upon Dresden, which was to be attacked and stormed before Napoleon could return.

Orders to this effect were prepared and issued. This wheel to the left, however, threw the bulk of the columns from the main roads and tracks upon cross-tracks, which, running transverse to the drainage lines of the district, presented a succession of up and down gradients of the worst description, thus throwing an increased strain upon the already over-taxed marching powers of the Allied troops, and though during the course of August 25 the heads of the columns, driving the French outposts before them, closed in on the city, the tails were left straggling far behind.

In the afternoon of that day Schwarzenberg, with the three Monarchs and their retinues, rode up to the heights above Räcknitz overlooking the town, and here again a long discussion took place. Eventually it was decided that the forenoon of the following day should be devoted to concentrating the several columns for battle, and that the attack itself should begin about 4 p.m.; the actual signal for movement was to be given by three gun shots.

The crowd now separated to prepare the necessary orders. How long Schwarzenberg's Staff required to draft out the prolix and exhaustive memorandum that was to guide every detail of execution, it is impossible to specify. I should imagine that it would take

a man well acquainted with the ground at least three hours, and after that it had to be dictated, and sent out to about 200,000 men. When, if ever, its pith reached the company officers must remain undecided; but it must have been late in the following day, if at all.

Next morning, the Monarchs were out early to watch the preparations, when about 9 a.m., through the veil of mist which still lay over the valley, a great cheer of *Vive l'Empereur* surged out of the town, and in a moment the words "too late" were on every one's

lips. The King of Prussia stood out, emphasizing the point that for an Army of 200,000 men to back down before the mere threat of a shout, was unprecedented; it could hardly be called War at all. Again a long discussion, prolonged into the afternoon. Finally counsels of prudence prevailed. It was decided to retreat, and Schwarzenberg rode off to prepare the necessary orders for this step. The precise time of this decision cannot be fixed, but the fact remains that at 4 p.m. no orders had reached the troops, who had all arrived at their appointed places, and were waiting for the word to advance. Suddenly, some one, who it never can now be ascertained, fired the signal guns, and the attack on Dresden began.

We must now return to Napoleon, whom Napoleon left on the 23rd at Görlitz.

Contact with the Bohemian advance had been established by the French troops watching the passes, early on the 22nd, and their reports reached Headquarters during the 23rd. For the moment the Emperor's thoughts turned towards Prague, as the Allies had anticipated that they would, but presently the letters from St. Cyr became alarming and his attention was directed into another channel. The situation appeared to him as follows. Distance precluded any immediate danger from the Silesian Army, but to make assurance doubly sure, he ordered Macdonald to advance, and attack anything that attempted to stand against him. It was this order in fact which brought on the battle of the Katzbach. Presuming his most explicit instructions to have been obeyed, Dresden was amply secured against any attempt to carry it by storm. At the worst its defenders could retire into the fortified "bridge head" of the Neustadt and so prolong their defence by days. To St. Cyr, together with his own Corps, he had given authority to call upon the II Corps (Victor) and I Corps (Vandamme) for assistance, both of which could reach him in twenty-four hours.

But St. Cyr did not mention whether he had as yet made any use of this authority, or indeed whether he intended to use it at all.

For the moment he appears to have made no definite plan. Calling up the Guards to Görlitz, where his own Headquarters lay, he wrote an encouraging letter to St. Cyr, pointing out the strength of his position, and the time during which it could be held, also intimating that he would march himself to his assistance, and could if necessary arrive on the 25th. But at the same time a doubt seems to have crossed his mind as to whether the fortifications which he had ordered were in fact as far advanced as they ought to have been.

Then at last Napoleon's resolution failed. Cancelling all previous orders, he directed all available troops (except Vandamme's) by the nearest roads to Dresden, and riding on himself in advance, he galloped over the bridge, where his unexpected arrival gave rise to the cheers which so terrified the Allies. Close behind him came the leading files of the Guard. These had marched from Stolpen at 4 a.m. and moving in dense rendezvous formations (mass of columns on a company front at half distance generally, only the guns being upon the road), they went straight across country, and by noon 26 battalions were already in Dresden. At nightfall this number had risen to 68 battalions, 117 squadrons, 534 guns. In what order the mounted arms actually arrived is uncertain, most of them probably between noon and 5 p.m., the distance (17½ miles) being of course for them inconsiderable. But the march as a whole remains one of the most remarkable on record, and one can only imagine how such a feat must have upset the calculations of his opponents, who judging the situation by the ordinary rules of the game, could never have believed it possible to transfer a whole Army of this magnitude by a single road in little more than twelve hours.

The Corps of Victor and Marmont (II and VI) reached Stolpen during the night, and pushing on at daylight next morning arrived in time to take part in the renewed fighting of the 27th. Considering the material of which these troops were composed—young and inexperienced conscripts—and considering also the fact that the Guards were always better fed and cared for than were any other of the units, their performance is even more remarkable, for they had traversed a distance of 120 miles in four days; by a single road and through a country practically destitute of supplies. They had had no proper night quarters, they had simply lain down and slept wherever the column halted. Yet as a body they marched in full of swing and life, and remained in touch with the enemy for the next forty-eight hours.

How many of them fell out and were left along the road it is impossible nowadays to ascertain. *The essence of the whole matter is that enough of these raw immature boys actually reached the field in sufficiently good order to be controlled and directed in action.*

The details of the battle which now ensued possess but little interest at the present day. About 4 p.m. of the 26th the columns of the Allies attacked with considerable vigour, driving in the principal advance posts of the French, but before they could recover from the confusion inseparable from such success, the French Reserves issued forth from the wide openings intentionally arranged to facilitate such counterstrokes, and attacking in their turn with the bayonet, promptly recaptured their lost positions. Generally, when darkness put a stop to the fighting, the troops on both sides occupied much the same alignment as they had held at starting. But during the night Napoleon made his arrangements for a great counterstroke against the left of the Allies.

Murat was given the command of the Cavalry Corps Latour Maubourg, and of Pajol's Cavalry Division, 68 squadrons in all, with 30 guns, and of Victor's Corps and Teste's Division, 44 battalions, totalling some 25,000 men with 76 guns. These were ordered to work round the enemy's outer, i.e. left, flank, whilst the fight was continued along the front, and fortune favoured this plan in a singular manner. Shortly after midnight the rain came down in sheets, turning all the country off the roads in the low grounds into a morass; on the plateaus between the water courses, the drainage being better, the going was at any rate fair. Whilst Victor and Teste attacked the Austrians in front, Murat took his Cavalry by road right round the prolongation of the enemy's front, and emerging suddenly out of the cover on which their left rested, literally swept away the whole wing, for owing to the continuous rain the flintlocks of the Infantry proved useless, and squares without fire power were entirely inadequate against the momentum of his charges.

The effect of this success, however, was only local, for owing to the configuration of the ground, the centre of the Allied Army still remained intact, as it was separated from the beaten wing by a broad and deep ravine. But the Allies' Commander-in-Chief had already determined that want of both food and ammunition rendered retreat imperative, and during the afternoon the fighting was only continued to gain time for the necessary dispositions. In fact, the battle came to an end by the mutual exhaustion of both sides. Men and horses were alike so worn out that anything approaching an effective charge across the rain-sodden fields was out of the question. Napoleon knew that Vandamme had already reached Pirna, thus closing the shortest and best line of retreat available for the Allies, and he felt confident that after a night's rest his troops would soon overtake any start the enemy might have obtained.

About 5 p.m. the Emperor rode back into Dresden, drenched to the skin, and worn out, but still in good spirits and hopeful for the morrow, as his letter written the same evening to Cambacères sufficiently proves: "I am so tired and so busy that I cannot write at length . . . the Duke of Bassano will do so for me. Affairs here are very satisfactory." At dinner in the palace of the King of Saxony, he was most cheerful, and after commiserating his unfortunate father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, he said: "To-day the rain saved the enemy from complete destruction. I had intended to storm the whole line of heights. However,

we shall be in Bohemia before my colleagues (the three monarchs) after all." Then a little later he added: "I am well satisfied with the results of the day; but when I am not present, things go wrong. All the troops sent towards Berlin have been beaten, and I fear for Macdonald. He is brave and good, but unfortunate." A true prediction, as it happened.

Early next morning the French were in motion; the Emperor riding out towards their left flank to reconnoitre in person. Everywhere the advancing troops came upon signs of a hasty retreat, and of terrible suffering in the ranks of the Allies. Whole Austrian battalions had moved off leaving their muskets still piled in ranks, and men too exhausted to drag themselves further lay in the fields, while some were found suffocated downwards in the deep mud. It seemed impossible that the Army could have gone far. Indeed, the Cavalry reports indicated that the retreat had been made along all the roads over the mountains, far to the south. Therefore, it was a reasonable conclusion that Vandamme with his 40,000 men at Pirna (in command of the only first-class road in the district) could reach the exits from the mountain passes about Teplitz in time to intercept the bulk of the enemy's forces. St. Cyr and the Young Guard marching by the same good road would be within supporting distance if anything untoward happened, and Marmont following on directly was to hang upon the enemy's rear, whilst Murat with Victor and the Cavalry tried to work round their southern flank.

As at the same time satisfactory news arrived from Vandamme, who had attacked and driven back the flanking detachment under the Duke Eugène of Wurtemberg (left to hold the passages of the Elbe at Pirna on the previous day), the Emperor concluded he could give the Young Guard a much needed rest. He accordingly ordered them to bivouac where they stood, and getting into his coach drove back to Dresden, where at 8.30 p.m. the news of Macdonald's defeat on the Katzbach was handed to him.

The escape of the right wing of the Allies from the trap thus laid for them is one of the most curious episodes in military history and deserves to be treated with more detail than is usually accorded to it.

Duke Eugène of Wurtemberg, in reply to his repeated requests for reinforcements, found himself suddenly superseded in his command by the arrival of General Ostermann with a whole Division of the Russian Guards. Ostermann, however, was practically out of his mind, and in charge of two attendants. But in his lucid intervals he agreed not to interfere with the Duke's command. Unfortunately he insisted on riding with him, and when any question concerning his Guards arose, his senses appear to have deserted him entirely.

The Duke saw quite clearly that Vandamme was endeavouring to reach the defile of Peterswalde, where the road on which he and Kleist's Corps of Prussians were marching opens into the great Pirna-Teplitz *chaussée*. He therefore implored Ostermann to give him the assistance of the Guards to attack, and hold Vandamme in check throughout the day, pointing out the vital importance to the whole Army of keeping him at bay.

But Ostermann was not at all touched by these arguments, nor were his subordinates either. The Guards were the Tsar's own personal property, and their officers felt that they would never be forgiven if the bright paint on their Ruler's expensive toy should be tarnished or chipped in the rough game of war. Deaf to all remonstrances from Duke Eugène, Ostermann marched off leaving the Duke to do the best he could with his very inadequate means to carry out his plan of obstructing Vandamme's movements.

In the meantime a number of coincidences arose. The King of Prussia had ridden on alone from the night quarters of the Monarchs, and had chosen a path along a spur of the mountains from whence he had a full view over the plains below. The sound of heavy firing arising from the action between the Duke's little column and Vandamme's advance guard, reached his ears, and he saw in a moment the inevitable consequences if the French General should succeed in driving his opponents beyond the defile of Priesten, through which at that moment Ostermann's column was retiring.

The King at once galloped after the madman, and by a happy inspiration pointed out to the Russian Staff the danger in which their Sovereign, still within the mountains, would be placed if Priesten was not defended by the Guard; this appeal proved efficient. Ostermann or his representative counter-marched the column, and took up a retaining position, ready to receive the Duke of Wurtemberg as he fell back.

Simultaneously, almost, the Tsar himself had left Headquarters by another path running along a spur parallel to that on which the King of Prussia was riding. The sound of firing caught his attention also, and in his turn he took in the situation at a glance. From his spur of the mountains he could not see Ostermann, however. What he did see was another large body of Allied troops away in the plains, and he rode after them to bring them back to the Priesten position.

They turned out to be Colloredo's Austrian Corps of 14 battalions and 18 guns moving in direct compliance with Schwarzenberg's orders, issued the night before, and Colloredo did not see his way to acceding at once to the Imperial request that he should reinforce Ostermann at Priesten. Fortunately at this moment Metternich, the Austrian Prime Minister, arrived, in a very dejected frame of mind. Learning from the Emperor Alexander's own lips the yet greater danger that threatened if the French under Vandamme were not promptly opposed, he took the responsibility of ordering Colloredo back to Priesten, at which place the latter arrived so opportunely that Vandamme found himself compelled to delay his final attack until the following morning, as in the long and confused day's fighting his command had straggled a good deal.

When the battle was renewed the next morning the two opponents were fairly well matched, about 46,000 victory inspired French against some 50,000 Austrians and Russians. Vandamme had taken up his position in the little village of Kulm in face of the Priesten defile. About 1 p.m. he had sent forward practically all his troops for a decisive effort. They seemed to be carrying everything before them, when suddenly there was an outburst of heavy firing and cheers to his rear. The next moment a mass of Prussians burst into the village, taking the French force completely in reverse, Vandamme was captured with his Staff, and his command was completely destroyed or dispersed.

We must now retrace our steps to follow the vicissitudes of this Prussian Corps which had appeared so exactly at the right moment.

The Corps of Kleist, some 10,000 strong, had been left in touch with the main French Army in the vicinity of Dohna, and in its retreat had found itself gradually shouldered off successive lines of escape by Vandamme's advance.

On the night of August 29, Kleist found himself in desperate straits. The one roadway still open to him was so completely blocked by broken-down transport that twenty-four hours would hardly have sufficed to clear it for the passage of troops, so he decided to cut himself adrift from the map and trust to luck to find a way across country. Calling his officers together, he told them that he intended to fight his way through the French, sword in hand, and his plucky resolution was greeted with cheers. At daybreak next morning his columns climbed the spur which lay between them and the Pirna-Teplitz road. They then moved northwards along it, till they struck a country track leading down a ravine which ultimately debouched upon the above-named road. Scrambling down through the forests, for some 2,000 feet, they at length reached it. Finding it entirely unoccupied they promptly proceeded to reform their columns, and then marched along it towards the sound of the firing which came from the village of Kulm.

Rounding a turn in the road, they saw the battle raging in front of them. Being as yet entirely unobserved, they formed up for attack and rushed the village, almost before the French were aware of their presence.

There can be little doubt that this fortunate intervention changed the whole fate of the campaign, and the credit for it belongs in fairly equal proportions to the Duke of Wurtemberg for his courage, to the King of Prussia and the Tsar for their timely interference,

and to Kleist for his daring acceptance of responsibility which meant much more in those days of rigid adherence to prescription, than it would do at present.

The proximate cause which led to this complete disappointment of all Napoleon's hopes, lay undoubtedly in St. Cyr's failure to avail himself of the authority delegated to him by Napoleon to call Vandamme to his assistance. How a man of St. Cyr's distinction, who had himself exercised independent command on several occasions, and whose writings prove him to have been one of the first strategists of his day, could have blundered in this extraordinary manner is one of those insoluble problems in human psychology which from time to time arise and upset all calculations and all designs. If Vandamme, in obedience to St. Cyr's summons, had been already on the march to Dresden when Napoleon sat down to write the letter quoted above, no question as to the safety of that town could possibly have arisen; while the Emperor would have been free to carry out his design of placing 100,000 men in rear of the Allies on August 27, as he wrote to Maret, then in Paris.

But the question then arises whether but for his uncertainty as to Vandamme's movements, the plan would have occurred to him at all? Evidently it was not in his mind when he began his letter. It flashed across him as he wrote, and so blinded him for the moment that he failed to notice that by ordering Vandamme back to Stolpen he created the very situation which ultimately caused its abandonment. The letter strikes me as conclusive evidence of an absolutely tired mind. It is so carelessly worded that it is almost incredible that he can have read it over a second time, and the following letter confirms the impression; for Napoleon, when under the full control of his genius, would never have contemplated a dual objective, and still less would he have talked about the occupation of Prague as long as his enemy's undefeated Field Army was in existence.

The next questions are—How did this fatigue originate? Was its cause preventable? and is not the fact of its appearance in itself the best proof of the failure of the Commander to have realized in this instance the whole scope of all that his career had previously taught the world of War. It has been said by many critics that in this campaign the Emperor no longer gave proof of that all compelling energy in execution, of that ceaseless attention to detail, and that absolute disregard of his personal comfort which had distinguished him in his earlier days? But Major Friedrichs, with all the documentary evidence now in existence before him, has no difficulty in rebutting these accusations. It is absolutely clear that Napoleon was ceaselessly on the move; the marvel is how he ever found time to either sleep or write. But all this only confirms the point I propose to bring forward, viz., that he had never intellectually realized the secrets of his own success.

Hitherto, when in command of Armies approximating in magnitude to those he was now directing, he had always acted on the offensive, with a clear and definite purpose before him, a purpose which no possible threat or movement of his enemies could possibly disturb. Where they moved in darkness, distracted by every passing rumour and threat, he marched confidently forward, convinced of his power of beating down all opposition on the battlefield itself, when and wherever he might encounter them. Now, however, events had thrown him upon the defensive, and at once the increased difficulty of the situation forced itself upon his attention.

It was not only that his Cavalry failed him, for that had happened to him before, notably in 1806 and 1809. No, the essential difficulty now lay in the fact that the initiative had passed from his hands to those of his adversary, and therefore he was compelled to wait until the latter gave him an opening, of which to take advantage. That opening he certainly saw when he penned his letter to Vandamme, but it is clear from the measures he suggested that his inspiration did not suffice to show him the best way in which to avail himself of the chance given to him; and this simply because his mind was at the time too weary to work out intellectually the full possibilities of the situation.

Presumably since he had actually prepared three bridges at or near Pirna, and held two others in hand to throw across the river as occasion might require—the

new road, or roads (I can only find mention of one) which he had ordered to be constructed, must have been good enough for 100,000 men to pass along them, during the twenty-four hours he allowed himself. But there was only one road available in continuation to Hellenendorf (the objective he mentions in his letters to Maret) and in the defiles of that district, his Army could hardly move on a broad front, as it had done from Bautzen and Stolpen on Dresden. His 100,000 men, therefore, would have taken about as long to concentrate to the front as the Austrians would have taken to counter-march to their rear. Moreover, the latter would have held the best graded road in the district in their possession, viz., from Freiburg via Dux to Teplitz, by which to manoeuvre against the French flank.

I therefore submit that had Napoleon's conduct of war been the result of intellectual study, and not the intuition of genius, a far simpler, and more effective plan would have followed from the intellectual application of the forms which he had himself invented, which depended for their efficacy on the superior marching powers of the French troops under certain conditions, all of which presented themselves in the case now before us.

In the campaigns of 1807 and 1812 in Poland and Russia, the formation "in battalion square of 200,000 men," had broken down because, owing essentially to difficulties of supply, he had not been able to outmarch his enemy and compel him to stand and give battle.

If he had struck towards Prague whilst the Austrians and Allies were still in the vicinity, it is possible that he might have caught them up. The harvest was just being gathered on the southern slopes of the Bohemian mountains, and as the whole district had escaped the ravages of war for the last fifty years, supplies therefore would have been abundant. On the other hand, however, there was no particular reason why the Allies should stand to be beaten, when they had the whole of Austria and Hungary in which to manoeuvre and escape.

When once, however, the columns of the Bohemian Army had entangled themselves in the defiles leading to Saxony, they were at Napoleon's mercy had he, as before said, only realized intellectually the secret of his own successes, viz., *superior mobility*. Leaving only a weak rear guard under Ney to cover his withdrawal the IV and XI Corps, preceded by Poniatowski (VIII Corps) as an advance guard, should have been set in motion via Zittau, Graben, Leitmeritz, Lobositz, on Teplitz, which they would have reached during the course of August 28, having started on the 24th, the distance being less than what the II and VI Corps actually accomplished in their march to Dresden, and the gradients better than those they had surmounted.

The II and VI Corps, with the Guards, would have reached Hellenendorf in the same time; while Dresden, with St. Cyr and Vandamme would have been perfectly safe for forty-eight hours, even assuming that the town was ever in danger. Further, whilst the centre and right attacked and held the enemy, the left would have taken the Teplitz-Dux-Freiburg road, and would have swung in on the enemy's rear, wherever and however he might have placed himself.

GROSS BEEREN—DENNEWITZ—WARTENBURG

We left Napoleon on the afternoon of August 28 driving back from Pirna, well satisfied with the promise of the day, and pleased with the number of trophies and prisoners which were hourly arriving from the front. A second report from Oudinot relating to his defeat at Gross Beeren, received about noon, was insufficient to disturb his serenity, which remained proof even against the far more serious news of Macdonald's defeat on the Katzbach, and of Girard's reverse at Hagelesberg, which reached him during the evening of the same day. For once, however, no immediate step was taken to remedy either misfortune, and we are amazed to find the great Emperor, hitherto the very incarnation of rapid decision, faltering for thirty-six hours before

deciding on his next move in the great Notes on the game. During these hours he dictated Situation two memoranda on his strategical situation. These are so absolutely opposed in their contents and arrangement to anything one could previously have conceived as coming from the mind of this great Master of men and War, that many doubts have been cast on their authenticity. But as the Ger-

man General Staff have accepted them, we may bow to their authority.

They are too long for reproduction, but briefly they discuss at considerable length two alternatives, viz., a march with the main Army on Prague, or a march, with Oudinot's command largely reinforced, on Berlin, and the marvel is that the Emperor's decision could have wavered for a moment. For Prague, it was already too late, from the moment when he had said, "I see nothing more to do" at Pirna; and, as already pointed out, the direction of Prague held out no hope of decision. The Bohemian Army could always run away faster than he could follow them. Berlin, on the other hand, held out all the fascination of his original northern plan, heightened by the satisfaction to be derived from administering prompt chastisement to Bernadotte, to say nothing of the more real advantage of a fresh country in which to operate, and finally the relief of the fortresses of Danzig, Küstrin and Frankfurt.

In the early hours of August 30 Napoleon's resolution was taken to march on Berlin, and Berthier was instructed to order the Guards and the Cavalry back from the Bohemian frontier, across the Elbe at Dresden, and towards Grosszennheim. In consequence of these orders, during the afternoon the troops began filing ceaselessly over the bridges.

But already the foundations on which this plan had been based, flimsy enough at the best, had crumbled to pieces under the stubborn logic of events.

Late in the evening the Emperor received Napoleon's a despairing appeal from Macdonald, im Disaster at ploring his presence to re-establish order and discipline in his defeated command, and at 2 a.m. on the 31st came the news of Vandamme's catastrophe at Kulm. A few hours later, General Corbineau, who, with a few cavalry men, had cut his way through the enemy, appeared, and was at once admitted to the Emperor's presence. What followed is thus described by Baron Fain in his *Manuscript de 1813* (ii. p. 319) which I translate from Major Freidrichs' work (Vol. ii, p. 8):—

"Napoleon received the detailed account of the disaster without betraying any sign of his feelings. What he could not understand was how Vandamme could have allowed himself to be tempted so far in pursuit. 'For an Army in retreat one must either build a golden bridge or oppose its progress with a dam of steel and iron.' Walking up and down the room in deepest thought, he asked Berthier: 'Can we have written anything which could have thus misled him? Fetch me your order book. Fain, show me my notes. Let us see what we said.'

"The Major-General brought his order book, the Cabinet Secretary the notes, and together they went through the papers. They found nothing which could have justified the unfortunate General in leaving his position at Peterswalde."

This was perhaps the most magnificent exhibition of his histrionic talent that Napoleon ever gave, and of such exhibitions not a few have been recorded. But the facts were too hard to be explained away, and the Headquarters Staff failed to be impressed with it. General von Gersdorf, (Saxon) writing in his diary the same evening summed up the situation as follows:—

"The impression made by the successes at Dresden and by Moreau's death have been wiped out; all consequences these events might have entailed are simply destroyed. Confidence grows in the camp of the Allies in proportion as it sinks with us. The Emperor is very quiet; I hardly like to write 'depressed,' but very pensive, curiously he is not irritable; the spirit of Headquarters generally bears the stamp of the time."

As an immediate consequence of these disasters the movement on Berlin was suspended. Nothing whatever was done on August 31. On September 1 the Emperor lied to Macdonald's appeal (received on the night of the 30th) ordering him to hold on to Görlitz at all costs, meanwhile holding out the hope of his own arrival with reinforcements. He also sent Ney to Wittenberg to relieve Oudinot of his command and to restore order in the disorganized débris which after the defeat of Gross Beeren had rallied about that place. But his chief attention appears to have been devoted to preparing the troops about Dresden to meet a renewed offensive on the part of the Allies.

With this object St. Cyr (XIV) was ordered to remain at Pima. Victor (II) was sent to Freiberg, and Marmont (VI), Mortier (Guards) and Latour-Maubourg's Cavalry were united around Dresden as a central reserve. Lobau received the command of the wreck of Vandamme's Corps, (I) which by using Teste's Division as a nucleus was raised to about 14,000 men and 66 guns (obtained by drafts from other commands) and 300 sabres.

It was now too late to carry out his march on Berlin in the manner he had originally designed. On the other hand, it was quite impossible for him to remain where he was, and since the outpost reports gave no hope that the "Grand Army"—as it had come to be called—would obligingly step down into the plains to be beaten, he now resolved to move the Guards, the VI Corps and his Headquarters to a central position equally convenient to reinforce Macdonald, Ney or Murat, whom he determined to leave in chief command at Dresden.

This central position Napoleon found in the little village of Hoyerswerda, where the road from Dresden to Berlin via Cottbus intersects a second-class road coming from Wittenberg via Leutenberg to Bautzen. During September 2nd Berthier wrote to Ney the following sketch of the situation, also an outline of Ney's special mission, to supplement such verbal instructions as the latter had taken with him from his personal interview with the Emperor, which seem to have been of the vaguest description:—

"We have just received news from the Duke of Reggio (Oudinot) who has seen fit to fall back to within two marches of Wittenberg. The consequences of this untimely movement are that General Taubentzen and a strong body of Cossacks have turned towards Lückau and Bautzen, where they threaten Macdonald's communications. It is really difficult to show less head than Oudinot.

"Everything is being set in motion for Hoyerswerda, where the Emperor and Headquarters will arrive on the 4th. You must march on the 4th, and be in Baruth on September 6. On that day the Emperor will place a Corps at Lückau which can join you. From Baruth it is only three marches to Berlin. Communication with the Emperor will thus be established, and the attack on Berlin can take place on the 9th or 10th. The whole division of Cossacks, and all this mass of inferior Landwehr Infantry will everywhere be thrown back on Berlin if your march is made in a determined manner. *You will understand the necessity for rapid action in order to draw advantage from the confusion of the Bohemian Army*, which is sure to set itself in motion as soon as it learns of the Emperor's move. Oudinot never attacked the enemy, and was clever enough to engage only one of his Corps. If he had gone at him resolutely would have overrun him everywhere."

The above deserves attentive study, as it was the immediate cause of the catastrophe of Dennewitz, which in its consequences proved the most serious reverse which the French had as yet sustained. Ney, who, in fact (in his usual impulsive manner), had started for Wittenberg with no definite instructions, had found Oudinot's troops in extreme disorder, penned in with their back against the Elbe by the whole of the Army of the North, which Bernadotte had very skilfully disposed so as to hide its weak effectives.

The Emperor in his instructions never alludes to the position of this enemy at all, and they were clearly written under the impression that no serious opposition could be opposed to the prescribed march on Baruth by the Army of the North. But Ney saw only his orders, and with the fate of Oudinot before his eyes, determined not to fall into the error of weak execution, which the context of Berthier's memoranda so strongly condemns.

Having re-established some measure of order among the troops (during September 3 and 4), on the morning of the 5th Ney broke out of his position with his whole three Corps. He moved straight across country in masses towards Zahna to gain the Lückau-Bautzen road. The weather being clear and dry, the dense dust clouds stirred up by this formidable array gave Bernadotte ample warning of its coming, and though Taubentzen's weak Corps of Landwehr, on whom the blow of Ney's advance directly fell, were easily thrown back in dire confusion, all the remainder of his Army,

Bülow, Wintzengerode and the Swedes, were immediately set in motion to move parallel to the French and head them off if possible from Jüterbogk. A cloud of Cossacks, and a low roll of the ground concealed this movement from Ney, whose troops bivouacked for the night around Zahna, quite unaware that a formidable enemy was gathering within five miles of their left flank.

Early the next morning the march was renewed, the IV Corps (Bertrand) leading, followed by the VII (Reynier) and XII (Oudinot), each marching in mass of Divisions, the Artillery only on the road.

Taubentzen had bivouacked near Dennewitz and had spent the night in restoring order amongst his Landwehr, and with such success that, confident of prompt support, he was able to take up a position effectively barring the further progress of the French, though he had barely 10,000 men under arms. *This is worth noting, for it shows how readily raw troops can be rallied, even from serious panic, if they only know what they are fighting for.* Still, an encounter against such odds could only end one way, and after about two hours' fighting the Landwehr were faltering in every direction, when Bülow's men appeared on the flank of the French IV Corps. Their attack at once stopped the progress of the latter, and now it was Bertrand who was thrown on the defensive. The arrival of the VII Corps again turned the scale, but fresh Prussian battalions turning up, the left flank of the French gave way, and their position was only saved by the appearance of the leading troops of the XII Corps.

But just as the whole mass of this new command were preparing for a final counterstroke against the allies in order to finish the day, Ney, who all this time had been watching the battle with Bertrand's men, and knowing nothing of what was happening on his extreme left, sent orders to Oudinot to continue his march to the front. The latter, who since his supersession by Ney in the command of the Army, had been in that worst of tempers in which a man confines himself to the literal obedience of his orders—however much circumstances may have altered and his own common sense may apprehend this fact—called off all his troops, and in spite of Reynier's most urgent remonstrances he resumed his march to join Ney, passing close along the rear of the hardly pressed VII Corps.

Punishment was not long delayed, for ever since morning the Russians and Swedes had been pressing their march to the utmost, and warned of the urgency of the case, their Horse Artillery and Cavalry had hurried on far in advance. Almost as the last of the XII Corps quitted the line, the storm burst upon the exhausted VII Corps. An advance of every available gun to case shot range preluded the approach of a perfect hurricane of horsemen, before whom the French broke, and pursuers and pursued poured down the slopes upon the flanks of Oudinot's masses.

The defeat was absolutely catastrophic! A wild panic seized the French, and for the next few days Ney's command ceased to exist.

We must now return to the Emperor, whom we left completing his arrangements for the defence of Dresden. His orders on this subject to Rogiat (his Chief Engineer) dated September 3 remain as masterpieces of all time, and equally so are his instructions to St. Cyr of the same date. Thus, having provided for every contingency as far as human foresight could well go, he started on the afternoon of the 3rd to overtake the Guards and Reserves already on their way to Hoyerswerda (about forty miles north-east of Dresden). But at the last moment a report from Macdonald, dispatched the previous evening, was handed in to him, which again shattered the basis of his whole design.

Briefly, Macdonald again represented his command as absolutely out of hand; he could find no one to support him in his efforts to maintain discipline, and only the Emperor's presence could avert utter disaster. This time there was no hesitation. Orders Joins Mac- went to all the marching columns to change donald direction towards Bautzen. Ney was warned of the Emperor's alteration of his destination, which might postpone his march on Berlin until Blücher's Army had been disposed of; but Ney was to continue the execution of his own march on Baruth to be able

to back up the Emperor the moment he returned, and Macdonald was warned to have all his troops in readiness for inspection early next morning, so that the Emperor could ride down the front in half an hour. Then the moment the Guards and Latour Maubourg arrived, which would be between 2 and 3 p.m., the Emperor proposed to attack the enemy wherever he found him.

Napoleon slept that night at Gross Harthau, and rode on in the early morning of September 4 towards Bautzen. That he had expected to find things in a bad way is clear from the steps he had already taken to meet the most urgent necessities, and to replenish both arms and equipment. But what he really encountered was worse than any one had dreamt of imagining. Swarms of bare-footed, unarmed and starving stragglers met him as he rode; and there was no food to give them, for a big convoy of provisions and ammunition had been intercepted by a raiding command from Blücher's Army, and only its smoking remains lay by the roadside. And here, at length, the Emperor lost his usual self-control. A miserable dog ran out and yapped at his horse as he rode by; he drew his pistol on the poor wretch, but the pistol missed fire, and in a rage he flung it at the animal. Then he rode on in gloomy silence, until he met Macdonald and his staff outside Bautzen. Then his temper completely overmastered him. Turning on Sebastiani (Commander of the 2nd Cavalry Corps), he upbraided him in such unmeasured terms that Caulaincourt and the Staff had to close round him to shut off the undignified scene. Thence he rode on to Hochkirch, where the heads of columns of the Silesian Army were seen approaching. At these he hurled the nearest of his troops at hand, who now, suddenly ashamed of themselves and anxious to retrieve their reputation under their Emperor's eyes, attacked with such vigour that Blücher and his Generals immediately detected the presence of the Master, and at once ordered a retreat behind the Lobau river. This was carried out successfully, thanks to the desperate fighting of their respective rear guards.

He then spent the night at Hochkirch, and rode off early in the morning to the Wohlauer hill to reconnoitre the enemy's position in person. But the morning reports made it clear that Blücher was in full retreat, and despairing of bringing him to action, suspecting also a plot to draw him further from Dresden, he returned to Bautzen with the Guards, and learning from Ney that he would leave Wittenberg for Jüterbogk on the 5th, orders were issued for the Guards and VI Corps to march on the 6th to Hoyerswerda.

But two hours after this decision had Napoleon Returns to been taken again he felt compelled to Dresden alter their destination, for further alarmist reports from St. Cyr at Dresden reached him. Seemingly forgetting all the orders which he had issued to meet the contingency of a fresh advance on the part of the Bohemian Army, he hesitated, changed his mind, and forthwith couriers were sent after the Guards and the 1st Cavalry Corps to change their direction from Hoyerswerda to Dresden. Only Marmont (VI Corps) was to continue his march on Kamenz.

Of the many strange situations in this Campaign, this is perhaps the most difficult to unravel. St. Cyr's reports contain nothing to show that anything had occurred in excess of what Napoleon's precautions had been intended to provide for. Hence, if his calculations before leaving Dresden had been correct, there was no particular reason for this extraordinary alarm. Further, even if St. Cyr's story had been many times darker, and the Bohemian Army had, in fact, been in full march over the mountains, this would have been only a repetition of the situation he had already faced and provided for on the 23rd of the previous month. Then he had written, in reply to similar dismal forebodings on the part of St. Cyr, "If the Bohemian Army crosses the mountains and advances into Saxony, in that case I will wish them *bon voyage*; they will come back quicker than they went."

His troops at this moment occupied almost identically the same position as on the night of August 25, and if Dresden really was in jeopardy, surely the shortest way to its relief would have been by one side of the triangle from Bautzen to Tepitz, rather than by the two sides from Bautzen to Dresden, Dresden—

Teplitz.

Before leaving Bautzen the following order was published to the Army:—

“Every soldier who leaves his colours betrays the first of his duties.

“His Majesty therefore orders—

“Soldiers who leave the colours without sufficient reason will be decimated. The Corps Commanders, therefore, every time they have collected ten stragglers will cause them to draw lots, and one of them is to be shot.”

On the evening of the 6th Napoleon reached Dresden, where he found renewed reports from St. Cyr to the effect that “The Austrians were advancing by Altenberg, the Prussians and Russians by Borna and Berggieshübel, where they had already arrived.” There was no indication at all of the forces they had deployed, still less as to whether they were moving on Chemnitz and Freiberg, both points of very great importance. The Emperor expressed his dissatisfaction at the incompetence of the whole Intelligence Service. To clear up the situation he sent Victor’s Corps in support of St. Cyr to Dohna, on the 7th, and rode out next morning at the head of the Guards to conduct a reconnaissance in person.

It is now time to return to the Bohemian Army, which we left at the moment when the tide of its misfortune had been suddenly arrested by its victory over Vandamme at Kulm (August 30), and when the news of Gross Beeren and the Katzbach, both of which had been received during the previous twenty-four hours, had stiffened its drooping spirits.

But though all idea of further retreat was abandoned, a halt to re-establish order in the several commands, and to issue fresh ammunition and equipments, especially boots (for nearly half the Army was by this time barefooted) was urgently necessary.

The abortive expedition had entailed a loss in killed, wounded, prisoners and sick of some 45,000 men, of which 9,000 men with 600 horses fell upon the Prussians, nearly 30 per cent. of their original effective. But in spite of this heavy punishment, endured day by day under the depressing conditions of continuous retreat, the Commanding Officers were all able to report that in their conduct the men had shewn both goodwill and devotion beyond all expectation or praise.

The breakdown of the commissariat had been complete, and the Russians, particularly the Cossacks, had sought to make good the deficiencies in their supply by living on the inhabitants, and robbing them right and left. So serious, indeed, were the disturbances and sufferings created by these half-civilized horsemen that flying columns had to be organized, which the inhabitants of the country gladly joined, to hunt down these marauders and hang them out of hand. It may be mentioned here that these same troops proved equally troublesome in the rear of all three Armies, and that behind the Silesian Army they formed themselves into organised bands of brigands, who waylaid, stripped and murdered every civilian and even officer who fell into their hands.

The chief result of these victories, viz., Kulm, Gross Beeren and Katzbach, on the future of the campaign was, however, to confirm for good and all the allegiance of Austria to the Triple Alliance. Up to the very day of the battle of Kulm, Metternich had been carrying on diplomatic relations with Napoleon, and both the Prussians and Russians felt that he might desert the common cause at a moment’s notice. Now decisively he flung diplomacy to the winds, and in a final communication to the French Emperor formulated such preposterous demands for the conclusion of peace that nothing but hopeless defeat could have enabled the latter even to consider them.

Under the depressing influences of the monarchs’ feat a letter had been despatched to Napoleon on August 29, calling upon him to march with 50,000 men (i.e., more than half his command as it stood) to the assistance of the Bohemian Army, and notwithstanding the victory of Kulm, the demand was not withdrawn. Thence a long correspondence arose, which reveals very completely the entire want of anything approaching or-

ganized co-operation in determining the ultimate issue of the campaign.

The letter to Blücher did not convey an absolute order, merely a royal wish, leaving, as far as these things can be left, the final decision to depend on the circumstances prevailing at the Silesian Headquarters on delivery of the document.

Now at that moment, unknown, of course, to Blücher, Napoleon had actually gathered together his forces for his often proposed march on Berlin, and Ney had received his orders to fall upon Bernadotte and overwhelm him, and it was only Blücher’s resolute pursuit, or, better, pressure upon Macdonald’s command which caused the Emperor to abandon his design and turn upon Blücher.

Meanwhile, Bernadotte, able to gauge the Emperor’s mind far better than did any other of his colleagues, was painfully aware of the imminent danger which threatened his command in its isolated position right in the path of the Emperor’s march on Berlin, which he had divined, from the first, as Napoleon’s immediate reply to the defeat of Oudinot at Gross Beeren. Judging by the light of the fuller knowledge now available, there can be no doubt that this counterstroke, had it been carried out, must have been decisive of the whole campaign. Having marched right over the North Army, relieved Danzig and the Oder fortresses, and then with Davout having reopened communications with Magdeburg, the Emperor again would have been in touch with all the resources of France, and the 32nd Military Division. Indeed, he might have renewed the campaign with an assured numerical superiority and with a wholly re-established military prestige. But not an inkling of this possibility seems to have dawned on the Allied Headquarters, who called on Blücher for reinforcements, which would only have added to the existing congestion of the district in which they stood. These were refused by Blücher, not on the grounds of Bernadotte’s danger and consequent claim on the loyalty of his nearest comrade, but because neither he nor Gneisenau desired to have their freedom hampered by the loss of half their troops.

Blücher’s private autograph letter to Knesbeck is so characteristic that I reproduce it with its original spelling; it was sent under cover with the formal dispatch:—

“Um des allgemeinen wohl und Besten, bewahren, si mich vor einer vereinigung mit der groszen armee; was soll eine solche ungeheure masse auf einen gleichsam ausgezertten terrain, hir will ich wirksahn sein und kann ich nützlich werden, weiche ich von einen den Kronprinzen von Schweden mitgetheilten operations Plan ab, so krieget er sicher, staht dasz er nu mit starken chritt vorwärts geht; solte Napoleon nach Boehmen hinein gehn wollen, so muss man ihn in Boehmen vernichten, ich glaube aber, dasz er die Elbe verläst wenn man gut manouvriert.

HERNHUT, den 13 Sept., 1813.

It will be noticed that in this letter Blücher does speak of a combined operation with the Crown Prince of Sweden. But Major Rühle von Lilienstein, who carried this dispatch, had verbal instructions to point out to the Allied Sovereigns, not the imminence of the danger which threatened the Crown Prince and his troops as long as Napoleon held the passages over the Elbe, but that no reliance could be placed on the loyalty of the Crown Prince himself unless Blücher and Gneisenau were at hand to drive him; and, in anticipation, it may be added, that a secret intrigue was already on foot by which on the approach of the Silesian Army Bülow and Taubert were to refuse obedience to the Prince and transfer their forces to Blücher’s command, in case the latter hesitated to press operations with the energy they desired.

Bernadotte’s conduct in every campaign has always remained an insoluble problem to all students. His absence from the battlefield of Jena at the critical moment, and his amazing indiscreetness at Wagram (for which the Emperor had actually ordered him to be tried by court martial) had cast suspicion on him in many quarters. Now the fact that neither at Gross Beeren nor Dennewitz had he nor his Swedes taken part

in either battle had completely shaken the confidence of the Prussians in his courage and his loyalty. Yet in the present instance those suspicions prove to have been unfounded, and Major Friedrichs (who is the first to discuss the situation with adequate documentary evidence at his disposal) is able to establish Bernadotte’s *bona fides* at this period of the campaign beyond all reasonable doubt. In so far as he appeared to be lacking in enterprise, the explanation is that he knew his wily adversary and the nature of his own danger far better than could any of his critics.

Fortunately for the Allies, events moved far more rapidly than the correspondence, but it was necessary to emphasize the point at this period of the narrative in order to throw light upon the undercurrents of intrigue which hampered the movements of the three Armies.

Returning now to the Bohemian Headquarters, we find the troops sufficiently re-established to resume operations on September 5. Accordingly, the columns again penetrated into the mountains by the same roads which they had used previously, and it was the fighting which ensued as the advance guards came in contact with the French outposts that led St. Cyr to send off his alarmist reports to the Emperor at Bautzen.

But on the 6th, and whilst the first line of their Army was still in close touch with St. Cyr’s troops, news reached the Allies from an unimpeachable source that Napoleon had again turned against Blücher, taking with him the bulk of his troops. Now it was that while still uncertain as to the reply Blücher would give to the demand for 50,000 men, the Headquarters decided to march 60,000, by Aussig, Leitmeritz and Rumburg, to his support, and the movement was actually initiated.

We must pause a moment to contemplate the amazing spectacle which would have been presented had Blücher already complied with the Allied Sovereigns’ request; 60,000 men marching north on one road, whilst parallel to them and only a few miles distant 50,000 marched south on another highway; 110,000 men neutralized, and Napoleon in the middle of them to take advantage of this incredible opportunity.

But hardly had the troops started their march than the situation once more underwent an entire change, for Napoleon was again reported as in full march for Dresden, and, as we have seen, the report was confirmed by his appearance in person during the course of September 8 at the head of his Guards in that city.

A retreat and concentration was immediately decided upon, and the whole Bohemian Army was ordered to be drawn up for battle on a plateau covering Teplitz and the exits from the mountains.

The retreat of the advance detachments involved severe fighting, but by the evening of September 9 the whole of the Russian and Prussian contingents had taken up their positions, and on the morning of the 10th Napoleon, from the heights of the Geiersberg, was able to look down upon, and almost count, the individual men opposed to him.

Reconnaissances were at once pushed out to find roads suitable for the passage of artillery across the ravine lying at his feet, but when in the evening Drouot, his most trusted Artillery Commander, returned with the report that the plateau was utterly inaccessible to that arm, he made up his mind to abandon the attempt to force on a battle. Leaving St. Cyr to make every show of concentration, to send out working parties to ostentatiously repair the roads, etc., he returned to Dresden to attend more closely to the situation which had arisen out of Ney’s defeat at Dennewitz, the full magnitude of which had at length struck home to him.

St. Cyr in his *Memoirs* has criticized this decision most adversely, drawing unfavourable comparisons between the man who crossed the St. Bernard without field artillery in 1800 when entering Italy, and the Emperor who now hesitated because his guns could not follow the Infantry. But this criticism only serves to show how little his contemporaries had fathomed the secret of their Leader, or grasped the profound change in the spirit of their own troops and the character of their opponents. In 1800 the French Infantry still fought with Republican fanaticism, the Long Service Armies of Austria by routine. Now the situation was entirely

reversed, and the French could only hope to beat their enemies when artillery fire had done its work. To bring up adequate masses of guns for this purpose on to the plateau being impossible, no decisive action could be hoped for, and only a decisive victory could be of use to the Emperor in his present situation.

Arrived in Dresden, Napoleon immediately issued orders transferring the Administrative Bureaus of the Army from Dresden to Torgau, which seems to indicate that for the moment a policy of concentration against the Northern Army, whilst still unsupported, flashed through his mind. But if this was the case, the idea was only temporary, for next morning (September 12) he ordered Marmont from Kamenz to Grossenhain, and sent Murat with the 1st and 5th Cavalry Corps to join him.

Immediately this movement served to cover the transit of a convoy of 15,000 cwt. of flour up the river into Dresden, but it might also have served as a preliminary for a renewed offensive against the Army of the North, and was appreciated in that spirit by Bernadotte.

The latter, after his victory over Ney at Dennewitz, had detailed Taubentzen to observe the French who had fallen back on Torgau, and Bülow was told off to besiege Wittenberg, whilst the Swedes moved down stream on Rossiau. Wintzingerode and Woronzow were at Zerbst, and Bernadotte was being strongly urged by his Prussian subordinates to pass at any rate one Corps of his Army over the Elbe to operate on the French communications, a step he had refused to take until Wittenberg was in his possession. His resolution had all but led to open mutiny on the part of the Prussians, as already noticed above, but Napoleon's threat from Dresden towards Grossenhain so completely vindicated his judgment, that it was impossible to cross the river as long as the Emperor was free to debouch from Dresden, Meissen or Torgau, that this opposition was for the time at least withdrawn, and more harmonious relations were established in his command.

But a fresh offensive by the Bohemian Army on September 14 against St. Cyr caused the Emperor to change his plans again, and on the 15th he marched with two Divisions of the young Guard to Pirna in the hope of surprising the Allies in an unfavourable position. This desire, however, was disappointed. The Allies immediately began their retreat, contesting every position desperately, and concentrating ultimately near Kulm, where they appeared as ready to accept battle once more.

On the 17th Napoleon rode out to reconnoitre from the mountains near Nollendorf, but fog and rain hindered all observations until midday. The attack was then begun, but a Prussian Corps defended the advance posts so resolutely that hardly any ground had been gained when a tremendous downpour of rain put a stop to the fighting about 5 p.m.

On the 18th the Emperor again rode out to reconnoitre in person. The air being clear he could see every detail of the enemy's position, and he noted particularly the stream of their reinforcements arriving. Reluctantly he ordered the Guards back to Pirna, and leaving Lobau and St. Cyr to reoccupy their former positions he returned to Pirna, where for the next few days (during which ceaseless rain made operations impossible) he remained secluded in his chambers, striving to grapple intellectually with the tide of misfortunes that now began to pour in upon him.

From the south came the news that the Austrians had surprised and captured (during the night of September 17-18) the garrison of Freiberg; from the west he heard that Mersburg, with a garrison of 1,800 men, had surrendered to a partisan commando under Thielmann and Mensdorf, and finally from Ney came the report, premature though it happened to be, that Bernadotte with 80,000 men had crossed the Elbe at Rossiau.

To add to all this, the condition of the French troops was deplorable; their rations had been cut down from 28 oz. of bread to 8 oz. (raised again, it is true, by the successful introduction of the 15,000 cwt. of flour into Dresden to 24 oz.); but this supply was already beginning to give out, and the district offered absolutely nothing but potatoes. Meat had scarcely been seen for weeks, and the half starved men, exposed to the inclement

weather night after night in rain-sodden bivouacs, were melting away by battalions.

Since the resumption of hostilities, he had lost not less than 150,000 men, 300 guns and a huge amount of war material. Upwards of 50,000 sick and wounded still crowded the hospitals, whence it was said only one man in ten came out alive; but yet, notwithstanding this accumulation of catastrophes, the iron will of this extraordinary man would not bow to the inevitable and sacrifice Dresden, although this city not only was of no further military advantage to him, but on the contrary was a source of gravest danger. And for this reason. His foes had now approached so close on both sides that he had no longer room to manoeuvre, and all the time Bernadotte lay in his direct path to ultimate victory, simply waiting to be destroyed. Here the Ruler undoubtedly sacrificed strategy to the apparent interests of his dynasty.

On September 21 Napoleon returned again to Dresden, and on the 22nd, taking with him his Guards, as usual, he joined Macdonald, who still faced Blücher, and drove the latter back on the 23rd to the strong position he had already prepared about Bautzen, where this time it was apparent the old fellow had determined to make a stand. But at this moment Ney sent word that the Northern Army had thrown a bridge over the Elbe at Wartenburg, close above Wittenberg, and that he feared to be cut off both from Torgau and Dresden. On receipt of this news (again a premature report) the Emperor at length gave orders for a general withdrawal of the whole of Macdonald's command to the left bank of the Elbe, giving out that it was his intention to afford them the few days' rest which they so urgently needed. In accordance with this intention, by September 27 the French Army occupied the following positions:—

- I. At Dresden (a) on the right bank of the Elbe—
XI Corps (Macdonald) at Weissig.
2nd Cavalry Corps (Sebastiani) at Pillnitz.
III Corps (Souham), Dresden and on the road to Grossenhain.
(b) On the left bank of the Elbe—
V Corps (Lauriston) around Dresden.
The Guards, Dresden and Pirna.
- II. Facing the Bohemian Army—
I Corps (Lobau) at Bergschühel.
XIV Corps (St. Cyr). 43rd Division, Pirna and Pillnitz. 42nd Division, Königstein. 44th and 45th Division, Borna and Dippoldiswalde.
II Corps (Victor) at Freiberg.
VIII Corps (Poniatowski) and 4th Cavalry Corps (Kellermann) at Waldheim.
- III. Facing the North Army—
IV Corps (Bertrand), Kemberg and Schleesen.
VII Corps (Reynier) and 3rd Cavalry Corps (Arighi) (exclusive Lorge's Division) in Dessau, Wörlitz and Oranienbaum.
- IV. Covering the Elbe north of Dresden—
VI Corps (Marmont) between Meissen and Wurzen.
1st Cavalry Corps (Latour) between Grossenhain, Meissen and Schildlau.
5th Cavalry Corps (L'Héritier) at Meissen.
- V. To guard the rearward connections—
2nd Guard Cavalry Division and Leipzig Corps of Observation (Margaron) under the command of Lefebvre-Desnouettes, at Altenberg.
Dombrowski's Division and Cavalry Division (Lorge) on the march across the Mulde.
- VI. On march to reinforce the Army—
IX Corps (Angereau) from Würzburg towards the Saar.
March Division (Lefol) from Erfurt to the Saale.

For the next few days the Emperor was fully occupied in reorganizing the Army and issuing instructions for placing the towns along his main line of retreat in a state of defence. Bridge heads were ordered to be constructed at all important river passages, and all sick and wounded were sent back towards France.

On September 27 a decree was published calling up 120,000 men of the contingents of 1812-11-10 who had hitherto not been drawn as conscripts, and 160,000 men of the contingent of 1815 were ordered to be enrolled in advance.

In order to obtain more unity in the command of the troops destined to confront the Bohemian Army, the King of Naples (Murat) was ordered to take over the II, V and VIII Corps with the 5th Cavalry Corps, and one Division of the 1st Cavalry Corps, and to establish his Headquarters at Freiberg.

If this disposition is carefully studied it will be seen that it is in itself a masterpiece of defensive strategy, for each wing is strong enough to resist, for a couple of days, any force which could reasonably be brought against it, and in that time the strong central reserve could support it with overwhelming numbers.

Unfortunately, however, it suffered from one grave defect, which nullified all its many advantages, viz., *the whole army was starving, and the men no longer possessed the physical strength with which to meet their Emperor's demands.* Yet there is no sign that the idea of retreat had received serious consideration, for such precautionary orders as had been issued are quite insufficient to justify this interpretation.

In the meantime, the Silesian Army, released from the pressure hitherto exercised upon it by Macdonald's command, had been quick to take advantage of its freedom for action. Posting Sacken to watch Dresden in the vicinity of Grossenhain, Blücher had directed the whole of the remainder of his forces by Kamenz-Liebenschwerda towards Wittenberg, hoping by his presence to drag the Crown Prince of Sweden into activity.

As already pointed out above, the relations between the two commands had been none of the best, and neither Gneisenau nor Blücher had recognized the extreme danger of Bernadotte's position, hence they seem to have been quite unprepared for the cordial reception their proposals evoked from him. In the Silesian Army itself the idea of undertaking this dangerous flank march across Napoleon's front, and abandoning all their communications, evoked the liveliest anxiety. The Russian Commissary-General, Count Thuyt, protested solemnly, and demanded that the proposed plan should be submitted to a council of all the Generals in the command, but Blücher here showed the firmness of his character, and dismissed the suggestion with an absolute refusal to hold any council of war. The risk was extreme, and he knew it; but since the Bohemian Army could not make up its collective mind, and Bernadotte alone was powerless to move, he determined to assert his initiative, and to drag the whole three Armies into motion by the force of accomplished facts.

The march was so far beyond anything that Napoleon had ever anticipated from any one of his enemies, that he was completely deceived as to its object when the news reached him, which it did very promptly.

He at once interpreted it as a preliminary to an attack on Dresden from the north-west, between Meissen and Grossenhain, in order to avoid all the difficulties of manoeuvring presented by the forest land towards Bautzen, and whilst making dispositions to deal with this threat, he allowed Blücher to continue his march undisturbed, with the result that on October 2 the Silesian Army had concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Wartenburg, and had begun preparations to force the passage of the Elbe at that point.

The attention of the French had already been directed to this spot by an attempt at a crossing made by detachments of the North Army on September 20, and Bertrand had provided abundantly, as he thought, for its defence. But though an engineer, he had forgotten to consult the levels of the river, and had not realized that a fall of a couple of feet might render his position untenable.

The Prussians, though in their own country, seem to have been equally, or indeed more, ignorant of the nature of the ground. They had selected the point of passage from the best map available (a very bad one), and on paper it appeared to present all the most desirable conditions for a river crossing, viz., a great re-entrant bend towards their side (the north), bushes and trees to mask operations, and a convenient tributary (the Elster) in which to collect their material. But the surface within the re-entrant was completely hidden from view by dense undergrowth, and the existence of an old branch of the river, only fordable with difficulty at a couple of points, seems to have been quite unknown to them. It was on the existence of this old river-

bed that Bertrand relied; he had personally reconnoitred the ground in the spring, and believed it to be quite impassable. But he had not noticed that the river itself was at the moment considerably lower than usual.

The Prussians, after several hours of desperate fighting across it at close quarters, ultimately did find unsuspected passages, and pouring through them with both Cavalry and Artillery, by almost unequalled efforts (the result of a fighting spirit which would not be denied) they turned the French right, defeated all counter attacks by case fire and Cavalry charges, and before nightfall were complete masters of the enemy's position.

The troops, line and Landwehr, side by side, had been marching and fighting incessantly for six weeks, alternately in advance and in retreat, and their privations had been most serious. Yorck's Corps, to whom the credit of the whole day belongs, had shrunk, notwithstanding frequent reinforcements, from 38,484 to 12,000 in the morning of the battle, and of these 12,000, 1,600 were left on the field. But this loss does not fairly indicate the strain actually endured by those personally engaged at the decisive points of the fighting line, for in the densely wooded ground only the heads of the columns could be hotly engaged; but these seem to have been shot away again and again, and it was their absolute refusal to admit defeat that in the end turned the scale in their favour.

STRENGTH OF FRENCH ARMY—END OF SEPTEMBER, 1813

(a) In and around Dresden—

	Men.	Guns.
Imperial Guard	44,000	202
XI Corps. Macdonald	25,000	68
I Corps. Lobau	12,500	47
XIV Corps. St. Cyr	28,000	60
2nd Cavalry Corps. Sebastiani	6,800	12
	116,300	389

(b) Along the Elbe, Strehla to Meissen—

III Corps. Souham	15,000	61
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(c) On the Mulde, Eilenburg to Bitterfeld—

IV Corps. Bertrand	15,500	32
VII Corps. Reynier	22,000	48
Dombrowski's Cavalry Division	3,500	8
Detachment. 3rd Cavalry Corps	2,500	6
VI Corps. Marmont	22,500	82
1st Cavalry Corps. Latour Maubourg (less Borekheim's Division)	6,000	27
	71,700	203

(d) Between Altenberg and Freiberg—

II Corps. Victor	16,000	55
V Corps. Lauriston	14,200	53
VIII Corps. Poniatowski	6,900	30
4th Cavalry Corps	3,000	12
Borekheim's Division from 1st Cavalry Corps	1,000	4
	43,550	156

(e) In and around Leipzig—

	Men.	Guns.
Corps of Observation under General Margaron	5,700	16
Cavalry Division. Lorge	1,500	6
	7,200	22

(f) Between Weissenfels and Naumburg—

A mixed Cavalry Corps under Lefebvre-Desnouettes	5,000	8
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(g) On the march to Leipzig—

IX Corps. Augereau	9,200	64
Cavalry Division. Milhaud	3,500	—
	12,700	14

Grand total . . . 256,000 men, 784 guns.

LEIPZIG

WHILST the Silesian Army completed the passage of the Elbe at Wartenburg, Bernadotte with the North Army crossed some twenty miles lower down at Rosslau. The two Armies were thus within easy supporting distance of each other, and together constituted a fairly formidable fighting force of about 150,000 men. The Bohemian Army could still put 180,000 in the field, and Napoleon at Dresden lay midway between them with—including reinforcements—about 260,000. From a purely military standpoint, therefore, his situation had not been altered for the worse, since he no longer had three separate forces to contend against; and by continuing to play the game of "interior lines" he could still mass a numerical superiority against either of the Allied enemies, sufficient at least to ensure a victory under normal conditions; but absolutely overwhelming when

multiplied in fighting power by the magnetism of his personal presence and command.

The catastrophe of Leipzig, however, was so complete and dramatic, and its final causes were so obvious, that posterity has invariably treated the subject as if the end must have been as clearly evident to the actors n it then as it is to us now; and instead of seeing in the Emperor a great General playing his part, still with absolute confidence in his final triumph, it has insisted on regarding him as a hunted animal trying to evade the toils of its trappers, and it has magnified every little incident which has seemed to intensify the animal's sufferings.

Viewed from this standpoint, it is indeed easy to pick holes in Napoleon's strategy; for his blindness and his hesitation to seize the many chances of escape which the blunders of the Allies provided for him, become quite unaccountable. But when we picture the Emperor to ourselves as still supremely conscious of his own superiority over his opponents, one can only marvel at the fertility of resource, and the unswerving confidence in his Army and in its marching and fighting powers which he maintained under the most depressing surroundings.

From his point of view his position at Dresden had become intolerable only because he could not get at his enemies to smash them utterly.

The Bohemian Mountains formed no suitable setting for a great tactical decision, but once he could tempt the Bohemian Army out into the plains he knew them to be far too slow to evade the consequences of his determined onslaught. On receiving the news of the passage of the Elbe, on the night of October 4, he at once issued orders for the troops about Dresden to march next day towards Meissen, placing the XI, VI and III Corps, together with the 3rd Cavalry Corps, provisionally under Ney's command. He then prepared to follow himself at the head of the Guards, the XI Corps, and 2nd Cavalry Corps next morning (October 7).

His general idea is best expressed in the following letter to Marmont:—

"I shall be this evening with 80,000 men in Meissen; my advance guard at the cross roads from Leipzig and Torgau, and I shall decide upon which to choose according to the reports I receive. . . . I intend to move to Torgau and from thence down the right bank of the Elbe in order to cut the enemy off and seize all his bridges without the necessity of attacking his bridge heads. An advance down the left bank would have the inconvenience that the enemy might retreat across the river and thus avoid the battle. In that case one certainly might debouch by Wittenberg. But as the enemy still holds the initiative I shall only decide when I learn the situation to-night."

As regards the fate of Dresden, the Emperor hesitated for some time. On the afternoon of October 6, he sent for St. Cyr and instructed him to take command of the I and XIV Corps in order to defend it. About midnight, however, he sent for him again and told him he had changed his mind. "I shall fight a battle, without doubt," he said. "If I win I shall regret not having all my troops at hand. If I lose, then if I leave you here, you will have been of no use to me, and you will be hopelessly lost. After all, of what advantage is Dresden to me now? The place can no longer form the pivot of our operations, the district is too completely cleaned out to feed an Army. . . . Once the Elbe is frozen over it ceases to form an obstacle. I will choose another position; my right on Erfurt, centre along the Saale, the left on Magdeburg. It is a big, strong fortress which one can leave to itself as often as one chooses without fear that the enemy can carry it by a surprise assault." Then, after dwelling in detail on the difficulties of fortifying Dresden, he continued: "Dresden is too near the mountains; as soon as I make the smallest movement from this town against the enemy's Army, it steps back again under their cover, as it has only a short way to go, and I have no means of cutting it off, as I cannot get behind it."

The result of this conversation was drafted into the form of an order, and next morning St. Cyr set about

evacuating his advanced positions, not without severe fighting. Later in the day he received a counter-order from the Emperor, dated 10 a.m. (October 7), instructing him to remain in his position, as he had decided not to give up Dresden after all.

Probably no orders during the whole course of the campaign have evoked more criticism than the above. St. Cyr, in his *Memoirs*, has dealt with them at length, describing in detail the Emperor's manner on the several occasions, and it is indeed difficult to explain away the obvious vacillation they betray. But if one endeavours to focus the position from the Emperor's standpoint of certain victory, and remember the many plans seething in his mind as to his future conduct in that event, such as the occupation of Berlin, and the relief of the Oder garrisons; or a descent on the rear of the Bohemian Army should it venture forth into the Saxon plains, his motive becomes clearer. It is certain that the concentration of every available man, horse, and gun on the decisive point is a sound fundamental principle, but just as no engineer thinks of putting more metal into a bridge than is necessary to meet the maximum strain which experience shows can be brought to bear upon it, so a General, when obviously he has made sufficient provision for every emergency, is justified in employing the excess of his forces elsewhere. This is more especially the case since the actual striking power of an Army does not increase in direct proportion with its numbers, but may on the contrary lose by them, particularly where, as in this instance, the troops had to live on the district they traversed, and the roads were few and very indifferent.

As the Emperor only estimated the combined forces of the Silesian and Northern Armies at 100,000 men (a 20 per cent. under-estimate, as a matter of fact), he was surely justified in believing that with himself and 160,000 men he had made sufficient provision for all possible contingencies. Bernadotte, as we shall presently see, considered them more than ample.

Meanwhile, Blücher and Bernadotte after their passage across the Elbe, determined to march upon Leipzig, with a view to facilitating the exit of the Bohemian Army into the plains by diverting to themselves Napoleon's attention. In pursuance of this plan the Silesian Army was to reach the vicinity of Düben on October 8, and both Headquarters together were to enter Leipzig on the 9th. Following out these orders, Sacken reached Eilenburg, Langeron Düben, and Yorck Müllbach. But the main body of the North Army, for some unexplained reason, remained halted at Jessnitz; and alarmed by a rumour of the approach of a French Corps from the direction of Magdeburg, Bernadotte sent back a strong force to guard his bridges at Rosslau. The whole Army was thus distributed over a depth of some forty miles, needing two whole days to close on its front for action. Notwithstanding the fact that they were operating in a friendly country, and possessed a great superiority in Cavalry, their knowledge of the French position was most vague. It was not until late in the afternoon, when the news reached them that the Emperor had left Dresden taking the road to Leipzig, whither a very large force had preceded him, that the full danger of the situation dawned upon the Allies. October 8, 22 Infantry Divisions and 12 Cavalry Divisions, in all 150,000 men closely concentrated under the Emperor himself, who was actually drafting the orders for the battle which he confidently expected to fight near Düben next morning.

During the previous days the Headquarters of the two Armies had discussed, on paper and verbally, the measures to be adopted in every emergency; and in the particular one that had now arisen, Blücher was to fall back on Wartenburg, whilst Bernadotte attacked the advancing French in flank. A proceeding which would, in fact, have resulted in the complete destruction of both Generals, for the Emperor in his *battalion carrée* formation was safe from anything which the North Army might attempt against him. But Blücher's obstinacy saved him from this pitfall. He was absolutely determined not to retreat, and his Staff knew it was impossible to move him; so using this knowledge as a fulcrum, they managed to open a door for escape.

In any event, the closest co-operation with Bernadotte was indispensable. Fortunately, it was common knowledge that Bernadotte had been most averse to the movement on Leipzig, and had strongly advocated the occupation of a defensive position behind the Saale.

Accordingly, an officer of the General Staff, Major Rühle von Lilienstein, was sent to Bernadotte by the Silesian Headquarters to give him the latest intelligence, and to suggest a recurrence to his previous plan of a position on the Saale. The Staff officer arrived late at night, and found the Crown Prince of Sweden in bed, but he was nevertheless immediately received, and duly made his report. Bernadotte having heard it, expressed his opinion that under the circumstances all the rules of War indicated an immediate retreat across the Elbe of both Armies, in order to cover Berlin. Von Rühle replied that the Silesian Headquarters attached no particular importance to Berlin. "The Russians had burnt Moscow, and they could sacrifice their capital also," further, that he knew for certain that Blücher would never consent to retreat, but would prefer to withdraw behind the Saale and thence extend a hand to the Bohemian Army. Asked by the Prince what authority he could show in support of his position, he replied that he had none, except his intimate personal knowledge of the character of his Chief.

Bernadotte appeared much stricken with this assertion, and he then proposed himself that both Armies should revert to the original plan of the Saale position. It is suggested that in fact he believed Blücher would not dare to accept this responsibility. With this message then von Rühle returned to his Headquarters.

Needless to say Bernadotte, if he really entertained any such idea, was disappointed in the result. Blücher jumped at the offer, and forthwith the orders were drafted which enabled the Silesian Army to escape the blow which Napoleon had intended should fall upon it, by sacrificing all its communications and moving to its right, though not without some fighting and a series of most fortunate accidents.

Had the French Cavalry been at all equal to its duties, the direction of Blücher's march could hardly have escaped detection. But in fact the French Army lost touch of its adversary altogether, and Napoleon therefore had recourse to his favourite principle of marching against the most vital point in the enemy's possession, in order to compel him to turn round and fight in its defence.

In 1806 this had been the roads to Berlin, in 1813 it was again the roads to Berlin, but more particularly the bridges which the Allies had thrown over the Elbe; and throughout the 9th and 10th the French pursued this general direction; the Silesian Army continuing its movement to the Saale, and Bernadotte's marching to join them in a very half-hearted manner.

For October 11, the Emperor ordered Reynier (VII), Macdonald (XI), Bertrand (IV) and Sebastiani's Cavalry Corps to cross the river at Wittenberg, disperse the Prussian Corps of observation before that place, and move down the right bank of the river to capture and destroy all the bridges. This movement was to be supported by Souham's Corps (III) directed towards Dessau, and the Guards at Kemberg; all the Cavalry well to the front, and Marmont to remain behind in support at Düben, scouting towards Halle.

These orders, however, received very partial execution. The weather had again set in very wet, and the exhausted half-starved troops were quite incapable of reaching their assigned destinations, while the information they collected proved insufficient to establish with any certainty the whereabouts of their enemy's main body.

Napoleon therefore directed the movement to be continued on the following day, and for himself remained in Düben, impatiently awaiting further intelligence.

If we revert to the usual standpoint of criticism and imagine the Emperor as endeavouring to find a loophole of escape, his apparent hesitation at this point can easily be construed into anxiety and vacillation. The road for escape to Magdeburg down the right bank of the Elbe was absolutely open, and the enemy's parks, miles of which were seen by the advanced parties moving along the roads, guaranteed his subsistence, whilst

Murat was free to retire at any moment either by Torgau or Wittenberg. Why then should he hesitate, or show any anxiety? But if we conceive him as bent on securing a really decisive success, it is quite clear that the strain upon his patience must have been immense, and sufficient to justify a certain shortness of temper. For now the idea was growing within him that a far bigger game than the mere destruction of the Northern and Silesian Armies was opening out for him.

A glance at the map is sufficient to show that these two Armies lay absolutely at his mercy. Taubentzen's force at Dessau had been driven over the Elbe in such disorder, that, in fact, it never rallied until it reached Berlin, ninety miles away, and a concentric advance of all his available forces must have placed Blücher and Bernadotte, wherever they stood, in an impossible position. But meanwhile to the southward, the Bohemian Army had at length left the shelter of the mountains for the plains and with every hour were laying themselves more and more open to his attack.

Instead of following boldly in the footsteps of the Emperor's forces, and taking Torgau and Wurzen as their points of direction—in which case Napoleon might have found himself between two fires—they had moved to their left via Chemnitz and Altenberg, in order to avoid any risk of an offensive return on the part of the Emperor, and were nearing Naumburg on the Saale. Their right, on the night of the 12th, actually rested on Chemnitz, so that there was a great gap open to Napoleon's attack between that place and the mountains, and their direct communications with Bohemia were completely uncovered.

Murat had hitherto easily held his opponents in check, and if Napoleon now joined him with his whole Army, he could count upon bringing 200,000 men on to the battlefield, a force which, under the Emperor's command, were more than sufficient to ensure success.

Defeat of the Bohemian Army would almost certainly entail the break-up of the whole Alliance and a peace on terms of his own dictation. Under such conditions, the idea of safety for his own line of retreat must almost have seemed superfluous to Napoleon, yet since he still held Dresden, Meissen, Torgau and Wittenberg, with the resources of the Oder fortresses and Berlin behind him, his situation even in the event of defeat, could hardly have appeared desperate in his eyes, and one can easily understand both his impatience at the delay until all necessary information for the carrying out of his resolution was in his hands. At the same time the vein of optimism that runs through all his correspondence of the day is equally easy to understand.

The one doubt in his mind had been whether the Bohemian Army would give him battle, and when at length at 9.30 a.m. on October 12, a report from Murat arrived, stating that the Austrians were actually advancing towards Leipzig, and not towards Naumburg, as he had feared, his decision was instantly taken, and Berthier was instructed to prepare at once the necessary orders for a general counter-march of the whole French Army.

At 3.30 in the afternoon he wrote to Marmont a note which reveals his whole line of thought. "We have captured the enemy's bridges over the Elbe and it appears that Bernadotte's Army has retreated to the right bank. On the other side, the King of Naples is at Crobern in a position which I have ordered him to hold all the 13th. My intention is that whilst the King holds this position, you should march off at 3 a.m. to-morrow and take up a position on the Düben road with your left on Taucha. I am coming from Düben with the Old Guard to join you, and Curial's and Lefebvre's Divisions are coming from Eilenburg, so that to-morrow about noon, we can unite 70,000 men about Leipzig. My whole Army will be concentrated on the 14th, and I shall give battle to the enemy with 200,000 men."

Later in the day again, a doubt appears to have crossed his mind whether Murat could hold his position throughout the 13th? But the only difference this makes in his disposition is to induce him to select a point of concentration on the Mulde nearer to his hand, at which to halt his troops if the necessity should arise, but a battle at all costs he is determined upon.

In the meantime the Silesian Army had taken up its position about Halle on the

Saale, and the Northern Army lay some fifteen miles further down the stream between Wettin and Cönnern. The patrols of the Silesian Army had joined hands with those of the Bohemian Army and communication between the Headquarters was regularly established.

Deserters from the French Army, generally Saxons or Württembergers, kept Blücher well informed of the French movements between Düben and Leipzig, but Bernadotte appears only to have received alarmist rumours from his bridges on the Elbe.

All through October 12, he had shown signs in his correspondence with Blücher of growing anxiety, and when at length the news of Ney's attack on Dessau reached him, he completely lost his head and ordered his own troops to concentrate forward on Cöthen; that is to say, if the reports on which he acted were well founded, he meant to commit the act of happy despatch, and at the same moment he wrote to Blücher to implore him to accompany him in this voluntary suicide.

Blücher, however, looked at the situation with far greater coolness. If Bernadotte's information was correct, it was clear that it was too late to retreat, and the greater the number of troops which Napoleon had massed on the north, the fewer there must necessarily be about Leipzig with Murat. The obvious plan, therefore, was to join the Bohemian Army in crushing the latter's forces. His (Blücher's) communications could look after themselves, for after all he had eaten up everything the country could contribute in the north whilst the south had almost escaped the ravages of recent War; and his guns and muskets took the same ammunition as the Austrians, Bavarians and French. Leipzig must fall into the hands of the Allies and was well known to be well stocked with war material.

He therefore decided to continue his movement on Leipzig, and meanwhile set in motion every conceivable means of diplomatic pressure to induce the Crown Prince to renounce the idea of retreat and join him in his manoeuvre towards the Bohemian Army.

Whether the diplomatic pressure succeeded, or whether the greater fear of being left to face Napoleon single-handed prevailed, cannot now be decided, but in the night Bernadotte changed his mind and ordered his Army to follow and support Blücher. But the delay had left them so far behind that his troops arrived far too late to render assistance in the desperate combat of Möckern on the 16th.

As we have seen, on the night of October 12, the Bohemian Army lay with its right in Chemnitz and its left on Altenberg, but its advance, in spite of its extreme slowness (about six miles a day), had been so badly regulated, that portions of the troops were still far to the rear and a couple of days at least were needed to concentrate it for action.

For October 13, Schwarzenberg had instructed the leading units of his right wing to report to Wittgenstein in order to carry out a "forced" reconnaissance towards Leipzig. Owing to the usual delays in the circulation of orders, the troops did not reach their allotted positions of readiness till 4 p.m., when it was too late to carry out the proposed advance—a typical instance of the hopeless want of organization of the Staff service throughout the whole campaign, and the direct cause of the extraordinary slowness of all its operations. What prompted Schwarzenberg to this reconnaissance is not quite clear, for long before it could by any possibility have borne fruit, he issued orders for the whole Army to continue its movement to the left, towards Naumburg.

This order, however, evoked a storm of opposition, especially from the Prussians and Russians, and such pressure was brought to bear upon him that it was cancelled, and in its place fresh instructions were drawn up which pointed to an advance on Leipzig. And these rendered a battle inevitable.

As a preliminary Wittgenstein was directed to execute the postponed reconnaissance on the following morning (14th), and out of this developed the sharp action of Liebertwolkwitz, notable for Murat's great Cavalry charges in masses; squadrons following one another at six horses' length distance; with which the more mobile Cavalry of the Allies, in spite of want of unity in the command, found no difficulty in dealing.

Though the French Cavalry achieved nothing, their Infantry held their ground without difficulty, and thus Napoleon was led into taking up the position for the battle of the 16th, which, it has always seemed to me, was the primary cause of his failure, as the sequel will show.

Schwarzenberg's Orders were so far in favour of the Allies, that it became practically impossible for their Commander-in-Chief to avoid the battle, and the whole of the 15th was spent in reconnoitring the ground and preparing detailed orders for the attack. Relying on Langenau's local knowledge (as a Saxon officer he was reputed to be intimately acquainted with the ground) a first disposition was issued about noon, which had the extraordinary effect of breaking up the whole Allied Army into three commands; separated from one another by the unfordable streams of the Pleisse and Elster, which converge in the suburbs of Leipzig itself.

On the right a body of 72,000 men were to attack the position held by Murat resting its left on the Pleisse; in the centre 52,000 were to operate in the marshy and densely overgrown district between the Pleisse and the Elster, with the intention of turning Murat's left which lay in the village of Connewitz; and 19,000 under Gylai were to attack the defile of Lindenau through which ran the main road from Leipzig to the west.

The defects of this disposition were so glaringly apparent that nearly the whole Russian Staff, including Barclay de Tolly, Diebitch, Toll, and Jomini, approached Schwarzenberg to induce him to modify it. All their efforts, however, were in vain, and at length in despair they sought the Emperor Alexander and laid the matter before him; in no measured language it would seem, for Jomini went so far as to say that "one would imagine Napoleon must have dictated it in order to procure for himself the most decisive victory possible" (*Friedrichs*, vol. iii, 11).

The Emperor Alexander, "surprised beyond measure at this unanimity between his Generals" (*ibid*) requested Schwarzenberg's attendance, and endeavoured to induce him to modify his plan. Even this was in vain, until at length the Emperor ended the interview by announcing his determination to dispose of all the Russian troops as he chose, which of course rendered an alteration of the plan inevitable. The Russo-Prussian Guards were withdrawn from the central command to Rotha, nearly ten miles from the probable battlefield, so that the possibility at least existed of bringing up the right wing during the course of the battle to 96,000 men, were ignored. Russian Divisions and Prussian Brigades, even Regiments, were distributed about on no system at all; and though it was impossible for his command to be concentrated within itself before noon, he ordered the leading detachments to commence the attack at 7 a.m., which meant a break up of their bivouacs long before daylight. Yet it seems quite possible that this typical piece of bad Staff management was really the most important factor in the day's success, for it took the French by surprise at a time when the Emperor had not yet completed his arrangements for the battle; and though nowadays it is impossible to trace in full detail the exact sequence of cause and effect, the best relations of the battle seem to reveal from the outset a want of co-ordination in its direction, unusual where Napoleon was present in person.

From the Emperor's instructions to Berthier, given out in the early morning of the 16th, it is clear that he meant to hold the direct attack of the Bohemian Army with Murat's command, viz., the V, II, and VIII Corps, together with the 4th Cavalry Corps, on the line Connewitz-Liebertwolkwitz, whilst the IX and XI Corps with the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Cavalry Corps, pivoting on Liebertwolkwitz, swung in on the right of the Allies; and the Guards, VI and III Corps, and 3rd Cavalry Corps were to give the decision out of the centre, when "the battle was ripe." Altogether he had about 160,000 men, with 600 guns, against the 96,000 troops of the Allies, which as we have seen could only be engaged in succession, and not handled as a united whole.

But at the moment the attack began the XI Corps had not reached its position, and both the III and VI Corps found themselves held by the advance of the Prussians from the direction of Schlanditz, a possibility

for which the Emperor had not made sufficient allowance.

However, the first rush of the Allies was easily repulsed; but, quite at variance with their usual custom, the repulsed troops refused to run away, and holding on to such cover as the ground afforded, they formed rallying points on which their reinforcements actually hastening to the roar of the guns formed in succession as they arrived. The accounts of this read exactly like those of the early battles of 1870; each detachment independently forcing its way to the front, with the superior Commanders in rear exerting no further influence on the troops engaged, except through such fresh troops as they could find to throw into the combat.

At length, about 11 a.m., Macdonald's Corps (XI) reached its preliminary position, initiated its turning movement, and about 2 p.m., its attack having sufficiently developed, the Emperor ordered the whole line of Corps to advance; and Drouot with 84 guns galloped out to clear the way for Mortier and the Guards with ease shot. But at this moment the unforeseen arrived. General Bordesouille, with his Division of about 2,000 Cuirassiers in 18 Squadrons, suddenly decided to launch his whole force against a great Russian battery from whose fire the leading columns of the French Infantry were suffering severely. The attack was most gallantly ridden, and 26 guns had been put out of action, when from all sides the Cavalry of the Allies, by Brigades, Regiments, or even Squadrons, just as they came to hand, bore down upon the blown and disordered Squadrons of Bordesouille's command. Then in turn, to rescue their comrades, all the remaining available Squadrons on the French side rode down into the *mêlée* which speedily formed. The confusion which ensued has baffled all attempts at analysis; but, briefly, for about an hour and a half wild hordes of horsemen were hurled at one another, rallying and charging again and again and completely masking the fire of the guns on either side, and thus preventing their further advance. But when at last the turmoil ceased, the French opportunity was lost, the Russian and Prussian Guards had arrived on the scene, had occupied villages, woods and coppices, and against these fresh troops under cover, the French case fire could achieve nothing. Step by step the French fell back, and as darkness put an end to the fighting, they had been driven back to the limits of the position they had held in the morning.

The attack of the Austrians on the bridge at Connewitz had effected absolutely nothing, and thus it came to pass that at length Napoleon on a field of his own choice, with odds of nearly two to one in his favour, had been beaten by the sheer obstinate devotion to their cause of his individual enemies, and not at all by the skill of their leaders.

Thus failed one of the greatest, if not the greatest strategical conception in history; for had it succeeded Napoleon's success must have been final and irrevocable. Nothing the Silesian Army could have achieved on the other extremity of the battlefield could have altered the final result, and the Austrian centre columns between the Pleisse and Elster could not conceivably have extricated themselves from their hopeless predicament.

Still, the French Army, though it had failed, was not beaten, as the events of the next forty-eight hours were to prove.

The night which followed the battle of Leipzig was one of terrible suffering for both sides. The opposing forces lay so close to one another that the utmost vigilance was necessary, and the actual fighting lines practically stood watch and watch all through the hours of darkness. There was no shelter for the wounded, who had to be left where they fell, and, though it rained all night, water except from the puddles in which men and horses had bled to death was hardly obtainable. Fire-wood, too, was so scarce that the men had to break up and burn saddle-trees, broken muskets and gun wheels, and the night was most bitterly cold. Exact statistics of the losses on this day are unattainable, but probably about 35,000 killed and wounded cumbered the ground on which the fighting had taken place, i.e., a strip about four miles long by one wide, and around the villages (scenes of the fiercest fighting) the dead lay in swaths. Fortunately for those who had been wounded at first, no quarter was either asked or given, thus several thousands escaped

the most awful suffering, prolonged, in some cases, for more than a week before they could be moved or help be brought to them.

Napoleon had his tent pitched in the midst of his Guards' bivouac, and here he spent a wakeful night, while messenger after messenger brought him tidings containing nothing but evil.

Worst of all these was the news of the **Battle of Möckern** Marmont's defeat at Möckern—about four miles north east of Leipzig. Marmont, on the 14th, had been sent from Taucha by Napoleon with a general mission, to keep the Silesian Army at bay, whilst Ney's command filed into the town behind him. Ney to support him, if necessary, as it was of vital importance to ensure the arrival of all the ammunition trains. On the morning of the 16th, the V Corps had safely passed, the III Corps was in the act of passing, and the VII was due during the early hours of the afternoon. Napoleon had summoned both the VI and III Corps to the main battlefield, believing that distance alone would prevent the Silesian Army from reaching the scene of action in time to take effective part in it. Both Corps were actually moving in accordance with this order, when such heavy masses of the enemy appeared in sight that Marmont decided to halt and face them, while Ney promised him the assistance of the III Corps. Marmont deployed his men across a low elevation of the ground, his left resting on Möckern and his right on Klein Widdertitzsch. Here he was assailed by Yorck's Corps and part of Sacken's, whilst Langeron's followed in echelon on their left rear.

The combat which ensued was most obstinate and sanguinary. Möckern was taken and retaken over and over again, and time after time the Prussians threw themselves upon the French lines. At length came the psychological moment. Marmont was moving his last reserves into the line, when out of a cloud of powder smoke a great mass of Prussian Cavalry suddenly charged down upon their flank. Panic ensued and spread along the position, which, attacked again by the Prussian Infantry, was carried all along the line.

Marmont left some 6,000 to 7,000 men on the ground, and Yorck's Infantry was reduced from 16,120 according to the morning states of the 16th, to 9,000 at nightfall. Langeron lost 1,500 men; Sacken's troops only reached the field at the last moment, and suffered less than did the others. It was in this combat in particular that the Prussian Landwehr won its enduring fame. Hitherto they had given the old officers, accustomed to the faultless march discipline which the regular troops had inherited from the old Frederickian Army, reason to complain bitterly of their conduct, and this unsteadiness seems to have inspired mistrust of their fighting spirit. Hence they had rarely been given a chance of showing what they could do when occasion demanded a supreme effort. On this day, however, they exceeded all possible expectations; and the example they afforded is at present being freely cited by German Socialists as an argument for still further reduction in the time of service in the existing Army, and is being so bitterly resented by the Regular Army, that even Major Friedrichs is hardly fair to them in consequence.

Marmont's defeat certainly aggravated the dangers of Napoleon's situation, and possibly had he been aware that a fresh Corps of Russians under Benningsen, 30,000 strong, was in full march upon the Dresden-Leipzig road to close the gap between the Parthe and the right wing of the Allies, he might even then have reconsidered his position and determined to break back to the northward on Wittenberg and Dessau, by the same roads by which he and Ney had just arrived.

If Blücher and Bernadotte endeavoured to interpose, his combined force could practically march out over their bodies, for with nearly two to one odds in his favour, victory must still have seemed almost a foregone conclusion. Moreover, there was always the very strong probability that Blücher and Bernadotte would never venture on such a bold stroke, but would manoeuvre to their right to join Gylai in front of Lindenau. Napoleon naturally believed this General to be still in the position he had occupied during the day, he could not know that Gylai had been ordered to move across to his right to join the Main Army, leaving the great road to the Rhine practically open for the French

retreat. As far as the Emperor's knowledge extended, there was still ample time to crush the Bohemian Army first of all, and his line of retreat could not be seriously compromised for another forty-eight hours at least. It was probably this line of reasoning which led Napoleon to decide to renew the battle on the 18th. Meanwhile, probably to create divided counsel at the Allied Headquarters, he endeavoured to reopen diplomatic relations by a proposal to treat for peace, with the view of putting a stop to further useless effusion of blood, for nobody could be more humane than Napoleon when it suited his purpose.

The Allies, however, were in no humour to treat, and with full knowledge of the near approach of Benningsen, they closed their whole Army in on its right (thereby uncovering the road to the Rhine, as already mentioned), and arranged with the Commanders of the North and Silesian Armies that these two forces should march off by their left, cross the Parthe, some five miles above Leipzig, and join hands with Benningsen, when the semicircle around the French would be completed, its outer flanks resting on the Elster and Parthe respectively, both being susceptible of easy defence.

During the day, Blücher also attacked the north-west suburb of Leipzig (through which run the roads to Halle and Düben) in order to conceal still further his ultimate intentions.

Napoleon, on his part, formed up his Army in a semicircle, his left still on the Pleisse about Connewitz, his centre at Probst Heyda, and his left thrown back towards the Parthe, whose marshy banks appeared impracticable for troops attacking from the north. Very strong outposts still held the ridge on which the fighting of the previous day had taken place, thus the dispositions of the French Army were entirely concealed, and the main position had this further advantage, that the Allies in advancing to the attack had, of necessity, to disclose their masses to sight, and found no sheltering woods or copses to conceal them as on the 16th.

Ney held the command of the whole of the right wing, Murat of the left; Napoleon himself with his Guards and Cavalry covered the junction at the centre, and could move unimpededly to either flank as occasion required. Only Bertrand (IV Corps) and the garrison of Leipzig were absent from the battlefield, the former remaining to cover the exit of the defile of Lindenau.

The exact strength of the French Army cannot now be ascertained. Probably 160,000 men with about 650 guns stood in the ranks on the morning of the 18th, and against this force the Allied Sovereigns disposed of no fewer than 295,000 men with 1,500 guns, of which some 100,000 never came into action at all.

It is impossible nowadays to trace in detail the vicissitudes of the struggle which followed. The French left and centre held their ground until the evening, and the decision was given by the junction of the Silesian and Northern Armies with Benningsen's column, which took place about 2 p.m.

But Napoleon had already realized that further resistance was useless; his first orders initiating a retreat by Lindenau had gone out at 11 a.m., and now fighting was only continued to gain space for withdrawal.

He himself spent the night on the battlefield, snatching a few minutes' sleep sitting upright on a peasant's chair by the bivouac fire, surrounded by his Staff. About 5 a.m. a chance round shot struck the embers of the fire, scattering the crowd. The Emperor woke up, and continued at once dictating the necessary orders.

About 10 a.m. he rode through the town, and took the road to the Rhine, moving through all the turmoil with the same stern set face which his men had learnt to know in the Russian retreat just a year before.

Eventually the Allies carried Leipzig by storm, and owing to the premature destruction of the bridges a large number of French prisoners fell into their hands; but of a pursuit in the real sense of the word there was no indication, and in a few days the Emperor again had in his hands a total force exceeding 80,000 combatants, with which he completely routed the attempt made by a combined force of Austrians and Bavarians (about 50,000 strong, under Wrede) to intercept his retreat at Hanau.

Here we must leave him, whilst we try briefly

to formulate the lesson of this most extraordinary, and *strategically most successful* of his campaigns, for strategically his concentration at Leipzig will ever remain his masterpiece. In his early campaigns he was handling little more than an Army Corps; in 1814 again his actual effectives mustered little more, and in both he was leading troops animated almost with fanaticism. But in this great struggle in the heart of an enemy's country, miles away from his ultimate base, he controlled Armies, he imparted to them his own spirit, and managed even to make good the mistakes of his Generals. But the fighting which centred around Dresden marked the limit of his powers, and it is interesting to note the essential reason why it was so. If we compare the conditions with which he had to contend from the Armistice to the end of September, we find the same enemies, the same masses of men, and the same subordinate Commanders, only whereas the enemy had become bolder, Napoleon's men and officers had grown more and more war weary, the latter indeed were often despondent, yet whereas in the earlier part of the campaign his conduct is marked by painful indecision (never due, by the way, to ignorance of his enemies' positions, but to inability to control their intentions) in the latter, once he had definitely decided to hold on to Dresden, we find him acting always with the fixed determination to inflict upon his opponents the maximum amount of punishment possible. As I have pointed out above, critics hitherto, judging him by the final result, have insisted on regarding him as a hunted animal seeking a loophole of escape, whereas in fact his anxiety for the future, in so far as any genuine feeling of the kind can be proved to exist (see Friedrichs' comments on Yorck von Wartenberg's account of events at Düben) *was always as to the magnitude of the result to be achieved, and not its achievement, that, he believed to be beyond question secured to his side.* The only one essential difference between these two phases of the war lies in the fact that about Dresden, force of circumstances compelled him to adopt the defensive, whereas in the end he was free to act as assailant, and the measure of the advantage which the latter form enjoys over the former can be measured by the startling resuscitation of all his powers, once Blücher's march to join Bernadotte enabled him to change his rôle from defender to that of aggressor.

It is clear that throughout the Dresden episode, from the moment indeed that his memory failed him in the middle of his letter to Vandamme on August 23, he was no longer able to control events, and the evidence available for every day shows the gradual breakdown of his powers. The most elastic mind in the world, however, can scarcely throw off the effects of such severe overstrain in forty-eight hours; and his men and officers could hardly thus easily shake off the depressing influences of hunger, useless exertion, and impending retreat. Yet once he was at liberty to act as he chose, and to dictate situations, he mastered the whole situation easily, and if, as alleged, he appeared worried and impatient for news when at Düben, well! any man who has ever been compelled to face great odds and to play for really high stakes can understand his frame of mind.


A further point brought out by this campaign is the purely *relative* value attaching to communications. Theoretically Napoleon's line was severed again and again by organized raids made in considerable force, but he never for one moment allowed these interruptions to hinder his designs. Both Blücher's and Bernadotte's communications lay open for nearly a month, and those of the Bohemian Army for about a fortnight, yet the Emperor simply disdained to strike at either, preferring to direct his blows at the Field Armies themselves. The curious thing to note is, *that no decision became possible until practically all parties had renounced the usual rules of the game*, and then at last it fell to the side which, according to all precedent, had placed itself in the most unfavourable position conceivable.

This appendix is a reprint of the original edition of 1908, published under the title "The Leipzig Campaign," by F.N. Maude (here slightly abridged). Even though the text occasionally departs from history to fuel the war hysteria which ultimately led to the First World War, it is the most concise treatment of the campaign in English. Any problems with legibility are the result of the state of the badly decomposed seventy-three year-old edition reproduced; which was never re-issued and is nowhere else available.



FRENCH ORGANIZATION DISPLAYS

(A)



Note that Leader Displays are grouped on this sheet according to their operational grouping according to history. This grouping is meant only to help Players orient themselves in the Set-up procedure, and is not meant to restrict their actual grouping once play has begun. Dashed lines in black indicate historical grouping in the spring; Red lines show same for the autumn.



Inf Maj Gen A 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10


6	7	8	9	10
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Armee de l'Elbe*
Prince Eugene 2-5-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
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AUTUMN: MURAT



II Corps
Marshal Victor 2-6-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
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I Cav—Lt Gen Latour-Maubourg 5-2-1

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6	7	8	9	10


Cav Maj Gen U 4-1-1

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(U)

AUTUMN: "BERLIN ARMY"

(E)



Inf Maj Gen E 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
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VII Corps
General Reynier 4★6-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
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II Cav—Lt Gen Sebastiani 5-3-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

(XI Corps)
Marshal Macdonald (ex St. Cyr) 4★6-3


1	2	3	4	5
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6	7	8	9	10
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V Corps
General Lauriston 2-5-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
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SPRING: ARMEE DE L'ELBE

THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS

How to Use:


The number in the spaces of the track indicate the strength of units set up therein. To determine in which space to place a unit, refer first to the letter code corresponding to the scenario being played: S/pring, D/resden, L/eipzig. Then find the number or abbreviation of the unit in question where it follows the ap-

propriate Scenario code letter, and place the unit in that space. Units whose ID does not appear on the track of their corps leader are most likely found with a higher commander or other leader in their same grouping.

Leaders:

Each Leader is given a rating which consists of three numbers: first is his Initiative Rating, second his Command Span, and third his Subordination Rating.

SPRING: ARMEE DU MEIN




Armee du Mein
Emperor Napoleon I 4★10-4

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----

(B)

AUTUMN: GUARD



VI Corps
Marshal Marmont 3-6-3

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10


6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----



I Corps
Gen Vandamme (then Mouton) 2★4-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----



Old Gde
Marshal Soult (then Drouot) 4-6-3

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----

Gde Cav
Marshal Bessieres (then Nansouty) 5-2-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Cav Maj Gen Z 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

(Z)

(C)

Inf Maj Gen C 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----

Static and Garrison Divs (S.D.L.)

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----

Cav Maj Gen Y 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Cav Maj Gen X 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

(Y)


(X)



IV Corps
Gen Bertrand 3★6-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----



XII Corps
Marshal Oudinot 2-6-3

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----

III Cav—Lt Gen Arrighi 5-2-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Cav Maj Gen W 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

(W)

(G)

Inf Maj Gen G 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----

(H)

Inf Maj Gen H 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----



(III Corps)
Marshal Ney 3-6-3

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----



XIV Corps
Marshal St. Cyr 4-6-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----



(II) Young Gde
Marshal Mortier 3★6-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----



Cavalry Res
Marshal Murat 4-6-3

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----

V Cav—Lt Gen L'Heritier 4-2-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

IV Cav—Lt Gen Kellerman 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

VIII Corps—General Poniatowski 4-3-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Ad Hoc
Lt Gen Girard 3-3-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----

Inf Maj Gen F 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10


6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----

Inf Maj Gen K 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

(F)


(K)



XI Corps
Lt Gen Gerard 3-4-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----



III Corps
Lt Gen Souham 2-6-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----

Inf Maj Gen L 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

(L)

IX (or XV) Corps—Marshal Augereau 2-3-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Inf Maj Gen I 0-1½-2


1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Inf Maj Gen J 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

(I)

(J)



I Young Gde
Marshal Oudinot 2-6-3

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	----

Cav Maj Gen T 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

(T)

AUTUMN CAMPAIGN ONLY

THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS



The Leaders on this display are grouped by three distinct types of line: the heavy brown dashed line is the upper boundary of Leaders used only in the Autumn Scenarios (Dresden and Leipzig). Thus the bottom of the display can be folded under and out of the way when playing the Spring Scenario. The solid red line groups distinct commands as actually formed historically; dashed red lines show sub-groups of the army of Bohemia.

How to Use:
The actual, combat units—the square

playing pieces—are all set-up and remain always on this display. To help in sorting, the Corps Designation of each unit is printed on the counter; this corresponds to the Corps listed above most Leader names, and in most cases the units carrying a Leader's Corps number will be set-up on his adjacent track. (Units not found immediately should be set aside.)

The number in the spaces of the track indicate the strength of units set up therein. To determine in which space to place a unit, refer first to the letter code corresponding to the scenario being played: S/spring, D/dresden, L/eipzig. Then find the

ALLIED ORGANIZATION DISPLAY

number or abbreviation of the unit in question where it follows the appropriate Scenario code letter, and place the unit in that space. Units whose ID does not appear on the track of their corps leader are most likely found with a higher commander or other leader in their same grouping.

AUTUMN: ARMY OF BOHEMIA

General Wittgenstein 2-5-3

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

I Inf Corps
Lt Gen Gortschakow (ex-Berg) 1-3-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

I Corps*
General Bluecher 4-8-3

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

II Corps
Lt Gen Kleist 2-5-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

II Inf Corps
Lt Gen Eugen 2-2-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

GUARD & RESERVE

Guard & Reserve
Lt Gen Konstantin (ex-Tormasof) 2-4-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Reserve Inf
General Miloradowitch 2-4-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

III Gren Corps
Lt Gen Rajewski (ex-Kenevitin) 1-2-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

V Gde Corps
Lt Gen Yermolow (ex-Lawrof) 1-3-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

II Cuir Corps
Prince Galitzin V 4-4-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Army of Bohemia
Prince Schwarzenberg 2-6-4

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

I Corps
General Colloredo 1-3-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

II Corps (then III Corps)
General Gyulai 1-3-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

II Corps
General Meerveldt 1-2-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

IV Corps
General Klenau 1-4-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Reserve Corps
Prince Hesse Homburg 2-6-3

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Inf Maj Gen A 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Cav Maj Gen Z 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Prince Barclay de Tolly 3-6-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

IV Cav Corps
Lt Gen Pahlen III 4-3-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

"Army of Poland"
General Bennigsen 2-4-4

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Inf Corps
General Dochturow 1-6-3

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Militia Corps
General Ostermann-Tolstoi 1-3-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Inf Maj Gen B 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Inf Maj Gen C 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Cav Maj Gen Y 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

AUTUMN: ARMY OF THE NORTH

Inf Maj Gen K 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Besieging Units

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Inf Maj Gen N 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Lt Gen Winzingerode 2-4-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

III Corps
Lt Gen Buelow 2-5-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

XIV Corps
Lt Gen Woronzow 1-4-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

AUTUMN: ARMY OF SILESIA

Inf Maj Gen L 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Cav Maj Gen T 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Cav Maj Gen U 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

III Cav Corps*
Prince Treubetzko 4-3-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

I Cav Corps
Lt Gen Korff 4-3-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

II Corps (then I Corps)
Lt Gen Yorck 2-5-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Army of the North
Prince Bernadotte 1-4-4

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Swedish Corps
Marshal Stedingk 1-5-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

IV Corps
Lt Gen Taubert 2-4-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Inf Maj Gen D 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Inf Maj Gen E 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Cav Maj Gen W 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Inf Maj Gen F 0-1½-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

Cav Maj Gen V 4-1-1

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Army of Silesia
General Bluecher 4-8-3

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

General Langeron 2-5-4

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

IX Inf Corps
Lt Gen Olsufiew 1-2-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

VII Inf Corps
Lt Gen St Priest 2-4-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

VI Inf Corps
Lt Gen Scherbatow 1-2-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

III Cav Corps
Lt Gen Wasiltschikow 4-3-1

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

X Inf Corps
Lt Gen Kapzewitsch 1-3-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

XI Inf Corps
Lt Gen Osten-Sacken 3-6-2

1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10

STRUGGLE OF NATIONS
TURN RECORD/
REINFORCEMENT
TRACK

25-26	Fr. Reinf. from Erfurt	APRIL Begin Scenario S. Soult (Bessieres). Napoleon (Marmont). Ru: li, lc.
27-28	Fr. Reinf. near Saalfeld	Bertrand
29-30	Fr. Reinf. near Saalfeld	MG G.
1-2	Fr. Reinf. near Saalfeld	MAY Oudinot MG A. (from Bayreuth) (Luetzen)
3-4		Ru: 3i, 2c Fr: 2i
5-6	Fr. Reinf. from Hamburg	Sebastiani (*Colditz)
7-8	Fr. Reinf. from Erfurt	MG B, Bridge Tr.
9-10	Fr. Reinf. appears at Magdeburg	MG C.
11-12		Ru: 4i, 2c Fr: 1i, 4c
13-14	Fr. Reinf. from Hamburg	Vandamme
15-16		
17-18		

19-20	Ru: 3i, 1c Fr: 4i, 2Gc
21-22	(Bautzen)
23-24	
25-26	
27-28	Ru: 1i
29-30	
31-June 1	
2-3	JUNE (Armistice)
4-5	Add "2" to Armistice die roll
6-7	
8-9	

HOW TO USE THE TURN RECORD/
REINFORCEMENT TRACK
The Game-Turn marker is placed in the space for the first turn of the scenario. Any leaders listed next to this space are brought on to the game map in the location shown in the Game-Turn space itself, which also lists the nationality of its reinforcements.
The Game-Turn marker is advanced at the end of each turn, and the process of entering reinforcement leaders is repeated. Units organic

15-16	AUGUST Begin Scenario D Ldw: 3i
17-18	
19-20	Schwarzenberg (Colloredo, Gyulai, Hesse-Homburg). Klenau (from Carlsbad).
21-22	(*Bunzlau)
23-24	Fr. Reinf. appears at Dresden Murat (Grossbeeren) Ldw: 3i Fr: 7i, 1c
25-26	Bernadotte (Stedingk) (Katzbach)
27-28	(Dresden)
29-30	(Kulm)
31-Sept 1	
2-3	SEPTEMBER MG V Ru. Reinf. from Carlsbad

to these reinforcement leaders should be left off of the Organization Display until their appearance, to avoid confusion.
Also shown are replacement points, abbreviations as explained. During the armistice, both sides receive a large number of reinforcements. These and the existing forces in play may be rearranged in any fashion and placed wherever in occupied territory* the Player wishes.

4-5	
6-7	(Dennewitz)
8-9	Ru: 2i, 1c Au: 2i, 1c Fr: 2i, 1c. Ldw: 3i Fr: 10G, 3i (*Gross-Seydlitz)
10-11	
12-13	MG I Fr. Reinf. from Wesel
14-15	Bennigsen (Dochturow, Ostermann-Tolstoy). (Gieshubel)
16-17	Ru: 2i, 1c Au: 1i, 1c Ldw: 2i, 1c Fr: 2i, 1c Weather Table: Change Column
18-19	
20-21	French depots 1 & 4, Dresden Supply Source Deactivate
22-23	
24-25	Augereau MGJ (from Erfurt). Ru: 2i, 1c. Ldw: 2i. Fr: 3i, 1c

*Occupied Territory: at the commencement of the armistice, the forward position of forces of both sides is determined, and undisputed territory is divided in such a way that the farthest forward "occupied" territory" is in fact occupied by a friendly force. The concept of "forward is left to the players to define.
Players may negotiate rationalizations of the line.

26-27	SEPTEMBER Begin Scenario L Wittgenstein (Eugen, Gortschakow). Kleist
28-29	Konstantin (Miloradovitch, Rajewski, Yermalow).
30-1 Oct	Gyulai
2-3	OCTOBER Ru: 2i, 1c Au: 2i Ldw: 2i, 1c Fr: 3i (*Wartenburg)
4-5	Schwarzenberg (H. Homburg, Galitzin V).
6-7	
8-9	Bavarian units withdraw
10-11	Au: 2i, 1c Ldw: 2i Fr: 3c
12-13	(*2nd Colditz)

TURN RECORD/REINFORCEMENTS KEY
Abbreviations:
Ru/ssian, Au/strian, Pr/ussian, Ldw = Landwehr, Gde = Guard, Fr/ench†, i/nfantry, c/avalry. Sw/edish.
= Game-Week Interphase
Guards Replacements:
(French Old Guard i, Russian Guard i.) Only Repl. Points so designated may be allotted these units.
† French Replacements:
can be allotted to any French Army units (except OG i); this does not change unit nationality.

Arrival:
Replacements arrive only during the Game-Week Interphase. Reinforcements arrive generally on road map-edge hexes (ie. "near Saalfeld" refers to the road map-edge hex nearest Saalfeld). All reinforcements on a given turn arrive in the same place unless a different location is shown in parenthesis after a name.

14-15	(Liebertwolkwitz)
16-17	(Wachau-Moeckern)
18-19	(Leipzig)
20-21	
22-23	(French exit map)
24-25	
26-27	
28-29	
30-31	

Landwehr:
Prussian irregular levies are noted by the code Ldw. These are Prussian replacements and in all ways behave as such.
Scenario Reinforcements (Scen. Reinf.):
These reinforcements which are used in Scenario L only, represent units already in the Campaign game, which had exited the map previous to the start of Scenario L.
Historical Notes (in *italic*—"*" = "actions"): Historical occurrences of battles are indicated in *italic*; these notes have no effect on play.

Struggle of Nations Charts & Tables

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WEATHER TABLE

Spring	Aug-Sept	16 Sept & Aft.
1 Rain	1 Rain & Mud	1 Rain & Mud
2 Fair	2 Fair	2 Rain & Mud
3 Fair	3 Fair	3 Mud
4 Fair	4 Fair	4 Fair
5 Fair	5 Heat	5 Fair
6 Fair	6 Fair	6 Fair

NOTE:

During Rain, Mud effects also apply. Mud and Heat affect the severity of March Attrition.

BRIDGE DESTRUCTION AND REPAIR TABLE

Type Bridge:	Primary	Secondary
Nationality		
French	5	6
Austrian	die roll	4
Russian	needed	3
Prussian	to affect:	2
Swedish	4	4

ADMINISTRATIVE POINT POOL

Army Distance in Primary Road Hexes

French Army	80	60	40	20
Silesian Army: Autumn	80	60	40	20
Armistice/Spring	80	60	40	20
Bohemian Army	80	60	40	20
North Army	60	40	20	

Die Roll: Administrative Points Received

1	1	2	2	4	5	5
2	1	1	2	3	4	5
3	0	1	1	2	3	4
4	0	0	1	1	2	3
5	0	0	0	0	1	2
6	0	0	0	0	0	0

Index 0 0 0 ¼ 1½ 2½

Explanation: Cross-reference the distance between the Center of Operations and the Supply Source with the appropriate army (the distance must be less than or equal to the number shown—if beyond the highest distance shown, LOC is considered broken). Then cross-reference the die roll result on that column to get the number of Admin Points received.

Morale Effect: Add or subtract the current Morale Rating to the die roll before cross-referencing; may not exceed 6 or 1.

Campaign Game Only: Use "index" to determine APs received during Armistice; determine nr. of Game-Turns there would have been from beginning of Armistice to 15 Aug. (exclusive), multiply by the index shown for current length of LOC; ignore morale; no bonuses; round fractions down. Do not count turns of Center of Opns inactivation due to movement during armistice. Bohemian Army begins to receive APs only on 19th July. (Ex: Jun 2-3—Aug 13-14 = 37 turns.)

Administrative Point Pool Commentary:

It should be pointed out that the number of APs received by an army represent the excess Administrative Capacity remaining after all maintenance functions, such as supplying food and equipment, have been performed, and thus is not an absolute measure of the Administrative Capacity of an army per se. Thus although, for instance, the French Admin Apparatus was vastly more extensive than the Prussian, its maintenance responsibilities were equally greater; thus the excess staff and material available for conversion to APs in the two armies is comparable.

COMMUNICATIONS TABLE

DISPATCH DISTANCE

Basic, for all armies: 22 Movement Points
Bonus, for segments in friendly territory: + 6 Movement Points
Penalty, for segments in hostile terr (French only): - 6 Movement Points

1. Friendly Territory for this purpose includes everything west of the Elbe (except Bohemia) for the French; Brandenburg, Silesia, and Bohemia for the Allies (regardless of Allied nationality). Saxon, Westphalian, and Anhalt-Dessau territory east of the Elbe is friendly to neither side. Territory friendly to the Allies is hostile to the French, but not vice versa; no territory is hostile to the Allies.
2. The 6 Bonus MPs must all be used inside friendly territory.
3. Dispatch Distance is the maximum distance between the Center of Opns (or Depot) and a given force, traced from the former to the latter.
4. The Penalty reduces the maximum Dispatch Distance, even if the segment in hostile territory is shorter, by the full 6 MPs.

SUPPLY SOURCES

French Army various, see Depot Capacity Table
Silesian Army any 1° road on mapedge in Silesia
Bohemian Army any 1° road on mapedge in Bohemia
North Army any 1° road on mapedge in Brandenburg

FRENCH DEPOTS

Class Nr. (names)

Spring Before 20 After Sept

1 (Hof)	A	A	•
2 (*Wesel, *Erfurt, Magdeburg)	A	A	A
3 (Wittenburg, Leipzig, Torgau, Dresden)	•	A	A
4 (Bautzen, Bunzlau, Goerlitz, Glogau, †Dresden)	•	A	•

NOTES:

* = Also a Supply Source. † = Supply source in separate class (no need to trace LOC beyond Dresden). Presence of Cent/Opns and Depot (and/or Supply Source) in same hex does not affect function of either.

Dresden's ability to function as a Supply Source is in category 4—it may be the Supply Source during the autumn before 20 Sept, in addition to being a Category 3 Depot. The French Player may elect to change his Supply Source back to Erfurt or Wesel before 20 Sept. In any case, Dresden is still considered a Class 3 Depot after it ceases to be a Supply Source.

Campaign Game Note:

A French Depot is considered in-active for the remainder of the game if it was in enemy occupied territory during the armistice.

KEY: A = Active. • = Inactive.

Note that to be "active," the depot must also be in dispatch distance of the Center of Opns (not of the Supply Source). "Before 20 Sept" means the period between 14 August and 20 Sept exclusive.

ARMISTICE TABLE

KEY: Nr. = die roll needed to produce Armistice. (Higher number means play continues.) Do not roll when comparative morale yields zero.

Modifier: On and after June 2-3, add "two" to the number shown on the chart.

Procedure: During the Game Week Interphase (only), compare the Allied and French morale, and roll the die. If the result is less than or equal to the number shown for that morale combination, Armistice occurs immediately.

Allied Morale

	+ 1	•	- 1	- 2
French Morale				
+ 2	4	1	0	0
+ 1	5	5	1	0
•	4	4	0	0
- 1	3	2	0	0

Armistice Effect on Morale:

Reset Morale Marker at start positions.

When to use Armistice Table:

Use between May 19 & June 9.

ATTRITION QUOTIENT MATRIX

APs Accumulated

Army

(.256)	(.128)	(.084)	(.042)	(.021)	(.000)	(—)	(Index)
27 +	14-26	9-13	4-8	2-3	0-1	1-2	Silesian, North
59 +	29-58	19-28	9-18	5-8	0-4	1-4	Bohemian, Fr./Spr.
42 +	27-41	14-26	7-13	0-6	1-6		French/Autumn

MPs expended during ... Forced March:

Strength of Force in SP's	... March:	0-1	2-3	4-5	6-9†
1-7	1-4	1-2			
8-10	5-7	3-4	1-2		
11-15	8-10	5-7	3-4	1-2	
16-20	11-15	8-10	5-7	3-4	1-2
21-30	16-20	11-15	8-10	5-7	3-4
31-40	21-30	16-20	11-15	8-10	5-7
41-60	31-40	21-30	16-20	11-15	8-10
61-68	41-60	31-40	21-30	16-20	11-15
	61-68	41-60	31-40	21-30	16-20
		61-68	41-60	31-40	21-30
			61-68	41-60	31-40
				61-68	41-60

KEY: Attrition Quotient predicts your average unmodified Attrition. * = not allowed. † = requires expenditure of a further Movement Command (except for all-Cavalry forces). "Silesian Army" is used by all Allied forces in Spring.

NOTE: The percentage of strength a force will lose goes up as the total strength of the force increases!

(—) Numbers under this index represent negative APs; indicate by flipping over "x1" marker. You may not exceed negative nr. shown.

Commentary:

Index number is for your information only. The number of men in a given army at the beginning of the scenario was multiplied by this decimal number to yield the amount of APs that army would have to accumulate to use that column. Example: the starting strength of the North and Silesian armies (both approximately 107,000) multiplied by .042 yields approximately 4 APs needed for that column.

The rationale is that the accumulated APs are those left over after all necessary maintenance has been accomplished, and that absolute number of accumulated APs is "spread out" over all the troops in an army. Thus, the smaller the army, the fewer the APs it would require. There is no favorable change for armies of shrinking size, since most of their attrition would go to hospitals, and thus would remain an administrative burden.

MARCH ATTRITION TABLE

Die Roll

Mud/Heat:	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Fair:	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
0	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
1/8	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
3/8	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
1	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
1½	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
3	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
5	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
8	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
12	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•

KEY: nr. = Strength Points lost by force. • = no loss. Reduce die roll by one for Bonus Point of the Leader of the force.

SUMMARY OF MODIFIERS, FACTS & FIGURES

(Arranged alphabetically by subject)

Admin Point Costs

To create a Movement Command: 1 AP
To create a Provisional Movement Command (reduces Initiative die roll by "2"): 1 AP
To allow an extended March (regular Movement Command only): 1 addtl AP

Army Morale Number is added to:

- Initiative die roll
- Pursuit die roll
- Admin Point Receipt die roll

Changes in Army Morale

(move marker one space for each event)

- Fall of Berlin (Allied only)
- Fall of Dresden (French only)
- Commander with Span of 6+ in Pitched Battle

Leader with Bonus Point

May add or subtract one from:

- Attrition die roll
- Combat die roll

Bridge Destruction Modifier

Enemy unit at other end: +1 to die

Return from Cantonment

Units must remain off map for 4 turns minimum.

Center of Opns

Return after disbanding (at Supply Source): 7 turns

In Enemy ZOC, must "fly": 5 MPs

Citadel Attrition

Units besieged inside suffer attrition normally:

If less than 6 SPs, always use Army AP level
If greater, use "zero" (or Army AP level if worse)

Maximum Force Size: 68,000

Weather Effect on Initiative

Rain and Heat (only): Reduces Initiative by "one"
(only of Active Leader when exiting enemy ZOC).

Cavalry Leader with Infantry in Force

Add to Initiative die roll: +2

Movement Allowances

Center of Opns: 5 MPs Infantry: 5 MPs
Heavy and unspecified cavalry: 7 MPs
Unaccompanied Leaders: 9 MPs
Light Cavalry: 9 MPs Bonus for French Gde: +1 MP
Engineers, Bridging Trains: 5 MPs
Extended March (all): 4 addtl MPs

Note: the entire Movement Allowance may be expended under a single Movement Comd.
An extended march always adds 4 MPs to the total shown.

Movement Point Costs

To Change Unit Mode or Direction :½ MP
To Exit Enemy ZOC: 2 addtl MPs (cavalry exempt)
Enemy Force of 2 SPs: 1 addtl MP
Enemy Force of 1 SP: no addtl MPs

Combat Effects of Unit Mode

(not cumulative)

In column: halve strength

River dividing package: halve strength

Attacking across bridge: must be in column

Pursuit Bonus

Cavalry and Old Guard: +1 hex

Replacements Arrive at any "Installation"

Repulse

Successful Repulse: 7 to 1 Combat Odds

Repulsed force retreats: 2 hexes

Unsuccessful Repulse: 6 to 1 or less

Resolved to left of actual odds: 2 columns

Subordination Ratings

Infantry units and march regiments and art: one

Cavalry units and march regiments: One-half

Supply Source

Garrison Strength of "Active" Marker: 1 SP

Changing Supply Source: Succeeds on die of "1" or "2"

Zones of Control blocked by

- Primary Rivers
- Citadels

Retreat Through Enemy ZOC

Double loss due to pursuit

ARTILLERY FIRE TABLE

Art Strength × 16 guns

1-2	3	4	5	6-7	8-9	10+
0	0	0	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	0	1	1	1
0	0	0	0	1	1	2
0	0	0	1	1	2	3
0	0	1	1	2	3	3
0	1	1	2	3	3	4
1	1	2	3	3	4	4
1	2	3	3	4	4	5

Cavalry differential

firing side-vs-target side

Index	1-1	2-1	3-1
	1-2		
	3	1	
	4	2	
	5	3	1
	6	4	2
	5	3	
	6	4	
			5
			6

NOTE: if differential is less than 1-1, use the 1-1 column; if greater than 3-1, or if one side has no cavalry and other side has any, use 3-1.

KEY: Nr. Result shows enemy loss in Strength Points, removing losses as evenly as possible (including Artillery if necessary).

Rationale: A preponderance of cavalry on the firing side would make necessary dense formations on the target side, thus exposing it to greater loss from artillery.

COMBAT RESULTS TABLE

Probability Ratio (Odds)

Terrain:	Attacker's Strength to Defender's Strength									
NA	1-5	1-4	1-3	1-2	1-1	2-1	3-1	4-1	5-1	6-1
Affecting	1-4	1-3	1-2	1-1	2-1	3-1	4-1	5-1	6-1	
Die:										
0,-1	3-2	3-4	2-4	2-5	1-5	1-7	1-9	1-10	1-10	1-10
1	8-2	4-2	3-4	2-4	1-4	1-5	1-7	1-9	1-10	1-10
2	4-1	5-2	4-2	3-3	1-3	1-4	1-6	1-8	1-10	1-10
3	10-0	5-1	5-2	3-2	2-2	1-3	1-5	1-5	1-6	1-10
4	10-0	6-0	5-1	3-1	2-2	2-3	2-5	1-4	1-4	1-4
5	10-0	10-0	8-1	4-1	3-1	3-3	2-4	2-5	3-8	2-8
6	10-0	10-0	9-0	6-0	4-0	4-2	4-3	4-8	4-10	4-10

Attacks at greater than 6-1 are treated as 6-1.

Attacks at worse than the worst odds shown are automatic 10-1's.

KEY: nr = number of Strength Points lost or number of hexes retreated.

Larger number (in *Italic*) indicates retreating side: Attacker-Defender.

Combat Bonus: The attacking Player may add or subtract one to the die for each bonus point the attacking force commander has.

INITIATIVE COMPARISON MATRIX

		Active Leader's Initiative						Initiative or Pursuit Die Roll, and is known as Resistance Modifier.
Passive Leader's Initiative		1	2	3	4	5		
	0-1	0	0	0	0	0		
	2	+1	+1	+1	0	0		
	3	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1		
	4	+1	+2	+2	+2	+1		
	5	+2	+2	+2	+2	•		
KEY: Resulting number is Initiative Die Roll Modifier, which is added to								
HOW TO USE: First, Leader Initiative must be determined. This is the basic Initiative Rating as found on the Organization Display. Cross-reference the resulting values of the opposing leaders. The Active Leader is the one moving or Pursuing; his Die Roll Modifier is the number found in the body of the chart.								

PURSUIT TABLE

(Unmodified)

Length of Retreat (in hexes):

Initiative: 0,1	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
2	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
3	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
4,5	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
Die: *0/-1	•	8	7	6	5	4	3	2
2/1	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1
4/3	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
6/5	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	•
8/7	5	4	3	2	1	•	•	•

KEY: nr. = advance in hexes. • = no advance.

* = impossible for pursuing force with initiative of 4 or 5

Pursuit Bonus: Add 1 hex for exclusively Cav and/or Old Gde Forces.

NOTE: Number on Combat Results Table tells only the length of retreat; after executing the retreat find the permissible length of advance. The length of advance determines pursuit losses to retreating side.

Modifiers: Resistance Modifier: +1 or +2

Cavalry Differential: +3 to -3

TERRAIN KEY:

TERRAIN EFFECTS:

		Movement Cost in MPs to enter or cross			Combat Effects
		Inf.	Type	Cav.	
Woods		2		4	•
Hills		2		2	Affecting
Hill/Woods		2		4	Affecting
River 1		cross at bridge			Not Allowed
River 2		+1		+1	Affecting
Road 1		½		½	•
Road 2		1		1	•
Bridge		apply road rate			Affecting
Marsh		2		4	Strength halved when attacking out of hex. Cav. halved when defending in.
Mountain		4		6	Max. of 3 inf. and no cav. may attack out of hex.
Town			•		•
Clear		1		1	•
Citadel			•		Defender in hex may avoid combat.
Fortified Town			•		Affecting: Defender's Strength doubled in hex, to max. bonus of 5 SPs.
Border			•		•
Supply Source			•		•
Depot			•		•
Zone of Control		+2 to exit			•

• = no additional effect. Mixed forces pay cavalry cost.

Struggle of Nations:

Combat Counters

French

Austrians

1 Lt M Liechtn	2 Lt Bubna	1st Schneller	2nd Wimpfen	3rd Greth	1st Lederer	2nd A Liechtn	3rd Weissenw	1st Crennevil	2nd Murray
3rd Philipp	1st Meszko	2nd Hohenlohe	3rd Mayer	1st Ehrendge	1st Chasteler	2nd Bianchi	1st Nostitz	1st Reisner	3rd Civalart

1 Lt M Liechtn	2 Lt Bubna	3rd Meszko							
1st Crennevil	1st Lederer								

Russians

14th Helfreich	5th Mesenzow	Mixed Kasakofsk	Allied Morale	4th Puschnz	3rd Schowskoi	1st Milesinow	1st Lisanewit	1st Zwileniel	2nd Sulina
1st Gde Rosen	2nd Udom I	1st Chur Deprerado	2nd Chur Kretow	3rd Duka	1st Tchalikof	1st Kos Ilowaiski	1st Kornilow	1st Udom II	1st Pilar

11th Gurgalow	18th Benardos	7th Talsin I	4 Drag Emanuel	1 Drag Borosdin	Engelhart	Chas Karpenko	2nd Schapski	8th Urusso	APs x10
1st Pahlen II	1st Denissiew	1st Kos Karpow	1st Kos Thielman	1st Kos Mensdorf	1st Kos Platov	27th Newjerok	10th Leiven	2nd Lanskoj	1st Pandschul

1st Kos Karpow II	21st Laplew	24th Wuitsch	Av Gde O'Rourke	1st Harpe	1st Krassofs	Av Gde Markow	1st Res	12th Chowanski	26th Paskiewit
1st Lindfors	1st Puschkin	1st Muruzow	1st Tschaplitz	1st Res	1st Glogau Rosen	Av Gde Markow	APs x1		

French

Allied

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Guard

Germans

4th Dubretton	5th Dufour	6th Vial	23rd Laboisre	16th Maison	17th Puthod	18th Lagrange	19th Rochambau	6th Bruno	32nd Durutte
2nd Dumonceau	23rd Teste	43rd Claparede	12th Morand	35th Fressinet	36th Charpent	31st Ledru des	14th Berthezue	APs x1	Artillery Reserve

1 OGde Roguet	2 OGde Curial	1st Ornano	2nd Lefebvre	3rd Walther	6th Brayer	9th Brenter	10th Albert	11th Ricard	
1 YGde Dumoustier	2 YGde Barrois	3 YGde Delaborde	4 YGde Roguet	Guard Artillery	20th Compans	21st Bonet	32nd Friederch	1st Philippon	

24th Briche-J.	29th Beaumont	29th Raglowich	15th Peyri	25th Sahr	Game -Turn	21st Corbineau	13th Pachthod	14th Lorencez	
22nd Hammerst	36th Franquem	39th Marchand	26th Gablenz	26th Montbrun	25th Normann	24th Lecoq	45th Razout	42nd Creutzer	10th Jacquet

51st Turreau	52nd Semelle	1st Bruyere	3 Lt Chastel	1 Hvy Bordessol	3 Hvy Doumerc	2 Lt dHurbal	1 Lt Exelmans	2 Hvy Wattier	1 Lt Lorge
6 Lt Fournier	4 Hvy Defrance			9 Lt Subervie	5 Hvy Collaert	6 Hvy Milhaud	Magdeburg Lanusse	APs x10	1st Glogau Laplane

Wittenbg Lapoype	1orgau Lauer	Leipzig Margaron	26th Kamienick	27th Rozniezky	27th Uminski	Gde Alvenslbn	Ldr Wobeser		
Dresden Durosnel	Lefol	Magdeburg Lemoine	French Morale	7 Lt Sokolnizk	8 Lt Sulkowski	APs x1	1st Res		

Poles


Prussians


10th Roeder	9th Kluex	12th August	11th Zieten	Res Dolffs	APs x10	Gde Alvenslbn	1st Losthin	2nd Warburg	7th Weltzien
6th Girsa	Res Juergass	3rd H. Hombg	5th Borstell	6th Krafft	Res Oppenhlmr	4th Thuemen	Ldr Puttitz	Ldr Hirschfeld	Ldr Dobschutz


Swedes


3rd Braendstr	4th Posse	6th Boije	1st Schutssnh	2nd Reuterskj	1st Res	1st Res	APs x10	APs x1	
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
Struggle of Nations Leader Counters











Accumulated Allied Administrative Points

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Use three marker sets: Prussian (Silesian Army), Russian (Bohemian Army), and Swedish (North Army).

Allied Morale


+1	●	-1	-2
----	---	----	----

Begins Game Here ↑

Accumulated Allied Replacements

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Use infantry and cavalry markers not in play for each nationality, as necessary.



THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS
EASTERN SECTION Silesia
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Relative Points

6	7	8	9
---	---	---	---

Allied Morale

+1	•	-1	-2
----	---	----	----


Begins Game Here! ↑

Accumulated Allied Replacements

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----

Use infantry and cavalry markers not in play for each nationality, as necessary.

...y), and Swedish (North Army).



0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Accumulated French Administrative Points

+2	+1	•
----	----	---


French Morale

↙ Begins Game Here ↘

THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS

NORTHERN SECTION
Brandenburg

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THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONS

NORTHERN SECTION
Brandenburg

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




1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----

Accumulated French Replacements

-1



to Hamburg
to Wesel

to Hamburg

TANGERMUNDE

Havel R.

BRAND

ROGAETZ

BURG

ZISAR

BARLEBEN

MOECKERN

MAGDEBURG

WARZLEBEN

DODENDORF

SCHONEBECK

BARBY

ZERBST

ROSSLAU

COSWIG

to Halberstadt

EDELN

CALBE

ASCHERSLEBEN

BERNBERG

ACKEN

DESSAU

WITTE

ANHALT

HARZ MTS.

ROTHENBURG

GROEBZIG

JESSNITZ

GRAFENHAINCHEN

KEMBERG

COENNERN

BITTERFELD

SCHMEDEL

WETTIN

ZOERBIG

LANDSBERG

OPPIN

DUBEN

MOKI

THE STRUGGLE OF OPERATIONS

WESTERN SECTION Saxony

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QUERFURT

MERSEBURG

HALLE

GROSS MUGEL

SCHKEUDNITZ

WIDDERITSCH

TAUCHA

LEIPZIG

MOCKERN

LINNENAU

MARKRANSTADT

WEISSENFELS

LUETZEN

GOERSCHEN

PEGAU

ZWENKAU

WACHAU

ROETHA

BORNA

NAUMBURG

STOESSEN

AIERSTADT

Saale R.

Flossgraben

Pleisse